Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, three Texas attorneys, filed suit against officers and directors of the State Bar of Texas under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the Bar is engaged in political and ideological activities that are not germane to its interests in regulating the legal profession and improving the quality of legal services. Plaintiffs therefore allege that compelling them to join the Bar and subsidize those activities violates their First Amendment rights. The district court granted summary judgment to the Bar.As a preliminary matter, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the Tax Injunction Act did not strip the district court of jurisdiction where neither membership fees and legal services fees are taxes. On the merits, the court vacated the district court's judgment, concluding that the district court erred in its reading of Lathrop v. Donahue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961), and Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1 (1990), and in its application of Keller's germaneness test on the Bar's activities. The court explained that Lathrop held that lawyers may constitutionally be mandated to join a bar association that solely regulates the legal profession and improves the quality of legal services; Keller identified that Lathrop did not decide whether lawyers may be constitutionally mandated to join a bar association that engages in other, nongermane activities; but Keller did not resolve that question. To determine whether compelling plaintiffs to join a bar that engages in non-germane activities violates their freedom of association, the court must decide (1) whether compelling plaintiffs to join burdens their rights and, (2) if so, whether it is nevertheless justified by a sufficient state interest.The court explained that plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment on their freedom-of-association claim if the Bar is in fact engaged in non-germane activities. In this case, the Bar's legislative program is neither entirely germane nor wholly non-germane; the Bar's various diversity initiatives through OMA, though highly ideologically charged, are germane to the purposes identified in Keller; most, but not quite all, of the Bar's activities aimed at aiding the needy are germane; and miscellaneous activities—hosting an annual convention, running CLE programs, and publishing the Texas Bar Journal—are all germane. In sum, the Bar is engaged in non-germane activities, so compelling plaintiffs to join it violates their First Amendment rights. Furthermore, there are multiple other constitutional options. Assuming, arguendo, that plaintiffs can be required to join the Bar, compelling them to subsidize the Bar's non-germane activities violates their freedom of speech. The court also concluded that the Bar's procedures for separating chargeable from non-chargeable expenses is constitutionally inadequate under Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1, AFT, AFL-CIO v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986).Accordingly, the court rendered partial summary judgment in favor of plaintiffs and remanded to the district court to determine the full scope of relief to which plaintiffs are entitled. The court additionally reversed the denial of plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and rendered a preliminary injunction preventing the Bar from requiring plaintiffs to join or pay dues pending completion of the remedies phase. View "McDonald v. Longley" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of qualified immunity to three officers employed by the Coleman County Jail in an action alleging claims regarding Derrek Monroe's death by suicide that occurred at the jail.The court concluded that Defendant Laws's decision to wait for backup before entering the cell after he saw Monroe strangling himself with a phone cord did not violate any clearly established constitutional right. The court explained that it was not sufficiently clear at the time that every reasonable official would have understood that waiting for a backup officer to arrive in accordance with prison policy violates a pretrial detainee's right. Therefore, Laws is entitled to qualified immunity on the deliberate indifference claim. Furthermore, it was not clearly established at the time that Laws should have immediately called 911, where he did call another jailer who called 911. The court also concluded that Defendants Brixey and Cogdill were not deliberately indifferent where holding Monroe in a cell containing a phone cord did not violate a clearly established constitutional right. Finally, Brixey and Cogdill's decision to staff only one weekend jailer did not violate any clearly established constitutional right. The court rendered judgment in defendants' favor. View "Cope v. Cogdill" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment based on qualified immunity to police officers who shot and killed Travis Stevenson. Stevenson was shot after unsuccessful efforts by police to deescalate a situation where Stevenson repeatedly slammed his vehicle into a police cruiser and a concrete pillar in front of an apartment building while yelling "Kill me!"The court concluded that the district court correctly held, in accordance with precedent, that plaintiffs' excessive-force claim fails as a matter of law. In this case, Stevenson was using his car as a weapon; Stevenson, like the drivers in the court's precedent, exhibited volatile behaviors that contributed to the officers justification in firing to prevent death or great bodily harm; and plaintiffs have not produced any evidence that suggests the officers might have had a reasonable alternative course of action. The court agreed with the district court that plaintiffs forfeited their failure-to-train claim against the sheriff by failing to plead it in their complaint and raising it only in response to the officers' motion for summary judgment. View "Jackson v. Gautreaux" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, her former Sociology teacher at a public high school in Texas, alleging that he violated her First Amendment rights by attempting to compel her to transcribe the United States Pledge of Allegiance and by retaliating against her after she refused. After the district court denied defendant's motion for summary judgment, he filed an interlocutory appeal. Plaintiff filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.The Fifth Circuit granted plaintiff's motion to dismiss, concluding that defendant seeks to have the court resolve the very factual disputes that the district court found to be genuine and properly submitted for trial on the merits, which the court did not have jurisdiction to do. In this case, defendant's legal arguments are inextricably intertwined with his challenges to the facts that the district court found to be disputed. View "Oliver v. Arnold" on Justia Law

On remand from the Supreme Court, the Fifth Circuit certified the following questions of law to the Supreme Court of Louisiana: 1) Whether Louisiana law recognizes a duty, under the facts alleged in the complaint, or otherwise, not to negligently precipitate the crime of a third party? 2) Assuming Mckesson could otherwise be held liable for a breach of duty owed to Officer Doe, whether Louisiana's Professional Rescuer's Doctrine bars recovery under the facts alleged in the complaint? View "Doe v. Mckesson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims based on allegations that defendants illegally extradited him from Pennsylvania to Louisiana and impermissibly extended his state sentence by thirty years. Plaintiff's claims arose from a records clerk's reversion of his release date to the 2052 date, rather than the 2023 date, on the grounds that he had stopped serving his state sentence when he escaped from prison and that his state and federal sentences were intended to run consecutively.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's sentence-based claims, but reversed and remanded with respect to the extradition-based claims. The court held that Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994), does not present a jurisdictional hurdle that would require a remand of this case to state court. The court explained that Heck implicates a plaintiff's ability to state a claim, not whether the court has jurisdiction over that claim. As to plaintiff's claim regarding his sentence enhancement, the court concluded that a claim for speedier release is actionable by writ of habeas corpus, and a section 1983 damages action predicated on the sentence calculation issue is barred by Heck because success on that claim would necessarily invalidate the duration of his incarceration. The court also concluded that the district court never analyzed whether plaintiff's extradition-based claims were barred by Heck, and the district court should have considered whether his extradition-based claims survived Heck in the first instance. Furthermore, the district court should consider the qualified immunity, absolute immunity, and limitations ruling issues on remand. The court vacated in part and remanded for further proceedings. View "Colvin v. LeBlanc" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit withdrew its prior opinion on April 21, 2021 and substituted the following opinion.After petitioner was convicted of capital murder in Texas and sentenced to death, on federal habeas corpus review, the district court granted him relief. The Fifth Circuit court then affirmed the grant of relief, petitioner was retried, and petitioner was resentenced to death. Petitioner again sought federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. 2254, but the district court denied relief on all claims.The Fifth Circuit denied petitioner a certificate of appealability (COA) on the issue of whether the admission of testimony from a defense expert was fruit of the poisonous tree where petitioner has not identified any clearly established Supreme Court precedent extending Harrison v. United States, 392 U.S. 219 (1968), to his incriminating statements to his own expert; whether the State's peremptory strike of a black juror violated petitioner's right to a fair and impartial trial under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), where the prosecutor gave six reasons for striking the juror and petitioner failed to present clear and convincing evidence to rebut the determination as objectively unreasonable; whether the State suppressed evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), where he failed to establish cause for defaulting his Brady claim; and (4) whether petitioner received ineffective assistance of trial, appellate, and habeas counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), where he failed to prove either the deficiency prong and/or prejudice prong of Strickland and thus could not overcome the procedural bar. View "Guidry v. Lumpkin" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Microsoft on plaintiff's claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) for failure to accommodate, discrimination, and creation of a hostile work environment. Plaintiff's claims stemmed from his efforts to obtain accommodations for his Autism Spectrum Disorder while employed as an account technology strategist and an Enterprise Architect (EA) at Microsoft.In regard to plaintiff's claim for failure to accommodate, the court concluded that plaintiff's requests for individuals to assist him with translating verbal information into written materials, recording meeting notes, and performing administrative tasks were unreasonable because they would exempt him from performing essential functions. Consequently, plaintiff is not a qualified person under the ADA. Furthermore, there is no genuine dispute of material fact that plaintiff's performance as an EA at this point was deficient and thus there was no genuine dispute of material fact that he could have performed EA essential functions without all of his requested accommodations. The court also concluded that, even if plaintiff were a qualified person under the ADA, he also fails to create a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Microsoft failed to negotiate in a good-faith manner. The court explained that, because Microsoft had the "ultimate discretion to choose between effective accommodations," it was justified in placing plaintiff on job reassignment over his objections. In this case, the record demonstrates that plaintiff, not Microsoft, was responsible for the breakdown of the interactive process seeking reasonable accommodation in refusing to indicate interest in any vacant position.In regard to plaintiff's discrimination claim, the court concluded that plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie discrimination claim for the same reason his failure-to-accommodate claim fails—he is not a qualified individual under the ADA. Even if he were qualified, plaintiff was not subject to an adverse employment decision. Finally, in regard to plaintiff's hostile-work-environment claim, the court concluded that none of the evidence plaintiff relies on indicates that he was subject to harassment pervasive or severe enough to alter the conditions of his employment. Furthermore, plaintiff's placement on job reassignment is not evidence of a hostile work environment. View "Thompson v. Microsoft Corp." on Justia Law

T.O. and his parents appealed the district court's dismissal of their claims arising under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1974. Plaintiffs' claims arose from a primary school disciplinary incident experienced by T.O.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the substantive due process claim, concluding that the facts simply do not suggest that T.O. was the subject of a random, malicious, and unprovoked attack, which would justify deviation from Fee v. Herndon, 900 F.2d 804. In this case, an aide removed T.O. from his classroom for disrupting class, and the teacher used force only after T.O. pushed and hit her. Even if the teacher's intervention were ill-advised and her reaction inappropriate, the court cannot say that it did not occur in a disciplinary context. Furthermore, the court has consistently held that Texas law provides adequate, alternative remedies in the form of both criminal and civil liability for school employees whose use of excessive disciplinary force results in injury to students in T.O.'s situation.The court also concluded that plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claims fail because this court has not conclusively determined whether the momentary use of force by a teacher against a student constitutes a Fourth Amendment seizure. In regard to the ADA and section 504 claims, the court concluded that the amended complaint failed to allege facts permitting the inference that either the teacher's actions or the school district's actions were based on T.O.'s disability. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's rulings. View "T.O. v. Fort Bend Independent School District" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Defendant Clark and Cox's motion to dismiss on the basis of qualified immunity for claims of failure to treat and the wrongful death of Hirschell Wayne Fletcher, Jr., who died from previously sustained head trauma while in custody.The court agreed with plaintiffs that between when paramedics Clark and Cox arrived and allegedly failed to treat Fletcher, but before he was formally transported, a reasonable person in Fletcher's position—surrounded and confronted by five officers—may not have thought he was free to leave, and was therefore detained. In this case, plaintiffs alleged that Clark, Cox, and the surrounding officers harassed and laughed at Fletcher until he was transported to the detention facility, all without any medical treatment. As alleged, the court concluded that such conduct supports that the paramedics may have been both subjectively aware of, and disregarded, Fletcher's serious risk of injury. Furthermore, it is undisputed that, at the time Clark and Cox allegedly failed to treat Fletcher, the law was clearly established that pretrial detainees have a Fourteenth Amendment right to medical care. View "Kelson v. Clark" on Justia Law