Articles Posted in US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

by
Oregon sought a declaratory judgment that, under state law, the DEA must obtain a court order to enforce investigative subpoenas. The ACLU intervened, arguing that the DEA's use of subpoenas violated their Fourth Amendment rights. The district court reached the merits of the Fourth Amendment claim and found a violation of privacy interests asserted by the ACLU. The Ninth Circuit reversed without reaching the merits of the Fourth Amendment claim, holding that the ACLU lacked Article III standing to seek declaratory and injunctive relief prohibiting the DEA from obtaining prescription records without a warrant supported by probable cause. The panel explained that the Supreme Court recently clarified this independent standing requirement for intervenors in Town of Chester v. Laroe Estates, No. 16-605, slip op. at 6 (U.S. June 5, 2017). The panel also held that the federal administrative subpoena statute, 21 U.S.C. 876, preempted Oregon's statutory court order requirement. View "OR Prescription Drug Monitoring Program v. ACLU" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiff filed suit against his former employer, Neiman Marcus, alleging interference with the exercise of his rights under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12203(b). The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order finding this action moot and granting summary judgment to Neiman Marcus. The panel held that section 12203 authorized the district court to award nominal damages as equitable relief to plaintiff. Accordingly, the panel remanded for further proceedings. View "Bayer v. Neiman Marcus Group, Inc." on Justia Law

by
Plaintiff filed a putative class action under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132, alleging that the City had systematically failed to comply with federal and state disability access laws, seeking declarative and injunctive relief. Specifically, plaintiff alleged that the City's public right-of-way, pools, libraries, parks, and recreation facilities were not readily accessible to and usable by mobility-impaired individuals. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff class has standing for claims related to all facilities challenged at trial; the district court’s credibility determinations were based on legal errors and its interpretation of the Disabilities Act Accessibility Guidelines (ADAAG) was erroneous; and the district court properly rejected plaintiff's program access claims. Accordingly, the panel affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for reevaluation of the extent of ADAAG noncompliance. View "Kirola v. City and County of San Francisco" on Justia Law

by
The 30-day impound of plaintiff's vehicle under Cal. Veh. Code. 14602.6(a)(1) constituted a seizure that required compliance with the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on behalf of vehicle owners whose vehicles were subjected to the 30-day impound. The panel held that the exigency that justified the seizure of plaintiff's vehicle vanished once the vehicle arrived in impound and plaintiff showed up with proof of ownership and a valid driver's license. In this case, defendants provided no justification for the seizure. View "Brewster v. Beck" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiffs filed suit against the Fire District, a subdivision of Arizona, alleging that it violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621-34. The district court granted the Fire District's motion for summary judgment, concluding that it was not an "employer" within the meaning of the ADEA. The Ninth Circuit held that the meaning of section 630(b) was not ambiguous and thus the district court erred in concluding that the twenty-employee minimum applied to political subdivisions. Even if the panel agreed with the First District and concluded that the statute was ambiguous, the outcome would not change. Accordingly, the panel reversed the district court's judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "Guido v. Mount Lemmon Fire District" on Justia Law

by
RDN filed suit challenging the constitutionality of California Business and Professions Code Section 25503(f)–(h), which forbids manufacturers and wholesalers of alcoholic beverages from giving anything of value to retailers for advertising their alcoholic products. The Ninth Circuit explained that it had considered the same challenge to section 25503(h) thirty years ago in Actmedia, Inc. v. Stroh, 830 F.2d 957 (9th Cir. 1986). The en banc court reaffirmed Actmedia's core holding that section 25503(h) withstands First Amendment scrutiny because it directly and materially advanced the State's interest in maintaining a triple-tiered market system, and because there was a sufficient fit between that interest and the legislative scheme. In rejecting the First Amendment challenge, the en banc court applied the four-part test established by Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission of New York, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), for evaluating restrictions on commercial speech. However, the en banc court disapproved of Actmedia's reliance on California's interest in promoting temperance as a justification for section 25503(h). Therefore,the en banc court affirmed the district court's orders granting summary judgment to defendant. View "Retail Digital Network, LLC v. Prieto" on Justia Law

by
The Ninth Circuit held that the search of claimant's vehicle following two coordinated traffic stops violated the Constitution and affirmed the district court's order granting claimant's motion to suppress. In this case, claimant's roadside detention was unreasonably prolonged in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The subsequent dog sniff and search of the vehicle followed directly in an unbroken causal chain of events from that constitutional violation. Consequently, the seized currency was the fruit of the poisonous tree and was properly suppressed under the exclusionary rule. View "United States v. Gorman" on Justia Law

by
President Trump, in issuing Executive Order 13780, "Protecting the Nation from Foreign Terrorist Entry Into the United States," exceeded the scope of the authority delegated to him by Congress. After determining that plaintiffs have standing to assert their claims based on the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), the Ninth Circuit held that plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success on the merits of that claim and that the district court's preliminary injunction order could be affirmed in large part based on statutory grounds. The panel declined to reach the Establishment Clause claim to resolve this appeal. The panel held that, in suspending the entry of more than 180 million nationals from six countries, suspending the entry of all refugees, and reducing the cap on the admission of refugees from 110,000 to 50,000 for the 2017 fiscal year, the President did not meet the essential precondition to exercising his delegated authority pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1182(f). The President failed to make a sufficient finding that the entry of the excluded classes would be detrimental to the interests of the United States. The panel also held that the Order violated other provisions of the INA that prohibit nationality-based discrimination and require the President to follow a specific process when setting the annual cap on the admission of refugees. Accordingly, the panel affirmed in large part; vacated portions of the injunction that prevent the Government from conducting internal reviews and the injunction to the extent that it runs against the President; and remanded with instructions. View "Hawaii v. Trump" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the City's policy of training its police dogs to "bite and hold" individuals resulted in a violation of her Fourth Amendment rights. A police canine bit plaintiff's upper lip during the execution of a search. Plaintiff had fallen asleep in her office and had accidentally triggered the alarm. The en banc court upheld the district court's conclusion that there was no genuine dispute as to whether the door was open, the suite was dark, and warnings had been given; the district court properly concluded that the use of force was "moderate" and not severe; the City had a strong interest in using the force; and the degree of force used was commensurate with the City's interest in the use of that force. The en banc court held that the force used was not excessive and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, because the officers' actions were constitutional, the City was not liable under Monell v. Department of Social Services of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). View "Lowry v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law