Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Ali sought to pursue 42 U.S.C. 1983 proceedings challenging as unconstitutional an executive order of Maryland’s Governor that prohibits boycotts of Israel by business entities that bid on the state’s procurement contracts. According to the Initial Complaint, “Ali is a computer software engineer who wishes to submit bids for government software project contracts but is barred from doing so due to the presence of mandatory ‘No Boycott of Israel’ clauses.”The district court dismissed with prejudice Ali’s lawsuit for want of Article III standing to sue. The Fourth Circuit affirmed but modified the judgment to provide that the dismissal is without prejudice. The court first disagreed with Ali’s interpretation of the Order. The Order indicates that if a business entity has engaged in anti-Israel national origin discrimination in the process of preparing a bid for a state procurement contract, the entity is barred from being awarded the contract; if the entity has engaged in a boycott of Israel entirely unrelated to the bid formation process, the Order is of no relevance. The court rejected Ali’s argument that the certification requirement constitutes an unconstitutionally vague loyalty oath. The Order does not require the entity to pledge any loyalty to Israel or profess any other beliefs. View "Ali v. Hogan" on Justia Law

West Virginia State Troopers Elliott and Cornelius received three 911 calls about Crumbley. Two different callers stated that Crumbley was armed and dangerous and keeping his family hostage. Another caller stated Crumbley made threats about shooting the police. The troopers, heading to Crumbley’s property, discussed Crumbley’s rumored drug connections. Crumbley came out of the house screaming and threatened a shootout. He had nothing in his hands but threatened to get a weapon. Crumbley went between the yard where the troopers were and the house, threatening to get a weapon and shoot the troopers. Crumbley pulled down his pants to expose his genitals while spinning in a circle. Crumbley then got a shovel, threatened the troopers with it, then ran, throwing the shovel. Cornelius fell in the snow. When Elliott turned a corner, he saw Crumbley turned away from him. Crumbley then abruptly turned toward Elliott and began to raise his hands, causing Elliot to believe that he might have a gun. Elliott fatally shot him. Crumbley did not have a gun.In a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to Elliott. Crumbley was shot in the back, raising a genuine dispute about Elliot’s version of events. The facts might show a violation of a clearly established constitutional right. View "Stanton v. Elliott" on Justia Law

Faver, a practicing Muslim inmate, sued, alleging the Virginia Department of Corrections (VDOC), had denied him the ability to practice tenets of his religion, in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc. He alleged that, because of the VDOC’s single-vendor policy for its commissaries, he was required to purchase “his perfumed oils [for prayer] from Keefe,” which also sells “swine and idols” to other inmates. While he did not allege that the Keefe prayer oil was itself unsuitable, he alleged that “Islam prohibits the acquisition of religious accouterments from a company that sells swine and idols.” VDOC explained that before 2013, under a multiple-vendor policy, VDOC experienced “negative and harmful results” to the security, safety, and efficiency of its facilities.The Fourth Circuit affirmed that VDOC did not violate Faver’s rights under RLUIPA. While Faver had a sincerely-held religious belief and his religious exercise was substantially burdened by the single-vendor policy, the policy furthered the VDOC’s compelling interest of “preventing contraband, which promotes prison safety and security, and reducing the time prison personnel must devote to checking commissary shipments, which controls costs.” The policy was “the least restrictive means to further its compelling interests.” View "Faver v. Clarke" on Justia Law

Two months after he turned 18, Doe was caught having sex with his 14-year-old girlfriend. Doe could have been charged with “carnal knowledge of a child,” a Class 4 felony but instead pleaded to “taking indecent liberties with children,” which only prohibits behavior like propositioning a child for sex, which resulted in a shorter prison sentence. Both crimes generally put an offender on the highest tier of the sex-offender registry for life, but for carnal knowledge convictions, an offender less than five years older than his victim may be removed from the registry in time. Doe, in his 30s, sought removal from the registry, raising an equal protection claim and an Eighth Amendment claim, arguing that a lifelong registration is not an appropriate sanction for a single nonviolent crime committed by a high-school student.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the suit. Virginia’s sex-offender registry complies with the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Even if Doe is similarly situated to an offender convicted of carnal knowledge, the differential treatment between the offenders satisfies rational-basis scrutiny. The government has a legitimate interest in not imposing its harshest collateral consequences on children. The registry is a regulatory scheme, not a punishment for Eighth Amendment purposes. View "Doe v. Settle" on Justia Law

Nine parents of students with disabilities who attend South Carolina public schools and two disability advocacy organizations filed suit challenging a South Carolina provision in the South Carolina state budget that prohibits school districts from using appropriated funds to impose mask mandates. The district court granted a preliminary injunction enjoining the law's enforcement.The Fourth Circuit concluded that the parents and the disability advocacy organizations lack standing to sue the governor and the attorney general, and thus vacated the district court's order granting the preliminary injunction as to those defendants. In this case, although plaintiffs have alleged a nexus between their claimed injuries and the Proviso, they have not established that such injuries are fairly traceable to defendants' conduct or would be redressed by a favorable ruling against defendants. Accordingly, the court remanded with instructions to dismiss defendants from this case. View "Disability Rights South Carolina v. McMaster" on Justia Law

Nadendla, a physician, is of Indian origin. Nadendla was a member of WakeMed’s hospital's medical staff where she was granted clinical privileges in 2010, In 2017, citing “clinical concerns,” WakeMed informed Nadendla that she would not be reappointed clinical privileges; her appointment on the medical staff would expire. Nadendla requested a hearing, pursuant to the Bylaws. She alleges that WakeMed’s actions during the hearing process “exhibited an abject lack of fairness” and deprived her of adequate process in contravention of the Bylaws.Nadendla sued the hospital under 42 U.S.C. 1981, which guarantees to all persons in the United States “the same right . . . to make and enforce contracts . . . as is enjoyed by white citizens.’” The district court initially ruled that Nadendla sufficiently stated a section 1981 claim and state-law claims for breach of contract and for arbitrary and capricious conduct, but subsequently dismissed Nadendla’s section 1981 claim. The Fourth Circuit affirmed in part. The district court had the discretion to revisit its prior order and did not abuse its discretion in doing so. The complaint contained extensive, specific allegations regarding WakeMed’s failure to abide by the Bylaws but details regarding race are conspicuously absent. The court reversed the dismissal of Nadendla’s claim for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. View "Nadendla v. WakeMed" on Justia Law

North Carolina inmate Moskos asked Officer Hardee for permission to cross the prison yard to get cold water. Hardee denied this request. Shortly thereafter, Moskos encountered Officer Butler, who allowed him to use a nearby cooler. Returning, Moskos encountered Hardee again. According to Butler and Hardee, Moskos attacked Hardee. Officer Horne ran to the scene and used pepper spray when Moskos refused to stop. According to Moskos, he had threatened to file a grievance against Hardee and Hardee struck him in the head without warning. Moskos complained that his eyes were burning, and according to an officer, he was given a shower within 30-45 minutes, subjected to a full medical assessment, then transferred to a medical center. Moskos disputes the timing and claims that when he returned from the hospital, he was placed in a segregation unit with horrible conditions and not allowed to shower or shave for about 20 days. Moskos was found guilty of assault on an officer, profane language, and disobeying an order. He lost 15 good-credit days, was sentenced to 60 days in segregation, and was transferred to a maximum-level security facility,Moskos unsuccessfully submitted a prison grievance then filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Fourth Circuit affirmed judgment as a matter of law for the defendants on his deliberate indifference and due process claims and a defense jury verdict on the remaining claims. View "Moskos v. Hardee" on Justia Law

Porter was convicted of capital murder in Virginia state court for killing a police officer in 2005. He was sentenced to death. After unsuccessfully pursuing direct and collateral review of his conviction and sentence in state court, Porter filed a 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition in 2012, asserting claims of actual juror bias and that juror Treakle failed to disclose in response to voir dire questioning that his brother, Pernell was a law enforcement officer. The district court dismissed the petition without an evidentiary hearing or any further discovery. The Fourth Circuit remanded. The district court again dismissed without an evidentiary hearing or any discovery. The Fourth Circuit again remanded. Discovery following remand revealed that Juror Treakle also withheld information in response to other voir dire questions about being the victim of a violent crime and about whether relatives had ever been arrested or prosecuted.The Fourth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief, deferring to the district court’s finding that the juror was credible when he testified that he did not intentionally withhold information in response to those questions. Porter did not establish that Juror Treakle would have been dismissed for cause if he had not withheld any information in response to the voir dire questions. View "Porter v. White" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254, seeking to apply retroactively a federal procedural rule first announced in 2019 to overturn the result of his state disciplinary proceedings that took place in 2015. At issue is whether the principles articulated in Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989), prohibiting the retroactive application of procedural rules on federal collateral review, apply to bar the inmate's effort in the circumstances of this case.The Fourth Circuit concluded that the retroactivity principles stated in Teague do indeed apply and that they preclude retroactive application of Lennear v. Wilson, 937 F.3d 257, 273–74 (4th Cir. 2019), to this case. The court concluded that Virginia made judicial relief available, even though no Virginia court addressed the relief claimed, and thus petitioner's assertion that the district court was his only "opportunity" for judicial review is a misstatement. Furthermore, defendant's argument that federal habeas review in this case is "direct review" in which new procedural rules apply is also not legally supportable. In regard to petitioner's alternative argument, the court concluded that, at bottom, petitioner's section 2254 petition is a federal collateral proceeding, not direct review of a state administrative proceeding, and therefore Teague's principle that a new procedural rule does not apply retroactively on federal collateral review governs. In this case, the court concluded that all the requirements of Teague have been met. The court rejected petitioner's remaining arguments and affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief. View "Wall v. Kiser" on Justia Law

The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for habeas relief and petitioner's accompanying request for supplemental expert funding. The court granted a Certificate of Appealability (COA) on five issues.The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying petitioner's supplemental expert funding request. In regard to petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC), the court concluded that petitioner's jury sentencing claim was without merit and there is no flaw in the district court's conclusion that the record establishes that petitioner was fully advised of his rights to a jury trial and sentencing, as well as the possibility that a jury could sentence him to life; the district court did not err in denying relief on petitioner's mitigation evidence claim where petitioner could not overcome the procedural bar for his defaulted subclaims and the evidence does not fundamentally alter his claim; counsel's performance in investigating and presenting mitigation evidence was not deficient and petitioner failed to establish prejudice; the record leaves no doubt that petitioner admitted to two aggravating circumstances in his guilty plea and knowingly and voluntarily waived any challenge to judicial factfinding by the trial court and that challenge would have been futile; and petitioner procedurally defaulted his guilty plea claim. View "Mahdi v. Stirling" on Justia Law