Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition in a case where petitioner was convicted of two murders and sentenced to death.The court concluded that petitioner's trial attorneys were not prejudicially ineffective by failing to further investigate and present to the jury evidence of his mental illness, cognitive deficits, and brain damage, and by failing to investigate and present evidence of additional mitigating family background and social history. The court concluded that the state court's rejection of these claims was neither contrary to nor an unreasonable application of clearly established Supreme Court law, nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented. The court was similarly unpersuaded regarding petitioner's procedural and substantive claims of incompetency to stand trial. Furthermore, petitioner's due process rights were not violated when he was required to wear a stun belt at trial. The court rejected petitioner's several claims of prosecutorial misconduct. Finally, the court concluded that it was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established law for the Georgia Supreme Court to have concluded, on direct review, that the prosecutor's violation of petitioner's Fifth Amendment rights by commenting on his failure to testify was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Raheem v. GDCP Warden" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, a deputy in the sheriff's office, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights were violated when the deputy seized his iPhone after plaintiff took photos and videos of a car accident crash scene from an interstate median. The district court granted summary judgment on all of plaintiff's claims except for one, which plaintiff prevailed at trial.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's order, holding that plaintiff's First Amendment claim is barred by qualified immunity because defendant did not violate clearly established law at the time; plaintiff's false-arrest claims fail because defendant had probable cause to arrest him because plaintiff's car was parked on a limited-access facility in violation of Florida law; and plaintiff's excessive-force claim fails on the merits and, in any event, is barred by qualified immunity. The court noted that, whether it analyzed plaintiff's excessive-force claim under the Fourteenth or Fourth Amendment, the court would reach the same result. View "Crocker v. Beatty" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit sua sponte vacated its previous opinion and substituted the following opinion.These appeals arose from a Title VII action filed by four ultrasound technologists against the Secretary, alleging that their supervisors and coworkers retaliated against them and subjected them to a hostile work environment at the Tampa VA because they engaged in protected EEOC activity. One plaintiff also alleged that she was subjected to a hostile work environment based on her sex. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Secretary. Because two intervening decisions changed the law applicable to plaintiffs' discrete retaliation claims and retaliatory hostile work environment claims, the court remanded those claims to the district court with the instruction that it analyze the claims consistent with the intervening decisions. Because the intervening decisions did not, in the court's judgment, affect the resolution of the sex-based hostile work environment claim in this case, the court considered that claim alone and affirmed the district court's decision to enter summary judgment for the Secretary.In this case, the court concluded as an initial matter that most of the named co-worker's conduct lacks the necessary sexual or other gender-related connotations to be actionable sex discrimination. The court explained that nothing in the record allows the conclusion that the coworker's conduct had anything to do with plaintiff's sex; the context surrounding the coworker's inappropriate touching of plaintiff shows that the touching was not sex based; and there is no evidence suggesting that the angry looks, harsh words, and silent treatment that the coworker gave plaintiff were influenced by plaintiff's sex. Even if the coworker's conduct was based on plaintiff's sex, her claim would still fail because the conduct is insufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the terms and conditions of plaintiff's employment. View "Tonkyro v. Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law

In this libel case, the Eleventh Circuit held that New York's "fair and true report" privilege, codified as N.Y. Civ. Rights Law 74, applies to the fair and true publication of the contents of a document that was filed and sealed in a Florida paternity/child custody proceeding.Plaintiff filed suit against Gizmodo and Katherine Krueger, the author of an article published on the Splinter website owned by Gizmodo, over an article entitled "Court Docs Allege Ex-Trump Staffer Drugged Woman He Got Pregnant with 'Abortion Pill.'" The district court concluded that section 74 applied, and that the Splinter article was a fair and true report of the supplement because it was "substantially accurate." Plaintiff does not challenge the district court's finding that the Splinter article was a fair and true report, but he maintains that the section 74 privilege does not apply because the supplement was filed in a paternity/child custody proceeding and sealed. The court held that section 74's fair and true report privilege applies to the Splinter article written by Ms. Krueger about the supplement filed by the mother of plaintiff's child, and that the 1970 decision of the New York Court of Appeals in Shiles v. News Syndicate Co., 261 N.E.2d 251, 256 (N.Y. 1970), does not preclude the application of section 74. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants. View "Miller v. Gizmodo Media Group, LLC" on Justia Law

After a jury returned a verdict in plaintiff's favor on his claim of First Amendment retaliation, he was awarded only one dollar in nominal damages because the Eleventh Circuit has interpreted the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e(e), as barring punitive damages for a prisoner's civil action where no physical injury is shown.The en banc court now recognizes that section 1997e(e) permits claims for punitive damages without a showing of physical injury. The en banc court explained that it did not conduct a textual interpretation of the statutory text and did not consider any non-physical injuries that were also not mental or emotional in nature. The en banc court misapprehended the text of the statute and the nature of the physical injury requirement when it comes to punitive damages. Therefore, in this case, plaintiff should be given an opportunity to obtain punitive damages too. In all other respects, the en banc court reinstated the panel opinion. View "Hoever v. Marks" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit sua sponte vacated its previous opinion and substituted the following opinion.In 2015, plaintiffs filed suit challenging Alabama's 2011 Photo Voter Identification Law passed by the Alabama legislature as House Bill 19 and codified at Ala. Code 17-9-30. The voter ID law took effect in June 2014 and requires all Alabama voters to present a photo ID when casting in-person or absentee votes. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the enforcement of Alabama's voter ID law, alleging that the law violates the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments of the Constitution; Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), 52 U.S.C. 10301; and Section 201 of the VRA, 52 U.S.C. 10501.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor of the Secretary, concluding that plaintiffs have failed to identify any genuine disputes of material facts and because no reasonable factfinder could find, based on the evidence presented, that Alabama's voter ID law is discriminatory. The court explained that the burden of providing a photo ID in order to vote is a minimal burden on Alabama's voters—especially when Alabama accepts so many different forms of photo ID and makes acquiring one simple and free for voters who lack a valid ID but wish to obtain one. Therefore, the Alabama voter ID law does not violate the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments of the Constitution, nor does it violate the VRA. View "Greater Birmingham Ministries v. Secretary of State for the State of Alabama" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a long-time customer with a visual disability who must access websites with screen reader software, filed suit against Winn-Dixie under Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) after he was unable to access Winn-Dixie's website with his software. The district court found that Winn-Dixie's website violated the ADA.The Eleventh Circuit vacated and remanded, concluding that plaintiff had Article III standing to bring the case where the difficulties caused by his inability to access much of the website constitute a concrete and particularized injury that is not conjectural or hypothetical and will continue if the website remains inaccessible; the websites are not places of public accommodation under Title III of the ADA because, pursuant to the language of Title III, public accommodations are limited to actual, physical places; and Winn-Dixie's limited use website, although inaccessible by individuals who are visually disabled, does not function as an intangible barrier to an individual with a visual disability accessing the goods, services, privileges, or advantages of Winn-Dixie's physical stores (the operative place of public accommodation). The court explained that, absent congressional action that broadens the definition of "places of public accommodation" to include websites, the court cannot extend ADA liability to the facts presented here, where there is no barrier to the access demanded by the statute. View "Gil v. Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's order granting summary judgment to AMR in a Title VII action brought by plaintiff, alleging failure to accommodate his religious requirement, discrimination on the basis of religion, and retaliation for filing a discrimination claim. Plaintiff's action stemmed from AMR's refusal to allow him to work emergency transports with his goatee, which he grew as part of his practice of Rastafarianism.In regard to plaintiff's disparate-treatment claims based on religion, the court concluded that plaintiff forfeited any "convincing mosaic" argument in support of his traditional religious disparate-treatment discrimination claim. Furthermore, plaintiff made no other argument to support that version of his disparate-treatment discrimination claim. In regard to plaintiff's religious-discrimination claim based on AMR's alleged failure to provide plaintiff with a reasonable accommodation of his religious practice of wearing a beard, the court concluded that AMR offered plaintiff a reasonable accommodation by providing him with an opportunity to maintain his beard and to work on the non-emergency-transport side of its operations, for which DeKalb County's facial-hair policy did not apply. The panel explained that his terms and conditions of employment would not have been affected by the accommodation AMR offered. In regard to the retaliation claim, the record indicates that the but-for cause of plaintiff's termination was AMR's belief that he had given an untrue answer on his employment application. Therefore, his retaliation claim necessarily fails. View "Bailey v. Metro Ambulance Services, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, a police officer, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Georgia state laws, alleging claims for unlawful entry, false arrest, excessive force, malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, assault, and battery. Plaintiff's claim arose from an August 4, 2016, interaction with defendant and other officers at his mobile home where defendant deployed his taser on plaintiff and plaintiff was arrested and charged with disorderly conduct, obstruction, and simple battery, which were eventually dismissed.The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the facts of this case are heavily disputed and there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether defendant lawfully entered plaintiff's home. Therefore, summary judgment was improper and the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to plaintiff on the unlawful entry claim. The court also concluded that disputed facts exist as to the remaining claims. Therefore, because genuine issues of material fact prevent finding for defendant as a matter of law, the court affirmed the district court's denial of summary judgment, qualified immunity, and official immunity on all other claims. View "Hardigree v. Lofton" on Justia Law

On remand from the Supreme Court, the Eleventh Circuit reversed and remanded on plaintiff's age discrimination and gender discrimination claims, affirming the Title VII retaliation and hostile work environment claims. Plaintiff sought rehearing, arguing that the Supreme Court's decision in her case also undermined the court's Trask-based rejection of her Title VII retaliation claim and that an intervening 11th Circuit decision, Monaghan v. Worldpay US, Inc., 955 F.3d 855 (11th Cir. 2020), gutted the precedent on which the court had relied in rejecting her hostile work environment claim.The Eleventh Circuit held that the Supreme Court's decision in plaintiff's case undermined Trask v. Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, 822 F.3d 1179 (11th Cir. 2016), to the point of abrogation and that the standard that the Court articulated there now controls cases arising under Title VII's nearly identical text. The court also held that Monaghan clarified the court's law governing what the court called "retaliatory-hostile-work-environment" claims, and that the standard for such claims is, as the court said there, the less onerous "might have dissuaded a reasonable worker" test articulated in Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (2006), and Crawford v. Carroll, 529 F.3d 961 (11th Cir. 2008), rather than the more stringent "severe or pervasive" test found in Gowski v. Peake, 682 F.3d 1299 (11th Cir. 2012). Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's Title VII retaliation and hostile work environment claims and remanded for the district court to consider those claims under the proper standards. View "Babb v. Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs" on Justia Law