Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Jaswinder Singh, a native of India, sought asylum in the United States, claiming persecution due to his political activities with the Mann Party, which advocates for a separate Sikh state. Singh testified that he was attacked twice by members of the opposition Indian National Congress Party (INC) in 2017 and faced threats and police inaction. He fled to the U.S. in 2018 and applied for asylum.The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Singh's application, citing concerns about the credibility of his testimony due to similarities with other asylum seekers' declarations from India. The IJ also found that Singh could safely relocate within India. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing with the adverse credibility determination and the internal relocation analysis.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the BIA and IJ misapplied Matter of R-K-K-, which allows for adverse credibility determinations based on strikingly similar affidavits in unrelated proceedings. The court held that the agency erred by relying solely on non-unique factual similarities without considering linguistic or grammatical cues that would suggest plagiarism. The court also noted due process concerns, as Singh could not meaningfully address the redacted declarations used against him.Additionally, the court found that the agency's internal relocation analysis was flawed. The government failed to prove that Singh could safely engage in Mann Party activities outside of Punjab. The IJ's conclusions were based on speculation and did not adequately consider the potential for persecution by local authorities or other actors in different regions of India.The Ninth Circuit granted Singh's petition for review and remanded the case to the BIA for a renewed credibility determination and a more individualized analysis of the feasibility of internal relocation. View "SINGH V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Derrick Patterson pleaded guilty to one count of Hobbs Act robbery and one count of identity theft. Patterson met his victim through Grindr, a dating application, and during their encounter, he took the victim’s phone and used it to withdraw money from the victim’s bank accounts.The United States District Court for the Central District of California sentenced Patterson to 111 months in prison, including a three-level enhancement for hate crime motivation under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1. The district court rejected Patterson’s argument that the enhancement required a finding that he was motivated by hate. Patterson appealed the sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with Patterson that the language of the enhancement was ambiguous. The court held that the enhancement requires a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was motivated by hate or animus. The court concluded that the district court erred by imposing the enhancement without such a finding. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit vacated Patterson’s sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. View "USA V. PATTERSON" on Justia Law

In this case, the plaintiff alleged that a Montana Probation Officer used excessive force during an encounter in a parking lot. The incident was captured by surveillance footage, which was later auto-deleted. Despite efforts to preserve the footage, the State failed to do so, leading to the plaintiff's motion for sanctions against the State for the loss of evidence.The United States District Court for the District of Montana found that the State acted recklessly in failing to preserve the footage but did not act with gross negligence or willfulness. Invoking its inherent authority, the district court sanctioned the State by instructing the jury that it was established as a matter of law that the officer used excessive force. The jury awarded the plaintiff $75,000 in damages for the excessive-force claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the district court committed legal error by relying on its inherent authority to impose sanctions. The appellate court determined that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e) governs the loss of electronically stored information and the sanctions imposed. Rule 37(e)(2) allows for severe sanctions only if the party acted with the intent to deprive another party of the information's use in litigation. The district court's findings confirmed that no such intent was present, making the sanctions unlawful.As a result, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's sanctions orders, reversed the verdict and judgment against the probation officer, vacated the award of attorneys' fees to the plaintiff, and remanded the case for a new trial on the excessive-force claim. View "GREGORY V. STATE OF MONTANA" on Justia Law

The case involves an encounter between the Hawai'i Police Department (HPD) and Steven Hyer, which resulted in Hyer's death. On June 22, 2018, HPD officers responded to calls about Hyer's erratic behavior. Hyer, who had a history of mental illness, barricaded himself in his apartment. After several hours of failed negotiations and attempts to subdue him, including the use of a Taser and chemical munitions, HPD officers deployed a police dog. When Hyer allegedly threatened the officers with a compound bow, Corporal Torres shot and killed him.The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, the City and County of Honolulu, and several HPD officers. The court excluded the plaintiffs' expert reports, finding them speculative, unreliable, and containing legal conclusions. The court ruled that the use of force was objectively reasonable and that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The court also dismissed the plaintiffs' claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and various state law claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court erred in excluding the entirety of the plaintiffs' expert reports, as the reports were based on sufficient facts and data. The Ninth Circuit found that the exclusion of these reports was prejudicial because they created genuine disputes of material fact regarding the reasonableness of the use of deadly force and chemical munitions, as well as potential ADA violations. The court reversed the district court's summary judgment on these claims but affirmed the grant of qualified immunity regarding the use of the police dog, as the law was not clearly established. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "HYER V. CITY AND COUNTY OF HONOLULU" on Justia Law

The plaintiff pleaded guilty to obstructing a peace officer under California Penal Code § 148(a)(1) after an incident where San Diego County Deputy Sheriffs came to his home to investigate a report of domestic violence. During the encounter, the plaintiff did not comply with the deputies' orders, leading to his being pushed to the floor, which he claims resulted in a dislocated shoulder and rotator cuff tear. He later filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that the deputies used excessive force.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California dismissed the plaintiff's complaint, citing Heck v. Humphrey, which bars § 1983 actions if a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction. The district court concluded that the plaintiff's resistance and the force used by the deputies were part of the same factual context and could not be separated into isolated events. Therefore, the court held that the § 1983 action was barred by Heck and denied the plaintiff's request to amend his complaint.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court held that Heck did not bar the plaintiff's suit because he engaged in multiple acts of resistance or obstruction that could serve as the factual basis for his conviction, both before and after the use of force he claimed was excessive. Since the plaintiff's guilty plea did not specify which act was the basis of his conviction, success in his § 1983 action would not necessarily undermine his conviction. The court emphasized that a § 1983 action is barred by Heck only if success in the action would necessarily imply the invalidity of the plaintiff's conviction. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "MARTELL V. COLE" on Justia Law

The case involves a plaintiff who alleged that four law enforcement officers used excessive force during his arrest. The incident occurred on March 21, 2018, in Mesa, Arizona. The plaintiff was a passenger in a vehicle that was pulled over for an unsafe traffic maneuver. During the stop, the plaintiff provided a false name and was asked to step out of the vehicle. When he did, he pushed one of the officers, leading to a struggle during which he was repeatedly punched, kicked, and tasered. The officers eventually handcuffed him using two linked sets of handcuffs. After being handcuffed, the plaintiff claimed that one officer continued to kneel on his upper back and neck, making it difficult for him to breathe.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona granted summary judgment in favor of the officers, concluding that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The court found that the officers' use of force was not clearly established as unlawful under existing precedent. The court also noted that one of the officers did not use any force and was focused on another individual, thus granting summary judgment on the merits for that officer.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's grant of qualified immunity for the officers concerning the force used up to the point of handcuffing, as there was no clearly established law prohibiting their actions. However, the court reversed the grant of qualified immunity for the officer who continued to kneel on the plaintiff's back and neck after he was handcuffed, finding that this conduct violated clearly established law. The court remanded the case for further proceedings regarding this officer and affirmed the summary judgment for the other officers. View "Spencer v. Pew" on Justia Law

In 1988, a California jury sentenced Jerry Grant Frye to death for the first-degree murders of Robert and Jane Brandt. Frye and his girlfriend, Jennifer Warsing, had moved to Amador County to grow marijuana. Warsing testified that Frye, after seeing the devil and feeling threatened, forced her to accompany him to the Brandts' cabin, where he shot and killed them. They then stole the Brandts' valuables and fled to South Dakota, where Frye was later arrested and confessed to the murders. The prosecution's case relied heavily on Warsing's testimony, corroborated by physical evidence and Frye's own statements.The California Supreme Court affirmed Frye's conviction and sentence in 1998. Frye filed a state habeas petition in 2000, claiming his due process rights were violated when jurors saw him shackled during the trial. The California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition on the merits in 2001. Frye then sought federal habeas relief, and in 2022, the district court granted a writ of habeas corpus on the shackling claim, concluding that the shackling prejudiced Frye at both the guilt and penalty phases.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's order. The Ninth Circuit held that Frye did not overcome the significant deference owed to an unreasoned state court decision on the merits under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). The court rejected the argument that the right to be free from unjustified guilt-phase shackling was not clearly established federal law at the time of the state court's decision. However, given the limited shackling evidence and the guilt evidence before the state court, the Ninth Circuit concluded that every fairminded jurist would not agree that the state court's harmlessness decision was objectively unreasonable. The case was remanded for further proceedings on Frye's remaining claims. View "FRYE V. BROOMFIELD" on Justia Law

The case involves two transgender girls, Jane Doe and Megan Roe, who wish to participate in girls' sports at their respective schools in Arizona. Both girls have not undergone male puberty due to puberty-blocking medication and hormone therapy. Arizona enacted the Save Women’s Sports Act, which prohibits "students of the male sex," including transgender women and girls, from participating in women’s and girls’ sports. The plaintiffs argue that this Act violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona reviewed the case and granted a preliminary injunction, preventing the enforcement of the Act against the plaintiffs. The court found that the Act was adopted with the purpose of excluding transgender girls from girls' sports teams and concluded that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their equal protection and Title IX claims. The court determined that before puberty, there are no significant differences in athletic performance between boys and girls and that transgender girls who receive puberty-blocking medication do not have an athletic advantage over other girls.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order, agreeing that the Act discriminates based on transgender status and is subject to heightened scrutiny. The court held that the Act’s categorical ban on transgender girls from participating in girls' sports is not substantially related to the state’s objectives of ensuring competitive fairness and equal athletic opportunities for female student-athletes. The court also found that the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm without the injunction and that the balance of equities and public interest favored granting the preliminary injunction. View "DOE V. HORNE" on Justia Law

Kate Adams, the former Chief of Police for the City of Rancho Cordova, was forced to resign over allegations that she sent racist text messages while working for the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Office. The messages, sent in 2013, included offensive images forwarded to two friends during a private conversation. Adams claimed she was merely expressing disapproval of the images. After her resignation, the messages were publicized, leading to further professional and personal repercussions for Adams.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California dismissed Adams’s First Amendment retaliation and conspiracy claims, ruling that her speech did not address a matter of public concern. The court found that the private nature of the text messages and their content did not relate to broader societal issues or public interest.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that Adams’s private text messages, which were part of a casual conversation and not intended for public dissemination, did not constitute speech on a matter of public concern under the Pickering v. Board of Education standard. The court emphasized that the content, form, and context of the messages indicated they were of personal interest rather than public interest. Consequently, Adams’s First Amendment retaliation and conspiracy claims were dismissed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings on other unresolved claims. View "ADAMS V. COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO" on Justia Law

The case involves a class action lawsuit against the City of Los Angeles, challenging the constitutionality of a $63 late fee imposed for failing to pay a parking meter fine within 21 days. The plaintiffs argue that this late fee, which matches the amount of the original fine, violates the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause. The plaintiffs incurred at least one parking meter citation and late fee, and they assert that the late fee is both facially unconstitutional and unconstitutional as applied to individuals who cannot afford to pay it within the specified time frame.The United States District Court for the Central District of California initially granted summary judgment in favor of the City, finding that the $63 parking fine was not "grossly disproportionate" to the offense of overstaying a parking meter. The court also rejected the challenge to the $63 late fee without providing a detailed rationale. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Ninth Circuit previously upheld the initial fine but remanded the case to determine whether the late fee violated the Excessive Fines Clause.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's summary judgment for the City regarding the late fee. The Ninth Circuit found that a genuine factual dispute exists about the City's basis for setting the late fee at 100 percent of the parking fine. The court noted that the City provided no evidence on how it determined the $63 late fee amount, making it impossible to conclude as a matter of law that the fee is not "grossly disproportional" to the harm caused by the untimely payment. The court declined to incorporate means-testing into the Excessive Fines Clause analysis, rejecting the plaintiffs' argument that the fee should consider individuals' ability to pay. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "PIMENTEL V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES" on Justia Law