Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries
Articles Posted in US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
State of Florida v. Department of Health and Human Services
In November 2021, the Secretary of Health and Human Services issued an interim rule that requires facilities that provide health care to Medicare and Medicaid beneficiaries to ensure that their staff, unless exempt for medical or religious reasons, are fully vaccinated against COVID-19, 86 Fed. Reg. 61,555. Under the rule, covered staff must request an exemption or receive their first dose of a two-dose vaccine or a single-dose vaccine by December 6, 2021. Florida unsuccessfully sought a preliminary injunction to bar the interim rule’s enforcement.The Eleventh Circuit upheld the denial of the motion, first deciding not to apply the mootness doctrine and to exercise jurisdiction despite another district court’s issuance of a nationwide injunction. Florida failed to demonstrate a substantial likelihood that it will prevail on the merits, that it will suffer irreparable injury absent an injunction, or that the balance of the equities favors an injunction. The Secretary has express statutory authority to require facilities voluntarily participating in the Medicare or Medicaid programs to meet health and safety standards to protect patients. The Secretary provided a detailed explanation for why there was good cause for dispensing with the notice-and-comment requirement. Ample evidence supports the Secretary’s determination that facility staff vaccination will provide important protection for patients. View "State of Florida v. Department of Health and Human Services" on Justia Law
Davis v. Legal Services Alabama, Inc.
Davis, a former Congressman, mayoral candidate, candidate for governor of Alabama, and federal prosecutor, is Black. In 2016, he became Executive Director of LSA, a non-profit law firm serving low-income Alabamians. Davis experienced problems with some of his subordinates and colleagues; some complained to LSA’s Executive Committee. On August 18, 2017, as Davis left work, he was informed that the Executive Committee had voted to suspend him with pay pending an investigation of those complaints. A “Suspension Letter” cited spending decisions outside the approved budget, failure to follow LSA's hiring policies and procedures, creating new initiatives without Board approval, and creating a hostile work environment for some LSA employees. LSA posted a security guard in front of its building and hired Mowery, an Alabama political consultant, to handle public relations related to Davis’s suspension. Mowery had handled one of Davis’s failed political campaigns until their relationship soured; Mowery had worked for the campaign of Davis’s opponent in another race.Days later, Davis notified the Board of his resignation. He filed suit, alleging race discrimination under 42 U.S.C. 1981 and under Title VII, and defamation. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants. Being placed on paid leave was not an adverse employment action and Davis did not raise a fact issue on his constructive discharge claim. LSA’s disclosures to Mowery did not constitute “publication”—an essential element of defamation. View "Davis v. Legal Services Alabama, Inc." on Justia Law
Johnson v. City of Miami Beach
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of a police officer individually and the City of Miami Beach on plaintiff's claims of excessive force and state law battery. Plaintiff alleged that his arrest was effected and he was fully secured, not resisting, and not posing a threat when the officer gratuitously and forcibly struck him in his face.The court reviewed the evidence and videos in the light most favorable to plaintiff, and with the benefit of oral argument, concluding that the district court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of defendants. In this case, a reasonable jury could find that the officer used excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment when he entered the holding cell and forcibly struck plaintiff, who was then secure, not resisting, and not a safety threat to any officers. Furthermore, an objectively reasonable officer would have known at the time that it was clearly unlawful to gratuitously and forcibly strike an arrestee who was fully secured, not resisting, not posing a safety threat, and not attempting to flee. Likewise, summary judgment is not warranted on plaintiff's state law battery claims. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Johnson v. City of Miami Beach" on Justia Law
Charles v. Johnson
After plaintiff was convicted of felony obstruction of a law enforcement officer in a Georgia state court, he brought suit against the individual defendants under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as state law claims.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants on all federal claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the pendent state claims. In regard to plaintiff's excessive force claim against the civilian bystander that assisted the police in subduing plaintiff, the court held that a civilian's rendering of brief, ad hoc assistance to a law enforcement officer is not state action, absent proof of a conspiracy to violate the constitutional rights of another. In regard to Deputy Thacker, the court applied the Graham factors and concluded that the deputy did not use excessive force where plaintiff suffered only de minimus injuries that were entirely consistent with a routine takedown. In regard to Deputy Brantley, the court again applied the Graham factors and concluded that the taser was not clearly excessive under the circumstances where two crimes were at issue by the time the taser was deployed: plaintiff had an outstanding warrant for his arrest, and he had already begun his active and loud obstruction of the arrest. In regard to Sheriff Johnson, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to demonstrate that he was disabled within the meaning of the Rehabilitation Act. View "Charles v. Johnson" on Justia Law
Cheshire Bridge Holdings, LLC, v. City of Atlanta,
In 1981, a Georgia federal district court concluded that Atlanta’s zoning regulations for adult businesses were constitutionally overbroad in their entirety and permanently enjoined their enforcement. Atlanta did not appeal. Cheshire operates an Atlanta adult novelty and video store, Tokyo Valentino, and sued, asserting that the definitions of “adult bookstore,” “adult motion picture theater,” “adult mini motion picture theater,” “adult cabaret,” and “adult entertainment establishment” in the current Atlanta City Code are facially overbroad in violation of the First Amendment.On remand, the district court granted Atlanta summary judgment. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. The district court did not err in providing a narrowing construction of certain terms (the term “patron” in the definitions of “adult motion picture theater” and “adult mini-motion picture theater”) in the challenged provisions. The phrase “intended, designed, or arranged” suggests that the challenged provisions do not apply to isolated or intermittent uses of the property. Cheshire failed to show that any overbreadth in the provisions is “substantial” as required by Supreme Court precedent. The challenged provisions do not purport to ban the activities or conduct they define or describe but are part of a zoning scheme regulating where covered establishments can locate or operate. View "Cheshire Bridge Holdings, LLC, v. City of Atlanta," on Justia Law
McCoy v. Governor of Florida
In 2018, Florida voters approved Amendment 4, a state constitutional amendment that automatically restored voting rights to ex-felons who had completed all of the terms of their sentences. Plaintiffs filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the "legal financial obligation" (LFO) requirement in Senate Bill 7066, which implemented the Amendment and required payment of all fines, fees, and restitution imposed as part of the sentence. The district court issued a preliminary injunction requiring the state to allow the named plaintiffs to register and vote if they are able to show that they are genuinely unable to pay their LFOs and would otherwise be eligible to vote under Amendment 4.In 2020, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction with respect to the “wealth discrimination” claims. In 2021, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the rejection of an Equal Protection claim based on gender discrimination, on behalf of “low-income women of color who face unemployment, low wages, and difficulty paying off their financial debts at much higher rates than their male and white female counterparts.” The plaintiffs could prevail on their constitutional challenges only if they could “show that gender was a motivating factor in the adoption of the pay-to-vote system,” and they presented no evidence of intentional discrimination. View "McCoy v. Governor of Florida" on Justia Law
Cox v. Deputy Warden
Cox, a transgender woman, was assaulted at three different Georgia prisons for male inmates: At each of these institutions, Cox received estrogen injections, causing her to present with female features. Cox’s identity as a transgender woman within these male prisons made her a target for sexual and other physical abuse she was forced to endure at the hands of other inmates. Cox sued six Georgia Department of Corrections (GDC) officials, invoking 42 U.S.C. 1983, and alleging that the GDC officials, in failing to protect her, violated the Eighth Amendment. She further alleged that three GDC officials exhibited deliberate indifference to the substantial risk of serious harm she faced as a transgender inmate by failing to comply with the Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA), 34 U.S.C. 30301.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Cox’s suit. Cox failed to state a failure-to-protect Eighth Amendment claim; with respect to each defendant, she either failed to establish the subjective component of deliberate indifference or failed to allege facts suggesting that the defendant acted in an objectively unreasonable manner. The court rejected the PREA claims for the same reasons. View "Cox v. Deputy Warden" on Justia Law
WBY, Inc. v. City of Chamblee
Follies, an adult entertainment nightclub, filed suit against the City of Chamblee, challenging Ordinance 754, which amended section 6-152(a) of its Alcohol Code to require establishments selling liquor for consumption on the premises to stop alcohol sales by 2:00 a.m. Monday through Saturday and by 11:59 p.m. on Sunday.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City, holding that although Follies had a vested right in its 2018 liquor license, that vested right did not extend to the hours in which alcohol could be sold. The court explained that the 2018 liquor license issued to Follies did not specifically guarantee that alcohol could be sold during certain set hours. Consequently, Follies had no more than a unilateral expectation that it would be able to sell alcohol during specific hours. View "WBY, Inc. v. City of Chamblee" on Justia Law
United States v. Giron
Giron, a Colombian national federal prisoner acting pro se, sought compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A). The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the denial of his motion. The application notes for U.S.S.G. 1B1.13 identify four general categories of “extraordinary and compelling reasons” justifying a sentence reduction: medical, age, family, and a “catch-all ‘other reasons’ category.” Section 1B1.13 constrains district courts’ authority to identify when extraordinary and compelling reasons exist and any sentence reduction must be “consistent with applicable policy statements.” Under the governing policy statement, medical conditions rise to the level of extraordinary and compelling only if the medical condition is a terminal illness or “substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care within” prison. The court found that Giron’s high cholesterol, high blood pressure, and coronary artery disease were manageable in prison, despite the existence of the COVID-19 pandemic. The district court was not required to analyze 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) sentencing factors; the finding of no “extraordinary and compelling reasons” was sufficiently supported. View "United States v. Giron" on Justia Law
United States v. Approximately $281,110.00 Seized from an East-West Bank Account, ending in the number 2471
Americans and co-conspirators based in China schemed to obtain EB-1C work visas fraudulently for Chinese nationals. Their clients each deposited about $300,000 into a client-owned American bank account. The government did not prosecute the Chinese clients but sought forfeiture of the funds. The Chinese nationals filed claims for the funds.The State Department denied visa requests to allow certain Chinese nationals to attend the forfeiture trial. The U.S. Attorney unsuccessfully worked with their attorney and DHS to obtain parole letters granting them entry without a visa. The Chinese argued that their inability to attend violated the Due Process Clause by preventing them from presenting an “innocent owner” defense, 18 U.S.C. 983(d)(1). The district court denied the motion, noting other means to present their testimony, such as by video conference, and that counsel could present their defenses. All the Chinese were represented by counsel at trial; four attended and testified. The court instructed the jury that the government bore the burden of proving that the “funds made the . . . visa fraud scheme easy or less difficult or ensured that the scheme would be more or less free from obstruction or hindrance.”The jury found that the government had satisfied its burden of proof as to all the funds, that five Chinese nationals—four of whom had testified—had proved that they were innocent owners, and rejected the remaining innocent-owner defenses. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, finding no due process violation. View "United States v. Approximately $281,110.00 Seized from an East-West Bank Account, ending in the number 2471" on Justia Law