Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

LRFP challenged the constitutionality (42 U.S.C. 1983) of three 2019 Arkansas statutes: Act 493 bans providers from performing an abortion when the “probable age” of the fetus is “determined to be greater than eighteen weeks’ gestation,” with exceptions for a medical emergency or a pregnancy that results from rape or incest; Act 619 prohibits a provider from intentionally performing an abortion with knowledge that the pregnant woman is seeking the abortion “solely on the basis” of any reason to believe that the fetus has Down syndrome, with exceptions if the abortion is necessary to preserve the woman’s life or health and for rape or incest; and Act 700, providing that a person who performs an abortion must be a licensed physician “board-certified or board-eligible in obstetrics and gynecology” (OBGYN). A provider who violates these statutes commits a Class D felony and is subject to suspension or revocation of his medical license.The district court preliminarily enjoined enforcement of the Acts. The Eighth Circuit affirmed with respect to Act 493 and Act 619 and dismissed as moot the appeal concerning Act 700 because the plaintiffs were in compliance with the OBGYN requirement. Defendants presented no generally accepted medical evidence that the attainment of viability has shifted; Act 493 effectively prohibits a substantial universe of pre-viability abortions. Act 619 is a complete prohibition of abortions based on the pregnant woman’s reason for exercising the right to terminate her pregnancy before viability. View "Little Rock Family Planning Services v. Rutledge" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the City and three police officers, in their individual and official capacities, alleging violations of his constitutional rights. The district court granted summary judgment for defendants. The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, holding that the officers are entitled to qualified immunity because plaintiff has not shown a deprivation of a clearly established right. In this case, officers observed plaintiff recording both vehicles near the police station and officers and civilian employees entering and leaving the police station; the officers possessed other significant information: they were aware of recent criminal activity involving cars parked in the area, and they were aware of a previous filming and stalking incident that escalated into the murder of two officers; and plaintiff was non-responsive, evasive, and confrontational. The court explained that, in light of the circumstances, the officers' conduct was not objectively unreasonable under clearly established law. Furthermore, the officers are entitled to qualified immunity for the Terry stop because they had at least arguable reasonable suspicion. Finally, there is no cognizable Monell claim.However, the court reversed in part, holding that the officers are not entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity on plaintiff's claim of false arrest. The court explained that a reasonable officer would not have believed he had probable cause to arrest plaintiff for loitering because there is no evidence plaintiff was blocking the sidewalk or disrupting the activity of the police station. Furthermore, regardless of whether the Place exception applies to personal effects such as phones and cameras, the duration of the seizure here was unreasonable. Therefore, the officers violated plaintiff's clearly established right to be free of unreasonable seizures of his property and are not entitled to qualified immunity. View "Robbins v. City of Des Moines" on Justia Law

Officer Baker, on school patrol, motioned for Garcia to stop and shouted for him to slow down. Garcia responded that he was going the speed limit. Garcia drove away. Later, in the afternoon, Garcia again saw Baker at the school. He extended his hand and raised his middle finger. Baker followed Garcia, called for backup, and pulled Garcia over. Baker told Garcia that there were children present and that his actions constituted disorderly conduct. Baker repeatedly asked for Garcia’s license but he ignored her requests and demanded that she call her supervisor. Other officers arrived. Baker told Garcia to get out his “g*d d**n D.L.” Garcia yelled that he was “protected by the First Amendment!” Baker opened the door and grabbed Garcia as he stepped out of the vehicle, placed him against his vehicle, handcuffed him, stating that he was being detained for disorderly conduct. Baker held Garcia in the squad car for seven minutes and issued a citation. As Garcia left, he yelled, “f**k you.” Baker later stated that she had noted a license plate violation. Garcia later apologized in writing, took a driving course, and entered into an “Agreement to Suspend Prosecution.” Garcia's complaint with the New Hope Police Department was not sustained.In Garcia’s suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court granted the defendants summary judgment, citing qualified immunity. The Eighth Circuit reversed with respect to Garcia’s First Amendment retaliation claim against Baker. Genuine disputes of material fact exist; a reasonable jury could find that Baker lacked probable cause to pull Garcia over. The court affirmed in part. Given the totality of the circumstances, the officers’ use of force in handcuffing Garcia was objectively reasonable. View "Garcia v. City of New Hope" on Justia Law

Harris pleaded guilty to first-degree assault. In 2012, the Circuit Court of Scott County, Missouri imposed a 15-year sentence, ordering that it run concurrently with Harris’s recently-imposed 25-year federal sentence, imposed after he pleaded guilty to interference with commerce by threat or violence, possession of a firearm in furtherance of a crime of violence, and being a convicted felon in possession of ammunition. His federal sentence, which was silent on whether it was to be served consecutively or concurrently, was later reduced to 183 months, in light of the Supreme Court’s Johnson decision.Harris is in state custody, receiving credit only against his state sentence. He will begin serving his federal sentence after he completes his state sentence and is transferred to the Bureau of Prisons. Despite the state court’s order, Harris will serve consecutive, not concurrent, sentences.Harris sought habeas relief, 28 U.S.C. 2254. The district court denied relief. The Eighth Circuit reversed. Harris alleged sufficient facts to apprise the court and the state of a distinct basis for his claim—that Plea Counsel advised that his 25-year federal sentence would “swallow” up any state sentence he would receive for pleading guilty to assault. On remand, the district court must determine whether Harris procedurally defaulted that claim. View "Harris v. Wallace" on Justia Law

Ellison, remodeling Stephen’s house, noticed a USB drive on the toilet tank. Ellison had researched hidden recording devices following a break-in and recognized it as a hidden camera. Ellison took the USB home but did not view its contents. The next morning, Ellison returned to Stephen’s home and discovered a young boy asleep. Stephen, a youth basketball coach, arrived with another boy. Returning home, Ellison viewed the USB’s contents, finding multiple videos depicting children secretly recorded in various stages of undress. Ellison delivered the USB to the Monticello Police. The Iowa Division of Criminal Investigation took possession of the USB, obtained a warrant, and viewed its contents. A warranted search of Stephen’s homes uncovered more secret recording devices and a hard drive containing approximately 400 visual depictions of nude minor boys, including images of Stephen molesting unconscious victims. Indicted for sexually exploiting a child, 18 U.S.C. 2251(a), possessing child pornography, section 2252(a)(4)(B), and transporting child pornography, section 2252(a)(1), Stephen unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of the motion and Stephen’s 2,160-month sentence. The Fourth Amendment does not apply to private-citizen searches unless that private citizen acted as a government agent. Ellison was acting out of civic duty; even if Ellison intended to assist law enforcement, it would not be enough to establish he was a government agent. The police chief had probable cause to take the USB from Ellison. View "United States v. Stephen" on Justia Law

After Daniel Elrod was shot and killed by a former Omaha police officer, plaintiff filed suit against the officer and others under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state law. The district court granted summary judgment to the officer in his individual capacity only, ruling that the former officer was entitled to qualified immunity on the section 1983 claim. After the district court's summary judgment decision, plaintiff abandoned her case and did not respond to subsequent motions or discovery requests.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case for failure to prosecute, finding (1) no abuse of discretion in dismissing plaintiff's case for failure to prosecute, (2) the dismissal for failure to prosecute bars appellate review of earlier entered interlocutory orders, and (3) plaintiff's failure to analyze in her brief issues related to other decisions identified in her Notice of Appeal constitutes a waiver. View "Beadle v. City of Omaha" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against various officials of an Arkansas jail, where he had been held as a pretrial detainee. After he was transferred to a facility in Texas, some of the defendants moved to stay the case. Although the case had already entered discovery, a magistrate judge granted the stay. Plaintiff then filed an objection to the motion to stay and a motion for relief from the magistrate order. The district court never acted on the motions, referred back to the magistrate judge, who then denied relief.The Eighth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that the court does not have jurisdiction to hear a direct appeal of a magistrate judge's order on a nondispositive pretrial matter. In this case, without a decision of a district court, this court lacked jurisdiction to proceed any further. View "Devine v. Walker" on Justia Law

After the school districts sought modification of existing desegregation consent decrees to allow their exemption from Arkansas's Public School Choice Act, Ark. Code. Ann. 6–18–1906, the district court granted the motions and modified the consent decrees to explicitly limit the transfer of students between school districts. The Department appealed, alleging that the modification imposed an impermissible interdistrict remedy.The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that there was a substantial change in Arkansas law after the consent decrees were enacted and the district court's modification was not an impermissible interdistrict remedy. The court explained that the district court did not abuse its discretion in considering and crediting evidence of white flight when it determined that a substantial change in circumstances had occurred warranting modification of the consent decrees. Furthermore, based on the court's review of the record and the large degree of deference given to the district court, the court could not find that the district court abused its discretion in modifying the consent decrees. View "United States v. Arkansas Department of Education" on Justia Law

Dat was born in a Kenyan refugee camp in 1993. Admitted to the U.S. around 1994, he became a lawful permanent resident. Dat pled guilty to robbery, 18 U.S.C. 1951, and was sentenced to 78 months' imprisonment. Dat’s robbery conviction is a deportable offense, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Dat moved to vacate his guilty plea, claiming that his attorney, Allen, assured him that his immigration status would not be affected by his plea. Allen testified that she repeatedly told Dat the charges were “deportable offenses,” that she never told him, his mother, or his fiancée that he would not be deported. that she encouraged Dat to hire an immigration attorney, and that they reviewed the Plea Petition, which says that non-citizens would be permanently removed from the U.S. if found guilty of most felony offenses. The Plea Agreement refers to immigration consequences. Dat and Allen also reviewed the PSR, which stated that immigration proceedings would commence after his release from custody.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the denial of relief, finding that Dat was not denied effective assistance of counsel. It was objectively reasonable for Allen to tell Dat that he “could” face immigration ramifications that “could” result in deportation. An alien with a deportable conviction may still seek “relief from removal. These “immigration law complexities” should caution any defense attorney not to advise a defendant considering a guilty plea that the result of a post-conviction, contested removal proceeding is certain. View "Dat v. United States" on Justia Law

After Cassandra Braun was killed in a high-speed police pursuit of a speeding vehicle, her mother filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action, alleging constitutional violations against the officer involved in the accident and his supervisor.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for defendants, holding that the officer believed he was responding to an emergency, triggering the intent-to-harm standard. In this case, plaintiff failed to argue, much less present any evidence, that the officer intended to harm anyone. Therefore, the district court correctly granted summary judgment for the officer on plaintiff's substantive due process claim because she failed to establish a constitutional violation. Furthermore, the district court also rightly granted summary judgment for the supervisor where plaintiff's failure-to-train-or-supervise claim requires an underlying constitutional violation. View "Braun v. Burke" on Justia Law