Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In this case, plaintiffs Kewon English and Earl Powell were arrested for sexual assault and burglary and detained for over a year before their cases were nolle prossed and they were released. They sued Senior Investigator Joseph Clarke of the Richland County Sheriff’s Department, alleging that he had coerced them into signing false confessions. They also sued Sheriff Leon Lott and the Richland County Sheriff's Department for damages under § 1983, claiming their constitutional rights under the First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments were violated. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment on English’s claims and dismissed Clarke’s cross-appeal. The court determined that there was probable cause to arrest English based on the victim’s identifications. Regarding English's malicious prosecution claim, the court held that even assuming probable cause was negated, Clarke cannot be held responsible for English’s continued detention. The court found no evidence that the Richland County Sheriff's Department had any unconstitutional policy or custom, and that Clarke could not be held liable for the continued detention of English. Furthermore, the court dismissed Clarke's cross-appeal, ruling that the appeal turned on a question of fact and was therefore not suitable for interlocutory treatment. View "English v. Clarke" on Justia Law

In this case from the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the plaintiff, Frank Morgan, appealed from a decision of the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia. Morgan alleged that a police officer, J.D. Tincher, used excessive force during his arrest and subsequent detention, causing him serious injuries. The case proceeded to a jury trial, and the jury found in favor of Officer Tincher.However, after presenting his case, Morgan discovered another lawsuit against Officer Tincher, involving similar allegations of excessive force, which Tincher had failed to disclose during discovery. Morgan requested sanctions and moved for a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(3), alleging misconduct by the opposing party. The district court denied the motion, leading to this appeal.In its decision, the Fourth Circuit held that Officer Tincher's failure to disclose the other excessive-force lawsuit constituted misconduct under Rule 60(b)(3). It also found that Morgan had presented a meritorious claim and that the misconduct prevented him from fully presenting his case. The court further concluded that the district court had erred in its analysis of whether the undisclosed evidence would have changed the trial outcome. Lastly, the court ruled that the interest of justice in this case outweighed the interest in the finality of judgments.Therefore, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court's decision, vacated the final judgment in favor of Officer Tincher, and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to allow for a reasonable period of additional discovery before conducting a new trial. View "Morgan v. Tincher" on Justia Law

In this case, Jordan Jones, a prisoner at North Carolina’s Avery-Mitchell Correctional Institution, sued multiple prison officials under § 1983. The suit challenged the conditions of his confinement and a transfer to another prison that he alleged was retaliatory. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants.Jones had been placed in a “dry” cell, with the water turned off, for about 17 hours after he was suspected of having ingested contraband. He was allowed to clean himself only with toilet paper, despite having to defecate three times in a portable toilet. He also had to eat a meal with his hands, which he was unable to wash. The court concluded that while the conditions of Jones's confinement were deplorable, the officials were entitled to qualified immunity on this claim because it was not clearly established in April 2015 that these conditions posed a substantial risk of serious harm in violation of the Eighth Amendment.However, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendant Gregory Taylor on Jones's claim that his transfer to another prison was in retaliation for his filing of grievances. The court concluded that a reasonable jury could find that Taylor ordered the transfer in retaliation for Jones's grievances, and that Taylor was not entitled to qualified immunity on this claim because it was clearly established at the time of the transfer that such retaliation violated the First Amendment. The court remanded for further proceedings on this claim. View "Jones v. Solomon" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, Gregory Kelly, the former Town Manager of Abingdon, Virginia, sued the Town for discrimination, retaliation, interference, and failure to accommodate under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Kelly alleged that he suffers from anxiety, depression, and high blood pressure, and these conditions worsened due to a hostile work environment created by the elected Mayor and Town Council. He further alleged that, despite his efforts to seek accommodations for his disabilities, the Town failed to engage in a meaningful dialogue to determine appropriate accommodations, and instead escalated its pattern of harassment.The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court's dismissal of Kelly's discrimination and interference claims, along with its ruling that a letter Kelly sent to the Town in January 2018 was not an ADA accommodation request. The court reasoned that although Kelly had informed the Town of his disabilities and it was aware of them, the January 2018 letter, despite being titled "Accommodations Requests," did not make it clear that Kelly was seeking accommodations for his disabilities. The requests in the letter were not connected to Kelly's disabilities and were more related to general workplace issues. Therefore, the letter did not trigger the Town's duty to engage in an interactive process to determine appropriate accommodations under the ADA.The Court also found that Kelly failed to state a claim for ADA discrimination. He did not provide any facts suggesting that the Town had a discriminatory motive or that his disability was a "but-for" cause of his constructive discharge. The Court further held that Kelly failed to state a claim for ADA interference, as he did not allege that the Town engaged in behavior to prevent him from exercising his ADA rights or that the Town had a discriminatory motive. View "Kelly v. Town of Abingdon" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the defendant, Keyon Paylor, appealed from the decision of the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, which denied his petition to vacate his conviction for being a felon in possession of a firearm. Paylor had entered a guilty plea, which he later sought to vacate, asserting that his plea was not knowing and voluntary. He claimed that law enforcement officers involved in his arrest planted the firearm and stole thousands of dollars from him, and that his plea was induced as a result of egregious law enforcement misconduct. The district court denied his petition, concluding that Paylor did not produce enough evidence to establish that information regarding former Detective Daniel Hersl’s misconduct materially influenced his decision to plead guilty. The Court of Appeals disagreed with the district court's decision and vacated it, concluding that Paylor is entitled to discovery and an evidentiary hearing in order to attempt to gather evidence to support his claim. The case was remanded back to the district court for further proceedings. View "US v. Paylor" on Justia Law

In this appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, James Dow Vandivere challenged a district court decision denying his motion for release from civil commitment under the Adam Walsh Act. Vandivere, who had been convicted of multiple crimes involving the sexual exploitation of minors and sentenced to almost twenty years in prison, was nearing the end of his sentence when the government moved to civilly commit him. The government argued, and the district court agreed, that Vandivere remained sexually dangerous. Vandivere filed a motion for discharge and, following a hearing, the district court found he remained sexually dangerous and denied his motion. Vandivere appealed, arguing that he was wrongly forced to bear the burden of proof at the hearing and that the district court erred in determining that he remained sexually dangerous.The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court found that under the Adam Walsh Act, the burden of proof at an Adam Walsh Act discharge hearing is on the detainee to show his recovery by a preponderance of the evidence. The court also found this allocation of burden does not violate the detainee’s due process rights. Further, the appellate court found no error in the district court's conclusion that Vandivere remained sexually dangerous, stating that the district court had appropriately considered Vandivere's behavior while in custody, his persistent cognitive distortions about sexual abuse, his refusal to participate in sex offender therapy, and his proposed release plan. View "US v. Vandivere" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled on a motion to intervene in an appeal filed by a coalition of civil rights organizations. The original lawsuit was brought by the Association for Education Fairness against the Montgomery County Board of Education and its superintendent, alleging that a new admissions policy for magnet schools in the county was discriminatory against Asian American students. The district court dismissed the case, ruling that the admissions policy was not enacted with discriminatory intent and did not have a disparate impact on Asian American students.After the Association appealed the district court's decision, the civil rights organizations moved to intervene in the appeal. They argued that the Board may not adequately defend the district court's disparate impact holding on appeal. However, the Board assured the court that it intended to defend this holding.The Court of Appeals denied the motion to intervene without prejudice, stating that it trusted the Board's representation that it would defend the disparate impact holding. The court also noted that if the organizations were granted intervention, their rights would be largely the same as those of amici, or friends of the court. They would be able to file a separate brief and attempt to participate in oral argument, both of which they could also do as amici. The court also found that the organizations' argument that they needed to be parties in order to participate in potential future Supreme Court proceedings was speculative and contingent on unknown factors. As a result, the court found no need to grant the motion to intervene. View "Association for Education Fairness v. Montgomery County Board of Education" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed and remanded a district court's dismissal of claims brought by Charles Willis Short, the husband and estate administrator of Victoria Christine Short, who died by suicide while in custody at the Davie County Detention Center. Mr. Short filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several employees of the Davie County Sheriff’s Department, alleging violations of the Fourteenth Amendment for deliberate indifference to Ms. Short’s risk of suicide. The district court dismissed all of Mr. Short's claims, applying a subjective standard for determining deliberate indifference.The Fourth Circuit disagreed with the lower court's application of the subjective standard, relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, which established an objective standard for determining deliberate indifference in cases involving pretrial detainees. The court decided that pretrial detainees can state a Fourteenth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to an excessive risk of harm on an objective standard, finding that the allegations in the complaint were sufficient to state a claim under any standard. Therefore, the court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the claims and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Short v. Hartman" on Justia Law

After the district court denied Petitioner’s initial 28 U.S.C. Section 2254 petition, he obtained new counsel and filed a motion to reopen that judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). He argued that exceptional circumstances warranted this relief because his original Section 2254 counsel had, in effect, abandoned him by submitting a Section 2254 petition that omitted several potentially meritorious issues and inadequately presented the issues that had been raised. He asked the court to reopen the judgment and allow him to file additional briefings and new claims. The district court concluded that Petitioner’s motion was not a true Rule 60(b) motion. Rather, Petitioner was attempting to use Rule 60(b) to circumvent the statutory limits placed on second or successive Section 2254 petitions. Recognizing that it would lack jurisdiction to consider a second Section 2254 petition, the district court denied Petitioner’s motion without considering its merits. Petitioner appealed.   The Fourth Circuit agreed with the district court’s conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s Rule 60(b) motion because he effectively sought to file a second or successive Section 2254 petition, something that a district court cannot authorize. The court also wrote that because it also concludes that the district court should have dismissed Petitioner’s motion rather than deny it, it vacated the district court’s order and remanded with instructions to dismiss. View "Steven Bixby v. Bryan Stirling" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, former pretrial detainees in Prince George’s County, Maryland, appealed from the district court’s denial of their motion for a preliminary injunction. The detainees sought an injunction that would require the County to release them, and others similarly situated, on the ground that the County’s pretrial-release program violates the Due Process Clause. The district court denied the motion without stating its factual findings and legal conclusions.   The Fourth Circuit vacated. The court explained that the detainees’ motion for a preliminary injunction presented the district court with a disputed factual record and a difficult, fact-bound constitutional question. Thus, the district court had to explain the factual findings and legal conclusions that supported its determination that the preliminary injunction should be denied. Yet it only made generalized comments about the difficulty of deciding. So it violated Rule 52(a)(2). Further, the court wrote that it will disregard a Rule 52(a)(2) error and reach the merits of the district court’s preliminary-injunction order only if there is a record sufficient “to enable us to pass upon the questions involved.” However, there isn’t one here. View "Robert Frazier v. Prince George's County, Maryland" on Justia Law