Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's convictions and dismissed without prejudice Defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, holding that Defendant was not entitled to relief on her allegations of error.Defendant was convicted of twelve counts of making a materially false statement to a federal agency. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that she received ineffective assistance of trial counsel. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's convictions were supported by sufficient evidence; (2) Defendant was not denied her federal constitutional right to be present at any stage of the criminal proceeding; (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in providing a so-called "nullification instruction" to the jury; (4) Defendant waived a duplicity challenge to certain counts; and (5) the record was not sufficiently developed to permit appellate consideration of Defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim. View "United States v. Brown" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction of drug trafficking charges, including conspiracy to distribute one kilogram or more of heroin, and Defendant's sentence of 136 months in prison, holding that no reversible error occurred in the proceedings below.Pursuant to a search warrant, federal agents searched Defendant's apartment and found a stolen gun, more than $30,000 in cash, more than a kilo of heroin, and other narcotics and drug paraphernalia. Defendant pleaded guilty to several drug trafficking charges. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the trial judge did not err by (1) denying Defendant's motion to suppress the evidence from his apartment; (2) denying Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea; (3) deciding not to appoint new counsel and to let Defendant handle his sentencing pro se; and (4) failing to set a lower guideline sentencing range. View "United States v. Gonzalez-Arias" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion to suppress his booking fingerprints as the fruit of what he argued was an unlawful arrest, holding that because the fingerprints were obtained for routine booking purposes there was no basis in the record for suppression of the fingerprint evidence.During a law enforcement scheme targeting a stolen identity refund fraud scheme, Defendant was administratively arrested for unlawful presence in the United States. Defendant was fingerprinted during a routine booking and later charged with multiple counts related to his involvement in the scheme. Defendant moved to suppress his booking fingerprints. The district court denied the motion, concluding that Defendant was arrested without probable cause but that the fingerprint evidence was admissible under the doctrine of inevitable discovery. The First Circuit affirmed, albeit on different grounds, holding that where the fingerprints were not obtained for any purpose other than routine booking the evidence could not be suppressed under the exclusionary rule. View "United States v. Cruz-Mercedes" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the judgment of the magistrate judge concluding that Defendant, a state drug lab supervisor, was not entitled to qualified immunity from a claim brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and vacated the denial of Defendant's motion to dismiss an intentional infliction of emotional distress state law claim, holding that Defendant was entitled to qualified immunity from the section 1983 claim.Plaintiff's conviction was vacated after the discovery of the drug abuse of Sonja Farak, a chemist at the Amherst Drug Lab on the campus of the University of Massachusetts. Plaintiff brought this complaint alleged that Defendant's inadequate supervision Farak constituted deliberate indifference to Defendant's constitutional rights. Defendant also claimed intentional infliction of emotional distress. The magistrate judge denied Defendant's motion to dismiss the section 1983 claim and held that Defendant's behavior showing a disregard for "repeated red flags" was enough to state a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress under state law. The First Circuit reversed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) Defendant was entitled to qualified immunity from the section 1983 claim; and (2) because the sole basis for federal jurisdiction was dismissed the judgment on the intentional infliction of emotional distress state law claim is remanded to state court. View "Penate v. Hanchett" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed in part the magistrate judge's grant of summary judgment for Defendants and dismissing Plaintiff's civil rights action, holding that the magistrate judge erred by granted summary judgment on the claims that police officers unlawfully searched Defendant's property and falsely arrested Defendant and that a jury could find that one police officer and the chief of police violated Defendant's Fourth Amendment rights.Defendant was arrested for theft after police officers obtained a warrant to search Defendant's home for certain property. Defendant later brought this action alleging that there was no probable cause for his arrest. A magistrate judge dismissed all of Defendant's claims on summary judgment. The First Circuit reversed in part, holding (1) the magistrate judge erred by granting summary judgment on the claims under the federal and state civil rights acts that the officers unlawfully searched Defendant's property; (2) the magistrate judge erred in granting summary judgment on Defendant's federal and state civil rights claims for false arrest; and (3) Defendant alleged sufficient facts that a jury might reasonably find the chief of police and one police officer liable on the Fourth Amendment claims, and the Court declined to affirm the judgment on qualified immunity grounds. View "Jordan v. Town of Waldoboro" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court denying Defendant's motion for reconsideration of the denial of his motion to suppress certain evidence, holding that the district court erred in determining that Defendant's sister had either actual or apparent authority to consent to the search.Defendant filed a motion to suppress fentanyl obtained from within closed black garbage bags that were found in his sister's storage unit during a warrantless search. The district court denied the motion to suppress and denied Defendant's subsequent motion for reconsideration. Specifically, the district court concluded that Defendant's sister, who had apparent authority to consent to the search, gave it even if she did not have actual authority to give consent. The First Circuit reversed, holding that the government failed to meet its burden to show that Defendant's sister had either actual or apparent authority to consent to the search of the evidence at issue. View "United States v. Moran" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants and dismissing Plaintiff's civil rights suit alleging excessive force claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Massachusetts state law, holding that the district court did not err in entering summary judgment against Plaintiff on his excessive force claims.Plaintiff was apprehended by Bellingham police officers in the woods after he was found lying in a shallow ravine with his pants unbuckled. The officers arrested Plaintiff and took him to the Bellingham police station, where Plaintiff became irrational and violent. Plaintiff pleaded guilty to several state criminal charges stemming from these incidents. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed this suit against the police officers that apprehended him in the woods and those who attempted to subdue him at the police station. The district court granted summary judgment for Defendants. The First Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), barred Plaintiff's excessive force claims arising from the events in the woods; and (2) the excessive force claims arising from the incidents at the police station failed as a matter of law because Defendants did not use excessive force against Plaintiff at the police station. View "O'Brien v. Town of Bellingham" on Justia Law

The First Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court granting a preliminary injunction prohibiting the Trustees of Boston College (BC) from imposing a suspension of one year on John Doe, a student, who was found to have engaged in the sexual assault of a female student, holding that the district court erred in finding a probability of success as to Doe's claim under Massachusetts contract law.The suspension decision in this case was the outcome of a disciplinary complaint filed against Doe, and the suspension decision was the outcome of the procedures set forth in BC's student sexual misconduct policy. In issuing the preliminary injunction the district court found Doe had shown a probability of success on the merits of the state law claim of violation of a contractual obligation of basic fairness. The First Circuit vacated the injunction, holding (1) to the extent the district court was attempting to base its ruling on a prediction of future developments in Massachusetts contract law, the court erred; and (2) where current Massachusetts law does not require the college discipline process Doe argues must be a part of a contractual obligation of basic fairness the court erred in granting the injunction. View "Doe v. Trustees of Boston College" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the decision of the district court granting Defendant's motion to suppress evidence obtained from his residence, holding that the fruits of the search of the residence were properly suppressed.The district court found that the warrant affidavit, reformed after a hearing under Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), did not establish probable cause to search either Defendant's business or his home. The government appealed, arguing that the district court erred in its probable cause determination as to Defendant's residence. The First Circuit affirmed, holding that the reformed affidavit failed to establish probable cause to search Defendant's residence, and therefore, the fruits of the search of the residence were properly suppressed. View "United States v. Roman" on Justia Law

The First Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court denying Petitioner's petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus alleging a violation of his right to confrontation and a violation of due process, holding that the district court, given the confines of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2254, correctly determined that Petitioner was not entitled to relief.Petitioner appealed his second-degree murder conviction to the Massachusetts Appeals Court (MAC), but the appeal was unavailing. Petitioner later sought a writ of habeas corpus in the federal district court, arguing violations of his right to confrontation, based on the admission of a videotaped deposition testimony premised on an erroneous unavailability determination, and of due process, based on what he characterized as prejudicial misstatements of evidence during closing arguments. The district court dismissed the petition. The First Circuit affirmed based on the strictures of AEDPA, holding (1) the district court correctly concluded that the MAC reasonably determined that the constitutional violation in admitting the deposition testimony was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt; and (2) the MAC's determination that the prosecutor's misstatements were not prejudicial was not contrary to clearly established federal law, nor did the misstatements violate Petitioner's right to due process. View "Dorisca v. Marchilli" on Justia Law