Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

After officers from the Cedar Rapids Police Department shot and killed Jonathan Gossman during an altercation after stopping his vehicle to investigate possible drug crimes, Gossman's relatives filed suit against officers and the city, alleging various federal and state law claims under the United States Constitution, the Iowa Constitution, and Iowa tort law.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the officers and the city, holding that, collectively, the officers' observations were enough to support the belief that criminal activity might have been afoot; the officers' first attempt to detain Gossman was also supported by reasonable suspicion; an officer's decision to release his canine to subdue the struggling Gossman and keep him from leaving was not unreasonable; police reasonably believed that Gossman posed a serious threat to their safety when he drew a gun; and the officers' use of deadly force was justified and did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The court also held that the district court properly disposed of the state law assault and false arrest claims. View "McElree v. City of Cedar Rapids" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against defendant, a police officer, alleging civil rights claims related to her conduct during an investigation into an alleged interstate sex-trafficking scheme. Specifically, plaintiffs claimed that defendant violated their Fourth Amendment rights by submitting a false affidavit causing their arrest. The district court concluded that plaintiffs may proceed on both a Bivens claim and a claim under 42 U.S.C. 1983.The Eighth Circuit concluded that this case is meaningfully different from a Bivens action in four ways: first, the sorts of actions being challenged here are different; second, defendant's role in the arrests was different; third, although the mechanism for inquiry is a closer call, there is still one meaningful difference; and fourth, proving these claims would require a different type of showing. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded to the district court to dismiss plaintiffs' Bivens claims and to determine whether their case can proceed under section 1983. View "Ahmed v. Weyker" on Justia Law

Dassault hired Gipson in 2004; he was promoted in 2006. In 2011, Gipson received a poor evaluation from his supervisor. Gipson complained to HR about his supervisor. Later, Gipson and his supervisor had an argument which ended with security escorting Gipson to HR. Gipson filed an EEOC charge but did not sue. Dassault assigned Gipson a different supervisor. In 2012, Gipson reported to HR a racially offensive email sent by a colleague. The sender was suspended. In 2013, Gipson’s team leader resigned. Gipson assumed some team leader duties. Dassault claims that Gipson was not given “personnel/ supervisor responsibilities.” In 2014, Dassault promoted Gipson to senior manufacturing engineer. Months later Dassault posted an open team leader position. Gipson applied but HR responded that he was not qualified because he had not served as a senior manufacturing engineer for at least 12 months. His application was never forwarded to the decision-makers. Another African-American was selected for the promotion.Gipson claimed that he did not receive the promotion because of his race and because he filed a 2011 EEOC complaint. Dassault later terminated Gipson’s employment as part of a reduction in force. Gipson contends that two Caucasian senior manufacturing engineers, who he alleges had less seniority than him, were offered voluntary demotions in lieu of termination. The Eighth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for Dassault on claims under Title VII (42 U.S.C. 2000e), 42 U.S.C. 1981, and the Arkansas Civil Rights Act. View "Gipson v. Dassault Falcon Jet Corp" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the District and three individual school officials in an action brought by a student, alleging claims of sexual abuse and harassment by a teacher and coach, Johnna Feazell.Where, as here, a complaint involves allegations against school officials brought under both Title IX and 42 U.S.C. 1983, this court has held that an official in these circumstances must have actual notice of the alleged sexual harassment or sexual abuse by a school employee to meet the standard for liability. In this case, a searching review of the summary judgment record reveals no evidence to indicate school officials had actual notice of sexual harassment or abuse by Feazell prior to the events at issue. Rather, when plaintiff's mother met with the school principal with the cell phone containing text messages evidencing a sexual relationship between plaintiff and Feazell, school officials took immediate action by contacting law enforcement and placing Feazell on administrative leave. Therefore, the district court did not improperly weigh the evidence and the summary judgment record established that no genuine dispute exists as to whether the District or any school official had actual notice of sexual abuse or harassment prior to October 13, 2014. View "KC v. Mayo" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of plaintiff's 28 U.S.C. 2254 motion for habeas relief based on the denial of his Sixth Amendment right to self-representation. Defendant was convicted of aggravated residential burglary, aggravated assault on a family or household member, and first-degree terroristic threatening.The court held that plaintiff clearly and unequivocally invoked his right to self-representation; as soon as he manifested this clear and unequivocal invocation, the proceedings should have paused, and the trial court should have conducted a proper Faretta hearing; and thus the Arkansas Supreme Court's finding to the contrary was an objectively unreasonable application of clearly established Federal law. The court also held that the record does not support a finding that plaintiff engaged in serious and obstructionist misconduct, and the Arkansas Supreme Court's finding to the contrary is objectively unreasonable. In this case, there is no evidence in the record that defendant was attempting to manipulate, subvert, or delay the trial process. Finally, the state waived its argument that there was a determination that plaintiff was incapable, under Faretta, of waiving his right to counsel. View "Finch v. Payne" on Justia Law

After plaintiff was found to have violated the University's policies prohibiting sexual harassment and stalking on the basis of sex, and was suspended for two years, he filed suit against the Curators of the University and four individual Title IX investigators.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment and held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff's motion to compel and the district court's discovery ruling did not prevent plaintiff from adequately opposing defendants' motion for summary judgment; summary judgment on the Title VI claim was appropriate because plaintiff failed to present evidence that his proffered comparators, including the two white students mentioned, were graduate students and thus similarly situated to him in all relevant respects; summary judgment on plaintiff's void for vagueness claim was appropriate because the University's policies provide adequate notice of what conduct is prohibited and the individual defendant's inability to agree on the exact scope of prohibited conduct or the definition of words in the policies does not mean the policies are subject to arbitrary enforcement; summary judgment on the First Amendment retaliation claim was appropriate in its entirety; dismissal of the substantial overbreadth claim was appropriate where plaintiff failed to plausibly allege that the University's policies against sexual harassment and stalking have a real and substantial effect on protected speech; dismissal of the sex discrimination under Title IX claim was appropriate where the complaint fails to plausibly allege that the investigation reached an outcome against the weight of the evidence or allege any additional facts suggesting bias based on his sex; and dismissal of the discrimination claims under the Missouri Human Rights Act (MHRA) were appropriate where plaintiff failed to state a plausible claim for sex discrimination for reasons similar to his Title IX claims. Finally, although the court believed that it was error for the district court to dismiss the state law race discrimination claim, the error was harmless in light of the court's conclusion. View "Rowles v. Curators of the University of Missouri" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a police officer, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 based on the police department's investigation of him after it received allegations that plaintiff had purchased illegal steroids and interfered with a department investigation. In this case, defendant's home, police locker, police cruiser, and wife's vehicle were searched. Furthermore, his blood and urine were taken and analyzed.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claim that Sergeant Koepke had unlawfully detained plaintiff in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights where, taken together, the facts do not establish that Koepke lacked sufficient reasonable and articulable suspicion that plaintiff might be involved in criminal activity. Therefore, Koepke was entitled to qualified immunity. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claims that Koepke had unlawfully arrested plaintiff where Koepke was entitled to qualified immunity because the length of plaintiff's detention was not unreasonable under the circumstances. The court also affirmed summary judgment based on qualified immunity for Captain Peterson and Legal Advisor Peters and concluded that any omitted material facts from their warrant application was immaterial. Finally, the court affirmed summary judgment based on qualified immunity to Sergeant Reynolds where Reynold's search of plaintiff's wife's vehicle, which was not the vehicle identified in the search warrant, was authorized under the automobile exception to the warrant requirement. View "Cronin v. Peterson" on Justia Law

This action concerns the validity of Minn. Stat. 204B.13, subd. 2(c), which addresses the administration of an election when the candidate of a major political party dies after the seventy-ninth day before a general election. Tyler Kistner is the candidate of the Republican Party for the United States House of Representatives in the Second Congressional District of Minnesota; Angela Craig is the incumbent Representative and the candidate of the Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party for that office; and Jenny Winslow Davies is a voter in the district. The dispute arose from the death of a third candidate in the race, Adam Charles Weeks, the Candidate for the Legal Marijuana Now Party, on September 21, 2020. At issue is whether Minnesota has authority to forego the election for Representative on November 3, 2020, and schedule a special election for February 2021. The district court ruled that the Minnesota statute is likely preempted, ordered that section 204B.13 must not be enforced as to the election on November 3 for Representative from the Second District, and enjoined the Minnesota Secretary of State from refusing to give legal effect to the ballots cast for Representative on November 3.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's order granting a preliminary injunction. The court agreed with the district court that the Minnesota statute is likely preempted by federal law. Even assuming for the sake of analysis that federal law permits a state to cancel an election and thereby to produce a "failure to elect" in certain extraordinary situations, the court concluded that federal law would allow that course only in truly "exigent" circumstances. The court concluded that the death of candidate Weeks is likely not the sort of exigent circumstance that permits the state to refrain from holding the election for United States Representative on the date prescribed by federal law. Nor do the unofficial results announced by the Secretary of State suggest that the balloting on November 3 failed to elect a Representative. Therefore, the court saw no error in the district court's determination that Craig and Davies would suffer irreparable harm without an injunction, as they would be left without representation in the House of Representatives between the end of the incumbent's term in January 2021 and the seating of a new Representative after a special election in February 2021. Furthermore, the balance of harms and the public interest do not militate against an injunction, especially when there is a likelihood of success on the merits of the complaint. View "Craig v. Simon" on Justia Law

After Drake University and its Board of Trustees expelled plaintiff for sexually assaulting a female student, plaintiff filed suit for violations of Title IX and the Americans with Disabilities (ADA), as well as claims related to breach of contract. On appeal, plaintiff challenges the district court's grant of summary judgment on his Title IX claim based on an erroneous outcome theory, his ADA claim, and his breach of implied duty of good faith and promissory estoppel claims.After determining that the court had jurisdiction to review plaintiff's appeal, the court held that there is no genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether being male was a motivating factor for plaintiff's expulsion from Drake; Drake's Code of Student Conduct and Policy on Sexual and Interpersonal Misconduct processes, although not equivalent to those provided in nonacademic settings, are not reflective of gender bias, either in statement or in application; the hearing panel did not reach decisions contrary to the weight of the evidence; and the pressure that was being put on Drake to investigate and adjudicate Title IX complaints by females against males does not appear to have approached that described in Doe v. University of Arkansas-Fayetteville, 974 F.3d at 865, nor was it combined with the clearly irregular investigative and adjudicative processes that were found to support a prima facie claim of sex discrimination in Doe v. Columbia University, 831 F.3d at 56-57, and in Menaker v. Hofstra University, 935 F.3d 20, 35 (2nd Cir. 2019).The court rejected plaintiff's ADA claim and affirmed the district court's ruling that no genuine issue of material fact existed regarding plaintiff's need for accommodations. Finally, the court held that the district court did not err in granting summary judgment on plaintiff's claims for breach of implied duty of good faith and promissory estoppel. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Drake and remanded with instructions to dismiss with prejudice the claims that had previously been dismissed without prejudice by stipulation. View "Rossley v. Drake University" on Justia Law

Minnesota law dictates that election officials only count ballots received by election day. The Minnesota Alliance for Retired Americans Education Fund filed suit against the Secretary, alleging that Minnesota's statutory deadline was unconstitutional. The Secretary and the Alliance entered into a consent decree that essentially made the statutorily-mandated absentee ballot receipt deadline inoperative. After the Minnesota state court confirmed the decree, the Secretary directed election officials to count absentee ballots received up to a week after election day, notwithstanding Minnesota law.Plaintiffs, both Minnesota registered voters and also certified nominees of the Republican Party to be presidential electors, filed suit alleging that the consent decree and the state court's order confirming it violate the United States Constitution. The district court denied plaintiffs' requested injunction, concluding that they lack standing to bring their claims.The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction and remanded to the district court to enter an injunction requiring the Secretary and those under his direction to identify, segregate, and otherwise maintain and preserve all absentee ballots received after the deadlines set forth in Minn. Stat. 203B.08, subd. 3.After determining that plaintiffs have Article III and prudential standing to bring their claims, the court considered plaintiffs' constitutional challenge to evaluate the propriety of preliminary injunctive relief rather than remanding for the district court to decide the merits in the first instance. The court held that the Secretary's instructions to count mail-in ballots received up to seven days after Election Day stand in direct contradiction to Minnesota election law governing presidential elections, and plaintiffs have strongly shown likely success on the merits since the Secretary's actions are likely to be declared invalid under the Electors Clause of Article II of the United States Constitution. The court stated that only the Minnesota Legislature, and not the Secretary, has plenary authority to establish the manner of conducting the presidential election in Minnesota. The court also held that the Secretary's plan to count mail-in ballots received after the deadline established by the Minnesota Legislature will inflict irreparable harm to plaintiffs. Furthermore, the balance of the equities and the public interest weigh in favor of the issuance of an injunction. Finally, the court held that the injunction does not violate the Purcell principle. View "Carson v. Simon" on Justia Law