Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, in her individual capacity and as guardian and next friend of T.D.H., a minor, alleging that Chief Carroll, the four named officers, and the City of Rainbow City violated her and T.D.H.'s constitutional rights to be free from the use of excessive force, failing to intervene in the use of that force, and falsely imprisoning and falsely arresting her and T.D.H. Plaintiff also alleged that Rainbow City and Chief Carroll failed to appropriately train and supervise the other named officers. Plaintiff's claims stemmed from defendants' actions while T.D.H. was suffering from a grand mal seizure at a concert.Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to T.D.H., the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Officer Morris's repeated tasings amounted to excessive force prohibited by the Fourth Amendment, and that the constitutional violation was clearly established based on both materially similar case law and the obvious clarity exception. Therefore, the district court properly denied qualified immunity to Officer Morris, and the court affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment on Count Five. Because the facts taken in the light most favorable to T.D.H. establish that Chief Carroll and Officers Kimbrough and Gilliland violated a clearly established right by failing to intervene, the court concluded that the district court did not err in concluding that they are not entitled to qualified immunity. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment on Counts Eight, Eleven, and Twelve (in part). The court also affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment on T.D.H.'s false imprisonment claim (Count Twenty-Two) against Officer Morris, and the denial of summary judgment on Counts One and Two. View "Helm v. Carroll" on Justia Law

After Junior Prosper was shot and killed by a police officer, Prosper's widow filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the officer. The district court found that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity and granted his motion for summary judgment.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, concluding that the district court was within its discretion to exclude the opinions of two expert witnesses. The court also concluded that the officer acted as an objectively reasonable officer both in tasing and in using deadly force on Prosper. The court explained that plaintiff's interpretation of the blurry surveillance video amounts to mere speculation and thus the video fails to create the issues of fact that plaintiff says it does. Rather, the officer's version of events remains unrebutted and controls the court's analysis. The court concluded that the officer did not violate Prosper's Fourth Amendment rights by using deadly force after Prosper struck him in the face, resisted arrest through three taser discharges, and bit down on his finger while "twisting and turning" with unabating intensity. Furthermore, the district court did not err by finding that the officer acted as an objectively reasonable officer by using the taser. View "Prosper v. Martin" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief to petitioner, who was convicted of murder and sentenced to death. Petitioner claims that since he was restrained without adequate and on-the-record justification by the district court, his trial counsel should have objected and that the failure to object constituted inadequate assistance.The court concluded that, even if Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012), could excuse petitioner's procedural default, he has failed to show actual prejudice under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and therefore has not presented a "substantial claim" that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance. In this case, given the strong evidence of his guilt, there is no reasonable probability that the jury seeing petitioner in shackles affected his conviction. Nor is there any reasonable probability that seeing petitioner in shackles affected the jury's decision to recommend the death penalty. View "Clark v. Commissioner, Alabama Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's 28 U.S.C. 2254 motion for habeas relief. Petitioner argued that his attorneys violated his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel by failing to adequately investigate and present mitigating evidence in the sentencing phase of his capital murder trial. The court concluded that the Georgia Supreme Court's determination that petitioner failed to show that the allegedly deficient performance prejudiced him, as required under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), was not an unreasonable application of federal law. In this case, it was not unreasonable for the Georgia Supreme Court to conclude that there is no reasonable probability of a different result if petitioner's trial attorneys had collected and presented the mitigating evidence proffered to the state habeas court. View "Lee v. GDCP Warden" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, two prolife sidewalk counselors, filed a civil rights action against the City and Police Chief, alleging that defendants violated their First Amendment rights to freedom of speech and the free exercise of religion through their application of the City's permit ordinance and the inclusion of a noise provision in their special-event permit.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim because the complaint failed to allege critical facts necessary to establish a violation of plaintiffs' constitutional rights. The court concluded that plaintiffs failed to plead necessary facts to support an inference that the noise provision violates their right to freedom of speech; the noise provision is not unconstitutionally vague; and the district court did not err by refusing to apply strict scrutiny to plaintiffs' free exercise claim. View "Henderson v. McMurray" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a 28 U.S.C. 2255 habeas petition as second or successive, holding that a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c) does not constitute a new, intervening judgment for purposes of the bar on second or successive section 2255 motions under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA). In this case, petitioner failed to obtain the required certification from this court before filing a second section 2255 petition, and the district court dismissed it as unauthorized. Without such authorization, the court concluded that the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain the petition. View "Armstrong v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against two police officers, alleging that the officers used excessive force when apprehending him. After a jury returned a verdict for the officers, the district court entered judgment in favor of them. Although represented by counsel, plaintiff, acting pro se, filed a motion for new trial pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59 on January 26, 2018. The district court struck plaintiff's motion as an unauthorized pro se filing by a represented party on February 27, 2018, and subsequently denied a motion for reconsideration filed by plaintiff's counsel.The Eleventh Circuit held that a pro se motion for a new trial that is stricken because the movant is represented by counsel tolls the time for filing a notice of appeal of the judgment under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(a)(4)(A). In this case, the court concluded that plaintiff's Rule 59 motion for a new trial tolled the time for him to file a notice of appeal, his notice of appeal was therefore timely, and the court has jurisdiction over his appeal. However, because plaintiff's claims are meritless, the court affirmed the judgment. The court rejected plaintiff's evidentiary challenges to the district court's admission of a hotel video; concluded that the admission of comments made by the officers' counsel during trial do not warrant a new trial; concluded that plaintiff failed to show plain error in the district court's questioning and commentary; concluded that the district court's summary denial did not warrant a new trial; and concluded that the district court did not err in striking plaintiff's pro se motion for new trial. View "Ruiz v. Wing" on Justia Law

In 1998, Williams was convicted of robbing a bank while carrying a firearm. The Armed Career Criminals Act (ACCA) sentencing enhancement, 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1), applies to defendants who committed three previous “violent” felonies. Williams had convictions for first-degree robbery, armed robbery, and federal kidnapping, 18 U.S.C. 1201(a)(1). The federal kidnapping PSR recounted that Williams “accosted” a man in Kentucky, threatened him with a revolver, and demanded a ride to Tennessee. In Knoxville, the victim leaped from the car and signaled a police officer. The federal statute provides that a person commits a federal kidnapping when he “unlawfully seizes, confines, inveigles, decoys, kidnaps, abducts, or carries away" a victim. The court never addressed why his previous felonies counted as violent but sentenced Williams to 327 months’ imprisonment, with a consecutive 60 months for carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence.Williams obtained leave to file his third 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion and disputed the classification of his kidnapping conviction as a “violent felony” under ACCA's “residual clause,” which the Supreme Court found unconstitutional in 2015. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of relief, finding it unclear whether the sentencing judge applied ACCA’s residual clause or the elements clause. Williams did not establish that the sentencing court committed a retroactive constitutional error. It is not enough that the court might have committed a statutory error by applying the elements clause in a case that did not warrant it; that error would not be retroactive on collateral review. Requiring Williams to provide “clear precedent showing that the court could only have used one clause” is not arbitrary. View "Williams v. United States" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit sua sponte vacated and withdrew its previous opinion, and issued this opinion in its place.Petitioner appealed the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2255 petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Eleventh Circuit granted a certificate of appealability to determined whether the district court violated Clisby v. Jones, 960 F.2d 925 (11th Cir. 1992) (en banc), by failing to address petitioner's claim that he no longer qualified as an armed career criminal in light of Johnson v. United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015), because his prior 1988 Alabama conviction for attempted first-degree robbery has no state law elements.The court affirmed the district court's judgment and held that a close review of the district court's opinion reveals that it correctly identified and sufficiently addressed petitioner's claim. In this case, the district court classified petitioner's claim as a collateral attack against his state sentence and dismissed it. The court noted that it may be best practice for a district court to follow a "show your work" approach by directly restating a movant's claim and then laying out all analytical steps in addressing that claim. However, the district court's approach here correctly identified and sufficiently analyzed petitioner's claim and did not run afoul of Clisby View "Senter v. United States" on Justia Law

Students filed suit against Broward County and five public officials on the theory that their response to the school shooting in 2018 at Marjory Stoneman Douglas High School in Parkland, Florida was so incompetent that it violated the students' substantive rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint based on failure to state a claim of a constitutional violation. The court first clarified that the three John Does are not parties to this appeal. The court concluded that the students failed to state a claim for violation of their right to substantive due process. The court explained that the students were not in custodial relationship with defendants, and the students did not allege any arbitrary or conscience-shocking conduct. The court also concluded that the students failed to state a claim of failure to train where they never properly presented the claim to the district court. Finally, the court concluded that the district court correctly dismissed the claims with prejudice because leave to amend would be futile. View "L.S. v. Peterson" on Justia Law