Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, six former inmates of the Faulkner County Detention Center, filed suit against the County and two jail employees under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that their conditions of confinement were unconstitutional because of mold in and around the jail's shower.The Eighth Circuit reversed in part and held that the district court erred in denying the individual jail employees summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The court held that the only thing clearly established in this case is that the definition of the asserted constitutional right embraced by the district court — a right to sanitary prison conditions — was impermissibly broad. The court also held that a finding that such a right was clearly established based on this general definition was therefore in error. Because the right at issue has not been properly defined and there are genuine disputes of material fact at play, it is not possible for the court to determine whether the individual officers committed a constitutional violation in the detention center due to the presence of Cladosporium. Finally, the court held that it lacked jurisdiction to reach the County's appeal where the question of whether the County was liable for failing to train its officers is not inextricably intertwined with the matter of qualified immunity. View "Thurmond v. Andrews" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's adverse grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim against the City for depriving plaintiff of her constitutional right to a prompt first appearance in a criminal proceeding. Plaintiff alleged that a district court lacks jurisdiction to conduct a first appearance for a defendant who was arrested and charged in a separate county or judicial district.The court held that any Arkansas district court may perform pretrial functions as necessary and as authorized by the Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure. Because the Ashley County district judge had jurisdiction and authority to conduct the first appearance, the court held that plaintiff's constitutional claim necessarily fails. Furthermore, because the City discovered new evidence and presented it promptly to the court, the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the doctrine of equitable estoppel inapplicable here. The court also held that the doctrine of equitable estoppel is not properly invoked here because there has been no showing that the City knew of plaintiff's first appearance before the new evidence was discovered or that the City tried to induce her to act to her detriment. View "Green v. Byrd" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Abbott in an action brought by a former employee, alleging a failure-to-accommodate claim under the Minnesota Human Rights Act (MHRA). The court held that plaintiff has not made a facial showing that reasonable accommodation is possible and that the accommodation will allow him to perform the essential functions of the job. In this case, plaintiff requested that he be permitted to use electric forklifts in place of manual pallet jacks, but he has not presented evidence that this accommodation would allow him to perform the essential functions of an M&I Specialist. View "Collins v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc." on Justia Law

After plaintiffs received criminal citations for trespassing and traffic violations while hunting, they filed suit alleging unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment and Iowa Constitution, as well as violations of their substantive due process rights.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the unreasonable seizure claim for failure to state a claim where the district court found no seizure under the prevailing federal standards because the officers were alleged only to have issued or verified citations. The court also affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the officers on the unreasonable search claims where the district court did not err in considering summary judgment for the unreasonable search claims under the Iowa Constitution; the district court properly refused to consider plaintiffs' claim that the warrants for their Facebook records were overbroad; and the district court properly ruled that plaintiffs' allegation that defendants placed a GPS tracker on one of the plaintiff's vehicles is, at best, speculative and contradicts all objective evidence on the record. Finally, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the substantive due process claims where plaintiffs point to no evidence in the record that the officers intentionally or recklessly failed to investigate in a way that shocks the conscience. View "Wendt v. Iowa" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against a police officer under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the officer used excessive force in seizing plaintiff's 16 year old son. The officer shot the son and the son sustained serious injuries paralyzing him below the waist.The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of the officer's motion for summary judgment, holding that the seizure was not unreasonable. The court held that, under the circumstances, a reasonable officer was justified in discharging his firearm where the son was carrying a gun that moved while he ran, the officers were investigating a report of a stolen firearm, and the son was fleeing from police who had arrived at the apartment building. Given the convergence of events and the split-second decision for the officer, the court stated that it was not unreasonable for the officer to use force as he did. View "Liggins v. Cohen" on Justia Law

After Officers Jorgensen and Eckert shot and killed John O. Birkeland in his home, plaintiff filed a wrongful death action against the officers as well as the sergeant and the city. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the officers and the city on all claims except the use of deadly force and "associated state-law claims."The Eighth Circuit granted the motion to dismiss the cross-appeal because the court lacked jurisdiction to review the grant of qualified immunity or the grant of official immunity under Minnesota state law. However, the court reversed the district court's denial of qualified immunity on the deadly force claim. In this case, regardless of whether Birkeland's movement toward the officers was voluntary, in light of the close proximity between the officers and Birkeland's location in the closet, Birkeland's failure to comply with Jorgensen's commands to drop the knife, and Birkeland's stabbing of the police dog in the face with a knife, Birkeland posed a threat of serious physical harm to the officers and the court cannot say that their use of deadly force, even if just over the line of reasonableness, violated a clearly established right.The court also reversed the district court's denial of official immunity on the state-law claims related to the use of deadly force where a reasonable fact finder could not conclude that the officers' conduct in this case was willful or malicious. Furthermore, because the officers' discretionary decisions are entitled to official immunity, the city is entitled to vicarious official immunity. View "Birkeland v. Jorgenson" on Justia Law

In 2016, plaintiff filed a pro se damages action asserting equal protection and First Amendment claims arising out of his grievances stemming from his transfer to FPC Yankton where he was denied permission to possess an aviation manual he had been allowed to have at his prior correction facility. The district court dismissed all but one claim asserting that plaintiff's First Amendment rights were violated when an FPC Yankton Correctional Counselor retaliated against him for filing grievances by denying him prison grievance forms. The district court interpreted the action as one brought against the counselor under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and granted summary judgment, concluding that a Bivens remedy should not be implied for retaliatory denials of administrative remedies.The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that plaintiff failed to prove an essential element of a First Amendment retaliation claim -- that denial of a few grievance forms would chill an inmate of ordinary firmness from filing future grievances. In this case, the record establishes that the BOP's flexible four-step process allowed plaintiff to have his initial grievance decided on the merits and then to submit a second grievance that initially bypassed the informal resolution step, which was also decided on the merits. Furthermore, there is no evidence that other inmates would not be granted comparable procedural access to BOP administrative grievance remedies. View "Gonzalez v. Bendt" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to police officers and the city in an action alleging claims arising under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Minnesota state law after officers entered plaintiff's home without a warrant, seized her, and transported her to a hospital for a mental health evaluation.The court held that the officers acted reasonably when entering plaintiff's home and affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the officers on plaintiff's warrantless entry claim. In this case, the warrantless search entry was justified by a reasonable belief there was a mental health concern and an emergency requiring attention. Furthermore, once inside the home, the officers did not expand the scope of their search. The court also held that the district court did not err in granting the officers qualified immunity on plaintiff's unreasonable seizure claim, because the probable cause standard was not clearly established and, as a result, a reasonable officer could have believed the decision to arrest plaintiff for an emergency mental health evaluation was lawful.However, the court now explicitly states that only probable cause that a person poses an emergent danger—that is, one calling for prompt action—to herself or others can tip the scales of the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness balancing test in favor of the government when it arrests an individual for a mental health evaluation because only probable cause constitutes a sufficient "governmental interest" to outweigh a person's "interest in freedom." Finally, the court held that the district court did not err in granting the officers summary judgment on plaintiff's retaliatory arrest claim; the district court correctly entered summary judgment in favor of the city on plaintiff's Monell claims; and the district court did not err by granting summary judgment to the officers on her state-law claims of false imprisonment, battery, assault, and negligence. View "Graham v. Barnette" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to officers in an 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging that the officers used excessive force against plaintiff after he led them on a high speed chase. In this case, the taser logs recorded that plaintiff was tased twice.In regard to the first tasing, where defendant admitted that he was not yet handcuffed, the court held under its precedent that it is reasonable for an officer to tase an uncuffed suspect who appears to be resisting arrest. In regard to the second tasing, the court held that the use of the taser in drive-stun mode was reasonable under the circumstances where there was a "tumultuous" struggle between plaintiff and the deputies. Furthermore, it makes no difference if one of the officers knew that plaintiff had a preexisting shoulder condition that made it difficult for him to comply with their commands. Therefore, if Deputy Dolleslager did not violate plaintiff's constitutional rights, then neither did Deputy Lubben by failing to intervene. The court also held that Deputy Tierney did not violate a clearly established right where plaintiff alleged that the officer used his knee as a weapon, the officers argued that no one's knee touched plaintiff's head, and a dash-cam video is equivocal at best. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims. View "McManemy v. Tierney" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's action seeking both a declaration that the State of Missouri's grand jury secrecy laws are an unconstitutional abridgement of free speech as applied to her and an injunction preventing their enforcement. Plaintiff was a grand juror serving on the grand jury that considered whether to bring criminal charges against a former police officer in the death of Michael Brown.The court explained that it need not settle whether plaintiff's proposed speech is covered by the First Amendment or whether plaintiff waived her speech rights by swearing an oath to keep grand jury matters secret. The court held that, because Missouri's grand jury secrecy laws survive even the most exacting scrutiny, plaintiff failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted. As applied to plaintiff, the court held that section 540.320 of the Missouri Revised Statutes is narrowly tailored to serve Missouri's compelling interest in preserving the functioning of its grand jury system. View "Grand Juror Doe v. Bell" on Justia Law