Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Speech First, Inc., which identifies itself as a national organization committed to protecting the rights of college students, initiated this action against the President of the Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University (Virginia Tech or the University). Speech First asserts that two Virginia Tech policies — the Bias Intervention and Response Team Policy (the Bias Policy) and the Informational Activities Policy — violate the First Amendment rights of its student members. Speech First asked the district court to preliminarily enjoin both policies. The district court held that Speech First (1) lacked standing to challenge the Bias Policy because its members had suffered no injury in fact, and (2) failed to demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits as to the Informational Activities Policy because the record was, at that time, inadequate as to that policy. Speech First appealed.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Speech First offers only speculation in support of its argument that it has suffered an injury in fact. Because the district court’s factual findings make clear that no record evidence establishes any such injury, the organization has failed to establish an injury in fact and so lacks standing to challenge the Bias Policy. The court explained that once this case is returned to the district court, and after further factual development has taken place, it will be for that court to determine in the first instance whether the Informational Activities Policy complies with the First Amendment. Without a developed record, the district court did not err in determining that Speech First has not yet shown that it is likely to succeed on the merits. View "Speech First, Inc. v. Timothy Sands" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was convicted of a double murder in Durham, North Carolina. But after new exculpatory DNA evidence was discovered, a state superior court judge vacated Plaintiff’s conviction, and he was released after 21 years in prison. Plaintiff then filed this civil rights action for his wrongful conviction. Ultimately, a jury found that former Durham Police Department Officer violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights during the murder investigation, and it awarded Plaintiff $6 million. On appeal, Plaintiff asked the Fourth Circuit to reverse the district court’s dismissal on summary judgment of his claims against the City of Durham and two other officers. He also sought a new damages trial, arguing that the jury’s award was impacted by improper character evidence. On cross-appeal, Defendant asked the court to set aside the jury verdict and remand for a new trial.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the jury verdict against the former police officer and the dismissal of the claims against the City; however, the court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the two other officers and remanded for further proceedings on those claims. The court explained that the jury could find that by not turning over the video of an alternative suspect making incriminating statements or their notes related to that interview, the two officers intentionally hid evidence from Plaintiff in his innocence proceedings—evidence that cast serious doubts on his conviction and, potentially, on DPD’s underlying investigation. The court wrote that any competing testimony is a credibility issue that should be left to the jury View "Darryl Howard v. City of Durham" on Justia Law

In 2017, when Plaintiff was in elementary school, he was diagnosed with autism spectrum disorder, language disorder, and anxiety. Between 2017 and 2021, Plaintiff's parents asked Defendant School District at least four times to allow Plaintiff to be accompanied at school by an ABA therapist, at no cost to the school district. The school district denied the first three requests and did not respond to the fourth request.Plaintiff's father filed a three-count complaint against the school under the Rehabilitation Act on behalf of his child. The complaint did not mention the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act. The district court denied Plaintiff's claim based on his failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Plaintiff appealed.The Fourth Circuit held that the district court erred in concluding Plaintiff needed to exhaust administrative remedies under the IDEA before bringing this suit because his complaint was not brought under the IDEA. View "Z. W. v. Horry County School District" on Justia Law

At issue is whether the admissions policy (hereinafter the “challenged admissions policy” or the “Policy”) adopted by Virginia’s Fairfax County School Board (the “Board”) in 2020 for use at Thomas Jefferson High School for Science & Technology (“TJ”) purposefully discriminates against Asian American students, in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. In March 2021, the Coalition for TJ (the “Coalition”) — an advocacy organization of Fairfax County public school parents — commenced this litigation against the Board in the Eastern District of Virginia, seeking to have the challenged admissions policy invalidated as unconstitutional. In February 2022, following the submission by the parties of cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court ruled that the challenged admissions policy violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee of equal protection.   The Fourth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded for entry of summary judgment in favor of the Board. The court held that it is satisfied that the challenged admissions policy does not disparately impact Asian American students and that the Coalition cannot establish that the Board adopted its race-neutral policy with any discriminatory intent. Moreover, the court wrote that it is satisfied that the policy passes constitutional muster under a rational basis standard of review. Accordingly, it is the Board — not the Coalition — that is entitled to summary judgment on the Equal Protection claim. View "Coalition for TJ v. Fairfax County School Board" on Justia Law

A criminal complaint was filed against Appellant. On May 20, 2009, a certificate of mental disease or defect and dangerousness issued pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 4246. Appellant’s mental condition improved with treatment. The district court ordered his conditional discharge. Appellant returned home and lived with his mother after conditional discharge. The district court revoked the term and recommitted him. This appeal presents two consequential questions. Both relate to the continued involuntary commitment of those afflicted with a mental illness. A commitment wrongly perpetuated is an unwarranted restraint of liberty; a commitment errantly discontinued poses a danger to the committee and the public.   The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. The court explained that the record is unclear whether the district court’s findings were made by a preponderance of the evidence. It also appears from the record that the district court collapsed both inquiries of Section 4246(f) into a single question, focusing only on whether Appellant violated the conditions of his release and not explaining why “in light of” those violations his continued release created a substantial risk to other persons or property. Additionally, the record would benefit from further development respecting the violations alleged and the available, recent records from the facility. Further, the court wrote that the government should take note of its evidentiary burden, develop evidence on the point, and provide the district court a sound basis for making reasoned findings on the matter of dangerousness for that particular alleged violation. View "US v. Christopher Perkins" on Justia Law

This case involves an appeal by the Charlotte-Mecklenburg County Board of Education (“CMS”) and cross-appeal by Plaintiff, individually and on behalf of his child, A.B. Plaintiff filed an administrative action in North Carolina, alleging that CMS violated the Individuals with Disabilities Act (“IDEA”), by failing to provide A.B. with a free appropriate public education (“FAPE”) through an individualized education plan (“IEP”). The administrative law judge (“ALJ”) dismissed Plaintiff’s action as time-barred by a one-year statute of limitations. CMS filed an original civil action in district court, seeking a judicial determination that the statute of limitations barred Plaintiff’s administrative action. Plaintiff and A.B. filed a counterclaim, asking the district court to decide the merits of the underlying IDEA claim. The district court agreed with the SHRO and held that the statute of limitations did not bar Plaintiff’s IDEA claim, but it held that Plaintiff needed to exhaust his administrative remedies before bringing the merits to federal court. Both parties appealed.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding as to CMS’s appeal and held that the statute of limitations does not bar Plaintiff’s IDEA claim. But, because Plaintiff’s counterclaim is compulsory, the court concluded that he need not exhaust. Therefore, the court reversed on that issue and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. The court explained that the Plaintiff was prevented from filing a timely administrative petition because CMS withheld information it was required to provide him. Therefore, his IDEA petition was not barred by the statute of limitations. View "Charlotte-Mecklenburg County Board of Education v. Aleah Brady" on Justia Law

Virginia police responded to a 911 call seeking help to locate Plaintiff, who they were told was potentially armed and suicidal. After failing to find Plaintiff in his house, two officers and a K-9 searched the surrounding woods. The dog quickly caught Plaintiff’s scent, leading officers to find him lying in a shallow ditch. Bodycam footage shows the subsequent heated encounter, with officers demanding Plaintiff turn around and Plaintiff angrily ordering them to leave. After a two-minute impasse, an officer twice released the dog, who bit Plaintiff and caused a severe injury. The officers ultimately discovered Plaintiff didn’t have a gun. Plaintiff sued under state law and 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging, among other things, violations of his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court denied the K-9 officer’s summary-judgment motion asserting qualified immunity, holding that the undisputed facts didn’t establish whether the officer had a reasonable belief that Plaintiff was armed.   The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity to the K-9 officer on the excessive-force count and remanded with instructions that the court enters judgment for him on that count. The court explained that while the bodycam video alone may not illuminate whether the officer had a reasonable belief that Plaintiff was armed, the full record clarifies that this assumption was reasonable. Given that, the officer’s use of his dog to seize Plaintiff didn’t violate the Fourth Amendment. View "Dillard Putman v. Quentin Harris" on Justia Law

Plaintiff signed a one-year contract to teach criminal justice courses at Spartanburg Methodist College (SMC). Less than a year later, SMC decided not to renew Plaintiff’s contract and terminated her shortly thereafter. Plaintiff brought a mix of state and federal law claims against SMC, essentially arguing that her contract nonrenewal and termination were unlawful. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of SMC on all federal claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. Plaintiff appealed. Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), Plaintiff accused SMC of discrimination, retaliation, and engaging in an unlawful health inquiry. Under Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972 (Title IX), she accused SMC of retaliation.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that in analyzing the case, it becomes clear that Plaintiff’s retaliation claims cannot succeed. SMC offers nonretaliatory reasons for not renewing Plaintiff’s contract and terminating her employment, and she is unable to demonstrate that SMC’s reasons are pretextual. Further, the court explained that Plaintiff’s claim of pretext is undermined by the fact that the primary decision-makers at SMC were not aware of Plaintiff’s ADA or Title IX-protected activity. Second, any notion of pretext is further dispelled by the fact that SMC’s explanations have been consistent throughout. Moreover, the court explained that Plaintiff cannot show that SMC refused to make an accommodation because she cannot show that she ever properly requested one. Her failure-to-accommodate claim fails for this reason. View "Summer Lashley v. Spartanburg Methodist College" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a wrongful-termination action against her former employer—the North Carolina Department of Justice—and two former supervisors in their official and individual capacities. The district court dismissed some claims as barred by sovereign immunity and dismissed the entirety of the complaint as time-barred.   The Fourth Circuit affirmed the uncontested dismissal of the North Carolina Department of Justice and the uncontested dismissal of the official-capacity claims against the individual Defendants for money damages. But because the statute of limitations for the remaining claims is four years and not three years as the district court found, the court explained it must otherwise vacate the district court’s grant of Defendants’ motion to dismiss the individual Defendants from the action.   The court explained that here, Plaintiff brought a Section 1983 action for wrongful termination in violation of Section 1981. A wrongful termination claim is based on post-contract-formation conduct. The court reasoned that as Defendants correctly recognized at oral argument, it would not have been possible for Plaintiff to bring this action prior to December 1, 1990, because, before that date, Section 1981 was limited to discrimination in contract formation and enforcement. In 1991, Congress expanded Section 1981 to include discrimination post-contract formation. Therefore, the 1991 amendment to Section 1981 “made possible” this Section 1983 action, and the four-year catchall statute of limitations provided by Section 1658 applies. View "Margaret Chambers v. North Carolina Department of Justice" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was dismissed from the Univeristy of Virginia's doctoral program after receiving poor grades. Plaintiff sued, alleging national origin discrimination and retaliation based on interactions with his immediate supervisor. The district court granted the school's motion to dismiss and Plaintiff appealed.The Fourth Circuit affirmed, finding that although his supervisor made derogatory comments about Plaintiff's national origin, they were not made in close proximity to the school's decision to dismiss Plaintiff. The supervisor made a "handful" of comments over the course of four years, none of which were close in time to the Plaintiff receiving poor grades or being dismissed from the program. View "Andreas Alberti v. Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia" on Justia Law