Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff is a music theory professor at UNT, a leading expert on the Austrian music theorist Heinrich Schenker, the director of the Center for Schenkerian Studies, and the founder of the Journal of Schenkerian Studies. Plaintiff published an article defending Schenker against charges of racism. The Dean of the College of Music announced that the College of Music would be launching a “formal investigation into the conception and production of” the Journal’s symposium issue. After interviewing eleven individuals, the panel produced a report. The provost sent Jackson a letter instructing him to “develop of a plan to address the recommendations.” After Plaintiff submitted his plan, Board members charged the department with launching a national search for a new editor-in-chief for the Journal, who is a full-time tenured faculty member. Plaintiff sued the Board defendants, among others, alleging a First Amendment retaliation claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983. The district court denied the defendants’ motions to dismiss.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court found that sovereign immunity does not bar Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim. Further, the court found that Plaintiff has standing to bring his First Amendment claim against the Board defendants. Accordingly, the court found that Plaintiff has “alleged an ongoing violation of federal law and seeks relief properly characterized as prospective.” Thus, at the motion to dismiss stage, sovereign immunity does not bar Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim against the Board defendants. The court also found that Plaintiff also has standing to bring his First Amendment claim. For Article III standing. View "Jackson v. Wright" on Justia Law

The Texas Department of Criminal Justice fired Plaintiff after he refused to cut his hair and beard in violation of his religious vow. Plaintiff exhausted his administrative remedies. He then filed a pro se lawsuit against TDCJ and various officers, which alleged claims of religious discrimination and failure to accommodate under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants.   The Fifth Circuit, in accordance with the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Groff v. DeJoy, 143 S. Ct. 2279 (2023), reversed. The court explained that Title VII forbids religious discrimination in employment. The statute defines “religion” broadly to include “all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief.” Further, the court explained that Title VII also requires employers to accommodate the religious observances or practices of applicants and employees. The court held that TDCJ breached both duties. TDCJ (A) failed to accommodate Hebrew’s religious practice and (B) discriminated against him on the basis of his religious practice   The court reasoned that the only issue is whether TDCJ has met its burden to show that granting Hebrew’s requested accommodation—to keep his hair and beard—would place an undue hardship on TDCJ. The court held that (1) TDCJ cannot meet the undue hardship standard and (2) the Department’s counterarguments are unavailing. The court noted that, in this case, TDCJ cannot hide behind its “otherwise-neutral policy.” This policy must “give way” to Plaintiff’s requested accommodation. View "Hebrew v. TDCJ" on Justia Law

Louisiana Fair Housing Action Center (LaFHAC) sued Azalea Garden Properties, LLC (Azalea Garden), alleging that Azalea Garden discriminated on the basis of race and disability at its apartment complex in Jefferson, Louisiana, in violation of the Fair Housing Act (FHA). The district court dismissed LaFHAC’s disability claim but allowed its disparate impact race claim to proceed, subject to one caveat: The district court certified a permissive interlocutory appeal on the issue of whether the “predictably will cause” standard for FHA disparate-impact claims remains viable after Inclusive Communities Project Inc. v. Lincoln Property Co., 920 F.3d 890 (5th Cir. 2019).   The Fifth Circuit remanded the case with instructions to dismiss LaFHAC’s claims without prejudice. The court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction over this case. Along the same lines, the court wrote that it cannot consider the district court’s certified question. The court explained that LaFHAC has plausibly alleged a diversion of resources, as it shifted efforts away from planned projects like its annual conference toward counteracting Azalea Garden’s alleged discrimination. But “an organization does not automatically suffer a cognizable injury in fact by diverting resources in response to a defendant’s conduct.” The court wrote that LaFHAC failed to plead an injury because it failed to allege how its diversion of resources impaired its ability to achieve its mission. Thus, the court held that because LaFHAC has not alleged a cognizable injury, it lacks standing to bring the claims it alleges in this action. View "LA Fair Housing Action v. Azalea Garden" on Justia Law

Savion Hall, an inmate at Midland County Jail, suffered severe breathing issues that were known to prison officials. The jail contracted with Soluta, Inc., a private company, for medical services, but Soluta employees failed to provide standard medical care to Hall and fabricated his medical reports. Eventually, Hall required urgent medical attention, but when he asked Daniel Stickel, a prison guard, for help, Stickel followed set protocol: Hall was only supposed to receive “breathing treatments” every four hours; because less than four hours had elapsed since Hall’s last treatment, Stickel sent him back to his cell. Eventually, Hall was seen by a doctor, who called Emergency Medical Services (“EMS”). Hall died in the hospital. Plaintiffs, various relatives and representatives of Hall’s estate appealed the dismissal of his constitutional claims against Midland County and Stickel.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that municipalities such as Midland County cannot be held liable unless plaintiffs can show “(1) an official policy (or custom), of which (2) a policymaker can be charged with actual or constructive knowledge, and (3) a constitutional violation whose ‘moving force’ is that policy or custom.” The court explained that there are no allegations that anyone other than the Soluta employees was aware, or should have been aware, of the nurses’ failure to provide adequate medical care. The court reasoned that this implies that neither Soluta nor Midland County4 knew of the “policy” of failing to follow the proper medical procedures. Further, the court held that Plaintiffs have not plausibly pleaded deliberate indifference predicated on a delay in medical treatment. View "Robinson v. Midland County, Texas" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is a devout Rastafarian who vowed to “let the locks of the hair of his head grow,” a promise known as the Nazarite Vow. During his brief stint in prison, Plaintiff was primarily housed at two facilities, and each facility respected Plaintiff’s vow. With only three weeks left in his sentence—Plaintiff was transferred to RLCC. Plaintiff explained that he was a practicing Rastafarian and provided proof of past religious accommodations. And Plaintiff also handed the guard a copy of the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Ware v. Louisiana Department of Corrections. The guard threw Plaintiff’s papers in the trash and summoned RLCC’s warden. When the Warden arrived, he demanded Plaintiff hand over documentation from his sentencing judge that corroborated his religious beliefs. Guards then carried him into another room, handcuffed him to a chair, held him down, and shaved his head. Plaintiff brought claims under RLUIPA and Section 1983. He also pleaded state law claims for negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violations of the Louisiana constitution. The district court agreed with Defendants and held that those claims were moot. Plaintiff appealed.   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court concluded that while Sossamon I RLUIPA’s text suggests a damages remedy, recognizing as much would run afoul of the Spending Clause. Tanzin doesn’t change that—it addresses a different law that was enacted under a separate Congressional power with “concerns not relevant to [RLUIPA].” Accordingly, the court held because Sossamon I remains the law, Plaintiff cannot recover monetary damages against the defendant-officials in their individual capacities under RLUIPA. View "Landor v. Louisiana Dept of Corrections" on Justia Law

The Verona Police Department twice arrested L.B. for his connection to violent shootings. Both times, however, he was released while his charges were pending. Just five months after his second arrest, L.B. drove to Annie Walton’s house and opened fire—killing Annie Walton and injuring her grandson, Aliven Walton. Annie Walton’s wrongful death beneficiaries (collectively, Plaintiffs ) believe the City of Verona and the Verona Chief of Police, J.B. Long, are responsible for the shooting at Annie Walton’s home, so they sued under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. At summary judgment, the district court initially dismissed all claims. But Plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration, and the district court reversed course—finding the City of Verona was not entitled to sovereign immunity under the Mississippi Tort Claims Act. Plaintiffs and the City of Verona subsequently filed interlocutory appeals.   The Fifth Circuit dismissed Plaintiffs appeal for lack of jurisdiction and reversed the district court’s finding against the City regarding sovereign immunity. The court explained that Long had no special duty to protect Plaintiffs besides his general duty to keep the public safe as the City’s Chief of Police. The court explained that the only evidence that demonstrates Long had knowledge of any connection between L.B. and Plaintiffs comes from Long’s investigative file, where there is a copy of a trespassing complaint that Annie filed against L.B. in 2016. Accordingly, the court held Long did not owe a duty to protect Plaintiffs from L.B.’s drive-by shooting. Thus, Plaintiffs cannot sustain their negligence claims or their MTCA claims against the City. View "Walton v. City of Verona" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, formerly a patrol sergeant in the Alamo, Texas police department, brought a Section 1983 action against the City of Alamo (the “City”), former chief of police, and several other officers in connection with an alleged scheme to have Plaintiff fired and arrested on bogus charges. The district court dismissed the City and the other officers under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), then dismissed the chief of police under 12(c). Plaintiff appealed the dismissals of the chief of police and the City.   The Fifth Circuit reversed the dismissal of Plaintiff's false arrest complaint against the chief of police and affirmed the dismissal of the City. The court explained that Plaintiff’s complaint presents Defendant as the sole moving force behind a deliberate, long-term conspiracy to create and file affidavits Defendant knew to be false, with the purpose of exploiting the criminal justice system to arrest, detain, and torment Plaintiff for crimes Defendant knew he did not commit. Defendant, moreover, ordered the sham investigations that served as the basis for the false affidavits and pushed the investigations forward despite knowing Plaintiff was innocent. The court wrote that Terwilliger v. Reyna controls here. As such, the court held that Defendant’s alleged actions are relevant, like Reyna’s, for purposes of evaluating his potential Franks liability at the Rule 12 stage. Defendant was the “driving force” behind the conspiracy, and he was “continuously updated” as to the status of the investigations he had ordered, including the fact the investigations revealed no criminality or impropriety. Therefore, the court reversed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff’s false arrest claim against Defendant. View "Guerra v. Castillo" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 and Louisiana state law against Louisiana Department of Public Safety and Corrections (“DPSC”) supervisory officials Tracy DiBenedetto, Angela Griffin, and Sally Gryder in their individual capacities alleging that he was wrongfully detained for sixty days after the expiration of his prison sentence. The district court denied qualified immunity at the motion-to-dismiss stage for DiBenedetto and Gryder but found Griffin enjoys qualified immunity. DiBenedetto and Gryder appealed, arguing that they are entitled to qualified immunity because they neither violated Plaintiff’s constitutional rights nor acted unreasonably in light of clearly established law   The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The court first explained that Plaintiff’s right to timely release was clearly established under these particular circumstances because governing law required DPSC to follow the state court’s orders requiring them to credit the Arkansas time. Further, the court found that Plaintiff plausibly alleged that DiBenedetto and Gryder were direct participants in violating his right to timely release from prison. According to the complaint, DiBenedetto reviewed all of Plaintiff’s ARPs, knew he was not being credited for the Arkansas time, yet did not take any action to correct the error. Indeed, she personally informed Hicks that her (incorrect) calculation was correct and refused to modify it despite Hicks’ pointing out that his Arkansas time was not credited. View "Hicks v. LeBlanc" on Justia Law

Due to a settlement in a civil matter, Plaintiff, an inmate incarcerated in Gatesville, Texas had an inmate trust fund worth nearly $100,000.00. In December of 2019, Plaintiff made a suspicious withdrawal, and Appellee, a former senior warden, notified her that she was under investigation for trafficking. Shortly after, Plaintiff was found guilty of the lowest level of rule violation. Plaintiff now asserts that she has submitted approximately three or four separate withdrawal requests to TDCJ, which were all denied without notice or an opportunity to be heard in violation of her procedural due process rights. The district court granted summary judgment to all Appellees and entered a final judgment. Plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Rule 59(e) and a Rule 15(a) motion for leave to file a second amended complaint, which the district court denied.   The Fifth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment and reversed the district court’s ruling denying Plaintiff’s Rule 59(e) motion. The court explained that the Ex Parte Young exception applies to this case. The court explained that any of Plaintiff’s claims seeking declaratory relief based on purported constitutional violations occurring in the past, as well as any requests for monetary damages, are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. However, her claims to enjoin a future action that might violate her constitutional rights may proceed. Further, the court held that Plaintiff provided evidence that her procedural due process rights were violated, which precludes summary judgment. Finally, the court found that the court erred in not vacating the judgment and granting Plaintiff leave to amend her pleadings. View "Calhoun v. Collier" on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought an action against Defendants-Appellees Holy Cross College, Inc. and Congregation of Holy Cross Moreau Province, Inc. (collectively, “Holy Cross”) in the district court. Plaintiff alleged that he suffered from sexual abuse carried out by Holy Cross teacher on two separate occasions while attending summer camp at Holy Cross as a 10- or 11-year-old boy in either 1968 or 1969. Plaintiff asserted that Holy Cross is liable for the teacher’s conduct under the doctrine of respondeat superior. At the time of the alleged abuse, such an offense was subject to a one-year liberative prescriptive period. Plaintiff invoked the Revival Provision as his basis to bring a suit. The district court granted Holy Cross’s motion and dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint.   The Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded. The court explained that while the appeal was pending, the Louisiana Supreme Court issued its decision in T.S v. Congregation of Holy Cross Southern Province, Inc., 2023 WL 4195778. The court wrote that with the benefit of the T.S. decision, the court is now certain as to how this case should be resolved under Louisiana law. As previously noted, the facts of both cases are nearly identical. Therefore, it is apparent that the district court should not have ruled on the Revival Provision’s constitutionality. Instead, it is now clear that the Revival Provision’s wording makes it inapplicable to Plaintiff’s claims. Accordingly, his complaint should be dismissed for that sole reason. The court directed that on remand, the district court may consider whether Plaintiff should be provided with leave to amend his complaint. View "Lousteau v. Holy Cross College" on Justia Law