Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Jesse Guardado confessed to the Walton County Sheriff’s Office that he had robbed and murdered Jackie Malone. He pleaded guilty without a plea agreement or counsel, and was later appointed counsel for the penalty phase. A jury recommended the death penalty, and the state trial court sentenced him to death. Guardado filed a habeas corpus petition, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to investigate and present mitigating evidence and for not challenging biased jurors.The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision, finding no prejudice from counsel's performance. The court determined that the additional mitigating evidence presented during postconviction proceedings was cumulative of the evidence presented at trial. It also found no actual bias in the jurors that Guardado claimed should have been challenged.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the Florida Supreme Court unreasonably applied Strickland v. Washington by using a stricter "actual bias" standard instead of the reasonable probability standard for prejudice. However, upon de novo review, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that Guardado failed to show a substantial likelihood of a different outcome if the jurors had been challenged or if additional mitigating evidence had been presented. The court affirmed the denial of habeas relief. View "Guardado v. Secretary, Florida Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

The case involves several special education students who alleged that their teacher physically and emotionally abused them. The students, who have various disabilities affecting their communication abilities, were assigned to the same classroom at Elm Street Elementary School in Coweta County, Georgia. The teacher, Catherine Sprague, was hired by the principal, Dr. Christi Hildebrand, despite lacking special education certification. Throughout the fall of 2019, the students exhibited signs of distress, and their parents noticed behavioral changes and physical signs of mistreatment. A paraprofessional, Nicole Marshall, reported multiple instances of abuse by Sprague to Hildebrand, who delayed reporting these allegations to law enforcement and the students' parents.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia dismissed the students' complaint. The court ruled that emotional distress damages are not recoverable under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) following the Supreme Court's decision in Cummings v. Premier Rehab Keller, P.L.L.C. The court also found that the students failed to state a constitutional violation against Hildebrand and the school district, and that Hildebrand was entitled to qualified immunity. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law negligence claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed that emotional distress damages are not recoverable under Title II of the ADA, as Title II incorporates the remedies of the Rehabilitation Act, which the Supreme Court in Cummings ruled does not allow for emotional distress damages. However, the appellate court found that the district court erred by not considering whether the students might be entitled to other forms of relief under Title II, such as damages for physical harm or nominal damages. The appellate court also affirmed the dismissal of the section 1983 claims, ruling that the alleged abuse did not meet the "shock-the-conscience" standard required for a substantive due process violation. The case was remanded for further proceedings to consider other potential relief under Title II. View "A.W. v. Coweta County School District" on Justia Law

Christopher Redding was wanted for parole violations related to robbery charges and was classified as a "Violent Felony Offender of Special Concern." On February 28, 2017, police officers, including Deputy Jason Popovich, attempted to arrest Redding at an apartment complex. Redding did not comply with the officers' commands and instead started shooting, injuring one officer. He fled, dropping his gun during the chase. Eventually, Redding was shot multiple times and fell to the ground. As officers, including Popovich, approached him, Redding made a sudden movement, prompting Popovich to shoot him twice in the head, resulting in Redding's death.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida granted summary judgment in favor of Popovich on qualified immunity grounds. The court found that while there was a genuine issue of fact regarding whether Popovich's use of force was objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, Franklin, representing Redding's estate, failed to show that Popovich violated clearly established law. The court concluded that a reasonable officer could believe Redding's sudden movement was an attempt to fight back, distinguishing the case from precedents cited by Franklin.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court concluded that there was no genuine dispute of fact that Popovich did not know Redding was unarmed. Given the severity of Redding's crimes, his recent shootout with police, and his sudden movement, a reasonable officer could have believed Redding posed a threat. Therefore, Popovich's use of deadly force did not violate the Fourth Amendment, and Franklin failed to show that Popovich's actions violated clearly established law. Consequently, Popovich was entitled to qualified immunity. View "Franklin v. Popovich" on Justia Law

A high school football coach's contract was not renewed by the Valdosta Board of Education in 2020. The vote split along racial lines, with all white members voting to renew and all black members voting against renewal. The coach believed the decision was racially motivated.In 2020, the coach sued the five black board members individually under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983, seeking monetary damages. The district court denied the board members' motions to dismiss based on qualified immunity, but the Eleventh Circuit reversed, finding the coach failed to state a claim. The case was remanded for dismissal.In 2021, the coach filed a new lawsuit against the same board members and the Board itself, this time under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The new complaint included more detailed allegations but was based on the same core facts. The district court granted summary judgment for the Board, ruling that the new lawsuit was barred by res judicata because the Board was in privity with the individual board members and the two cases involved the same cause of action.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that the Board was in privity with the individual board members because they acted as the Board when they voted not to renew the coach's contract. The court also found that both lawsuits arose from the same nucleus of operative facts, thus meeting the criteria for res judicata. View "Rodemaker v. City of Valdosta Board of Education" on Justia Law

David Efron and Madeleine Candelario were involved in a divorce proceeding in Puerto Rico, during which Efron was ordered to pay Candelario $50,000 per month. After the divorce was finalized, Candelario began a relationship with Judge Cordero, and Efron alleges that Candelario, her attorney, and Judges Cordero and Aponte conspired to reinstate the payments through a corrupt scheme. Efron claims this resulted in Candelario receiving approximately $7 million. Efron filed a federal lawsuit against Candelario and her attorney, asserting claims for deprivation of procedural due process, conspiracy to deny civil rights, civil conspiracy, and unjust enrichment.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida dismissed Efron’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, citing the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The court found that Efron’s claims were inextricably intertwined with the Puerto Rico court’s judgment and that granting relief would effectively nullify that judgment. The district court also rejected Efron’s argument that his claims fell under a fraud exception to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Eleventh Circuit held that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred Efron’s claims because they essentially sought to challenge the state court’s judgment. The court concluded that Efron’s claims for damages were not independent of the state court’s decision but were directly related to it, as they required the federal court to review and reject the state court’s judgment. Therefore, the district court correctly dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. View "Efron v. Candelario" on Justia Law

John Doe, a student at Emory University, was accused of sexual misconduct by Jane Roe following an encounter in April 2019. Roe alleged that Doe engaged in nonconsensual intercourse and choked her. Doe denied the allegations, asserting that the encounter was consensual. Emory conducted an investigation, during which Roe changed parts of her story. Despite inconsistencies in Roe's account, Emory found Doe responsible for sexual misconduct and suspended him for a semester. Doe appealed internally without success.Doe then filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia, claiming that Emory violated Title IX by discriminating against him based on sex and breached a contractual obligation to conduct the investigation fairly. The district court dismissed Doe's Title IX claim, reasoning that his allegations suggested pro-complainant bias rather than gender bias. The court also dismissed his contract claims, finding no mutual assent to the terms of the university's sexual misconduct policy.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the dismissal of Doe's Title IX claim, holding that his allegations did not plausibly indicate gender bias but rather suggested pro-complainant bias, which is not prohibited under Title IX. However, the court reversed the dismissal of Doe's breach-of-contract claims. It concluded that Doe plausibly alleged mutual assent to an implied contract based on Emory's sexual misconduct policy and found no basis to determine that Emory retained a unilateral right to amend the policy that would preclude mutual assent. The case was remanded for further proceedings on the contract claims. View "Doe v. Emory University" on Justia Law

Roland McCarthy, a white man, was hired as Finance Director by the City Commission of Cordele, Georgia, in 2017 and promoted to City Manager in January 2021. During his tenure, Joshua Deriso campaigned for chairman of the City Commission, expressing intentions to replace white employees with African Americans and to have an all-black City Commission. After winning the election, Deriso and other black commissioners voted to fire McCarthy and replace him with a black City Manager, Angela Henderson Redding. McCarthy was warned by Deriso and another commissioner, Royce Reeves, that he would be replaced due to his race and could not return to his former position because he did not "look like" them.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Georgia dismissed McCarthy's complaint, ruling that he failed to state plausible claims of racial discrimination against the City. The court found that McCarthy did not sufficiently allege that the Commission acted with a racially discriminatory motive, as only one voting commissioner was alleged to have racial animus. The court also dismissed claims against Deriso in his official capacity as duplicative of claims against the City and dismissed claims against Deriso in his individual capacity, citing qualified immunity.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the district court's dismissal of McCarthy's claims against the City. The appellate court found that McCarthy plausibly alleged that the Commission discriminated against him because of his race, based on Deriso's and Reeves's statements and the racial composition of the vote. However, the court affirmed the dismissal of claims against Deriso in his individual capacity, as he did not have the authority to make the official decision to fire McCarthy. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "McCarthy v. City of Cordele Georgia" on Justia Law

A civilian, Clarissa Gilmore, was strip-searched while visiting her incarcerated husband at Smith State Prison in Georgia. During the search, officers manipulated her breasts, ordered her to bend over, and felt between her buttocks with a gloved hand. The officers did not inform her of the reasons for the search, and no contraband was found. Gilmore sued the officers and the Georgia Department of Corrections, claiming the search violated her Fourth Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia granted summary judgment to the officers, finding that the search did not violate clearly established law and that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The court concluded that the officers acted within the scope of their discretionary authority and that there was no clearly established requirement for reasonable suspicion to conduct a strip search of a prison visitor.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case and agreed that the strip search violated Gilmore’s Fourth Amendment rights. The court held that correctional officers must have at least reasonable suspicion that a visitor is concealing contraband before conducting a strip search. However, the court also found that no Supreme Court or Eleventh Circuit precedent expressly prohibited suspicionless strip searches of prison visitors at the time of the search. As a result, the law was not clearly established, and the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. View "Gilmore v. Georgia Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

The case involves two groups of Montgomery residents who were jailed for failing to pay traffic fines. They sued the City of Montgomery, a private contractor (Judicial Correction Services, Inc.), and a lawyer (Branch D. Kloess), alleging that the process of converting fines into jail sentences violated the U.S. Constitution and Alabama law. The plaintiffs sought to certify their claims as class actions, arguing that the City and its contractors systematically failed to conduct proper inquiries into their ability to pay before jailing them.The U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Alabama denied class certification in both cases. The court found that the plaintiffs failed to meet the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, particularly the predominance and superiority requirements under Rule 23(b)(3). The court concluded that the claims would require individualized inquiries into each probationer's circumstances, such as whether they were given proper hearings and whether the City or its contractors acted wrongfully or in bad faith.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the district court's decision. The appellate court affirmed the lower court's denial of class certification. It agreed that the plaintiffs' claims necessitated individualized proof, making it difficult to resolve the issues on a class-wide basis. The court emphasized that the evidence required to prove the claims, such as records of what happened at individual probation hearings, was not available on a common, class-wide basis. The court also noted that the plaintiffs' claims involved a variety of individual incidents rather than a single, systemic issue that could be addressed collectively.In summary, the Eleventh Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying class certification, as the plaintiffs' claims required individualized inquiries that did not satisfy the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3). The decision to deny class certification was affirmed. View "Carter v. The City of Montgomery" on Justia Law

Charles Johnson, Jr. was arrested by Officer Garrett Rolfe for driving while intoxicated. Johnson alleged that Rolfe used excessive force during the arrest, resulting in a broken collarbone. Johnson sued Rolfe and the City of Atlanta under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Georgia state law, claiming excessive force and battery. Johnson's complaint stated that he was respectful and did not resist arrest, but Rolfe threw him to the ground, causing his injury.The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia reviewed the case. The City moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing it failed to state a claim for Monell liability. Rolfe moved for judgment on the pleadings, submitting body camera and dashcam footage showing Johnson resisting arrest. The district court considered the video evidence, determining it was central to Johnson's claims and its authenticity was not disputed. The court found that Rolfe did not use excessive force and was entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claims and official immunity on the state law claims. Consequently, the court dismissed the Monell claim against the City, as there was no underlying constitutional violation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's decision, holding that the video evidence was properly considered under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine. The court found that Rolfe's use of force was objectively reasonable given the circumstances, including Johnson's resistance and the dangerous location of the arrest. Therefore, Rolfe was entitled to qualified immunity on the federal claims and official immunity on the state law claims. The court also affirmed the dismissal of the Monell claim against the City, as no constitutional violation occurred. View "Johnson v. City of Atlanta" on Justia Law