Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s entry of summary judgment for Defendants in this case, holding that an objectively reasonable police officer in May 2013 could have concluded that a single use of a Taser to quell a nonviolent, mentally ill person who was resisting arrest did not violate the Fourth amendment and that, in any case, the officer here was shielded by qualified immunity.Plaintiff, a mentally ill person who was tased after absconding from the hospital to which she had been involuntarily committed, sued the officer and the Town of Athol, Massachusetts asserting causes of action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12131-65, along with supplemental state-law claims for, inter alia, assault and battery and malicious prosecution. The magistrate judge found no violation of the Fourth Amendment under section 1983 and no viable state-law claims, that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity, and that there was no violation of the ADA. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence to make out a jury question as to whether the officer used excessive force, but the officer was entitled to qualified immunity; and (2) Plaintiff was not entitled to relief on any of her remaining claims. View "Gray v. Cummings" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court dismissing Plaintiff’s claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and various state laws, holding that the district court properly dismissed Plaintiff’s claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).Plaintiff, a captain in the Chicopee Police Department, brought this action against the City, its police chief and mayor, a fellow police officer, and other defendants, alleging that his First Amendment rights were violated after Defendants improperly targeted him for “speaking out and participating in a government investigation.” The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claimed under Rule 12(b)(6). The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court (1) properly dismissed Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim because al of Plaintiff’s speech was made within the scope of his official duties rather than as a citizen; and (2) did not err in dismissing the state law claims. View "Gilbert v. City of Chicopee" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Employer on Plaintiff’s claims alleging handicap discrimination and retaliation under Massachusetts state law, holding that there was no probative evidence of discrimination or retaliation.While Employer maintained that Plaintiff was fired because she violated company policy on unexcused absences, Plaintiff argued in her claim that she was fired because of her disability and that Employer retaliated against her for filing a complaint with the Massachusetts Commission against Discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Employer. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that neither of Plaintiff’s claims could survive summary judgment. View "Miceli v. JetBlue Airways Corp." on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed in part and affirmed in part the district court’s grant of summary judgment to all Defendants on Plaintiff’s claims of discrimination, unlawful retaliation, and violations of the Equal Protection Clause and the First Amendment, holding that summary judgment was properly granted as to Rodney Bouffard and Troy Ross but improperly granted as to Correct Care Solutions, LLC (CCS) and Maine Department of Corrections (MDOC).Plaintiff was employed by CCS at a MDOC prison. After MDOC revoked Plaintiff’s prison security clearance and CCS terminated Plaintiff’s employment, Plaintiff sued CCS, MDOC, and Bouffard, the warden, and Ross, the deputy warden, bringing claims under the Maine Human Rights Act (MHRA) and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants on all claims. The First Circuit held (1) a reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff’s work environment was hostile; (2) summary judgment was properly granted in favor of the warden and deputy warden based on qualified immunity; (3) an employer can be liable for a hostile work environment created by non-employees as long as the employer knew of the harassment and failed to take reasonable steps to address it; and (4) summary judgment was improper was to MDOC and CCS. View "Roy v. Correct Care Solutions, LLC" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the order of the district court finding that an arbitration agreement between the parties in this case was enforceable, granting AT&T Mobility Puerto Rico, Inc.’s (AT&T) motion to compel arbitration and dismissing Nereida Rivera-Colon’s (Rivera) suit, holding that Rivera manifested her intent to accept the agreement to arbitrate legal grievances as per Puerto Rico law.Rivera filed suit against AT&T, her former employer, alleging age discrimination and wrongful termination. AT&T entered a special appearance and moved to stay the proceedings and compel arbitration. In response, Rivera argued that there was no valid arbitration agreement. The district court held that the arbitration agreement was enforceable and granted the motion to compel arbitration. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that, under Puerto Rico law, Rivera was bound by the arbitration agreement because she failed to opt out of the agreement. View "Rivera-Colon v. AT&T Mobility Puerto Rico, Inc." on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed in part and vacated and remanded in part the district court’s dismissal of Appellant’s complaint claiming that he was fired from his job in retaliation for accusing his employer of violating the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS) and making false representations in customer contracts, holding that Appellant plausibly pleaded that he engaged in protected conduct within the meaning of a False Claims Act (FCA) retaliation claim.The district court dismissed the complaint after finding that Appellant did not allege sufficient facts to show he was engaged in protected conduct within the meaning of the retaliation provision of the FCA. The First Circuit affirmed as to the contractual language claim but vacated and remanded as to the AKS claim, holding that Appellant plausibly pleaded that the concerns he raised about certain payments could have led to an FCA action. View "Guilfoile v. Shields" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant’s conviction and sentence without prejudice to his right to raise his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in a collateral proceeding brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2255, holding that Defendant’s ineffective assistance of counsel claim ought not to be aired for the first time on direct appeal.Defendant pleaded guilty to violating the Mann Act, 18 U.S.C. 2423(a) and was sentenced to a 327-month term of immurement. On appeal, Defendant argued for the first time that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that this case did not qualify for an exception to the general rule that an ineffective assistance of counsel claim must first be raised in the district court. View "United States v. Miller" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Appellant’s federal petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254, holding that the district court did not err in dismissing the petition.In his petition, Appellant challenged his convictions under Massachusetts law for murder and other offenses, arguing that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, in violation of the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The district court denied relief. Because Appellant’s case was adjudicated on the merits in state court, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (AEDPA) highly deferential standard of review applied. See 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). The First Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas relief, holding that any error on the part of counsel was not unsustainable under AEDPA’s deferential review standard. View "Walker v. Medeiros" on Justia Law

In this 42 U.S.C. 1983 case, the First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Kathy Bergeron, a corrections officer, holding that no reasonable juror could conclude that Bergeron was deliberately indifferent to the health and safety of Plaintiff, an inmate, under the Eighth Amendment based on the facts presented by Plaintiff.Plaintiff was severely beaten by other inmates in a cell at a medium-security prison. In his complaint, Plaintiff alleged that Bergeron was deliberately indifferent while doing a round, leading to a delay in his being provided with medical treatment, which exacerbated his injuries. The district court granted summary judgment for Bergeron. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to produce enough evidence for a jury to conclude that Bergeron had the requisite culpable state of mind of deliberate indifference to Plaintiff’s need for medical care. View "Leite v. Goulet" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court concluding that Plaintiff was not discriminated against but that Defendant’s decision to terminate her employment, rather than impose lesser discipline, was in retaliation for protected conduct, holding that the district court’s rulings were not erroneous or an abuse of discretion.In her complaint, Plaintiff, a former employee of the U.S. Postal Service, argued that her termination was unlawfully discriminatory due to her race and national origin and, independently, was in retaliation for her having filed earlier complaints. Defendant appealed the ruling that Defendant’s termination was in retaliation for protected conduct, and Plaintiff appealed the remedy awarded - back pay but not reinstatement or front pay. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that there was no error in the district court’s judgments. View "Anderson v. Brennan" on Justia Law