Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a federal action against the State of Connecticut, a colonel in his official capacity, and a retired detective in her individual capacity, alleging three constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983. Plaintiff alleged that those provisions of Connecticut’s sex offender registration statute that required him to disclose his email address and other internet communication identifiers and periodically to verify his residence violated the First Amendment and the Ex Post Facto Clause. Plaintiff further alleged that the detective engaged in malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth Amendment by seeking an arrest warrant for Plaintiff’s alleged failure to disclose one of his email addresses. The district court dismissed all of Plaintiff’s claims.The Second Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim and affirmed the district court’s dismissal of his Post Facto Clause and malicious prosecution claims. The court concluded that the burden of demonstrating that the disclosure requirement satisfied intermediate scrutiny fell on the government and the government must show that the challenged law advances important governmental interests and is narrowly tailored to those interests. The court found that the government did not make the showing.The court further found that because the residence verification provision has not been applied to Plaintiff retroactively, the Ex Post Facto Clause is not implicated. Finally, although the history between Plaintiff and the Sex Offender Registry Unit suggests a motivation to harass him, an officer cannot be liable for a vexatious motivation as long as she acts with arguable probable cause. View "Cornelio v. Connecticut" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment as to absolute and qualified immunity in an action raising Fourth Amendment claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court agreed with the district court that absolute prosecutorial immunity did not apply to appellants' participation in obtaining the arrest warrant for plaintiff. The court explained that long-standing precedent makes clear that swearing to an arrest warrant affidavit and executing an arrest are traditional police functions, and performing such functions at the direction of a prosecutor does not transform them into prosecutorial acts protected by absolute immunity.The court also concluded that the district court correctly determined that summary judgment on the issue of qualified immunity was unwarranted given the factual disputes here. In this case, the district court identified relevant and exculpatory omissions from the arrest warrant affidavit related to plaintiff's intent and credibility that, construing the evidence in a manner most favorable to plaintiff, could have materially impacted a magistrate judge's determination as to whether probable cause existed for plaintiff's arrest, and such factual issues preclude summary judgment for appellants on the ground of qualified immunity at this stage of litigation. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Washington v. Napolitano" on Justia Law

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint, alleging violations of regulations promulgated pursuant to the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA). Plaintiff, who uses a wheelchair and is disabled, did not assert in the complaint that he visited West Point Realty's website with the intention of visiting the hotel run by West Point Realty; rather, he alleged that he frequently visits hotel websites to determine whether those websites comply with ADA regulations. The court agreed with the district court that plaintiff failed to allege a concrete injury in fact and therefore lacked standing to assert a claim under the ADA. The court also concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by considering only the allegations in plaintiff's complaint when deciding West Point Realty's motion to dismiss. View "Harty v. West Point Realty, Inc." on Justia Law

Exxon appealed the dismissal of its complaint against the New York and Massachusetts Attorneys General, alleging that the states' investigations into Exxon's purportedly deceptive speech regarding climate change were motivated by viewpoint discrimination and violated Exxon's constitutional rights. During the pendency of this appeal, the New York Attorney General closed the New York investigation and started an enforcement action, which resolved in Exxon's favor and is not being appealed by the state.The Second Circuit concluded that these events mooted Exxon's claims against the New York Attorney General and thus the court lacked jurisdiction over those claims. In regard to claims against the Massachusetts Attorney General, the court concluded that the claims are barred under the doctrine of res judicata because Exxon could have pursued the relief it now seeks in an earlier Massachusetts state court proceeding arising from the same events that underlie the present suit. Accordingly, the court dismissed in part and affirmed in part. View "Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Healey" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, ten nurses and their former attorney, filed claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 as well as common law claims of false arrest and malicious prosecution under New York law against defendants, alleging that Defendants Spota and Lato improperly prosecuted them for child endangerment, endangerment of a physically disabled person, and related charges by fabricating evidence and engaging in other improper conduct before a grand jury, in violation of plaintiffs' federal constitutional rights and New York state law. The district court found that Spota and Lato were entitled to absolute immunity for starting the criminal prosecution and presenting the case to the grand jury, and it dismissed plaintiffs' claims arising from any alleged misconduct during that prosecutorial stage. The district court then granted summary judgment in favor of the prosecutors and the DA's Office as to the remaining claims.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment, concluding that although Spota and Lato may have unlawfully penalized plaintiffs for exercising the right to quit their jobs on the advice of counsel, under the court's precedent both of them are entitled to absolute immunity for their actions during the judicial phase of the criminal process. In regard to plaintiffs' claim that Spota and Lato fabricated evidence during the investigative phase of the criminal process, the court agreed with the district court that there was insufficient admissible evidence of fabrication to defeat summary judgment. View "Anilao v. Spota" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that the USTA discriminated and retaliated against him in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and discriminatorily interfered with his employment contract with AJ Squared Security, in violation of 42 U.S.C. 1981, by rejecting his temporary assignment as a security guard for the 2016 U.S. Open.The Second Circuit concurred with the district court that plaintiff has failed to state any claim for relief under Title VII or section 1981. The court concluded that plaintiff did not plausibly allege the existence of an employer-employee relationship necessary to sustain his Title VII claims. Furthermore, plaintiff did not allege any facts to support his claim under section 1981 that, but for his race, the USTA would not have interfered with his employment contract. However, because plaintiff—represented by court-appointed counsel for the first time on appeal—has indicated that he can plead further allegations of a "joint employer" relationship, and because he has plausibly alleged that the USTA rejected his assignment in retaliation for his protected activities against a USTA subcontractor, the court vacated the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's Title VII retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. 2000e–3(a), and remanded with instructions that plaintiff be permitted to amend his complaint as to that claim. The court affirmed as to the Title VII and section 1981 claims. View "Felder v. United States Tennis Association" on Justia Law

The PBA appeals the district court's order denying its motion to intervene in the consolidated cases captioned In re New York City Policing During Summer 2020 Demonstrations, asserting interests in the litigation that it argues the parties to the actions cannot adequately represent. Therefore, the PBA claims it is entitled to intervene as of right pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a).The Second Circuit held that the district court erred in holding that the PBA did not have a cognizable interest in the personal safety of its member officers at the merits stages of the actions seeking injunctive or declaratory relief and that such interests were adequately represented. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's denial of intervention with respect to the actions seeking declaratory injunction relief, and affirmed the district court's denial of intervention with respect to those actions seeking neither declaratory nor injunctive relief. View "Payne v. City of New York" on Justia Law

At a gas station, police detained the vehicle that Patterson was driving because it fit the description of a car whose occupants had reportedly menaced a woman with a firearm in a nearby supermarket parking lot. They discovered a gun. Patterson was charged as a felon in possession of a firearm, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1).The district court granted Patterson’s motion to suppress the firearm, stating that the degree of force used in detaining Patterson’s vehicle and its occupants—pointing firearms at, shouting orders toward, and blocking an exit route for the vehicle—exceeded that permissible for a reasonable investigatory stop and had to be viewed as a de facto arrest; the arrest was unlawful because, when first effected, it was not supported by probable cause; and the firearm seized from the car’s glove compartment after Patterson fled the scene had to be suppressed as a fruit of the unlawful arrest.The Second Circuit reversed. Patterson’s initial detention in the vehicle was not an arrest but an investigatory stop supported by the requisite reasonable suspicion. Pointing firearms at, shouting toward, and blocking an exit route for the vehicle driven by Patterson, were reasonable safety precautions given that the officers were investigating a report of menacing with a firearm. View "United States v. Patterson" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, seven inmates in Connecticut state prison facilities, filed suit against DOC alleging that the 2012 revised Administrative Directive, which limits access by inmates to pictorial sexually explicit materials, violates their First Amendment rights. Plaintiffs also allege that the prison regulation's exception for material that qualifies as "literary, artistic, educational or scientific in nature" is unconstitutionally vague.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's decision in favor of the DOC, discerning no clear error as to the district court's factual findings in light of the trial record. The court also concluded that the district court, based upon its factual findings, properly held that A.D. 10.7 is reasonably related to legitimate penological objectives—namely, promoting a non-hostile work environment for DOC staff, enhancing the safety and security of DOC facilities, and facilitating the rehabilitation of sex offender inmates—and does not violate the First Amendment. Furthermore, the court concluded that the district court correctly determined that the regulation, including the exception, is neither unconstitutionally vague on its face, nor unconstitutional as applied to plaintiffs. View "Reynolds v. Quiros" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against a detective with the Nassau County Police Department for false arrest under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and New York state law. Plaintiff also filed suit against Nassau County under the theory of respondeat superior. The district court vacated the jury's verdict in favor of plaintiff and dismissed the claims against both defendants.The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the claims against the detective where the detective's actions, though wrong, were not so wrong that no reasonable officer could have determined that the challenged action was lawful. Therefore, the detective is entitled to qualified immunity in regard to the section 1983 claim. In regard to the New York state law claim, the court concluded that the record could only support a finding of callousness or indifference in making the arrest, and such a finding does not preclude the legal conclusion that the detective acted in subjective good faith.However, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of the claims against the County because the County remains vicariously liable under New York law for the compensatory damages because (1) municipalities are not entitled to qualified immunity, (2) municipal employers may be vicariously liable on state law claims brought against their police officer employees, (3) a principal remains liable for damages caused by its agent, even when that agent is individually immune, and (4) the detective was acting within the scope of his employment when he arrested plaintiff. The court explained that, even if the detective is shielded from personally paying for the damages he caused by falsely arresting plaintiff, the County remains liable for those damages under New York state law. The court remanded for entry of judgment in plaintiff's favor against the County in the amount of $150,000 and for such other proceedings as may be appropriate. View "Triolo v. Nassau County" on Justia Law