Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Byrne Memorial Justice Assistance Grant (“JAG”) program is a federal formula grant that supports state and local criminal justice efforts. Effective Fiscal Years 2017 and 2018, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) imposed new immigration enforcement-related conditions (“Conditions”) on Byrne JAG funds. In order to draw upon their Byrne JAG funds, grant recipients had to certify that their laws complied with independent provisions of the Federal Code, specifically 8 U.S.C. Section 1373, a provision of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act enacted in 1996, and 8 U.S.C. Section 1644, of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act.   The district court for the Northern District of California and the district court for the District of Oregon determined that the Conditions exceeded the DOJ’s statutory authority and permanently enjoined their enforcement. The district courts also held that Sections 1373 and 1644 violated the Tenth Amendment, and permanently enjoined their enforcement.   In consolidated appeals, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and vacated in part district court judgments. Addressing the facial constitutional challenges under the Tenth Amendment to Sections 1373 and 1644, the court held that these challenges were not justiciable in their present posture. The court explained that because Plaintiffs’ laws complied with the federal provisions, their facial challenges were no longer ripe. Having concluded that Plaintiffs’ facial challenges were either not ripe, or were mooted, the court narrowly vacated the district courts’ determinations that Sections 1373 and1644 were facially unconstitutional. View "CITY & COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Two members of the Poway Unified School District (“PUSD” or the “District”) Board of Trustees, (together, “the Trustees”), created public Facebook and Twitter pages to promote their campaigns for office. Plaintiffs, two parents of children in the School District, frequently left comments critical of the Trustees and the Board on the Trustees’ pages, The Trustees eventually blocked Plaintiffs entirely from their social media pages. Plaintiffs sued, asserting that the Trustees violated their First Amendment rights by ejecting them from the social media pages. The district court agreed with Plaintiffs that their First Amendment rights had been violated. Both parties appealed.   The Ninth Circuit rejected the Trustees’ assertion that the dispute was moot because after Plaintiffs filed their lawsuit, the Trustees began using a word filter on Facebook to prevent any new comments from being posted. The court held that: (1) using a word filter on Facebook would not affect Plaintiffs’ claims involving being blocked from Twitter; (2) the word filter limit did not change Facebook’s non-verbal “reaction” feature; and (3) the Trustees failed to carry their burden of showing they would not, in the future, remove the word filters from their Facebook pages and again open those pages up for verbal comments from the public.   The court further held that the district court correctly concluded that at the time the Trustees blocked Plaintiffs, it was not clearly established that Plaintiffs had a First Amendment right to post comments on a public official’s Facebook or Twitter page. The district court, therefore, did not err by granting qualified immunity to the Trustees as to Plaintiffs’ damages claim. View "CHRISTOPHER GARNIER V. MICHELLE O'CONNOR-RATCLIFF" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought an action against the State of Washington, the Review Board, and its members (State Defendants). Plaintiff specifically sought review of the district court’s decision that the Review Board’s actions relating to Plaintiff’s release determination hearing fall squarely within the quasi-judicial nature of the Review Board’s functions, and that Defendants are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of an action alleging false imprisonment, negligence and civil rights violations arising from actions taken by the Washington Indeterminate Sentencing Review Board in scheduling Plaintiff’s hearing.   The Indeterminate Sentencing Review Board is a parole board created by the Washington State Legislature that is tasked with reviewing the sentences of convicted sex offenders to determine whether the offenders should be released on parole. The court held that under the facts of this case and in the context of the proceedings as a whole, the Review Board’s setting of hearings pursuant to Wash. Rev. Code Section 9.95.420 was “part and parcel of the decision process,” thereby warranting quasi-judicial immunity. The court rejected Plaintiff’s contention that the scheduling of the hearing was an administrative task not entitled to quasi-judicial immunity. Because the court agreed with the district court that the Review Board was entitled to quasi-judicial immunity, Plaintiff was unable to state a plausible claim for relief against the state Defendants. View "DALLIN FORT V. STATE OF WASHINGTON" on Justia Law

Defendant determined that Plaintiff’s renovation of property violated local ordinances. Although he conceded the ordinance violation, Yoshikawa alleged that the enforcement action against him was motivated by racial animus, in violation of Section 1981. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying the building inspector Defendant’s motion to dismiss, on the basis of qualified immunity.   The court held that, in addressing a qualified immunity claim in an action against an officer for an alleged violation of a constitutional right, the court first asks whether, taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, the facts alleged show that the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right. If not, the complaint must be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Second, the court asks whether the constitutional or statutory right was clearly established, such that the officer had fair notice that his conduct was unlawful.   The court held that Plaintiff stated a Section 1981 damages claim against Defendant a state actor. Under Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009 (2020), an allegation of discrimination on the basis of race is a but-for element of a claim brought under Section 1981. The court further held that Defendant’s alleged actions violated clearly established law because he was accused of intentional racial discrimination. The court found irrelevant to qualified immunity, at the motion to dismiss stage, the issue of the applicability of the McDonnell Douglas test, an evidentiary standard, for analyzing Section 1981 claims in non-employment cases. View "HITOSHI YOSHIKAWA V. TROY SEGUIRANT" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who has paraplegia and uses a wheelchair for mobility, tried to book a room at the downtown Marriott Marquis using the hotel’s online reservation website. According to Plaintiff the website lacked sufficient information about the hotel’s accessibility features, which prompted him to sue Marriott Hotel Services Inc. (“Marriott”) under the ADA. Plaintiff takes issue with the website’s description of “Accessible Hotel Features,” and its list of accessible features in some guestrooms.   The district court granted Marriott’s motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), finding that the website complied with the DOJ Guidance and satisfied the Reservations Rule. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal, for failure to state a claim.   Addressing “Auer deference” to an agency’s construction of its own regulation, the court concluded that the Reservations Rule was ambiguous in its directive that hotels "[i]dentify and describe accessible features” in “enough detail to reasonably permit individuals with disabilities to assess independently” whether the hotel’s offerings suit their needs. To resolve that ambiguity, the court deferred to the Department of Justice’s sound and reasonable interpretation of that rule (the “DOJ Guidance”), published in an appendix to the Code of Federal Regulations. The court concluded that Defendant’s website satisfied the DOJ Guidance and thus the Reservations Rule, which contains different requirements depending on the age of a building. The court concluded that this distinction did not matter here because Defendant’s website passed muster under either set of requirements. View "SAMUEL LOVE V. MARRIOTT HOTEL SERVICES, INC." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed from the district court’s dismissal of her claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 alleging that a sheriff’s deputy used excessive force in arresting her. The district court held that Plaintiff’s claim was barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), because Plaintiff was convicted of willfully resisting, delaying, or obstructing the deputy during the same interaction in violation of Cal. Penal Code section 148(a)(1).   The en banc Ninth Circuit court reversed the district court’s summary judgment for Defendants. The court held that because the record did not show that Plaintiff’s section 1983 action necessarily rested on the same event as her criminal conviction, success in the former would not necessarily imply the invalidity of the latter.   Heck would bar Plaintiff from bringing an excessive force claim under section 1983 if that claim were based on force used during the conduct that was the basis for her section 148(a)(1) conviction. Crucially, the criminal jury was told that it could find Plaintiff guilty based on any one of four acts she committed during the course of her interaction with the Deputy. Because the jury returned a general verdict, it is not known which act it thought constituted an offense. Although any of the four acts could be the basis for the guilty verdict, Plaintiff’s section 1983 action was based on an allegation that the Deputy used excessive force during only the last one. The court held that if Plaintiff were to prevail in her civil action, it would not necessarily mean that her conviction was invalid; and the action was therefore not barred by Heck. View "GABBI LEMOS V. COUNTY OF SONOMA" on Justia Law

The Arizona Department of Corrections issued Order 914, under which the Department may prohibit inmates from receiving mail containing “sexually explicit material.” The Department invoked the order to redact several issues of Prison Legal News, a monthly journal for prison inmates that covers developments in the criminal justice system. The publisher of Prison Legal News sued the Department under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, arguing that Order 914 violates the First Amendment on its face and as applied to Prison Legal News. The district court granted summary judgment to the publisher and entered a permanent injunction requiring the Department to amend its order and allow distribution of the issues that had been censored.   The Ninth Circuit reversed in part, affirmed in part, vacated the permanent injunction in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The court concluded that most of the order’s relevant prohibitions are facially constitutional under the First Amendment and that most of the as-applied challenges lack merit.   The court held that the penological interests in jail security and rehabilitation were legitimate and the order was neutral in the sense relevant to the analysis set forth in Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987). The court determined, however, that one aspect of the order swept more broadly than could be explained by the Department’s penological objectives: section 1.2.17’s ban on content that “may” cause sexual arousal or be suggestive of sex. That provision was not rationally related to the Department’s interests. As to one portion of the May 2017 issue, the court vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded for the Department. View "PRISON LEGAL NEWS V. CHARLES RYAN" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, one of whom is a former Montana State Senator, operate a website that tracks the voting records of Republican state legislators in Montana. Based on the travel expenses Plaintiffs incurred in giving presentations about the website, Montana’s Commissioner of Political Practices determined that Plaintiffs had formed a “political committee” under Montana law, subject to numerous reporting obligations.   Montana law broadly defines a “political committee,” in relevant part, as “a combination of two or more individuals . . . who receives a contribution or makes an expenditure” to “support or oppose” a candidate or a ballot issue. An expenditure of $250 or less does not create a political committee. Nor will expenditures that qualify as “de minimis acts,” which do not count towards the $250 threshold.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment for Montana state defendants and held that Montana Administrative Rule 44.11603, under which Plaintiffs were required by the Montana Commission of Political Practices to register as a political action committee, is unconstitutionally vague as applied to Plaintiffs.   The court held that Montana’s administrative scheme did not give Plaintiffs fair notice that when they traveled around Big Sky Country without pay to give presentations, their purchases of fast food, fuel, and lodging at a roadside motel were not considered de minimis expenses associated with volunteer services. The court wrote that nothing in Montana law suggests that only those persons providing volunteer services or efforts within an organizational structure of a group are exempted from a political committee designation. View "ED BUTCHER V. AUSTIN KNUDSEN" on Justia Law

In 2011-2013, Fierro made six requests to be placed into protective custody, insisting that he was at risk of harm because he had received threats from the Border Brothers, a gang active throughout Arizona’s prisons. All six requests were denied. Fierro was physically assaulted in the prison yard by two other prisoners, at least one of whom was a suspected member of the Border Brothers. Fierro brought suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court instructed the jury to “give deference to prison officials in the adoption and execution of policies and practices that, in their judgment, are needed to preserve discipline and to maintain internal security in a prison.”The Ninth Circuit vacated a verdict in favor of the prison officials. The evidence at trial reflected a genuine dispute whether the decisions to deny Fierro’s requests for protective custody were made pursuant to a security-based policy, and, if so, whether the decisions were an unnecessary, unjustified, or exaggerated response to security concerns, so the district court’s deference instruction was erroneous. View "Fierro v. Smith" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Amber Machowski was an individual with a disability who used a wheelchair for mobility. Defendant 333 N. Placentia Property, LLC, was the owner of a property in Fullerton, California, on which a business establishment known as City Market Liquor II was located. When Machowski attempted to patronize the store, she encountered architectural barriers that prevented her from making full use and enjoyment of the premises. Machowski sued Defendant, asserting claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Unruh Civil Rights Act. The complaint sought injunctive relief, statutory damages under the Unruh Act, and reasonable attorney’s fees and costs. After Defendant failed to respond to the complaint, Machowski applied for the entry of default judgment, seeking injunctive relief and statutory damages. Machowski’s application for default judgment did not seek an award of attorney’s fees. Instead, it advised the district court that “plaintiff will separately file a motion for her attorney fees and costs once this application is granted and judgment has been entered.” The district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Machowski’s Unruh Act claim, granted default judgment on her ADA claim, ordered injunctive relief, and sua sponte awarded Machowski $1000 in attorney’s fees under Central District of California Local Rule 55-3. Machowski timely appealed the fee award. The Ninth Circuit held that where, as here, a prevailing party advises the district court that it is opting out of the fee schedule and will seek by motion, an award of reasonable attorney's fees, the district court abuses its discretion by disregarding the plaintiff's choice and sua sponte awarding fees under the fee schedule. Accordingly, the fee award was vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Machowski v. 333 N. Placentia Property, LLC" on Justia Law