Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against prison officials, alleging that the delay in treatment of the cut on his hand amounted to deliberate indifference to a serious medical need. Captain Lewis asserted a qualified immunity defense, which the district court denied.The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's denial of qualified immunity to Lewis, concluding that Aldridge v. Montgomery, 753 F.2d 970 (11th Cir. 1985) (per curiam), did not place an objectively reasonable officer in Lewis's position on notice that his conduct was unconstitutional. In this case, although plaintiff's cut was bleeding while he was in Lewis's custody, nothing in the record supports the inference that, during Lewis's brief interaction with plaintiff, plaintiff's cut bled so continuously or profusely that it rose to the level of the circumstances in Aldridge. View "Wade v. Lewis" on Justia Law

Compensatory education is not an automatic remedy for a child-find violation under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA). Compensatory educational services are designed to counteract whatever educational setbacks a child encounters because of IDEA violations—to bring her back where she would have been but for those violations. At minimum, a parent must offer evidence that a procedural violation—like the child-find violation asserted here—caused a substantive educational harm, and that compensatory educational services can remedy that past harm.The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the district court was well within its "broad discretion and equitable authority" when it concluded that plaintiff had not shown that the school board's child-find violation resulted in educational deficits for the child that could be remediated with prospective compensatory relief. Furthermore, because the school began its special education referral process before plaintiff filed suit, she cannot show that she is entitled to attorney's fees. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "J.N. v. Jefferson County Board of Education" on Justia Law

After Christian Redwine led officers from the Columbus Police Department on a high-speed chase across state lines before crashing into bushes on the side of a road, the driver of the police vehicle stopped behind and to the right of Redwine's car. Seconds after the officer stepped out to make an arrest, the car's reverse lights turned on, and the car started backing up. The officer fired 11 shots as the car passed near him, then he changed magazines and fired another 10 shots. The officer killed Redwine and injured two passengers. The district court granted the officer's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity as to the first round of shots but denied it as to the second.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part, concluding that the officer acted reasonably in firing both rounds of shots. The court concluded that the officer did not violate the Fourth Amendment and therefore he is entitled to qualified immunity. The court also concluded that the officer is entitled to state-law immunity and the police chief and the county are entitled to summary judgment for all claims against them as well. View "Tillis v. Brown" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's final judgment against plaintiff in an action brought against Koch for race and national origin discrimination under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and Title VII. In regard to plaintiff's Batson challenges, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case for Juror 9. Even assuming plaintiff established a prima facie case for Juror 32, Koch offered plausible non-discriminatory reasons for the strike; a company defending the decisions of a manager in a civil lawsuit would naturally not want a current union member and disgruntled worker's compensation claimant on the jury.The court rejected plaintiff's argument that Koch counsel's violation of the order in limine so prejudiced the jury that a new trial is warranted. Rather, considering the length of the trial, the shortness of the offending remarks, the context of the "prevailing party" comment as a response to a door plaintiff opened, and the curative instructions offered, the court could not find that the district court abused its discretion by denying plaintiff's motions for mistrial and a new trial. View "Vinson v. Koch Foods of Alabama, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a cheerleader at Kennesaw State University, filed suit alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. 1983 and 1985(3) after she and her teammates kneeled during the pre-game national anthem at one of the university's football games to protest police brutality against African Americans and to advance the cause of racial justice. Plaintiff claimed that there was a public and private conspiracy to deprive her and her teammates of their First Amendment rights. At issue on appeal is whether the district court erred by dismissing plaintiff's section 1985(3) claim against the sheriff.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's order dismissing plaintiff's claim against the sheriff, agreeing with the district court that plaintiff failed to surmount section 1985(3)'s class-based animus bar under the standard established by Supreme Court precedent. The court concluded that plaintiff's direct race-based theory cannot succeed because she failed to plead sufficient facts supporting it; plaintiff's indirect race-based claim failed to allege animus under Bray v. Alexandria Women's Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263 (1993); and plaintiff's political class-based theory is also precluded by Bray. View "Dean v. Warren" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants in an action alleging excessive force and municipal liability claims. Plaintiff claims that an officer stopped in front of his car, began shooting at him, and thus caused him to accelerate to drive away, and in doing so he hit another officer with his car.In regard to the excessive force claim, the court concluded that, although the officers violated plaintiff's Fourth Amendment rights when they shot him, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiff has not demonstrated that his rights were clearly established at the time. In regard to the municipal liability claim, the court concluded that plaintiff has not demonstrated that the City failed to train the officers. Finally, the court concluded that there was no error in the district court's finding that the officers were entitled to immunity under Alabama law. View "Underwood v. City of Bessemer" on Justia Law

Officer Sullivan pulled over Braddy on I-65 in Saraland, Alabama, after seeing Braddy react to the presence of his marked patrol vehicle and observing that Braddy’s vehicle’s license tag was obscured by bicycles. During the traffic stop, officers discovered cocaine in Braddy’s vehicle following two canine sniffs. Braddy was charged with possession with intent to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1), and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute more than five kilograms of cocaine, 21 U.S.C. 846.The trial court denied his motion to suppress, rejecting an argument that the reason for pulling Braddy over, a violation of an Alabama law requiring motor vehicle operators to keep their license plates plainly visible, did not provide probable cause because the statute did not apply to Braddy as a nonresident of Alabama. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Any mistake of law by Sullivan was objectively reasonable and the traffic stop of Braddy’s vehicle was based on probable cause. Sullivan did not unlawfully prolong the traffic stop. There was probable cause to search Braddy’s vehicle based on the reliability of the drug detection dogs’ alerts. View "United States v. Braddy" on Justia Law

Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs (FLFNB), a nonprofit unincorporated association, advocates the message “that food is a human right, not a privilege.” FLFNB’s efforts include its weekly food sharing events in Fort Lauderdale’s downtown Stranahan Park, a location where the homeless tend to congregate. FLFNB does not serve food as a charity, but to communicate its message that "society can end hunger and poverty if we redirect our collective resources from the military and war.’ The Eleventh Circuit previously held FLFNB’s food-sharing to be expressive conduct protected by the First Amendment and remanded the issue of whether the city’s regulations violated the First Amendment. Fort Lauderdale Park Rules require city permission for social service food-sharing events in all Fort Lauderdale parks,The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the city. The Eleventh Circuit reversed. The Rule commits the regulation of FLFNB’s protected expression to the standardless discretion of city permitting officials. It provides no guidance nor explanation of when, how, or why the city will agree. As applied to FLFNB’s protected expression, it violates the First Amendment. It is neither narrowly drawn to further a substantial government interest that is unrelated to the suppression of free expression, nor, as applied, does it amount to a reasonable time, place, and manner regulation on expression in a public forum. View "Fort Lauderdale Food Not Bombs v. City of Fort Lauderdale" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal with prejudice of plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims against the GDC and ASMP officials. The district court found that plaintiff did not properly exhaust the available administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).The court rejected plaintiff's contention that there were no available administrative remedies under the GDC policy. Rather, the court concluded that the GDC's grievance policy is distinct from the policy at issue in Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1856–57 (2016), and is not a "dead end." Furthermore, inmates need not wait for the Internal Investigations Unit investigation to conclude before filing a civil suit. The court explained that, under the GDC procedure, an inmate exhausts his administrative remedies once he properly submits a grievance alleging excessive force because that act automatically ends the grievance process. Finally, regardless of whether an inmate's mental illness may render an administrative remedy unavailable in some other case, it did not do so here. Because plaintiff did not file a timely grievance and because GDC did not waive the procedural defects in the untimely grievances that he did file, the court concluded that he failed to satisfy the PLRA's exhaustion requirement. View "Varner v. Shepard" on Justia Law

During a criminal investigation into money laundering and wire fraud, the FBI obtained a search warrant to be executed at the Miami offices of entities that comprise the Optima Companies, which were located in a business suite. The warrant identified the items to be seized, including records of and concerning two Ukrainian nationals and several American citizens who allegedly own, control, or manage more than 30 entities that fall under the name “Optima” and have offices in the Miami offices. Among the materials seized were items from the office of an in-house attorney. Optima and affiliated individuals asserting attorney-client and work-product privilege, moved under Rule 41(g), Fed. R. Crim. P., to prohibit the government’s filter team (attorneys and staff who were not involved in the criminal investigation) from reviewing any potentially privileged documents unless either they agreed or the court, after conducting its own privilege review, ordered disclosure.The district court imposed a modified filter protocol but denied the request to prohibit anyone from the government from reviewing potentially privileged documents without consent or court order. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, rejecting an argument that government filter teams per se violate privilege holders’ rights. The modified filter-team protocol allows the Optima parties to conduct the initial privilege review and requires their permission or court order for any purportedly privileged documents to be released. The filter team cannot inadvertently provide the investigation team with any privileged materials. View "United States v. Korf" on Justia Law