Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff-Appellant brought suit against Defendant-Appellee the City of Salem, Virginia, alleging that Salem failed to promote her based on her age, in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). Bandy sought a booking-coordinator position at the Salem Civic Center (the Center), but Salem passed her up and instead hired a significantly younger candidate. Following discovery, Salem moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted. Plaintiff appealed.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the finding that no reasonable jury could find that Salem did not promote Plaintiff because of her age. The court explained that Plaintiff asserted that her employer preferred to hire “young men” and “stacked” the interview committee against her by excluding human resources representatives. These assertions amount to little more than speculation. Human resources remained involved in the hiring process and screened every applicant to ensure that they were minimally qualified. Moreover, Plaintiff was not even among the top three candidates for the position, and one of the candidates ranked ahead of her was, in fact, a woman older than her. Crucially, the evidence demonstrated that the interview committee hired the other employee over Plaintiff for a number of legitimate reasons: his job experience, particularly in promotion and marketing; higher education in sports, communication, and executive leadership; sales background; enthusiasm; and preparation. View "Tammy Bandy v. City of Salem, Virginia" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought suit against Defendant the National Railroad Passenger Corporation (“Amtrak”), alleging that Amtrak suspended and subsequently terminated him based on his race in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. Section 1981. Following discovery, Amtrak moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted. Plaintiff appealed.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court held that the district court properly granted summary judgment to Amtrak because Plaintiff failed to present a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether Amtrak suspended and terminated him based on race. The court reasoned that Amtrak “considers insubordination a terminable offense due to its severity and adverse impact in the workplace.” As such, Plaintiff did not demonstrate a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether he satisfactorily performed his job duties. Further, Plaintiff did not show that he was treated differently than other similarly situated employees outside his protected class. View "Duncan Giles v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation" on Justia Law

This case asks whether a town’s alleged policy that bans video livestreaming certain interactions with law enforcement violates the First Amendment. It also asks whether a police officer who, during a traffic stop, attempted to stop a passenger from livestreaming the encounter may be successfully sued under Section 1983. Plaintiff sued under Section 1983. He sued the officers in their official capacities—effectively suing the Town of Winterville—for allegedly having a policy that prohibits recording and livestreaming public police interactions in violation of the First Amendment. He also sued an Officer in his individual capacity. The district court awarded Defendants judgment on the pleadings after finding that the policy did not violate the First Amendment. The court dismissed the individual-capacity claim.   The Fourth Circuit vacated in part and affirmed in part. The court reasoned that Plaintiffs seeking redress under Section 1983 for a violation of their constitutional rights must walk through a narrow gate. The doctrines of qualified immunity and Monell liability for local governments substantially diminish their chances. Here, faithful application of the doctrines leads to divergent results. Plaintiff’s has sufficiently alleged that the Town has a policy barring livestreaming one’s own traffic stop that violates the First Amendment. He must now show this policy exists. And, if it does, the Town will have the chance to prove that it does not violate the First Amendment. On the other hand, although the Officer was allegedly acting under the policy that plausibly violates the First Amendment, Plaintiff’s claim against him in his personal capacity fails. View "Dijon Sharpe v. Winterville Police Department" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was an inmate at Sussex I State Prison (SISP) in 2017. A female correctional officer at SISP charged Plaintiff with a disciplinary offense, alleging that he directed lewd behavior toward her in the prison showers. Plaintiff denied the allegation, contending that security-camera footage would vindicate him. Subsequent to what Plaintiff alleged was a defective disciplinary-hearing process, prison officials found that he committed the offense and transferred him to a maximum-security facility. Based on the defects that Plaintiff perceived in the hearing process and subsequent transfer, he commenced a pro se civil action, levying a procedural due process claim and a First Amendment retaliation claim against Defendants collectively, the “Prison Officials”). The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s procedural due process claim, then granted summary judgment—pre-discovery—in favor of the Prison Officials on the remaining First Amendment retaliation claim. Defendant appealed.   The Fourth Circuit reversed. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by granting summary judgment pre-discovery. Plaintiff properly received a Roseboro notice, explaining his rights to file competing affidavits and other evidence in response to the Prison Officials’ pre-discovery summary judgment motion. Plaintiff failed to respond with such evidentiary filings—or with a Rule 56(d) affidavit. But the district court was on fair notice of potential disputes as to the sufficiency of the summary judgment record. Accordingly, the court wrote that Plaintiff plausibly alleged a violation of his procedural due process rights such that dismissal at the pleading stage was inappropriate. Pre-discovery summary judgment on his First Amendment retaliation claim was likewise inappropriate. View "Emmanuel Shaw v. T. Foreman" on Justia Law

Plaintiff claimed Atlas Box and Crating Company, fired him because of his race. Allen filed charges with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission against Atlas and the staffing agency, and concedes he received right-to-sue letters by August 8, 2018. Plaintiff, acting pro se, delivered four documents to the clerk of the district court. The applications were stamped “filed” and entered as filed motions on the district court’s electronic docket. On November 8, 2018—92 days after Plaintiff received the right-to-sue letters—a magistrate judge recommended denying the motions for relief from the filing fee. Four days after Plaintiff paid the filing fee and 131 days after he received the right-to-sue letters—the district court directed the clerk to file Plaintiff’s complaint. Eight months later, the district court granted summary judgment for Defendants on the ground that Plaintiff’s action was time-barred. The district court concluded Plaintiff was not entitled to equitable tolling.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment. The court held that Plaintiff commenced this action within the statutory period by timely delivering a complaint to the district court clerk. Because he did so, no consideration of equitable tolling is necessary. The court held that an action under federal law is commenced for limitations purposes when a plaintiff delivers a complaint to the district court clerk—regardless of whether the plaintiff pays the filing fee, neglects to do so, or asks to be excused from the fee requirement. View "Andrew Allen v. Atlas Box and Crating Co., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Alive Church of the Nazarene, Inc. (the “Church”) purchased 17 acres of land — zoned primarily for agricultural use — on which the Church sought to conduct religious assemblies. After Defendant Prince William County, Virginia (the “County”), denied the Church’s request to worship on its property before the Church complied with the zoning requirements, the Church initiated a lawsuit in district court. By its Complaint, the Church has alleged six claims against the County — three claims under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (“RLUIPA”), and three federal constitutional claims. For reasons explained in its Memorandum Opinion of November 2021, the district court dismissed those claims pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that allowing religious institutions to conduct worship services does not further the purpose of the Agricultural Zoning Ordinance — that is, to promote farming. Specific to the Church, allowing services would not increase its ability to continue farming its land. Accordingly, the court wrote it cannot agree with the Church that it is similarly situated to farm wineries and limited-license breweries with regard to the Ordinance. The Church has failed to meet its initial burden of proof by providing a similarly situated comparator with which it has been treated unequally, and has thereby failed to state an RLUIPA equal terms claim. View "Alive Church of the Nazarene, Inc. v. Prince William County, Virginia" on Justia Law

Plaintiff’s father died of carbon monoxide poisoning in his apartment at Allen Benedict Court Apartments, a housing complex owned and maintained by the City of Columbia Housing Authority. The city police and fire chiefs concluded that the cause of the man’s death was a faulty, thirty-year-old furnace that had caused carbon monoxide to leak into his apartment, as well as several others. Plaintiff and the personal representative of his estate appealed the district court’s dismissal of her complaint against the City of Columbia Housing Authority (“Housing Authority”) for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.   The Fourth Circuit reversed, concluding that Plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to plead a Section 1983 claim against the Housing Authority. The court wrote that Plaintiff has alleged enough facts at this early stage to establish that the Housing Authority recognized the risk of carbon monoxide poisoning and acted inappropriately in light of that risk. By affirmatively adopting regulations recognizing the life-threatening danger of missing carbon monoxide detectors, the Housing Authority demonstrated that it knew the risk of harm that the man faced. Specifically, the Housing Authority failed to install a single carbon monoxide detector at the man’s 244-unit complex. It provided no preventative maintenance of appliances. In sum, at this early stage, Plaintiff has alleged sufficient facts to establish that the Housing Authority’s policies and customs were the moving force behind the constitutional injury. View "Danielle Washington v. Housing Authority of the City of Columbia" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the mother of a minor child with special needs, brings this action for attorney’s fees under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”). The IDEA allows parents who prevail in state administrative proceedings challenging their children’s individualized education programs to recover attorney’s fees in federal court. But Plaintiff did not file her claim for fees until almost two years after her administrative hearing, and the district court dismissed her case as untimely. The district court concluded that a standalone fees action like Plaintiff’s is most comparable to an IDEA claim for substantive judicial review of an adverse administrative determination. And because Virginia, where Plaintiff lives, sets a 180-day limitations period for such substantive IDEA claims, the court deemed her claim time-barred.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the IDEA contains no express statute of limitations for attorney’s fees actions, so courts must “borrow” an appropriate limitations period from state law. The court wrote that Va. Code Section 22.1-214(D), by allowing parties 180 days to seek substantive judicial review of IDEA due process hearings, provides an appropriate – even generous – analog to attorney’s fees actions under 20 U.S.C. Section 1415(i)(3)(B). The court also agreed with the district court that his 180-day limitations period does not begin to run until after the aggrieved party’s time to seek substantive review has expired, meaning that a party has 360 days from the date of the administrative decision to commence a fees action. View "Jemie Sanchez v. Arlington County School Board" on Justia Law

Plaintiff a longtime employee of the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality (“DEQ”), commenced this action against DEQ, claiming that it paid her less than it paid a male employee with the same position doing equal work, in violation of the Equal Pay Act. The district court entered summary judgment against Plaintiff, concluding that she lacked evidence to demonstrate that any higher-paid male employee was doing work “virtually identical” to the work she was doing. Indeed, the court explained that the record showed that the male employee whom Plaintiff had identified as a comparator was doing different and more complex work than she was, such that she could not show that she was paid less for equal work.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that the district court did not err in concluding that Plaintiff could not establish that she and the male employee performed “equal work.” To be sure, Plaintiff and the male employee performed similar work. But the differences in the actual work performed and the level of complexity involved were significant enough that their work cannot be fairly described as “substantially equal” or “virtually identical,” as required to establish a claim under the Equal Pay Act. View "Elizabeth Polak v. Virginia Department of Environmental Quality" on Justia Law

Plaintiff spent nearly three months in Middle River Regional Jail. And he alleges that Middle River’s practices during that time substantially burdened his Islamic faith while unconstitutionally favoring the practice of Christianity. He argues that he was kept from engaging in Friday Prayer.   Plaintiff’s claims regarding Friday Prayer implicate the Free Exercise Clause. Under that clause, prisons can impose burdens on inmates’ religious practice— even substantial burdens—so long as the prison rules that do so are “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Middle River had three rules in place that kept Plaintiff from attending in-person Friday Prayer: no inmate led groups; no maximum-security prisoners allowed in any in-person groups; and prisoner services and classes by volunteer or donation only.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s Free Exercise decision and remanded for further proceedings on the Establishment Clause. The court explained that Middle River’s policies do not violate the Free Exercise Clause. Each of the rules and regulations that combined to keep Plaintiff from engaging in communal Friday Prayer during his brief stay was reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest and, therefore, acceptable under Turner. Whether the challenged practices violate the Establishment Clause is a question best left to the district court to resolve in the first instance, with the benefit of intervening legal developments. View "David Firewalker-Fields v. Jack Lee" on Justia Law