Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Previously, a panel of 11th Circuit judges affirmed the district court's dismissal of Plaintiff's 42 Sec. 1983 claims under the three-strikes rule of the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"). The panel based its decision on precedent holding that a "dismissal for failure to exhaust qualifies as a strike under the PLRA."The court voted, deciding to hear the appeal en banc. Thus, the panel's decision was vacated. View "Jeremy John Wells v. Warden, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an Iraq War veteran, suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder. Two sheriff’s deputies conducted a welfare check after a report that the plaintiff had slit his wrist with a knife. When the deputies arrived, the plaintiff was calm and posed no threat to them. Although the plaintiff expressed his willingness to be arrested, one of the deputies suddenly body-slammed him headfirst, causing a serious neck injury.The Eleventh Circuit held that the deputy had probable cause to seize the plaintiff; therefore, the deputy and supervisor are entitled to qualified immunity from unlawful seizure claims. However, the deputy is not entitled to qualified immunity because the way he did so was excessive. The plaintiff satisfied his burden of proving that the supervisor violated his constitutional right, and the right was clearly established at the time of the alleged violation. Therefore, the sheriff's supervisor was not entitled to qualified immunity from the plaintiff’s claim of supervisory liability. Finally, vicarious liability is unavailable under the Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act. View "Kirby Ingram v. Louis Kubik, et al." on Justia Law

Under its Social Media Policy, Defendants, the Palm Beach County Fire Rescue Department, disciplined appellants, two firefighters who work for the department. The termination resulted from an exchange the appellants had on an invitation-only social medial page associated with one of Appellant’s campaigns for the presidency of the local firefighters’ union. Appellants accused Defendants of conspiring to misuse member-donated paid time off. The court reviewed the case by examining four factors developed from Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968), and Connick v. Myer, 461 U.S. 138 (1983). The court held that the district court (“DC”) erred in finding that Appellants’ speech did not address a matter of public concern at step one of the four-part test.Further, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the DC’s dismissal of Appellants’ free-association claim, finding that it is a free speech claim at its core. Finally, the court found that the Social Media Policy in question suffers from “astonishing breadth,” as it expressly prohibits “disseminating content” that “could be reasonably interpreted as having an adverse effect upon Fire Rescue morale, discipline, operations, the safety of staff, or perception of the public.” The court vacated the DC’s summary judgment on the overbreadth claim and affirmed the DC’s decision rejecting Appellants’ facial-vagueness claim. View "AJ O'Laughlin, et al. v. Palm Beach County" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit vacated the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's Americans with Disabilities lawsuit based on lack of Article III standing, concluding that plaintiff has at least alleged an Article III qualifying stigmatic injury. In this case, plaintiff alleged that she suffered a concrete injury when she viewed a hotel's website that omitted accessibility-related information required by federal regulations and as a result, she says, experienced "frustration and humiliation"—even though she admits that she had (and has) no intention to personally visit the hotel.Despite the absence of a close common-law comparator, the court concluded that under existing precedent plaintiff has alleged a concrete intangible injury. The court explained that plaintiff's allegations satisfy Article III under a narrower reading of Sierra v. City of Hallandale Beach, 996 F.3d 1110 (11th Cir. 2021). Because she claims not only that she suffered illegal discrimination but also that the discrimination resulted in "frustration and humiliation" and a "sense of isolation and segregation," the court concluded that plaintiff has adequately pleaded a concrete stigmatic injury. And because her emotional injury is her emotional injury, it affects her "in a personal and individual way" and is therefore sufficiently particularized. The court remanded for further proceedings. View "Laufer v. Arpan LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against University officials, alleging that the University's policy requiring a permit to engage in public speech on the University's sidewalk violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The Eleventh Circuit previously concluded, among other things, that plaintiff had not shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his case and agreed with the district court that the sidewalk at issue is a limited public forum and thus the University's permit requirement needed to be only reasonable and view-point neutral.In this appeal, after careful consideration and with the benefit of oral argument—and even assuming that the City of Tuscaloosa owns the sidewalk at issue—the Eleventh Circuit disagreed with plaintiff that any facts material to its analysis have changed. Accordingly, the court again concluded that the sidewalk is a limited public forum. The court also reviewed the permitting requirement and found that the policy provisions on leafletting were reasonable, and that plaintiff's actions do not fall within the "casual recreational and social activities" exception. The court concluded that the University's advance-notice requirement was reasonable where the University phrases the ten-day advance-notice period in terms of "should," not "must," and the record contains no evidence that the University has rejected an application simply because it was not submitted ten days before the event. Furthermore, the University's reasons for the advance-notice requirement are also reasonable, and the sidewalk is a limited public forum. Moreover, the policy permits the fast-tracking of a permit if an event relates to a current issue or responds to another event. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Keister v. Bell" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit concluded that John Doe, a pseudonymous student at Samford University, has not stated a claim against the university for a violation of Title IX, based on a university disciplinary board finding him responsible for sexual assault and suspending him for five years. The court concluded that the alleged facts do not permit a reasonable inference that the university discriminated against Doe "on the basis of sex" where the alleged procedural irregularities do not make sex discrimination plausible; the alleged public pressure and public statements do not make sex discrimination plausible; and the Clery statistics do not change the plausibility of the Title IX claim.The court also concluded that the Title IX claim failed under the Yusuf tests; nor has Doe satisfied the selective enforcement test. Finally, the court concluded that the appeal from the denial of the motion to proceed under a pseudonym is moot. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment in favor of the university and dismissed as moot the appeal from the denial of the motion to proceed under a pseudonym. View "Doe v. Samford University" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's grant of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus vacating petitioner's convictions for murder, armed robbery, and kidnapping with bodily injury. Of the twelve claims presented to the Circuit Court, only the first five challenged petitioner's conviction and thus are relevant here. Claims I and III incorporated numerous subclaims: Claim I had three subclaims, while Claim III had eight subclaims denoted A through H, with Claim III-H having an additional five subclaims of its own. Claim III-H-4, which provided the principal basis for the writ of habeas corpus the district court issued, alleged that the prosecutor failed to disclose to the defense as required by Brady v. Maryland the handwritten notes he made of a pretrial conversation he had with two named individuals.The court concluded that petitioner failed to exhaust Claim III-H-4 in the state courts because he failed to present the claim to the Florida Supreme Court such that the reasonable reader would understand the claim's particular legal basis and specific factual foundation. Furthermore, the district court's issuance of the writ based on a witness's statement constituted reversible error. The court considered the remaining claims and affirmed the district court's denial of relief as to petitioner's cross-appeal. View "Green v. Secretary, Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

The Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's entry of summary judgment in favor of defendant in an action brought by plaintiff, alleging race discrimination after defendant terminated plaintiff. The court concluded that the district court properly found that plaintiff failed to show that defendant engaged in race discrimination under the McDonnell Douglas framework. However, in the alternative, plaintiff provided a convincing mosaic of discrimination sufficient to survive summary judgment at this stage. In this case, plaintiff has met his burden of showing factual disputes that should be decided by a jury—a jury whose role it is to weigh conflicting evidence and make any necessary credibility determinations. Therefore, the court remanded for further consideration. View "Jenkins v. Nell" on Justia Law

Heather operated a health-coaching business called Constitution Nutrition. She started her business in California, which did not require a license. After moving to Florida in 2015, she continued to run her business—meeting online with most of her clients and meeting in person with two clients who lived in Florida. She described herself as a “holistic health coach” and not as a dietician. Heather tailored her health coaching to each client, which included dietary advice. After a complaint was filed against her and she paid $500.00 in fines and $254.09 in investigatory fees, Heather sued, claiming that Florida’s Dietetics and Nutrition Practice Act, which requires a license to practice as a dietician or nutritionist, violated her First Amendment free speech rights to communicate her opinions and advice on diet and nutrition to her clients. The district court granted the Florida Department of Health summary judgment.The Eleventh Circuit affirmed, after considering the Supreme Court’s decision in National Institute of Family & Life Advocates v. Becerra (2018). The Act “is a professional regulation with a merely incidental effect on protected speech,” and is constitutional under the First Amendment. View "Del Castillo v. Secretary, Florida Department of Health" on Justia Law

One of the mandatory conditions of Dennis’s probation for stealing social security funds was that she not commit any new state crimes. A police officer later investigated Dennis for theft of services after he suspected that she took food from a restaurant without paying. During a heated exchange with the officer, Dennis repeatedly disobeyed his commands. Based on this encounter, a probation officer provided written notice that Dennis had committed theft, battery, and felony obstruction.After a hearing, the district court found that Dennis committed misdemeanor obstruction and sentenced her to a term of supervised release. Dennis objected to that sentence on the ground that she had not been given written notice that her probation could be revoked for committing misdemeanor obstruction. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. Because misdemeanor obstruction is a lesser included offense of felony obstruction, the inclusion of felony obstruction in the petition “thereby g[ave] notice to the defendant that [s]he may be [found guilty] on either charge.” The notice given to Dennis satisfied the requirements of “due process of law.” View "United States v. Dennis" on Justia Law