Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Following the October 1, 2017 tragedy in Las Vegas where a gunman fired several semiautomatic rifles equipped with bump stocks and killed 58 people and wounding 500 more, the ATF promulgated a rule stating that bump stocks are machineguns for purposes for the National Firearms Act (NFA) and the federal statutory bar on the possession or sale of new machine guns.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's rejection of plaintiff's challenge to the rule, agreeing with the district court that the rule properly classifies a bump stock as a "machinegun" within the statutory definition and that the rule of lenity does not apply. The court need not address plaintiff's contentions that the ATF exceeded its statutory authority by issuing the rule or that the rule violates constitutional principles of separation of powers as resolution of these issues will not affect the outcome of the case. View "Cargill v. Garland" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed two actions against their landlord, MAA, alleging that it charged unreasonable late fees in violation of the Texas Property Code and seeking to certify a class under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court certified in both cases and MAA sought interlocutory review of class certification.The Fifth Circuit concluded that, under section 92.019 of the Texas Property Code, there is no requirement that a landlord engage in a process to arrive at its late fee so long as the fee is a reasonable estimate at the time of contracting of damages that are incapable of precise calculation. Therefore, the district court erred in interpreting section 92.019 and the court remanded to the district court to determine if class certification is appropriate. View "Cleven v. Mid-America Apartment Communities, Inc." on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of the Department's motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding that Louisiana has not waived its sovereign immunity for claims under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act. In this case, plaintiff filed suit for disability discrimination under the Act after he was terminated from his job of nearly twenty-four years based on his medical problems. The court also denied plaintiff's request to certify a question to the Louisiana Supreme Court, concluding that this case does not present a genuinely unsettled matter of Louisiana law and thus certification is not appropriate. View "Fletcher v. Louisiana Department of Transportation and Development" on Justia Law

The Fifth Circuit granted the Texas Attorney General a stay pending appeal of the permanent injunction that bars him from enforcing Texas Governor Greg Abbott's Executive Order GA-38, which prohibits local governmental entities from imposing mask mandates.After determining that plaintiffs have likely failed to demonstrate standing, the court concluded that the Attorney General has demonstrated a strong likelihood of success on the merits as a matter of law. In this case, the district court lacked jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims where plaintiffs have not exhausted their administrative remedies under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Furthermore, even if a failure to exhaust remedies does not bar plaintiffs' claims, plaintiffs likely failed to make out a prima facie case under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) or the Rehabilitation Act. The court explained that, given the availability of vaccines, voluntary masking, and other possible accommodations, the record before the court likely does not support the conclusion that a mask mandate would be both necessary and obvious under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act. The court also held that it was likely erroneous for the district court to hold that GA-38 was preempted by either the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act. To the extent that it is even properly before the court, the court did not read the American Rescue Plan Act to preempt GA-38's prohibition of local mask mandates, as the district court did. The court further concluded that, assuming plaintiffs' claims are otherwise viable, at a minimum, the district court's blanket injunction prohibiting the enforcement of GA-38 in all public schools across the State of Texas is overbroad. Finally, the court concluded that the Attorney General has demonstrated the prospect of irreparable injury absent a stay; has shown that maintaining the status quo ante pending appeal will not risk substantial injury to plaintiffs; and that the public interest favors a stay. View "E.T. v. Paxton" on Justia Law

Plaintiff and her now-adult son K.S., a former high school student with a specific learning disability, filed suit under the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA), alleging that the school district neither provided K.S. with a free appropriate public education (FAPE) nor complied with procedural safeguards meant to ensure such.The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision affirming two administrative decisions concluding that the school district did not violate the IDEA's substantive and procedural requirements. The court reviewed the voluminous record and the magistrate judge's thorough report that the district court adopted, discerning no reversible error in the district court's holding that: (1) the school district did not violate its obligation to identify and evaluate K.S. as a student with a suspected disability; (2) the individualized education programs and transition plan created for K.S. complied with IDEA's substantive requirements; and (3) the school district's procedural foot-faults in failing to include K.S. for the first manifestation determination review and failing to consider certain relevant information were not actionable. View "H v. Riesel Independent School District" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants Galman, Sutton, and the City of New Orleans, alleging a violation of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983, as well as various state law claims including assault, battery, and false arrest. Plaintiff also alleged a section 1983 claim against the City for failure to hire, train, supervise, or discipline officers, as well as various state law claims including negligent hiring, negligent supervision and retention, and vicarious liability. Plaintiff's claims stemmed from Galman and Sutton's actions harassing plaintiff while he was sitting at a local bar in his military fatigues and beating plaintiff unconscious. Galman and Sutton were local police officers who were off duty. The district court dismissed plaintiff's federal claims because it found that the officers were not acting under color of law.The Fifth Circuit concluded that plaintiff alleged sufficient facts to support all of his claims where plaintiff has adequately pleaded facts which establish that Galman and Sutton acted under color of law. In this case, plaintiff alleges that when he exited the bar, Sutton acted as a police officer and gave plaintiff a direct order to stop and not leave the patio area of the bar; plaintiff obeyed; when plaintiff attempted to drive away after getting violently beaten, Sutton and Galman ordered him to stop and to step out of his vehicle; and, because they acted like police officers, plaintiff believed he was not free to leave, and did as he was ordered. However, the court concluded that plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts to support a Monell claim against the City based on the officers' actions. The court further concluded that plaintiff has pleaded sufficient facts to support his state-law negligent hiring, retention, and supervision claims against the City. Finally, the district court correctly dismissed the vicarious liability claim against the City. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Gomez v. Galman" on Justia Law

Carver, a corrections officer at the Stiles Unit of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ), sued three of her former coworkers under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging they had sexually assaulted her at the Stiles Unit. The complaint specified that Carver was suing these defendants in their official capacities. Carver also brought section 1983 claims against TDCJ and the Stiles Unit. The court dismissed TDCJ on sovereign-immunity grounds and also dismissed Carver’s claims against the Stiles Unit. None of the individual defendants responded to their summonses or defended the suit in any way. The clerk entered a default. The court ordered the individual defendants to “show cause” why a default judgment should not be granted.Without giving Carver notice or an opportunity to respond, the court subsequently dismissed her claims against the individual defendants with prejudice. The court reasoned that, because Carver had sued the three in their official capacities for money damages, the suits were prima facie barred by sovereign immunity. The Fifth Circuit reversed. Both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Fifth Circuit precedents preclude the dismissal of the complaint sua sponte and with prejudice. The Rules give plaintiffs a variety of ways to fix a defective complaint. View "Carver v. Atwood" on Justia Law

Gray claims that officers came to his cell, attacked Gray without provocation, took him to a shower, where, despite complying with all orders, he was sprayed with a chemical agent, and passed out. Upon waking up, he was placed in restraints and dragged to a transportation van. Officers continued to beat him. Gray’s injuries included a broken nose and a bruised kidney. These allegations are contradicted by the disciplinary reports indicating that officers went to Gray’s cell for a targeted search. Gray was intoxicated. There was vomit on the floor and Gray failed to answer questions. The officers moved Gray to the shower area, where he resisted by kicking and spitting, necessitating the use of a chemical agent to gain compliance. He knocked a radio from an officer's belt, breaking it. The prison disciplinary board found Gray guilty of intoxication, defiance, aggravated disobedience, property destruction, and having synthetic marihuana in his cell. Gray sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983.The district court granted the defendants summary judgment. The Fifth Circuit vacated in part. Gray’s claims cannot be deemed to be Heck-barred because it is impossible to know which of his allegations might necessarily contradict his disciplinary convictions. The allegations of excessive force after Gray left the shower area were properly dismissed because Gray failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, as required by 42 U.S.C. 1997e. View "Gray v. White" on Justia Law

Santos alleges that he witnessed six prison officers beating another inmate. Santos intervened. He claims that he was then knocked to the ground, hit, kicked, choked, handcuffed, and dragged so that his head hit poles. He was then placed in a shower cell, where Captain Wells sprayed him in the face, genitals, and anus with a chemical agent. Wells allegedly cut Santos with a knife and threatened to kill him. Santos was ultimately transferred to a medical center where, he alleges, he was denied adequate attention. According to prison officials, Santos physically attacked them. Despite initially being restrained, he hit Wells hard enough to break his dentures. His actions necessitated the use of a chemical agent to gain compliance. A prison disciplinary board concluded that Santos was guilty of defiance, aggravated disobedience, property destruction, and unauthorized area.Santos sued under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The district court granted the defendants summary judgment, determining that Santos’s claims were barred by “Heck” because prison disciplinary reports contradicted Santos’s allegations. The Fifth Circuit upheld the decision to admit the disciplinary reports, rejecting a hearsay argument, but remanded with regard to the application of Heck. The reports were offered to demonstrate that the disciplinary board found Santos guilty, not to prove the truth of the assertions. Whether the board’s findings related to the assault on Wells bar the corresponding claims by Santos must be determined by a fact-specific analysis. View "Santos v. White" on Justia Law

This case concerns OSHA's November 5, 2021 Emergency Temporary Standard requiring employees of covered employers to undergo COVID-19 vaccination or take weekly COVID-19 tests and wear a mask.The Fifth Circuit granted petitioners' motion for a stay pending review, holding that the Nken factors favored a stay. The court concluded that petitioners' challenges to the Mandate are likely to succeed on the merits. The court stated that, on the dubious assumption that the Mandate does pass constitutional muster, it is nonetheless fatally flawed on its own terms. The court wrote that the Mandate's strained prescriptions combine to make it the rare government pronouncement that is both overinclusive (applying to employers and employees in virtually all industries and workplaces in America, with little attempt to account for the obvious differences between the risks facing, say, a security guard on a lonely night shift, and a meatpacker working shoulder to shoulder in a cramped warehouse) and underinclusive (purporting to save employees with 99 or more coworkers from a "grave danger" in the workplace, while making no attempt to shield employees with 98 or fewer coworkers from the very same. The court found that promulgation of the Mandate grossly exceeds OSHA's statutory authority and found arguments to the contrary unavailing.The court also concluded that it is clear that denial of petitioners' proposed stay would do them irreparable harm where the Mandate threatens to substantially burden the liberty interests of reluctant individuals, companies, and the States. In contrast, the court stated that a stay will do OSHA no harm whatsoever. Finally, the court concluded that a stay is firmly in the public interest. View "BST Holdings, LLC v. Occupational Safety and Health Administration" on Justia Law