Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

After an explosion at Massey’s West Virginia coal mine killed 29 miners, Blankenship, then Massey’s Chairman of the Board and CEO, was convicted of conspiring to willfully violate federal mine safety and health standards, 30 U.S.C. 820(d) and 18 U.S.C. 371. The evidence indicated that Blankenship had willfully failed to address numerous notices of mine safety violations that Massey had received, favoring production and profits over safety. Following the trial and in response to Blankenship’s ongoing requests, the government produced documents to Blankenship that it had not produced before trial and that it should have produced under applicable Department of Justice policies. The suppressed documents fell broadly into two categories: memoranda of interviews conducted of seven Massey employees and internal emails and documents of the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) showing, among other things, some MSHA employees’ hostility to Massey and Blankenship.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of Blankenship’s 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to vacate his conviction. While the documents were improperly suppressed, they were not material in that there was not a reasonable probability that they would have produced a different result had they been disclosed before trial. The verdict that Blankenship conspired to willfully violate mandatory mine standards was supported by ample evidence. View "United States v. Blankenship" on Justia Law

In 2014, Davison began to publicly criticize Louden school policies, alleging violations of federal law, misleading budget information, and flouting Virginia’s Conflict of Interest Act. Davison frequently chastised school board members in many forums and during board meetings. He routinely emailed individual board members and made multiple social media posts about his complaints. Davison also commented on board members’ social media platforms. Davison mentioned weapons; there were concerns about the welfare of his children. Board members voiced personal safety concerns, which led to the 2015 no-trespass letters that prohibited his presence on school property and attendance at any school-sponsored activities unless authorized. Davidson’s previous state-court challenge has been dismissed.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Davison’s 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit, citing res judicata. Davison agreed to dismiss his state petition, which included federal claims, with prejudice, despite having the opportunity to withdraw his petition. The board’s policy, which prohibits all personal attacks, regardless of viewpoint, because they cause “unnecessary delay or disruption to a meeting,” is a constitutional policy for a limited public forum because it is viewpoint neutral, and the restriction is reasonable in light of the purpose of the board. The district court correctly determined that Davison did not experience retaliation. With respect to claims against individuals and claims based on reports to protective services concerning Davison’s children, the court cited qualified immunity. Davison was not deprived of procedural due process. View "Davison v. Rose" on Justia Law

Moss filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that while he was a pretrial detainee, jail officials put him in disciplinary confinement without a hearing, in violation of his procedural due process rights, and that they delayed his access to urgent medical care, again violating his due process rights. Moss claims that he informed the intake officer that he was taking a medication for a thyroid condition, Vyvanse for attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, and Zoloft for PTSD and alleges delays in providing him with those medications while he was detained.The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, finding that Moss failed to exhaust available administrative remedies for his procedural due process claim and that any delay in the provision of medical treatment did not rise to the level of deliberate indifference. The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Moss argued that jail officials made administrative remedies unavailable by denying him access to the grievance system while he was in disciplinary confinement but undisputed record evidence establishes that Moss was able to use the grievance system during that time, compelling the conclusion that administrative remedies were available to him. There is no evidence that the defendants knew of but deliberately ignored a substantial risk to Moss’s health. View "Moss v. Harwood" on Justia Law

Burr was convicted for the 1991 murder of an infant, “Susie.” Burr was living with Susie’s mother, Bridges, and was physically abusive to Bridges. Bridges had returned home to find Susie unconscious, having seizures, bruised, and with broken bones. Burr was sentenced to death. Burr has pursued habeas remedies before the state and federal courts. In 2020, the district court declined to grant habeas relief on the basis of claims under "Brady" and "Napue," related to transcripts of interviews with two witnesses, Susie’s brother, Scott, and Bridges.The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Burr has not demonstrated that the state court’s decision was “based on an unreasonable determination of the facts,” 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(2). The state court did not unreasonably apply Brady when it concluded that “any inconsistencies between the trial testimony of [Bridges and Scott] and their pre-trial comments to the prosecutors are of de minimis significance.” Burr did not explain how the transcript would have allowed him to impeach that testimony. The jury could make its own determination of how much weight to give the statements of a young child who repeatedly stated that he could not remember key details. Burr has not pointed to any “false impression” about Scott’s testimony that prosecutors should have been aware of and flagged but that the jury would not also have been aware of after listening to that testimony. View "Burr v. Jackson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit challenging the constitutionality of Section 3-506 of Maryland's Election Law, which provides that a list of Maryland registered voters (the List) may be given to an applicant who is himself a registered Maryland voter (Access Provision), so long as the applicant attests that he will use the List for purposes that are related to the electoral process (the Use Provision). On remand from the Fourth Circuit, the district court awarded summary judgment to Maryland state officials on plaintiff's Use Provision-based free speech and vagueness claims.The Fourth Circuit applied the Anderson-Burdick balancing test and concluded that plaintiff's claim that — as applied to him — the Use Provision contravenes the Free Speech Clause was without merit. The court explained that, when weighed against the State's interests — that is, safeguarding the List, protecting Maryland's election system, and shielding Maryland registered voters from harassment — the burden imposed on plaintiff is modest. The court also found plaintiff's as-applied vagueness claim unavailing where plaintiff understands the Use Provision's reach. Finally, the court found meritless plaintiff's facial challenges to the Use Provision which argued that the Use Provision facially contravenes the Free Speech Clause and that the phrase "related to the electoral process" is facially vague. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Fusaro v. Howard" on Justia Law

During an automobile stop in Richmond, Virginia, Ball struggled with a Virginia law enforcement officer, pulled out a gun, and shot the officer in the forehead at close range, killing him. Virginia prosecutors charged him with capital murder. Pursuant to a plea agreement, he was sentenced to life imprisonment with all but 36 years suspended. Following community outrage over the sentence, federal prosecutors charged Ball with possession of a firearm by a felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). The district court sentenced Ball to the statutory maximum of 10 years’ imprisonment and, as a variance, required that the 10 years be served consecutive to the state sentence.The Fourth Circuit affirmed, rejecting arguments that the federal indictment should have been dismissed because that prosecution violated the Double Jeopardy Clause, was unnecessarily delayed within the meaning of FRCP 48(b), having been initiated more than two years after the shooting, and constituted vindictive prosecution under the Due Process Clause because the federal prosecution and sentence were “intended to punish him for negotiating a favorable deal with state prosecutors.” The federal government articulated valid federal interests in prosecuting Ball for his violation of federal law, pointing to its prioritization of felon-in-possession cases, and the serious nature of Ball’s conduct. View "United States v. Ball" on Justia Law

Walters entered his ex-girlfriend’s home, struck her with a hammer, and left with her cell phone and $700. Walters was arrested and charged in West Virginia state court with first-degree robbery, malicious assault, and burglary. Public defender Stanley represented him. In March, the state extended a plea offer. Stanley’s office timely received the offer, set to expire in April, but failed to communicate it to Walters until July. Despite Walters’s requests for a new attorney, Stanley continued to represent Walters. In July, the state extended another plea offer. Stanley communicated that offer to Walters and secured a 30-day extension. The July plea offer lapsed.Walters filed an ethics complaint. Stanley explained that Walters refused to respond to the July plea offer and had indicated that he would only “plead[] guilty to a misdemeanor, serve a year in jail, and make restitution." After negotiating a plea with new representation Walters pleaded guilty to reduced charges. The court sentenced Walters to 43-65 years’ incarceration, citing Walters’ criminal history, the seriousness of the offense, and the danger he posed to the community,After exhausting state remedies, Walters sought federal habeas relief. The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of his petition, which alleged ineffective assistance of counsel. The state court appropriately concluded that Walters failed to show a reasonable probability that he would have accepted the March plea offer had Stanley timely communicated it. Walters cannot demonstrate prejudice. View "Walters v. Martin" on Justia Law

Sergeant Callahan was a shift supervisor at Bertie Correction Institution (BCI). Wissink, a murderer serving a life sentence without the possibility of parole, was housed in the medium custody unit that she supervised. Callahan wrote a disciplinary report for Wissink. Later that day, Wissink started a trashcan fire. Callahan put the fire out with a fire extinguisher. Wissink then threw boiling liquid, that he had heated up in the microwave, in Callahan’s face. After Callahan fell, Wissink grabbed her fire extinguisher and repeatedly beat her with it. Callahan died from the attack. Callahan’s father sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violation of his daughter’s substantive due process rights, alleging that approximately a week before Callahan’s murder, Wissink warned “BCI officials that he had homicidal thoughts and needed help for his mental health conditions” but no one at BCI took any action and Wissink remained in medium custody. Callahan alleged that BCI’s policies required four officers per shift but on the day of the murder, only three officers were on duty and only Callahan was fully trained, so state-created danger led to Sergeant Callahan’s death.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Callahan’s complaint. A plaintiff alleging state-created danger must plausibly allege more than a mere failure to protect. The substantive due process claim failed to adequately allege how the individual defendants created or substantially enhanced the danger which resulted in Callahan’s death and failed to plead “intent to harm.” View "Callahan v. North Carolina Department of Public Safety" on Justia Law

In 2014, Dr. DiCocco, then 67, accepted a job as a Bureau of Prisons (BOP) psychiatrist. As a condition of her hiring, DiCocco, like all new BOP employees, had to pass the Physical Abilities Test, which requires dragging a 75-pound dummy at least 694 feet for three minutes, climbing a ladder to retrieve an object within seven seconds, completing an obstacle course in 58 seconds, running a quarter-mile and handcuffing someone within two minutes and 35 seconds, and climbing three flights of stairs in 45 seconds while wearing a 20-pound weight belt. DiCocco took the test and failed. Under BOP policy, she could retake the test within 24 hours, but she declined. She was informed that unless she resigned, her BOP employment would be terminated. She resigned. After exhausting her administrative remedies, DiCocco filed suit, alleging disparate-impact theories of sex discrimination under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, and age discrimination, 29 U.S.C. 621–634.The Fourth Circuit reversed, in part, the dismissal of the complaint. In finding that DiCocco’s resignation did not constitute an “adverse employment action.” the district court inappropriately intertwined its standing analysis with the merits. DiCocco alleged that she suffered financial and job-related injuries that are fairly traceable to the government’s action and likely to be redressed by a favorable ruling. The age discrimination claim was properly dismissed because the ADEA provision applicable to federal-sector employees does not provide a disparate-impact cause of action. View "DiCocco v. Garland" on Justia Law

As students were arriving at the high school, an administrator reported an unknown man (Coleman, age 39) “asleep or passed out” in his vehicle with a crossbow visible in the backseat. The vehicle, stopped but running, was primarily parked in a travel lane. Deputy Johnson believed possession of the crossbow was illegal under Virginia law because it could fire “a projected missile on the school campus.” During questioning, Coleman stated that he had a firearm in the vehicle’s center console. Johnson asked Coleman to exit the vehicle. When Coleman did so, Johnson observed “a fairly large bag of a green leafy substance that appeared to be marijuana” beside the driver’s seat. Another deputy searched the vehicle, finding marijuana, crystal methamphetamine, individual baggies, a scale, a .38 Special revolver, and the crossbow.Coleman was among 28 defendants indicted for participating in a drug trafficking organization. Coleman was charged in two drug counts and for using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. Coleman unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that Johnson did not have reasonable suspicion of criminal activity to conduct an investigative “Terry” stop because possession of a crossbow on school grounds is not illegal in Virginia. The Fourth Circuit affirmed his convictions and 211-month sentence. Even if Coleman had not possessed the crossbow, Johnson would have had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigative stop based on the totality of the circumstances. View "United States v. Coleman" on Justia Law