Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a now-retired Special Agent with the United States Secret Service, filed a civil suit against two United States Park Police officers (“officers”) under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Plaintiff asserted that the officers violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment by unlawfully seizing him during two traffic stops. A jury found the officers liable for Plaintiff’s emotional injuries resulting from the constitutional violations and awarded him a total of $205,000 in compensatory damages and $525,000 in punitive damages. The district court entered final judgment in accordance with the jury verdict and later denied the officers’ post-trial motions seeking judgment as a matter of law or a new trial.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that Plaintiff presented a cognizable Bivens claim because his claim is not meaningfully different from the claim asserted in Bivens. Both cases involved allegations of unjustified, warrantless seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment committed by federal “line” officers conducting routine police work. Also, the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity. They violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights by significantly prolonging the initial stop without justification and by initiating a second, unjustified stop. This constitutional right to be free from such unlawful seizures was clearly established at the time the seizures occurred. Further, the court held that Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence of emotional injury to support the compensatory damage award, and the punitive damages award was not excessive. View "Nathaniel Hicks v. Gerald Ferreyra" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a petition asserting that Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools (CMS) failed to provide her daughter, A.C., with a free appropriate public education in violation of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). An administrative law judge (ALJ) ruled for Plaintiff on two of the seven issues she had raised but against her on all others. Plaintiff sought review contending that the ALJ had improperly delegated the remedy for the two issues and erred in deciding the rest. Plaintiff further argued that the ALJ’s adverse findings were not entitled to deference. The district court granted summary judgment to CMS.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that based on the extensive process Plaintiff received in the handling of her case, as well as the detail provided in the ALJ’s written decision, the court concluded that the ALJ’s findings were regularly made. The court further held that the district court was correct to accord those findings deference and to determine that Plaintiff failed to prevail by a preponderance of the evidence on the five issues she disputes. While the deference in these cases is owed the ALJ, it is not remiss to point out that the district court likewise proceeded with its own thorough review in a lengthy opinion. Plaintiff does not persuasively challenge the court’s decision on appeal. Further, the court wrote, it discerns no abuse of remedial discretion on the part of the district court in allowing the respondent to fashion “benchmark(s) and criteria” in A.C.’s IEP indicating when she may move on from Metro School. View "Hind Bouabid v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools Board of Education" on Justia Law

Lincare, Inc. terminated Plaintiff, concluding that she had violated Lincare’s “Corporate Health Care Law Compliance Program” and “Code of Conduct.” While Plaintiff does not dispute her conduct, she contends that Lincare discriminated against her on the basis of sex because it gave a fellow male employee, who had engaged in similar conduct, only a “final written warning.” Plaintiff filed suit alleging violations of the West Virginia Human Rights Act. The district court found Lincare liable to Plaintiff and awarded her damages. On appeal, Lincare contends that there was no evidence of discrimination on the basis of sex and that, therefore the district court’s finding that it violated the Human Rights Act was clearly erroneous. Plaintiff cross-appealed, contending that the district court erred in determining her compensatory damages award.   The Fourth Circuit reversed. The court explained that while the district court’s findings are entitled to substantial deference, the core evidence showed that Plaintiff was fired by a woman and replaced by a woman and that, during the entire process, there was no indication that gender was even remotely a factor in Lincare’s decision. The only explanation Plaintiff offered to substantiate the claim that Lincare had discriminated against her on the basis of sex was her “belief” that she and her comparator “were doing the same thing” and the fact that “he’s a man; [she’s] a woman.” The court wrote that Plaintiff failed to present evidence sufficient for a factfinder to conclude that it was the product of discrimination based on sex. View "Chandra Balderson v. Lincare Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner, an employee of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement division of the Department of Homeland Security (“ICE” or “Agency”), petitions for review of the final judgment of the Merit Systems Protection Board (the “Board”), which rejected Petitioner’s claim that the Agency suspended him for two days in retaliation for his disclosures of misconduct.   The Fourth Circuit denied the petition. The court explained that after conducting a hearing and considering the evidence, the administrative judge denied the corrective action sought by Petitioner, concluding that Petitioner’s protected disclosures were not contributing factors to the discipline imposed and, alternatively, that the Agency proved by clear and convincing evidence that it would have taken the action even in the absence of the disclosures. The court denied the petition explaining that the administrative judge committed no legal error and his factual findings are supported by substantial evidence. View "Yuriy Mikhaylov v. Dept. of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

Following an investigation by the North Carolina Innocence Inquiry Commission and the testing of DNA evidence, a state court vacated Plaintiffs-brothers’ convictions, finding significant evidence of innocence. North Carolina Governor Patrick McCrory granted each a “Pardon of Innocence.” When they were released, they had served 31 years in prison. Through appointed guardians, the two commenced this action against six law enforcement officers, the town of Red Springs, and Robeson County under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 for violations of their due process rights. The jury awarded Plaintiffs a total of $62 million in compensatory damages and $13 million in punitive damages.   On appeal, Defendants challenged (1) the district court’s conduct of the trial on several procedural grounds, arguing that they were denied a fair trial and that the district court, therefore, erred in denying their motion for a new trial; (2) the court’s refusal to reduce the jury’s verdict by the $11.5 million that the Plaintiffs had received from others as redress for their injuries prior to the verdict; (3) the court’s addition of $36 million in prejudgment interest to the jury’s award; and (4) the reasonableness of the court’s award of attorneys fees.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order denying Defendants’ motion for a new trial; vacated its order denying Defendants’ motion to reduce the jury’s compensatory damages award, and directed that the court reduce the award by $10 million and determine whether the award should be reduced by another $1.5 million; reversed the court’s order awarding prejudgment interest; and affirmed the court’s award of attorneys fees and costs. View "J. Gilliam v. Leroy Allen" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, on behalf of the Estate of former federal inmate brought suit against the United States and several Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) officials after the decedent was allegedly beaten to death by fellow inmates. The Estate (“Appellant”) alleges that BOP officials violated the Eighth Amendment by failing to protect the decedent from the attack and failing to intervene to prevent his transfer to a “violent” facility. Appellant also sued the United States pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”), alleging that prison officials had been negligent in their failure to intervene and protect the decedent. Appellant argues that its Eighth Amendment claims are cognizable under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) and its progeny.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that the Appellant’s Bivens claims arise in a new context and that several special factors, including separation-of-power implications and an increased burden on the federal prison system, counsel against an extension of Bivens in this new context. The court also concluded that the discretionary function exception to the FTCA applies to BOP officials’ decisions to transfer Bulger and place him in general population. View "William Bulger v. Hugh Hurwitz" on Justia Law

On March 20, Plaintiff, an inmate, experienced abdominal pain, nausea, and vomiting. He was transported to an outside hospital for evaluation and testing. The results were deemed “unremarkable,” and Plaintiff was returned to his home institution. Ultimately, Plaintiff was diagnosed with an abdominal infection due to a small bowel obstruction and alleged permanent injury.Plaintiff brought a claim of deliberate indifference against various prison officials ("Defendants"). The district court dismisses Plaintiff's claim under 12(b)(6). Defendants argued that Plaintiff's “generalized, conclusory, and collective allegations” fail to plausibly allege deliberate indifference on the part of each Defendant.The Fourth Circuit affirmed. Plaintiff's complaint made collective allegations against all “Defendants,” without identifying how each individual Defendant personally interacted with Langford or was responsible for the denial of his Eighth Amendment rights. View "Chad Langford v. Hector Joyner" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his claim against TrustedID, Inc. under South Carolina’s Financial Identity Fraud and Identity Theft Protection Act (the “Act”), S.C. Code Ann. Section 37-20-180. The district court held that Plaintiff alleged an Article III injury in fact but failed to state a claim under the Act. Plaintiff agrees with the district court’s decision on standing but appeals its Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.   The Fourth Circuit vacated and remanded with instructions to remand this case to state court where it originated. The court conceded that it is odd that TrustedID failed to comply with the five-digit SSN cutoff, which doesn’t appear to be unique to South Carolina’s Act. But federal courts can’t entertain a case without a concrete injury in fact. The court offered no opinion about whether the alleged facts state a claim under the Act. Absent Article III jurisdiction, that’s a question for Plaintiff to take up in state court. View "Brady O'Leary v. TrustedID, Inc." on Justia Law

Defendant Deputy Sheriff cited Plaintiff for a parking violation. In response, Plaintiff complained about Defendant on social media for issuing the citation. Listening to her police radio, Defendant heard about another Deputy’s encounter with Plaintiff. She then called that Deputy and offered to buy him lunch if he cited Plaintiff. After the Deputy cited her, Plaintiff learned of Defendant’s lunch offer. So she sued Defendant in her personal capacity under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant’s lunch offer violated her First Amendment rights. Defendant made this offer, Plaintiff asserted, to retaliate against Plaintiff for her earlier complaints about Defendant. But the jury found Defendant not liable, leading to Plaintiff’s appeal. She now claims that the district court erred in instructing the jury on the applicable standard for First Amendment retaliation and in excluding certain witness testimony during the trial’s liability phase.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. The court explained that Plaintiff would have preferred to call additional witnesses to bolster her testimony. But the district court had to balance that interest with the fact that, under the court’s precedent, the inquiry into the second element of the test set forth in Constantine—“whether a person of ordinary firmness in the plaintiff’s position would likely be deterred by the defendant’s retaliatory conduct”—is an objective analysis. Thus, the court affirmed the jury’s verdict and the judgment of the district court in favor of Defendant. View "Rebecca Snoeyenbos v. Marcia Curtis" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a self-professed “tester” who has filed hundreds of similar lawsuits throughout the country under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”). Plaintiff complained about hotel reservation websites that do not allow for reservation of accessible guest rooms or provide sufficient accessibility information. Here, the defendant is Naranda Hotels, LLC, the owner of the Sleep Inn & Suites Downtown Inner Harbor in Baltimore. The district court dismissed Laufer’s ADA claim against Naranda for lack of Article III standing to sue.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and remanded. The court concluded that Plaintiff’s allegation of an informational injury accords her Article III standing to pursue her ADA claim against Naranda and to seek injunctive relief-whether or not she ever had a definite and credible plan to travel to the Baltimore area. The court also recognized that its decision appears to even the split among the courts of appeals at 3-3 — three circuits that have ruled in Plaintiff’s favor based on an informational or stigmatic injury, and three that have ruled against her and similarly situated plaintiff. View "Deborah Laufer v. Naranda Hotels, LLC" on Justia Law