Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that Officer Swarbrick falsely arrested him and used excessive force; Officer Trammel failed to intervene; and the Sheriff had a custom or policy of excessive force or failed to adequately train, supervise, and discipline Swarbrick and Trammel.The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Swarbrick on plaintiff's false arrest claim and plaintiff's excessive force claim regarding an alleged three-to-five minute period of pepper spraying. In this case, plaintiff has presented a genuine dispute of material fact regarding Swarbrick's use of force as to that period of pepper spraying. Accordingly, the court remanded those claims for further proceedings. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Swarbrick as to any other allegations of excessive force. Likewise, the court affirmed the claims against the Sheriff and Trammel. View "Alston v. Swarbrick" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, as the personal representative of her son, filed suit against a deputy, alleging that he violated her son's substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment by stopping several bystanders from performing CPR on her son after he attempted to commit suicide by hanging himself.The Fourth Circuit vacated the district court's judgment and held that the district court analyzed this case under the erroneous assumption that a deliberate indifference level of culpability was sufficient. Rather, the court held that the deputy's actions cannot be deemed to violate clearly established substantive due process rights, unless the jury finds that he acted with a level of culpability more than reckless interference with bystanders' attempted rescue efforts. In this case, the court could not conclude that the deputy's reckless or deliberately indifferent interference with bystanders' rescue attempts is sufficient to constitute a violation of plaintiff's clearly established substantive due process rights. The court held that the deputy's actions would rise to that necessary level should the jury find that the deputy acted for the purpose of causing harm to plaintiff's son. The court explained that, if the jury finds that the deputy intended to cause harm to plaintiff's son in the form of death or serious brain injury, and finds the other circumstances it assumed in this summary judgment posture, then plaintiff would have proved a violation of clearly established substantive due process rights. Accordingly, the court remanded for further proceedings. View "Waldron v. Spicher" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an inmate who was diagnosed with gender dysphoria, filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging violations of her Eighth Amendment rights, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. The Eleventh Circuit held that plaintiff's challenges to the prior freeze-frame policy and the FDC's initial denial of hormone therapy are moot in light of the FDC's subsequent repeal and replacement of the policy and its provision of hormone treatment.The court rejected the merits of plaintiff's claim that the FDC violated the Eighth Amendment by refusing to accommodate her social-transitioning requests (to grow out her hair, use makeup, and wear female undergarments). In light of the disagreement among the testifying professionals about the medical necessity of social transitioning to plaintiff's treatment and the "wide-ranging deference" that the court pays to prison administrators' determinations about institutional safety and security, the court could not say that the FDC consciously disregarded a risk of serious harm by conduct that was "more than mere negligence" and thereby violated the Eighth Amendment. Rather, the court concluded that the FDC chose a meaningful course of treatment to address plaintiff's gender-dysphoria symptoms, which was sufficient to clear the low deliberate-indifference bar. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order, dismissed as moot in part, and reversed in part. View "Keohane v. Florida Department of Corrections Secretary" on Justia Law

Relying on an earlier decision (Rabun County), the Eleventh Circuit affirmed a decision ordering the removal of a 34-foot Latin cross from the City of Pensacola’s Bayview Park, finding that the maintenance of the cross violated the First Amendment’s Establishment Clause. While the city's petition for certiorari was pending, the Supreme Court held, in "American Legion," that a 32-foot Latin cross on public land in Bladensburg, Maryland does not violate the Establishment Clause. The Supreme Court vacated the earlier decision and remanded for further consideration in light of American Legion.On remand, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that it remains bound by Rabun to conclude that plaintiffs have Article III standing to challenge Pensacola’s maintenance of the cross but that American Legion abrogates Rabun to the extent that the latter disregarded evidence of “historical acceptance.” When "American Legion" is applied, the cross’s presence on city property does not violate the Establishment Clause. The Bayview cross (in one iteration or another) stood in the same location for more than 75 years; there is no evidence of the city's original purpose in its placement. The message and purposes of the cross have changed over time. A strong presumption of constitutionality” attaches to “established” monuments, View "Kondrat'yev v. City of Pensacola," on Justia Law

In 2018, Florida voters approved Amendment 4, a state constitutional amendment that automatically restored voting rights to ex-felons who had completed all of the terms of their sentences. Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the "legal financial obligation" (LFO) requirement in Senate Bill 7066, which implemented the Amendment and interpreted its language to require payment of all fines, fees and restitution imposed as part of the sentence. The district court ultimately issued a preliminary injunction requiring the state to allow the named plaintiffs to register and vote if they are able to show that they are genuinely unable to pay their LFOs and would otherwise be eligible to vote under Amendment 4. The state appealed.The Eleventh Circuit held that the LFO requirement violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as applied to these plaintiffs. The court stated that it was undeniable that the LFO requirement punishes those who cannot pay more harshly than those who can, and denying access to the franchise to those genuinely unable to pay solely on account of wealth does not survive heightened scrutiny. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its considerable discretion in balancing the equitable factors for a preliminary injunction. Furthermore, under Florida law the unconstitutional application of the LFO requirement was easily severable from the remainder of Amendment 4. Accordingly, the court affirmed the preliminary injunction entered by the district court. View "Jones v. Governor of Florida" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the city, alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violations of her Fourth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, and a state-law claim under Georgia law for false imprisonment. Plaintiff's claims stemmed from her misdemeanor proceedings in municipal court for failure to maintain automobile liability insurance as required by Georgia law.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's section 1983 claims, holding that the municipal court was exercising its judicial power under Georgia law to adjudicate a state-law offense, not a violation of a city or county ordinance, and thus was not acting on behalf of the city. However, the court held that the district court failed to address plaintiff's state-law claim for false imprisonment and therefore remanded for further proceedings on that claim. The court stated that, because there are some Georgia cases suggesting that the invalidity of a warrant may permit a false imprisonment claim, it was best for the district court to consider that claim in the first instance. View "Teagan v. City of McDonough" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a petition for habeas relief. Petitioner argued that he would not have pleaded guilty to access device fraud and aggravated identity theft but for his counsel's erroneous advice concerning the deportation consequences of his plea. The district court assumed, without deciding, that petitioner's attorney's performance was deficient.The court declined to assume that counsel's performance was deficient and held, instead, that counsel's performance was not deficient and petitioner failed to satisfy his claim for ineffective assistance of counsel. In this case, counsel could not have predicted the district court's fraud loss findings. Furthermore, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying an evidentiary hearing under 28 U.S.C. 2255. View "Martin v. United States" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the Fifth and Sixth Circuits, holding that Congress validly abrogated state sovereign immunity in the Voting Rights Act (VRA). The court explained that the VRA, as amended, clearly expresses an intent to allow private parties to sue the states. The court stated that the language in sections 2 and 3 of the VRA, read together, imposes direct liability on states for discrimination in voting and explicitly provides remedies to private parties to address violations under the statute.Furthermore, both section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment, using identical language, authorize Congress to enforce their respective provisions by appropriate legislation. The court agreed with the Fifth and Sixth Circuits that if section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment permits Congress to abrogate state sovereign immunity, so too must section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's denial of Alabama's motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds and held that Alabama is not immune from suit under the VRA. View "Alabama State Conference of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama" on Justia Law

Petitioner was sentenced to death for first degree murder, kidnapping, robbery, sexual battery, and burglary of a conveyance with assault. Petitioner subsequently filed a 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition, which the district court denied.The Eleventh Circuit granted a certificate of appealability on two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's ineffective assistance claims, holding that petitioner has not shown that his counsel's failure to investigate and call a witness prejudiced his defense at either the guilt or sentence stage. View "Johnston v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit denied petitioner authorization to file another federal habeas petition so that he could raise an actual innocence claim, a Brady claim, and an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. The court held that its authority to grant the application was restricted by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), because petitioner failed to make a prima facie showing that the claims in his application met the requirements under 28 U.S.C. 2244(b).In this case, petitioner could not raise an actual innocence claim in his successive petition because he has already raised the claim, he has not identified a "but for" constitutional violation, and he has not met the demanding actual innocence standard in Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 417 (1993). Furthermore, petitioner's Brady claim failed because he could not show that he could not have discovered the information at issue with due diligence or, assuming the State failed to disclose the information, petitioner failed to show a "but for" constitutional violation. Finally, petitioner failed to show that the factual predicate for his ineffective assistance of counsel claim could not have been discovered previously. View "In Re: James Dailey" on Justia Law