Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In this case heard in the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Marta Alicia Mejia-Alvarenga, a citizen of El Salvador, sought to challenge the denial of her application for asylum by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). Mejia-Alvarenga was detained when trying to cross the Rio Grande into the United States and was subsequently charged with removability due to her lack of valid documentation. She filed an application for statutory withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture, later amending her application to seek asylum, based on threats she received from a man named Rigoberto Nelson and others associated with him.The immigration judge denied Mejia-Alvarenga’s application and ordered her removal to El Salvador. Despite finding Mejia-Alvarenga a credible witness and acknowledging she had suffered previous harm amounting to persecution, the immigration judge ruled she had not been harmed due to political opinion or membership in a particular social group. The judge also concluded that Mejia-Alvarenga did not demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution because she did not show that the government would be unable or unwilling to control a future persecutor.The Court of Appeals denied Mejia-Alvarenga's petition in part and dismissed it in part due to lack of jurisdiction. It ruled that the BIA did not err in concluding that Mejia-Alvarenga failed to establish that the Salvadoran government was unable or unwilling to protect her from private persecutors. The court also rejected Mejia-Alvarenga’s claim that the BIA violated its regulatory obligation to be impartial and her argument that the BIA violated her due process rights by allowing a single BIA member to render its decision. Lastly, the court dismissed Mejia-Alvarenga's claim that the BIA committed an abuse of discretion by not referring her case to a three-member BIA panel, ruling it lacked jurisdiction over this claim. View "Mejia-Alvarenga v. Garland" on Justia Law

In an appeal before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, two defendants, Robert Brumfield and Jeremy Esteves, convicted for their roles in a 2013 armed truck robbery in New Orleans, challenged the district court's denial of their motion for a new trial. This motion was based on their claim that the Government had suppressed evidence related to the credibility of two witnesses, which they argued violated the rules established in Brady v. Maryland and Giglio v. United States. In addition, Brumfield separately claimed that the Government failed to correct false testimony and also appealed his sentence.The Court found that the new evidence was not material in Brumfield's case, his claim of false testimony was without merit, and his sentence was both procedurally and substantively reasonable. However, the Court concluded that the new evidence was material as to Esteves, and thus his Brady claim required further consideration by the district court. Consequently, the Court affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded the case to the district court for further consideration of Esteves’s Brady claim. View "USA v. Brumfield" on Justia Law

Craig Price, a Black man, filed a lawsuit against his former employer, Valvoline LLC, alleging that his employment was terminated due to his race and he was subjected to a hostile work environment. Valvoline operated on an attendance policy, and Price had been repeatedly warned about his absenteeism, with his employment eventually terminated after he missed a shift due to food poisoning. Price also alleged that discriminatory comments had been made by his supervisors. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of Valvoline. The Appeals Court found that Price's employment was terminated due to his repeated absenteeism, not because of his race. Furthermore, the court concluded that the allegedly race-motivated comments were not objectively severe or pervasive enough to create a hostile work environment. The court also noted that Price could not demonstrate that the alleged harassment he experienced was frequent or that it interfered with his work performance. Therefore, Price's claims of race discrimination and a hostile work environment were rejected. View "Price v. Valvoline" on Justia Law

A non-profit organization, Vote.org, sued several county election officials in Texas, alleging that a state law requiring an original signature on a voter registration form violated the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The law frustrated Vote.org's use of its smartphone app, which only allowed for digital signatures. The district court ruled in favor of Vote.org, but the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed the decision. The appellate court concluded that Vote.org had standing to sue, both in its own right and on behalf of third parties. The court found that the requirement for an original signature on a voter registration form did not violate the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The court held that Texas's requirement of an original signature was a material condition of voter registration and served legitimate state interests in ensuring the reliability of the registration process and reducing fraud. The court also found that the burden imposed by the requirement was only slight and did not unduly burden the right to vote. Therefore, the court ruled in favor of the defendants. View "Vote.Org v. Paxton" on Justia Law

In an appeal before the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, Erma Wilson sought to overturn the decision of the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas which dismissed her federal civil rights suit against Midland County, Texas, and individuals Ralph Petty and Albert Schorre. Wilson was convicted of cocaine possession 22 years prior and she maintained her innocence, claiming that the cocaine found was not hers. The case revolved around her claim that she was denied due process since the assistant district attorney in her case, Ralph Petty, was also moonlighting as a law clerk for the judge presiding over her trial. Wilson was sentenced to eight years of community supervision which derailed her dream of becoming a nurse.Upon review, the Fifth Circuit held that Wilson's claim is barred by the "favorable termination" rule from Heck v. Humphrey. The rule states that a convicted party cannot seek § 1983 damages for unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment without first showing that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on appeal or otherwise declared invalid. The court noted that Petty’s dual role indeed constituted a conflict of interest that violated Wilson's constitutional right to a fair trial. However, under the court's precedent, noncustodial plaintiffs, such as Wilson, must meet the favorable-termination requirement, even if it’s practically impossible for them to do so. The court found that it was bound by prior circuit precedent and could only affirm the lower court's decision. The court noted that only the en banc court or the United States Supreme Court could deliver a different result. The court affirmed the judgment of the lower court. View "Wilson v. Midland County" on Justia Law

This case involves Delta Charter Group, Inc. (Delta), a public charter school operating within Concordia Parish in Louisiana. The case has its roots in a 1965 lawsuit against the Concordia Parish School Board for operating segregated schools in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court approved a desegregation plan, but the Board has yet to achieve unitary status, and Delta, which had intervened in the ongoing desegregation case, was required by a 2013 consent order to comply with the Board's desegregation decree. A second consent order in 2018 outlined a race-based enrollment process for Delta, giving the highest enrollment preference to black students.Four years later, Delta moved to discontinue the race-based enrollment process, arguing that it was unconstitutional. The district court declined to modify the order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5), which allows courts to modify or dissolve a consent decree if applying it prospectively is no longer equitable. Delta failed to show a significant change in factual conditions or in law that would justify modification. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, stating that Delta had forfeited any argument that the district court had abused its discretion by failing to adequately brief the argument on appeal. The court did not offer any opinion on the underlying constitutional merits, as Delta had forfeited any available argument that the district court should have applied Rule 54(b) and that it had abused its discretion in denying relief under Rule 60(b)(5). View "Delta Charter v. Sch Bd Concordia Prsh" on Justia Law

Sammy Tawakkol sued two Texas state officials, alleging that they violated his right to procedural due process when they notified him that he was required to register as a sex offender under Texas law. The district court ruled in Tawakkol's favor. However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit found that Tawakkol's suit was barred by sovereign immunity and therefore the district court lacked jurisdiction to rule on the case.The case began when Tawakkol was required to register as a sex offender under the federal Sex Offender Registry and Notification Act (SORNA) because of a crime he committed while he was a cadet at the United States Air Force Academy. After he moved to Houston, Texas, state officials determined that he also needed to register as a sex offender under Texas's system. Tawakkol sued the state officials, alleging that their registration determination violated his procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment.The district court ruled in favor of Tawakkol, but the Court of Appeals vacated this decision and remanded the case back to the district court with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals found that the suit was barred by sovereign immunity, a legal doctrine that prevents certain lawsuits against state officials. The court concluded that Tawakkol's case did not meet the criteria for an exception to sovereign immunity established in Ex parte Young, a Supreme Court case that allows lawsuits against state officials to prevent them from enforcing state laws that violate federal law.The court reasoned that unlike in Ex parte Young, the district court's order did not enjoin the state officials from enforcing a state law that violated federal law. Instead, the district court invalidated federal law and prohibited the state officials from enforcing a state law that was consistent with that federal law. The court determined that this type of relief fell outside the narrow parameters of the Ex parte Young exception and did not serve its purpose, which is to vindicate federal rights. View "Tawakkol v. Vasquez" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was bitten and injured by a police dog after Plaintiff’s partner called 911 to report that Plaintiff was suicidal, had hurt herself, and had left her house on foot. In the operative third amended complaint, Plaintiff asserted various claims against Sutton and Montes in their individual capacities as well as claims against the City of Conroe and Montgomery County. Specifically, as relevant to this appeal, she asserted (1) a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 excessive force claim against Sutton; (2) a Section 1983 failure-to-intervene/bystander liability claim against Montes; (3) a Section 1983 municipal/Monell liability claim against the City of Conroe; and (4) various failure-to-accommodate claims under Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act against both the City of Conroe and Montgomery County. Montgomery County and Montes jointly moved to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim, raising, inter alia, a qualified immunity defense as to Montes.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff failed to allege specific and nonconclusory facts that would show that the City was deliberately indifferent in adopting its training policy. Accordingly, the court found that the district court did not err in dismissing Sligh’s failure-to-train claim against the City of Conroe. Further, the court explained that Plaintiff can “prevail only by showing that ‘the disability, resulting limitation, and necessary reasonable accommodation’ were ‘open, obvious, and apparent’ to the entity’s relevant agents.” But she does not attempt to make this showing. Nor could she. View "Sligh v. City of Conroe" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging violations of his First and Fourth Amendment rights when he was arrested as a terrorist for a post on Facebook. The district court granted Detective Randall Iles and Sheriff Mark Wood’s motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds and dismissed Bailey’s claims with prejudice.The Fifth Circuit reversed. The court held that the district court erred in concluding that Plaintiff’s Facebook was constitutionally unprotected; erred in granting qualified immunity to Defendant on Plaintiff’s Fourth and First Amendment claims; and erred in granting summary judgment to Defendants on Plaintiff’s state law false arrest claim. Therefore, the court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Defendants and remanded for further proceedings. The court explained that Plaintiff has shown that Defendant is not entitled to qualified immunity as to the First Amendment claim. Based on decades of Supreme Court precedent, it was clearly established that Plaintiff’s Facebook post did not fit within one of the narrow categories of unprotected speech, like incitement or true threats. Thus, when Defendant arrested Plaintiff he violated Plaintiff’s clearly established First Amendment right to engage in speech even when some listeners consider the speech offensive, upsetting, immature, in poor taste, or even dangerous. View "Bailey v. Iles" on Justia Law

Appellant sued the Northside Independent School District, arguing that the District failed to properly accommodate her hearing impairment as required by the Americans with Disabilities Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the District, holding that Appellant’s ADA claim was barred by 20 U.S.C. Section 1415(l), the “exhaustion requirement” of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act.   The Fifth Circuit vacated the summary judgment order; the court held that the district court erred in its interpretation of Section 1415(l). The court explained that the district court erred when it held that Appellant did not have a standalone claim under the ADA because the gravamen of her complaint was the denial of a FAPE. Under the plain text of Section 1415(l), “nothing in [the IDEA]” “restricts or limits” Appellant’s ability to assert her claim “under . . . the Americans with Disabilities Act.” The court noted that as Fry explained, “the IDEA does not prevent a plaintiff from asserting claims under [other federal] laws”—including “the ADA”—“even if . . . those claims allege the denial of an appropriate public education (much as an IDEA claim would). Further, the court wrote that it cannot affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment, as it would return the Circuit to the Smith era—an erroneous decision that would have “consequences . . . for a great many children with disabilities and their parents,” and one which Congress directly abandoned by enacting Section 1415(l). View "Lartigue v. Northside Indep" on Justia Law