Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Fifth Circuit concluded that plaintiffs' request to enjoin Harris County's administration of drive-thru voting in the November 2020 election is moot. The court explained that, since plaintiffs' appeal, the November 2020 election has been completed; the results have been certified; and new officeholders have been sworn in. The court also concluded that plaintiffs failed to identify any evidence in the record before the district court demonstrating that Harris County will offer drive-thru voting again in the future, let alone that it will offer it in such a way as to evade judicial review.Furthermore, while this appeal was pending, the Legislature passed S.B. 1, which addresses drive-thru voting. The court concluded that the challenge raised in last year's case before the district court is moot as to elections after December 2, 2021. Even if the court considered the argument that candidates have standing and assumed arguendo that candidates do have standing to challenge election procedures, that standing would pertain only to their claim as to the November 2020 election, the only election in which they claimed to be candidates. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of injunctive relief and the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims for want of jurisdiction. The court also vacated the district court's advisory discussion of the legality of drive-thru voting without offering any opinion as to the merits of that reasoning. View "Hotze v. Hudspeth" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, tenants living in substandard conditions in a "Section 8" housing project, filed suit seeking to compel HUD to provide relocation assistance vouchers. The Fifth Circuit held that, because 24 C.F.R. 886.323(e) mandates that HUD provide relocation assistance, its alleged decision not to provide relocation vouchers to plaintiffs is not a decision committed to agency discretion by law and is therefore reviewable. Furthermore, the agency's inaction here constitutes a final agency action because it prevents or unreasonably delays the tenants from receiving the relief to which they are entitled by law. Therefore, the district court has jurisdiction over plaintiffs' Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and Fair Housing Act (FHA) claims and erred in dismissing those claims.However, the court agreed with the district court that plaintiffs failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted on their Fifth Amendment equal protection claim. In this case, plaintiffs failed to state a plausible claim of intentional race discrimination. Accordingly, the court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Hawkins v. United States Department of Housing and Urban Development" on Justia Law

Louisiana Trooper Curlee observed a handicap-plated truck after nightfall stopped on the road's shoulder, high atop the Pontchartrain Expressway. Curlee stopped to investigate, saw men spray painting the overpass wall, and based upon their odd statements, sought their identification. Evans, the driver, and Gizzarelli complied. Kokesh refused to comply and videotaped the encounter. Curlee arrested Kokesh because of his failure to provide identification, determined that the two other men were acting on Kokesh’s instructions, decided Gizzarelli should be released, photographed the overpass, and wrote Evans a ticket for illegally stopping on the interstate shoulder.Kokesh subsequently sued. The district court dismissed all claims for injunctive and declaratory relief, all official-capacity claims, and all state law claims, leaving only 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against Curlee in his individual capacity for unreasonable seizure and excessive force and First Amendment retaliation. The district court granted Curlee qualified immunity as to the excessive force claim but denied it as to the unreasonable seizure claim and the First Amendment claim. The Fifth Circuit reversed, in favor of Curlee, describing the incident as “a regular investigation of an extraordinary and hazardous situation created voluntarily by the plaintiff.” Curlee’s conduct was in accord with reasonable expectations. “The Fourth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. 1983 should not be employed as a daily quiz tendered by videotaping hopefuls seeking to metamorphosize law enforcement officers from investigators and protectors, into mere spectators, and then further converting them into federal defendants.” View "Kokesh v. Curlee" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit held that the Chisom decree, which created Louisiana's one majority-black supreme court district, does not govern the other six districts. Therefore, the district court properly denied Louisiana's motion to dismiss this Voting Rights Act suit for lack of jurisdiction. In this case, the state argued that the Chisom decree centralizes perpetual federal control over all supreme court districts in the Eastern District of Louisiana, which issued the decree. The court concluded that the district court rejected that reading for good reason because it is plainly wrong. Rather, the present suit addresses a different electoral district untouched by the decree. View "Allen v. Louisiana" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit principally seeking an injunction against the Texas court system to prevent any Texas court from entertaining suits under Senate Bill 8, which authorizes private civil actions against persons who abort an unborn child with a detectable fetal heartbeat. The motions at issue arise out of defendants' appeal of the district court's denial of their motions to dismiss the case on jurisdictional grounds.The Fifth Circuit previously denied plaintiffs' emergency motion for injunction pending appeal, which was premised on plaintiffs' argument that the district court's Eleventh Amendment immunity ruling was correct, and now explained the grounds for its actions. The court concluded that SB 8 emphatically precludes enforcement by any state, local, or agency officials, and thus defendant officials lack any "enforcement connection" to SB 8 and are not amenable to suit under Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).In regard to Mark Lee Dickson's appeal, the court concluded that jurisdictional issues presented in the proceedings against Dickson are related to the issues presented in the state officials' collateral-order appeal. Therefore, the notice of appeal divested the district court of jurisdiction over Dickson as well as the officials. Accordingly, the court denied plaintiffs' motion to dismiss Dickson's appeal; granted Dickson's motion to stay the district court proceedings pending appeal; and expedited the appeal to the next available oral argument panel. View "Whole Woman's Health v. Jackson" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of the City's motion to dismiss for lack of standing an action brought by plaintiff, a professional musician and accordionist, challenging three City ordinances which restrict busking in Houston. Plaintiff alleges that the ordinances violate his First Amendment right to free expression.The court agreed with plaintiff that the district court adopted an erroneously restrictive pleading standard for his First Amendment claim. The court concluded that, in pre-enforcement cases alleging a violation of the First Amendment's Free Speech Clause, the Supreme Court has recognized that chilled speech or self-censorship is an injury sufficient to confer standing. The court explained that a plaintiff bringing such a challenge need not have experienced "an actual arrest, prosecution, or other enforcement action" to establish standing. In this case, the complaint alleged that plaintiff intends to engage in conduct arguably affected with a constitutional interest; plaintiff's desired conduct is arguably proscribed by the ordinances; and he previously received a busking permit from the City—indicating recent enforcement of the permitting provision—which bolsters his entitlement to the substantial-threat-of-enforcement presumption. Therefore, plaintiff has adequately pleaded a justiciable injury and has standing to maintain his lawsuit at this stage. The court remanded for further proceedings. The court dismissed plaintiff's appeal of the district court's order denying his motion for reconsideration or leave to amend as moot. View "Barilla v. City of Houston" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment in an excessive force case where the district court held that a jury could conclude that an officer shot a citizen four times without warning while the citizen was turning away and empty-handed. The court explained that, because genuine disputes exist on three material facts—whether the officer warned before shooting, whether the citizen had turned away from the officer, and whether the officer could see that the citizen was unarmed—the district court properly denied a summary judgment motion invoking qualified immunity. The court agreed with the district court that there was a violation of clearly established law if the jury resolves the factual disputes in favor of plaintiff. View "Poole v. City of Shreveport" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255 because the motion was time-barred by the one-year limitations period in the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). The court concluded that defendant is not entitled to equitable tolling or recharacterization on his pro se filings. The court found United States v. Riggs, 314 F.3d 796, 799 (5th Cir. 2002), controlling where the record showed that defendant's counsel erroneously told defendant that he had not missed the deadline. Furthermore, even if defendant were entitled to have his pro se Johnson motion recharacterized as a section 2255 motion, his current arguments alleging prosecutorial conflict of interest do not relate back to his Johnson filing under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c). View "United States v. Cardenas" on Justia Law

Ward pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine. In February 2018, the district court sentenced Ward to 200 months of imprisonment. Ward unsuccessfully sought postconviction relief. In March 2020, through counsel, Ward sent a request for compassionate release to the warden, claiming that her kidney failure, other medical problems, and vulnerability to COVID-19 constituted an extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence reduction. In May 2020, the Bureau of Prisons denied her request because Ward’s “medical condition has not been determined to be terminal within eighteen months nor end of life trajectory.”In July 2020, after exhausting her administrative remedies, Ward sought relief under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A), arguing that compassionate release would be consistent with Sentencing Guideline 1B1.13 and that the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors favor a reduction. Ward filed her medical records, and an expert’s report that her kidney disease put her “at higher risk for developing severe illness, kidney failure, or death if she becomes infected with the coronavirus.” The Fifth Circuit affirmed the denial of Ward’s motion. The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Ward’s motion based on arguments not advanced by the government. Motions for compassionate release are inherently discretionary. The district court had the authority to consider Section 3553(a)'s sentencing factors. View "Ward v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1899, the Barnard E. Bee chapter of the United Daughters of the Confederacy erected a monument of a Confederate soldier in a San Antonio Park, also placing a time capsule beneath the statue. In 1932, the Albert Sidney Johnston (ASJ) chapter of the United Daughters of the Confederacy formed, and that chapter functionally took the place of the Bee chapter when the Bee chapter dissolved in 1972. Over a century after the monument was erected, the City of San Antonio removed both the monument and time capsule. The ASJ chapter filed suit, claiming violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint based on lack of standing, agreeing with the district court that the ASJ chapter had no property right in the monument, time capsule, or land at the center of the park. The court rejected ASJ's contention that it possesses an easement or license to use the land. Rather, the land was generally inalienable and unassignable. Furthermore, any permission to use the land was limited. Even assuming arguendo that the 1899 document created an easement or irrevocable license, however, it transferred only to the Bee chapter and terminated with its dissolution in 1972. Therefore, the ASJ chapter's failure to establish a particularized injury undermines both of its claims. View "Albert Sidney Johnston Chapter v. City of San Antonio" on Justia Law