Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in US Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
by
Plaintiff filed suit against defendants under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging claims of excessive force and municipal liability, as well as state tort claims. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the officers' motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity where plaintiff established that the officers violated his Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force. In this case, the officers delivered repeated strikes, punches, and blows to plaintiff while plaintiff pleaded with them to stop hitting him because he was not resisting arrest or doing anything wrong. Therefore, a reasonable officer standing in defendants' shoes would have understood that the amount of force used to subdue plaintiff was excessive, as was their action in purposefully dropping plaintiff face-first onto the sidewalk after he had been subdued and handcuffed. The court also held that it lacked jurisdiction over the officers' appeal of the denial of summary judgment on the state law claims because the court's resolution of the qualified immunity appeal did not necessarily resolve plaintiff's state law claims against the officers. View "Burnikel v. Fong" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiff filed a pro se civil rights action against four South Dakota corrections officials, asserting both facial and as-applied challenges to the State's prison-pornography policy. The Eighth Circuit found it prudent to decide whether the policy was constitutional as applied to plaintiff before reaching his facial challenges. However, the court could not adopt the district court's as-applied analysis because it was error to resurrect and apply the 2000 Policy. The court explained that this was not the policy that plaintiff actually challenged, nor was it the authority under which SDSP staff withheld the rejected materials. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's summary judgment order and remanded for it to reevaluate defendant's as-applied claims based on the 2014 Policy. View "Sisney v. Kaemingk" on Justia Law

by
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of an action alleging that defendant violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101-12213. Plaintiff has cerebral palsy and uses a wheelchair for mobility. In this case, she tried to eat at an Omaha steakhouse owned and operated by defendant and alleged that she could not access the steakhouse due to certain physical barriers. The court held that the action became moot after defendant's mediation; plaintiff could not use the violation encountered in the parking space to expand her standing to sue for unencountered violations inside the steakhouse that never injured her; the district court did not abuse its wide discretion in allowing evidence on jurisdictional issues; plaintiff's request for discovery was futile because she did not have standing to sue in this action; and the district court did not err in deciding the Rule 12(b)(1) motion and denying discovery under Rule 56. View "Davis v. Anthony, Inc." on Justia Law

by
The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court's denial of qualified immunity to deputies in an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force. In this case, each of the deputies knew that plaintiff was a paranoid schizophrenic who had not taken his antipsychotic medication, could potentially be dangerous, refused repeated requests to go to the hospital or lie on his stomach, pretended to shoot himself in the head, took a defensive position lying on the ground with his hands and feet up, and yelled "just shoot me." Therefore, the deputies knew there was a reasonable expectation of aggression and a resistant subject. The court held that Deputy Maggard acted reasonably in cuffing and shackling plaintiff; Deputy Shuster acted reasonably in applying an arm lock that broke plaintiff's arm and by using nunchucks to obtain plaintiff's compliance; Deputy Calvin acted reasonably by tasing plaintiff five times after giving warnings to plaintiff and attempting less intrusive methods; and, even if Deputy Calvin did not act reasonably, he was entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiff could not show that a reasonable officer would have been on notice that his conduct violated a clearly established right. View "Cravener v. Shuster" on Justia Law

by
The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded the district court's denial of qualified immunity to deputies in an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging excessive force. In this case, each of the deputies knew that plaintiff was a paranoid schizophrenic who had not taken his antipsychotic medication, could potentially be dangerous, refused repeated requests to go to the hospital or lie on his stomach, pretended to shoot himself in the head, took a defensive position lying on the ground with his hands and feet up, and yelled "just shoot me." Therefore, the deputies knew there was a reasonable expectation of aggression and a resistant subject. The court held that Deputy Maggard acted reasonably in cuffing and shackling plaintiff; Deputy Shuster acted reasonably in applying an arm lock that broke plaintiff's arm and by using nunchucks to obtain plaintiff's compliance; Deputy Calvin acted reasonably by tasing plaintiff five times after giving warnings to plaintiff and attempting less intrusive methods; and, even if Deputy Calvin did not act reasonably, he was entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiff could not show that a reasonable officer would have been on notice that his conduct violated a clearly established right. View "Cravener v. Shuster" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiffs filed suit against defendant, a police officer, after the officer shot and killed Marilyn Denise Ambrose-Boyd during a welfare check. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment, holding that the officer was entitled to qualified immunity on the 42 U.S.C. 1983 claims where the officer's use of deadly force was objectively reasonable. In this case, the officer went to Ambrose-Boyd's home after receiving a 911 call report that she was home alone, suicidal, and had a gun. Furthermore, Ambrose-Boyd failed to respond to commands to drop her weapon and raised her gun to another officer's shin level. The court also held that the police chief and the city could not be liable because the officer acted reasonably. View "Rogers v. King" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiffs, Eric Wong and the Disability Support Alliance (DSA), filed suit against Heartwood, alleging public accommodation violations of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA), and a "bias offense" that entitled them to recover damages and injunctive relief under Minnesota Statutes 611A.79. The Eighth Circuit held that Wong made a sufficient showing of actual injury for Article III standing; Heartwood more than satisfied any applicable burden of production when it submitted with its motion for summary judgment detailed evidence showing that removal of its access barriers was not readily achievable; and thus the district court did not err in granting Heartwood summary judgment dismissing Wong's Title III claim on the merits. The court also held that the district court properly granted summary judgment dismissing Wong's state claim. Because Heartwood did not violate the MHRA, the district court also properly dismissed this claim. View "Disability Support Alliance v. Heartwood Enterprises, LLC" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiff, an inmate at a correctional center, filed suit against two officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for failure to protect in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The jury found for the officers and plaintiff appealed. The court assumed without deciding that plaintiff's offer of proof sufficiently preserved the issue of whether the district court should have allowed cross-examination a corrections guard about a disciplinary report about the guard. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit the cross-examination because the probative value of the evidence was low, and the danger of unfair prejudice and a "mini-trial" was great. The court also held that the district court did not plainly err in admitting evidence of the second incident, which was less probative than the first and similarly risked unfair prejudice and confusion of the issues. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting testimony about plaintiff's aggressive behavior toward cellmates where any error was harmless. View "Walker v. White" on Justia Law

by
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of intervenor's motion to unseal certain judicial records. The underlying litigation involved an omnibus Eighth Amendment challenge to Missouri's execution protocol where state government agencies filed documents under seal in order to be able to carry out executions. The court held that, under common law, the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that the documents at issue should remain sealed and that there was not way to redact the information to preserve certain identities. The court also held that intervenor has not established a First Amendment right to unseal the information where there was no historic tradition of accessibility, and public access to the documents in the instant case would not play a significant positive role in the function of Missouri's execution protocol. Finally, the court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in electing to review the supplemental briefing in camera, and denying intervenor's subsequent request to review it. View "Flynt v. Lombardi" on Justia Law

by
The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant, a police officer, in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action. The court held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff brought his claims against the officer in his official capacity only. In this case, the officer acquiesced in an unexpressed motion to amend the complaint to include individual-capacity claims against him, that a formal motion to so amend the complaint was not necessary, and that the complaint was correspondingly amended. View "Stephens v. Jessup" on Justia Law