Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment against plaintiff in her employment discrimination action. Plaintiff filed suit against DHS, alleging claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and 42 U.S.C. 1983. DHS filed a motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). After plaintiff did not file a response, the district court granted DHS's motion.The court concluded that plaintiff's arguments unrelated to the grounds on which her claims were dismissed are waived. The court also concluded that plaintiff cannot proceed with a Rehabilitation Act claim as it is precluded by the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA); the district court properly determined that plaintiff's section 1983 claim is preempted by Title VII; and, because plaintiff failed to name the Acting Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security as a defendant, the district court had no alternative but to dismiss the case for lack of a proper party defendant. View "Kaswatuka v. Department of Homeland Security" on Justia Law

Texas state prisoner Haverkamp, a biological male at birth who identifies as a transgender woman, sued, alleging violations of the Equal Protection Clause by denying Haverkamp medically necessary sex-reassignment surgery and by failing to provide certain female commissary items and a long-hair pass. Texas’s Correctional Managed Healthcare Committee has a policy concerning the treatment of gender disorders. Based on the state’s advisory, the district court ordered service of Haverkamp’s operative complaint on Dr. Murray, whom the state identified as the proper defendant if Haverkamp were seeking sex-reassignment surgery, and the nine Committee members who had not yet been named as parties. The district court subsequently denied motions to dismiss, concluding that the state was not entitled to sovereign immunity.The Fifth Circuit vacated. Haverkamp’s suit is barred by sovereign immunity because the Committee members are not proper defendants under Ex Parte Young; Haverkamp fails to allege they have the requisite connection to enforcing the policies Haverkamp challenges. In light of the state’s representations to the district court that these defendants are the proper state officials to sue, the court did not dismiss them from the case. View "Haverkamp v. Linthicum" on Justia Law

After Topletz lost a civil case in Texas state court, the plaintiff served him with discovery requests aimed at uncovering his assets. Topletz supplied many of the requested records but failed to produce documents related to a family trust of which he is a beneficiary. The court ordered production, but the trustee (Topletz’s brother) purportedly sent Topletz a letter stating that the trust agreement allowed Topletz only to inspect the documents, not to obtain copies, and that it would breach the trustee’s fiduciary duty to supply the requested records. The state court granted a motion for contempt and sanctions against Topletz, finding that the requested documents were under his control for purposes of discovery. The court sentenced Topletz to detention for 14 days or until he provided proper responses.After unsuccessful state court proceedings, Topletz filed a federal habeas petition, arguing that the contempt order violated his constitutional right to due process by requiring him to produce documents that he could not obtain. He requested a preliminary injunction to allow him to remain free during the adjudication of his petition. The district court denied Topletz the preliminary injunction because it found that he was unlikely to succeed on the merits. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. Topletz failed to show a substantial likelihood that the state court’s decision was contrary to clearly established Supreme Court precedent or based on an unreasonable interpretation of the facts in light of the evidence. View "Topletz v. Skinner" on Justia Law

This case arose from Port's efforts, in cooperation with the U.S. Army Corps, in planning and executing the Freeport Harbor Channel Improvement Project. To construct new facilities, the Port needs land, and has consequently been acquiring properties in the East End with the goal of eventually buying up the entire neighborhood. Plaintiff filed suit alleging that defendants intentionally discriminated against East End residents during its expansion in violation of section 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and denied plaintiff's administrative complaint in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).The Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's section 601 claim because plaintiff failed to sufficiently allege that the Port acted with discriminatory intent. However, the district court erred in dismissing plaintiff's APA claim. The court explained that the Corps' decision to deny plaintiff's administrative complaint was not committed to its discretion and is thus reviewable under the APA. On remand, the court instructed the district court to consider only the issue of whether the Corps correctly denied plaintiff's administrative complaint on the basis that it lacked jurisdiction due to an absence of federal financial assistance within the meaning of Title VI. View "Rollerson v. Brazos River Harbor Navigation District of Brazoria County Texas" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief to petitioner, who was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death. This court previously granted petitioner's application for a certificate of appealability (COA) on two issues: first, whether petitioner's trial was tainted by the exclusion of black jurors (the Batson Claim); and second, whether trial counsel rendered unconstitutionally ineffective assistance before trial and during the guilt phase of trial by failing to conduct an adequate investigation (the Strickland Claim).After rejecting the state's procedural default, abandonment, and waiver arguments, the court concluded that, because petitioner cannot identify clearly established federal law requiring state courts sua sponte to find and consider all facts and circumstances that may bear on whether a peremptory strike was racially motivated when those facts and circumstances were not identified by the strike's challenger, this argument is insufficient to surmount the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act's relitigation bar and the court is unable to grant relief on the Batson Claim. The court also concluded that petitioner's Strickland Claim ultimately fails because he cannot show prejudice affecting his substantial rights. In this case, the "unaffected" circumstantial evidence of petitioner's crime, including his direct confession, is overwhelming. View "Ramey v. Lumpkin" on Justia Law

The Prims attended a concert at the Pavilion after consuming wine and consumed more wine during the concert. After the concert, Janet, who suffers from MS, was “stumbling" and unstable. A Pavilion employee called for a wheelchair, escorted the Prims to the security office, and smelled alcohol on Eric’s breath. Deputy Stein, who was working traffic, noticed that Eric had difficulty standing and had slurred speech. Eric admitted that he had been drinking. Eric twice failed a horizontal gaze nystagmus test. A medic evaluated Janet and called Lieutenant Webb. The Prims insisted on walking home but they would have had to cross two busy intersections in the dark. The officers tried, unsuccessfully, to find the Prims a ride home. Stein arrested them for public intoxication. The charges were ultimately dismissed. The Prims brought claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and Rehabilitation Act, and tort claims.The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Fifth Circuit reversed with respect to Eric’s assault claim but affirmed as to Janet’s assault claim and both false imprisonment claims. The officers are entitled to qualified immunity on the section 1983 claims. Given their apparent intoxication and their route home, the officers reasonably concluded that the Prims posed a danger to themselves or others. With respect to the ADA and Rehabilitation Act, the court affirmed, noting the Pavilion is a private entity and does not receive federal financial assistance. Janet was not discriminated against based on her disability. View "Prim v. Deputy Stein" on Justia Law

Two Planned Parenthood entities and three Jane Does filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging that the Louisiana Department of Health is unlawfully declining to act on Planned Parenthood's application for a license to provide abortion services in Louisiana. The district court denied the Department's motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).The Fifth Circuit held that it has jurisdiction over the Department's interlocutory appeal because the Department asserted sovereign immunity in the district court. The court held that plaintiffs' second requested injunction—directing the Department to "promptly rule" on their application "in accordance with all applicable constitutional requirements"—is not barred by Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 106 (1984), because plaintiffs allege a potential violation of their procedural-due-process rights pursuant to Ex parte Young and because requiring the Department to make a decision on the application and comply with the federal Constitution does not infringe the state's sovereign immunity.The court also held that the first and third of plaintiffs' requested injunctions—directing the Department to "not withhold approval" of their application or "grant" them a license—are barred by Pennhurst because there is no free-standing federal right to receive an abortion-clinic license. The court declined to exercise its pendant jurisdiction to consider other issues raised by the Department. Accordingly, the court denied the motion to dismiss, affirmed in part and reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Planned Parenthood Gulf Coast, Inc. v. Phillips" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit granted Judge Mack's motion for a stay pending appeal after the district court held that the judge violated the Establishment Clause, as incorporated against the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, by allowing volunteer chaplains to perform brief, optional, and interfaith opening ceremonies before court sessions.The court concluded that Judge Mack is likely to succeed on the merits of his claims that the district court erred, because the district court's adjudication of FFRF's official-capacity claim was manifestly erroneous and also because FFRF's individual-capacity claim is likely to fail. The court explained that, even assuming Judge Mack could be considered a state official, rather than a county official, FFRF's official-capacity claim must be dismissed because the Supreme Court's Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 (1989), decision squarely prohibits official-capacity claims against state officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983. In regard to the individual-capacity claim, the court explained that the Supreme Court has held that our Nation's history and tradition allow legislatures to use tax dollars to pay for chaplains who perform sectarian prayers before sessions. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). The court noted that Judge Mack's chaplaincy program raises fewer questions under the Establishment Clause because it uses zero tax dollars and operates on a volunteer basis. The court rejected FFRF's arguments that the evidence of courtroom prayers at the Founding was spotty; that the Supreme Court's invocation does not solicit the participation of the attending public, but that Judge Mack's opening ceremony is "coercive;" that Justice Kagan's hypothetical prayer in the dissent of Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565 (2014), supported FFRF's position; and that Judge Mack's practices runs afoul of the Lemon test. The court also concluded that Judge Mack will be irreparably harmed in the absence of a stay pending appeal; any injury to FFRF is outweighed by Judge Mack's strong likelihood of success on the merits; and the public interest warrants a stay. View "Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc. v. Mack" on Justia Law

These consolidated appeals arose from a deadly shootout that occurred at a restaurant in Waco where hundreds of motorcyclists gathered, including gang members. Plaintiffs filed 42 U.S.C. 1983 actions against Waco public officials based on their arrests and detentions following the rampage, alleging Fourth Amendment violations. Defendants appealed after the district court denied their motions for qualified immunity in part.The Fifth Circuit reversed and rendered as to Defendants Stroman and Lanning; affirmed in part and reversed in part as to Defendants Reyna, Chavez, and Rogers; and remanded for further proceedings. The court concluded that District Attorney Reyna's immunity is limited to that of a law enforcement officer. In this case, his conduct exceeded his prosecutorial function, and some of his actions were more akin to those of a law enforcement officer conducting an investigation. In regard to Franks liability, the court concluded that the issues raised by plaintiffs concern both the sufficiency of the warrant affidavit by Detective Chavez and the extent to which non-signer defendants may be held responsible for any material false statements or omissions. The court concluded that Chavez is within the compass of potential Franks liability; the allegations are sufficient to tie Reyna to potential Franks liability; Detective Rogers may also be implicated in potential Franks liability; but Franks liability is not sufficiently alleged as to Asst. Police Chief Lanning or Chief Stroman. The court concluded, however, that plaintiffs' conspiracy and bystander claims failed and thus the district court erroneously allowed these claims to proceed. View "Terwilliger v. Reyna" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit challenging Louisiana law that forces lawyers to join and pay annual dues to the Louisiana State Bar Association (LSBA). Plaintiff contends that compelling dues and membership violates his First Amendment rights, and that LSBA's failure to ensure that his dues are not used to fund the Bar's political and ideological activities also violates his First Amendment rights.The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims. The court concluded that Lathrop v. Donahue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961), and Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1 (1990), foreclose plaintiff's challenge to mandatory membership in LSBA. In this case, plaintiff's claim presents the (previously) open free association question from Keller (which the court closed today in this circuit with the court's concurrently issued opinion in McDonald v. Longley, No. 20-50448, __ F.3d __ (5th Cir. 2021)). The court also concluded that the Tax Injunction Act does not preclude federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over plaintiff's challenge to mandatory dues. The court explained that the bar dues are a fee, not a tax, and thus dismissal under the Act was improper. Finally, the court concluded that plaintiff has standing to pursue his claim that LSBA does not employ adequate procedures to safeguard his dues. The court found that plaintiff has pleaded an injury-in-fact by alleging that LSBA does not regularly provide notice of its expenditures with sufficient specificity. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Boudreaux v. Louisiana State Bar Ass'n" on Justia Law