Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Appellants, Medicaid providers and former members of public-sector unions, challenge the district courts’ dismissals of two cases, consolidated on appeal. When Appellants joined the unions, they authorized the California State Controller to deduct union dues from their Medicaid reimbursements. Appellants now contend that, when the Controller made these deductions, she violated the “anti-reassignment” provision of the Medicaid Act, which prohibits state Medicaid programs from paying anyone other than the providers or recipients of covered services.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court explained that California uses some of its Medicaid funding to provide assistance with daily activities to elderly and disabled beneficiaries under a program called In-Home Support Services (IHSS). The recipients of these services are responsible for employing and overseeing the work of their IHSS providers, who are often family members. The Controller makes a variety of standard payroll deductions, including for federal and state income tax, unemployment compensation, and retirement savings. California law also authorizes the Controller to deduct union dues from the paychecks of IHSS providers.   Thus, the court held that the Medicaid Act’s anti-reassignment provision, 42 U.S.C. Section 1396a(a)(32), does not confer a right on Medicaid providers enforceable under Section 1983. The text and legislative history of the anti-reassignment provision make clear that Congress was focused on preventing fraud and abuse in state Medicaid programs rather than on serving the needs of Medicaid providers. Because Congress did not intend to benefit Medicaid providers, the anti-reassignment provision did not confer a right as enforceable under Section 1983. View "DELORES POLK V. BETTY YEE" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought this 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 action against Defendant, a deputy sergeant with the Multnomah County Sheriff’s Office. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant violated her Fourth Amendment right to be free of excessive force by pepper-spraying her without adequate justification. The district court denied Defendant’s motion for qualified immunity, and Defendant filed this interlocutory appeal.   The Ninth Circuit denied a motion for attorney’s fees sought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. Section 1988 following the court's decision, in an unpublished disposition, affirming the denial of qualified immunity to a deputy sergeant who allegedly violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights to be free of excessive force.   The court denied fees because Plaintiff was not a “prevailing party” within the meaning of Section 1988(b). The court published this order to reaffirm that a plaintiff who accomplishes no more than to defeat a defendant’s motion for qualified immunity is not entitled to attorney’s fees pursuant to Section 1988(b), because the plaintiff has not yet prevailed on any claim. Although the Supreme Court later overruled Cooper in part, on a different issue, the holding in Cooper as to attorney’s fees remained good law. Independently, the court noted its agreement with the rule announced in Cooper, which comports with Supreme Court precedent and accords with holdings by sister circuits in the identical procedural posture. View "LINDA SENN V. KYLE SMITH" on Justia Law

The FBI issued three national security letters ("NSLs") with indefinite nondisclosure requirements to the appellant communications service provider (“Provider”). Provider complied and took no action until 2018 when it requested that the government initiate judicial review pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 3511(b)(1)(A)–(B). The district court then reviewed in camera confidential declarations pertaining to the three NSLs and found continued nondisclosure statutorily authorized.   On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviewed whether the nondisclosure requirements in the district court’s order are narrowly tailored to serve the government’s compelling interest in national security. The court affirmed the district court’s order requiring the recipient of three national security letters to comply with the nondisclosure requirements set forth in 18 U.S.C. Section 2709(c) “unless and until the Government informs it otherwise.” The court explained that here, the district court reviewed the three NSLs and related materials in camera and found that, given the important government interests at stake, nondisclosure remained authorized for an indefinite period and court scheduled review was unnecessary to ensure that nondisclosure continued no longer than justified. The communication service provider did not contest the government’s compelling interest or the necessity of continued nondisclosure. The court rejected the provider’s assertion that a district court is constitutionally required on its own accord to schedule future judicial review once it finds a nondisclosure order to be statutorily authorized for the foreseeable future. Finally, the court found no constitutional infirmity in the order of the district court. View "MERRICK GARLAND V. UNDER SEAL" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged excessive force after being shot by a correctional officer during an incident that occurred while Plaintiff was incarcerated at California’s San Quentin State Prison. Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff’s third amended complaint against Defendant Clawson for failure to state a claim and because Plaintiff had not exhausted administrative remedies under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) before he filed his original complaint. The district court agreed that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his claim against Defendant at the time he filed his original complaint and dismissed the third amended complaint for lack of exhaustion under the PLRA.   The Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred and reversed the district court’s dismissal.  The court clarified the underlying principle in Jackson v. Fong, 870 F.3d 928 (9th Cir. 2017). Jackson made clear that the PLRA does not supplant or modify Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15. Rule 15 allows plaintiffs, regardless of their incarceration status, to supplement pleadings with leave of court “even though the original pleading is defective in stating a claim or defense.” A prisoner who has fully complied with the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement need not file an entirely new federal case simply because he had not exhausted when he filed his original federal complaint. The parties agreed that Plaintiff had fully exhausted by the time he filed his third amended complaint, which the district court deemed the “operative complaint.” Plaintiff’s operative third amended complaint was the only relevant pleading for purposes of the PLRA exhaustion analysis. View "SHIKEB SADDOZAI V. RON DAVIS" on Justia Law

As a condition of getting a permit, the Los Angeles Department of Transportation (“LADOT”) required e-scooter operators to provide vehicle location data through an application programming interface called Mobility Data Specification (“MDS”). Plaintiff, an e-scooter user, filed a complaint alleging that the location disclosure requirement violates the Fourth Amendment and California law. The district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim.   The Ninth Circuit first held that Plaintiff’s complaint alleged facts giving rise to Article III standing and therefore the court rejected LADOT’s assertion that the complaint was beyond the court’s constitutional purview because it was premised on a hypothetical invasion of privacy that might never occur.   Next, the court concluded that the third-party doctrine, which provides that a person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to third parties, foreclosed Plaintiff’s claim of a reasonable expectation of privacy over the MDS data. The court reasoned that Plaintiff could not assert a reasonable expectation of privacy because Plaintiff knowingly and voluntarily disclosed location data to the e-scooter operators.   Further, the court determined that the nature of MDS location data indicated a diminished expectation of privacy. The data only discloses the location of an e-scooter owned by the operator and typically re-rented to a new user after each individual trip. The court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s claim under the California Electronic Communications Privacy Act (“CalECPA”) on the grounds that the statute did not provide Plaintiff with authorization to bring an independent action to enforce its provisions. View "JUSTIN SANCHEZ V. LADOT" on Justia Law

Plaintiff sued the detectives and the City of Henderson (collectively, Defendants) under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The case arose following an incident where Defendants believed they had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff for a series of armed robberies and forcibly tackled him as he was leaving a Nevada state courthouse.   The detectives moved for summary judgment arguing that they are protected by qualified immunity, and the City moved for summary judgment arguing Plaintiff could not establish municipal liability. The district court denied the detectives’ motion and denied the City’s motion except as to Plaintiff’s ratification theory.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the use of force was substantial. Although Plaintiff was suspected of a serious crime, the detectives knew that he was not armed and was not posing an immediate threat to anyone as he exited the courthouse. Under these circumstances, a reasonable jury could find that the degree of force used against Plaintiff violated his Fourth Amendment right against excessive force, and the detectives were not entitled to summary judgment on the question of whether they committed a constitutional violation.   The court held that Blankenhorn v. City of Orange, 485 F.3d 463 (9th Cir. 2007) clearly established, that an officer violates the Fourth Amendment by tackling and piling on top of a relatively calm, non-resisting suspect who posed little threat of safety without any prior warning and without attempting a less violent means of effecting an arrest. View "DANIEL ANDREWS V. CITY OF HENDERSON" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs challenged the bans on long guns and semiautomatic centerfire rifles under the Second Amendment. The district court declined to issue a preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit held the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to enjoin the requirement that young adults obtain a hunting license to purchase a long gun. However, the court found that the district court erred in not enjoining an almost total ban on semiautomatic centerfire rifles. The court found that the Second Amendment protects the right of young adults to keep and bear arms, which includes the right to purchase them.   The court held that the district court’s reasoning that the laws did not burden Second Amendment rights was a legal error. The court further held that the district court properly applied intermediate scrutiny to the long-gun hunting license regulation and did not abuse its discretion in finding it likely to survive. However, the district court erred by applying intermediate scrutiny, rather than strict scrutiny, to the semiautomatic centerfire rifle ban. And even under intermediate scrutiny, this ban likely violates the Second Amendment because it fails the “reasonable fit” test. Finally, the court held that the district court abused its discretion in finding that Plaintiffs would not likely be irreparably harmed. View "MATTHEW JONES V. ROB BONTA" on Justia Law

A National Security Letter is an administrative subpoena issued by the FBI to a wire or electronic communication service provider requiring the provider to produce specified subscriber information that is relevant to an authorized national security investigation. 18 U.S.C. Section 2709(a). By statute, a National Security Letter may include a requirement that the recipient not disclose the fact that it has received such a request. Here, recipients of National Security Letters alleged that the nondisclosure requirement violated their First Amendment rights.   The Ninth Circuit amended its opinion affirming the district court’s orders denied a petition for rehearing; denied a petition for rehearing en banc, and ordered that no further petitions would be entertained. The court held that Section 2709(c)’s nondisclosure requirement imposes a content-based restriction subject to strict scrutiny.   The court held that Section 2709(c)’s nondisclosure requirement imposes a content-based restriction that was subject to, and withstood strict scrutiny. The court further held that assuming the nondisclosure requirement was the type of prior restraint for which the procedural safeguards set forth in Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965) were required, the National Security Letters law provided those safeguards. The court concluded that the nondisclosure requirement did not run afoul of the First Amendment. View "UNDER SEAL V. JEFFERSON SESSIONS" on Justia Law

After the Spokane County prosecutor filed charges against Plaintiffs pursuant to Wash. Rev. Code Section 77.15.265, Plaintiffs entered into a Stipulation to Police Reports and Order of Continuance (“SOC”), which provided that the charges would be dismissed if Plaintiffs complied with certain terms. Under Washington’s wildlife forfeiture statute, the entry of a SOC also resulted in the forfeiture of the wildlife and animal parts at issue. Plaintiffs successfully completed their SOCs, and the charges against them were dismissed. They brought suit alleging that the forfeiture and transfer of their property to Canada, without notice or a hearing, functionally destroyed their property interests, thus depriving them of due process.   The Ninth Circuit dismissed the due process claim as moot and affirmed the district court’s entry of judgment with respect to the constitutionality of Washington State’s forfeiture statute. The court held that because Plaintiffs signed the SOCs, which triggered the automatic forfeiture, their suit for recovery of the forfeited property was moot. To the extent Plaintiffs’ constitutional claims hinged on their argument that the seized property was not contraband, these claims were also mooted by the Plaintiffs’ agreement to forfeiture. The court reasoned that even if Plaintiffs had a property interest in the seized wildlife parts protected by the Fourteenth Amendment at the time the parts were transferred, they gave up that interest by agreeing to the ultimate forfeiture of the items to the state; Plaintiffs therefore could not maintain a concrete injury as a result of the transfer to British Columbia. View "CHAD BOCK V. STATE OF WASHINGTON" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that her former employer violated the ADA by failing to accommodate her disability and instead terminating her from her human resources job after she underwent a bone biopsy surgery on her right shoulder and arm. The district court concluded that Plaintiff failed to plead a “disability” because she did not adequately allege that she had “a physical or mental impairment that substantially limit[ed] one or more major life activities.” The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s employment discrimination action. The court concluded that Plaintiff pleaded facts plausibly establishing that she had a physical impairment both during an immediate post-surgical period and during an extension period in which her surgeon concluded that her injuries had not sufficiently healed to permit her to return to work. The court also found that the activities that Plaintiff pleaded she was unable to perform qualified as “major life activities,” which included caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, lifting, and working. Finally, the complaint adequately alleged that Plaintiff’s impairment substantially limited her ability to perform at least one major life activity. View "KAREN SHIELDS V. CREDIT ONE BANK, N.A." on Justia Law