Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The people of Florida amended their state constitution to restore the voting rights of convicted felons. Before regaining the right to vote, felons must complete all the terms of their sentences, including imprisonment, probation, and payment of any fines, fees, costs, and restitution. Felons sued, challenging the requirement that they pay their fines, fees, costs, and restitution before regaining the right to vote. They alleged the requirement violated the Equal Protection Clause as applied to felons who cannot pay; imposed a tax on voting in violation of the Twenty-Fourth Amendment; was void for vagueness; and adopted requirements that make it difficult for them to determine whether they are eligible to vote. The district court permanently enjoined the condition's enforcement.The Eleventh Circuit reversed. States may restrict voting by felons in ways that would be impermissible for other citizens. Laws governing felon disenfranchisement and re-enfranchisement are generally subject to rational basis review; “reform may take one step at a time.” Florida has legitimate interests in disenfranchising convicted felons, even those who have completed their sentences, and in restoring felons to the electorate after justice has been done and they have been fully rehabilitated. Fines, which are paid to the government as punishment for a crime, and restitution, which compensates crime victims, are not taxes. Felons and law enforcement can readily discern exactly what conduct is prohibited: a felon may not vote or register to vote if he knows that he has failed to complete all terms of his criminal sentence. View "Jones v. Governor of Florida" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Georgia inmate at Baldwin State Prison, filed a pro se 42 U.S.C. 1983 complaint alleging, among other claims, that medical staff at the prison failed to give him proper medical treatment in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The district court dismissed plaintiff's claim based on his failure to exhaust administrative remedies.The Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded for further proceedings on the availability of administrative remedies under Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850 (2016). Although the district court was correct to dismiss plaintiff's argument that his mental capacities made the grievance procedure unavailable, the court held that plaintiff's argument that misleading prison assistance caused his grievance errors should have been considered. In this case, plaintiff alleged and provided some evidence that he received misleading assistance in the prison grievance process. View "Geter v. Akunwanne" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, former sex offenders and currently homeless residents of the County, filed suit alleging that County Ordinance No. 05-206, which restricts certain sex offenders from living within 2,500 feet of a school, violates the ex post facto clauses of both the federal and state constitutions because the residency restriction amounted to an impermissible retroactive criminal punishment.The Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying plaintiffs' Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15 motion to conform their pleadings to the evidence. The court explained that Rule 15(b) allows parties to add unpled issues to a case if those issues have been tried with the express or implied consent of the parties, but one must comply with the notice demands of procedural due process before an unpled issue can be added. In this case, plaintiffs failed to give fair notice to the County of their as-applied theory of relief, and the County says it would have defended the Ordinance differently had it known that plaintiffs sought this relief. View "John Doe #6 v. Miami-Dade County" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit vacated its original opinion in this appeal and substituted in its place the following opinion.At issue is whether several voters and organizations may challenge in federal court a law that governs the order in which candidates appear on the ballot in Florida's general elections. Plaintiffs alleged that the law violates their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments because candidates who appear first on the ballot enjoy a "windfall vote" from a small number of voters who select the first candidate on a ballot solely because of that candidate’s position of primacy. The district court permanently enjoined the Secretary—and the 67 county Supervisors of Elections, none of whom were made parties to this lawsuit—from preparing ballots in accordance with the law.The court held that the voters and organizations lack standing to sue the Secretary because none of them proved an injury in fact. In this case, any injury they might suffer is neither fairly traceable to the Secretary nor redressable by a judgment against her because she does not enforce the challenged law. Rather, the Supervisors—county officials independent of the Secretary—are responsible for placing candidates on the ballot in the order the law prescribes. However, the district court lacked authority to enjoin those officials in this suit, so it was powerless to provide redress. The court also held, in the alternative, that the voters and organizations' complaint presents a nonjusticiable political question. The court explained that complaints of unfair partisan advantage based on the order in which candidates appear on the ballot bear all the hallmarks of a political question outside the court's competence to resolve. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. View "Jacobsen v. Florida Secretary of State" on Justia Law

After Robert Earl Lawrence was shot and killed by a police officer while trying to return a stray dog to an animal shelter, the executor of his estate filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment and asserting a state law claim for assault and battery.The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the officer, holding that, taking the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiff, a reasonable jury could find that the officer violated Lawrence's clearly established constitutional rights by shooting him. In this case, Lawrence was not committing a dangerous felony, or even a non-dangerous one. Rather, he was just trying to drop off at an animal shelter a stray dog he had found in a parking lot earlier that day. The court explained that the underlying crime for which he was being arrested was, at worst, driving without a license, the maximum punishment for which is a $100 fine; the only flight he engaged in was running around his car on two occasions when he managed to break loose from the officers who were trying to handcuff him; he did resist being handcuffed and arrested, but not violently; while being held by an officer who outweighed him by 75 pounds, another officer tased him at least twice in the abdomen; when he grabbed at the taser in an attempt to avoid being tased again, he and two of the three officers struggled over it, but Lawrence never gained control of it; and, at that point, the officer who had been tasing him let go of the taser, drew her firearm, and fatally shot him without warning, all in the space of three seconds. Therefore, the officer that shot Lawrence is not entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity or based on state agent immunity. View "Cantu v. City of Dothan" on Justia Law

Hepatitis C (HCV) is a bloodborne virus. Only about 1% of the general population suffers from HCV; its prevalence among prison inmates is much higher. HCV primarily attacks the liver, causing scarring, or “fibrosis,” which is measured from F0 (no fibrosis) to F4 (cirrhosis). Many people “spontaneously clear” HCV without treatment. HCV patients were previously prescribed weekly injections of Interferon, which caused unpleasant side effects, and succeeded in eradicating HCV only about 30% of the time. In 2013, a new HCV treatment became available—direct-acting antiviral (DAA) pills, with few side effects and a 95% cure rate. DAAs are very expensive.Chronic-HCV inmates incarcerated in Florida prisons filed a class action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to inmates’ serious medical needs. Florida then hired Dr. Dewsnup, who had developed and implemented an HCV-treatment plan for the Oregon prison system. Florida adopted Dewsnup's proposal of providing DAAs for all inmates at level F2 and above and monitoring F0- and F1-level inmates and treating them with DAAs under certain circumstances. Ultimately, the court ordered DAA treatment of all F0s and F1s within two years of their initial staging. The Eleventh Circuit reversed. The state’s plan to monitor all HCV-positive inmates, including those who have not exhibited serious symptoms, and provide DAAs to anyone with an exacerbating condition, showing signs of rapid progression, or developing even moderate fibrosis, satisfies constitutional requirements. View "Hoffer v. Secretary, Florida Department Corrections" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging that four officials at the Georgia Institute of Technology played a role in creating a report that falsely accused him of stealing resources from the Institute, which then led to his arrest and prosecution for racketeering and theft. Plaintiff filed suit against the officials in the district court for malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment. The district court granted the officials' motion to dismiss the complaint.The Eleventh Circuit held that a dismissal for untimeliness qualifies as a favorable termination in a claim for malicious prosecution under the Fourth Amendment. The court explained that, because plaintiff's complaint alleges that the prosecution against him formally terminated and does not allege that he was convicted or that he admitted his guilt to each charge that justified his seizure, he has alleged that he received a favorable termination. The court also held that plaintiff has alleged that two of the officials violated his clearly established constitutional rights by initiating the warrant proceedings without probable cause and with malice; the officials caused his seizures; and the officials violated plaintiff's clearly established rights to not be seized based on intentional and material misstatements in a warrant application. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Laskar v. Hurd" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's denial of a 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion for habeas relief and remanded for further proceedings. In this case, while petitioner was on supervised release, he faced a classic penalty situation when his probation officer asked him to answer questions that would reveal he had committed new crimes. Petitioner's attorneys never raised this argument during his criminal proceedings on the newly revealed crimes and, had they done so and filed a motion to suppress petitioner's statements, the government would have had to establish that it nonetheless would have obtained the incriminating evidence against petitioner through other, lawful means. The court explained that, if the government had been unable to do so, it is reasonably likely that petitioner would have prevailed on his suppression motion, and the outcome of his case would have been different. Therefore, petitioner would be entitled to habeas relief upon a showing that his counsel's performance was deficient in failing to raise this argument.Because the current record lacks information concerning whether the evidence derived from petitioner's statements otherwise would have been admissible, the court remanded for the government to present any evidence and arguments to show that the evidence from petitioner's phone would have otherwise been admissible, and the district court shall rule on any such arguments. Should the district court conclude that the evidence would have been otherwise admissible, it shall deny the section 2255 motion, since filing the Fifth Amendment suppression motion would not have been reasonably likely to change the outcome in McKathan II. However, should the district court determine that the evidence would not have been otherwise admissible, it shall address whether petitioner's counsel performed deficiently by failing to raise the Fifth Amendment issue in McKathan II. View "McKathan v. United States" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit certified the following question to the Supreme Court of Georgia under O.C.G.A. 15-2-9: Does O.C.G.A. 45-5-3.2 conflict with Georgia Constitution Article VI, Section VIII, Paragraph I(a) (or any other provision) of the Georgia Constitution? View "Gonzalez v. Governor of the State of Georgia" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against a deputy sheriff and others, alleging that the deputy violated plaintiff's Fourteenth Amendment rights in two ways: (1) by using unconstitutionally excessive force when he placed plaintiff in an unventilated, un-air-conditioned transport van and kept him there for an unreasonable amount of time; and (2) by exhibiting deliberate indifference when he recklessly disregarded plaintiff's serious medical needs. Plaintiff also alleged state law claims. The district court granted the deputy's motion for summary judgment.The Eleventh Circuit held that, although the deputy violated plaintiff's constitutional rights by applying excessive force, it was not clearly established at the time of his transport. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment as to this claim. The court also held that the deputy exhibited deliberate indifference to plaintiff's serious medical need when he ignored plaintiff's resulting distress, which included unconsciousness, shaking, profuse sweating, and labored breathing. Furthermore, the deputy was on notice that he was confronted with a serious medical need and did nothing to aid plaintiff. Therefore, the deputy was not entitled to qualified immunity on the deliberate indifference claim. Finally, the court held that the district court erred in rejecting plaintiff's adjunct state-law claims on official immunity grounds. View "Patel v. Smith" on Justia Law