Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

In this case, James Scott filed a civil rights lawsuit against the City of Sherwood, Sherwood City Attorney Stephen Cobb, and Sherwood City Code Enforcement Officer Sheila Reynolds. Scott owned property in Sherwood, Arkansas, which he used for storage and a repair business. After Sherwood annexed his property, Scott faced numerous complaints, citations, and prosecutions over the use of his property.Scott filed a lawsuit in state court, which was dismissed on grounds of sovereign immunity. Later, he filed a nearly identical lawsuit in federal court. The defendants moved for dismissal, arguing that the doctrine of res judicata, which prevents issues that have been judicially decided from being re-litigated, applied to Scott's claims. The district court granted the motion, and Scott appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court found that under Arkansas law, all the elements for claim preclusion, a type of res judicata, were satisfied. The court noted that Scott's lawsuit in state court was fully contested in good faith and resulted in a dismissal with prejudice, which constituted a final judgment. The state court had jurisdiction over the matter, and Scott's state and federal lawsuits involved the same civil rights claims and parties.Scott argued that the Arkansas court did not have jurisdiction and that it did not enter a valid final judgment. The appellate court rejected these arguments, explaining that under Arkansas law, sovereign immunity is treated like an affirmative defense, not a matter of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court also noted that the proper course of action for Scott to remedy an erroneous decision would be an appeal or a post-judgment motion, not another lawsuit. View "Scott v. City of Sherwood, Arkansas" on Justia Law

Two former police officers, Thomas Noon and Christopher Skidmore, were dismissed from their jobs in Platte Woods, Missouri, after submitting a letter of grievances about the police chief, James Kerns, to the city's mayor and Board of Aldermen. The officers filed a lawsuit against the mayor and police chief, claiming their First Amendment rights were violated under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The defendants moved for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, but the district court denied their motion. The defendants then brought an interlocutory appeal.Noon and Skidmore had raised several concerns about Kerns's performance as Chief of Police, including issues with department vehicles, radar equipment, personnel, and Kerns's use of department time for personal business. After their concerns were not addressed, the officers sent a document outlining their grievances to the mayor and the Board of Aldermen. After the officers admitted to authoring the document, they were both removed from the department's schedule and eventually fired.In reviewing the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit found that the officers had established a First Amendment violation. The court determined that the officers' speech, criticizing the police chief's leadership and alleging corruption and financial mismanagement, was made as citizens on matters of public concern. The court also concluded that the defendants failed to show that the officers' speech had an adverse impact on the department's operations. Finally, the court determined that the officers' First Amendment right to be free from retaliation for protected speech was clearly established. Therefore, the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity. The court affirmed the district court's decision. View "Noon v. Smedley" on Justia Law

In a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, the plaintiffs, The Arc of Iowa and several parents of children with disabilities, sought to challenge a provision of the Iowa Code that prevents schools from imposing mask mandates unless required by other laws. They had received a preliminary injunction from a lower court that had been vacated by this court due to changing circumstances related to the COVID-19 pandemic. On remand, the district court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, declaring that the phrase 'other provisions of law' in the contested Iowa Code section includes Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, and that the contested Iowa Code section cannot be cited as the sole basis for denying a student's request for reasonable modification or accommodation under the ADA or the Rehabilitation Act that requires others to wear masks.The defendants, the Governor of Iowa and the Director of the Iowa Department of Education, appealed to the Eighth Circuit, raising issues of exhaustion of remedies under the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA), standing of the plaintiffs, and the propriety and necessity of the relief granted by the district court.The appellate court, after de novo review, found that the plaintiffs failed to meet the requirements for standing, which include having suffered an injury in fact, traceability of the injury to the defendant's conduct, and the likelihood of redress by a favorable judicial decision. The court found that the general risks associated with COVID-19 were not enough to constitute "imminent and substantial" harm for standing. It also concluded that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated that the alleged injuries were fairly traceable to the conduct of the Governor or the Director of the Department of Education. As a result, the court vacated the district court's order and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss due to lack of standing. View "The Arc of Iowa v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

Catherine Brennan, after being prescribed psychotropic medications due to a stressful job transition, began to experience symptoms of akathisia, a neuropsychiatric syndrome associated with psychomotor restlessness often seen in individuals using antipsychotic medications. Despite having no prior history of mental illness, Brennan was treated by multiple providers and was diagnosed with bipolar disorder, depression, and generalized anxiety disorder between 2015 and 2018. In 2019, Brennan was committed due to displaying signs of mental health decompensation. She was diagnosed with bipolar disorder involving current manic episodes with psychotic features, suicidal ideations, and medication noncompliance. Brennan was committed for a period of six months. After this commitment, she commenced a federal action alleging wrongful commitment and unlawful forced medication, arguing that her symptoms were side effects of the prescribed medications and were mistaken for psychosis and mania.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, however, upheld the district court's dismissal of Brennan's claims. The court held that Brennan could not proceed with her wrongful commitment claim because her commitment order was still valid, as per the precedent set in Heck v. Humphrey and Thomas v. Eschen. Regarding Brennan's claim of forcible administration of neuroleptic medications, the court found that Brennan failed to show deliberate indifference on the part of the defendants. The court noted that deliberate indifference is more than negligence and requires a plaintiff to show that an objectively serious medical need was knowingly disregarded by the defendants. The court ruled that Brennan did not adequately plead deliberate indifference as she failed to identify how her care exceeded gross negligence or demonstrate when the defendants knew or should have known that her psychiatric problems were the result of akathisia and not mental illness. The court thus affirmed the district court's judgment dismissing Brennan's claims. View "Brennan v. Cass County Health" on Justia Law

This case involves an appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Dakota filed by the defendant, Nathaniel Crawford. Crawford was involved in a domestic dispute with his ex-girlfriend at an apartment complex, which led to concerned residents calling 911, reporting that Crawford was threatening to shoot a person or burn the complex. After officers arrived at the scene, Crawford fled but returned later to threaten his ex-girlfriend with a firearm. He fled again before officers could arrive; however, they found him and his vehicle in a nearby parking lot. Officers identified a wooden object protruding from the vehicle's center console, which they inferred to be a firearm. Crawford was subsequently charged with being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm due to his prior felony and misdemeanor domestic violence convictions.Crawford moved to suppress the firearm, arguing that officers lacked probable cause to search his vehicle. The district court denied his motion, leading to Crawford's appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing that the 911 calls, the ex-girlfriend's statements, and the wooden object established probable cause for the vehicle search. The court ruled that the officers' search was supported by probable cause based on the combination of these factors, establishing probable cause to search Crawford's vehicle for a firearm. The court also rejected Crawford's arguments that the search was unreasonable due to the officers' original investigation of him for a different crime and their lack of knowledge about his status as a prohibited person under federal law. The court maintained that the government can search for evidence of one crime and charge the suspect with a different crime based on what it later learns. The court concluded that the "fruit of the poisonous tree" was admissible because the tree in this case was not poisonous. View "United States v. Crawford" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, One Love Housing, LLC, a company that operates a residential sober living home in Anoka, Minnesota, sued the City of Anoka for refusing to grant a waiver from the city's zoning regulations. The regulations permit only a single family or a group of not more than four unrelated persons to reside together in the area where the sober home is located. One Love wanted to accommodate seven unrelated recovering addicts in the home. One Love and two residents of the home alleged that the city violated the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Fair Housing Act by refusing to grant this waiver.The district court granted One Love summary judgment on its claim that the city failed to reasonably accommodate the sober home's request. The court ordered the city to grant the waiver for One Love to house seven unrelated individuals recovering from substance abuse. The city appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings. The appellate court held that the district court erred by considering evidence that was not presented to the city council when it denied One Love's request for a waiver. The appellate court also found that the district court erred in granting summary judgment to One Love because there was a genuine dispute over whether the requested accommodation was reasonable and necessary. The court stated that the financial viability of One Love's sober home is relevant only if One Love can prove that the service it offers provides a therapeutic benefit that is necessary for people recovering from alcohol or drug abuse to successfully live in a residential neighborhood without relapsing. The court concluded that there are genuine issues of disputed fact on these issues. The court also declined to rule on One Love's disparate treatment and disparate impact claims, leaving those for the district court to address on remand. View "One Love Housing, LLC v. City of Anoka, MN" on Justia Law

The case involves Albert Collins, who was employed by the Kansas City Missouri Public School District. After the termination of his employment, Collins sued the school district, alleging racial discrimination and retaliation for participating in protected activities. The school district had fired Collins following an investigation into "attendance fraud," a scheme in which Collins admittedly took part. The three claims relevant in this case were racial discrimination during termination in violation of Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, retaliation for engaging in protected activities under Title VII and § 1983, and violation of a state law prohibiting public employers from retaliating against whistleblowers.The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the school district. The court held that Collins failed to provide sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that his termination was motivated by his race. He failed to demonstrate that a white employee engaged in the same fraudulent scheme was treated differently, failing to meet the "rigorous" requirement that the comparators must have dealt with the same supervisor, been subject to the same standards, and engaged in the same conduct.The court also found that Collins' retaliation claim failed for lack of evidence linking his termination to any protected conduct. His interviews about the attendance fraud scheme were not related to race, and he failed to demonstrate that another employee's claims, in which he acted as a witness, had anything to do with racial discrimination or retaliation.Regarding the whistleblower claim, the court held that a Missouri law excluding disclosures related to the employee's own violations applied to Collins. Since he failed to argue against the court's application of the statutory exclusion, his challenge to the court's grant of summary judgment on his whistleblower claim was deemed waived. View "Collins v. K.C. MO Public School District" on Justia Law

In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit considered an appeal by several Missouri public officials who were denied qualified immunity by a lower court regarding five claims arising from a murder prosecution. The murder case, involving Donald Nash who was eventually convicted for the murder of Judy Spencer, was reopened in 2007, 25 years after the crime occurred. The officials based their case on a theory that DNA evidence found under Spencer's fingernails belonged to Nash, which they asserted could not have remained present if Spencer had washed her hair after their last encounter.Nash was convicted and spent 11 years in prison until the Missouri Supreme Court set aside his conviction in 2020. The charges were dismissed after DNA testing on the shoelace used to strangle Spencer supported Nash’s noninvolvement. Nash and his wife filed a lawsuit against the officials, claiming violations of rights including unlawful arrest and detention, fabrication of evidence, failure to investigate, violations of rights of access to courts, and violation of the right to familial and marital associations.The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and dismissed in part the appeals on the denial of qualified immunity. The court held that the officials were not entitled to qualified immunity on the claim of unlawful arrest and detention, finding that the omission of certain exculpatory facts from the probable cause affidavit negated probable cause for Nash's arrest. However, the court reversed the denial of qualified immunity for the claim alleging violation of the right to familial and marital associations, as this was not a clearly established constitutional right in 2008. The court dismissed the officials' appeal on the remaining claims due to lack of jurisdiction, as these involved genuine disputes of material fact to be resolved by a jury. View "Estate of Nash v. Folsom" on Justia Law

In the case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, Curtis Stewart, an inmate in the Missouri correctional system, filed a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action against various Missouri Department of Corrections (MDOC) officials, including MDOC Director Anne Precythe. Stewart alleged that he was subjected to excessive force and cruel and unusual punishment due to a policy of handcuffing and shackling prisoners to a steel bench for hours. Precythe filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, asserting that she was entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied Precythe’s motion with respect to qualified immunity.The appeal court reversed the district court's decision. It held that Stewart failed to plausibly allege that Precythe authorized a policy that permitted jailers to use excessive force where it was unnecessary or unprovoked. The court also found that the complaint did not plausibly allege that Precythe acquiesced in any such practice of unprovoked or unwarranted excessive force because it failed to allege a pattern of such conduct.The court further noted that Stewart’s allegations against Precythe regarding the restraint policy did not violate the Eighth Amendment. The court held that the allegations represented the kind of punishment necessary “to preserve internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional security.” There were no allegations that Precythe’s conduct in adopting and promulgating the policy was “repugnant to the conscience of mankind.” Therefore, the court concluded that Precythe was entitled to qualified immunity. The court reversed the district court's denial of qualified immunity to Precythe and remanded for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "Stewart v. Precythe" on Justia Law

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed a lower court's ruling in a case involving Sarah Felts, who had been blocked on Twitter by Lewis E. Reed, the then-President of the St. Louis Board of Aldermen. Felts sued Reed in his official capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights had been violated. The district court ruled in favor of Felts, granting her declaratory relief, nominal damages, costs, and attorney’s fees. On appeal, the Board’s new President, Megan E. Green, challenged the district court's ruling.The court held that the act of blocking Felts on Twitter constituted a final municipal policy decision in the area of the City’s business associated with the office of the President of the Board of Aldermen. It also held that Reed administered the account under color of law as an official government account, and that blocking Felts violated her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The court further concluded that Reed, as the President of the Board of Aldermen, had the authority to establish the final social media policy for his office and that his decision to block Felts was a deliberate choice of a guiding principle and procedure to silence online critics. Therefore, the City of St. Louis was held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court affirmed the district court's judgment granting Felts declaratory relief and nominal damages. View "Felts v. Green" on Justia Law