Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, Arkansas prisoners who are or were on death row for capital murder convictions, filed suit alleging that Arkansas's method of execution violated the Eighth Amendment. In an effort to obtain the necessary information about the existence of known and available alternatives that would significantly reduce a substantial risk of severe pain, they served subpoenas on several state correctional departments, including the NDCS. After the NDCS objected, the district court determined that the Eleventh Amendment did not categorically bar the subpoena. NDCS appealed. While the appeal was pending, the Arkansas district court dismissed the inmates' suit and the Nebraska Supreme Court ordered public disclosure of the documents.The Eighth Circuit held that this case has been rendered moot where there is no effective relief that the court could grant because the materials at issue are already public. The court explained that requiring the return or destruction of the subpoenaed documents would provide no effective relief, and the court declined to do either. Finally, no exception to the mootness doctrine is applicable here. View "McGehee v. Nebraska Department of Correctional Services" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against a deputy and the County under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for violations of his Fourth Amendment rights. In this case, defendant was arrested at a halfway house and booked for second-degree criminal mischief, a misdemeanor.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity where a jury could find that plaintiff's constitutional rights were violated when the deputy body-slammed plaintiff to the floor, knocking him out. Assuming that plaintiff was a nonviolent, nonthreatening misdemeanant who pulled his arm away from the officer, Karels v. Storz, 906 F.3d 740, 747 (8th Cir. 2018), put the deputy on notice that his body slam was excessive force. View "MacKintrush v. Hodge" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit in state court against Amber Pharmacy and others, alleging claims of discrimination, retaliation, demotion and a hostile work environment. After removal to federal court, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on all but a portion of plaintiff's Nebraska Fair Employment Practice Act (NFEPA) claim.In regard to plaintiff's claim of age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), the Eighth Circuit assumed that plaintiff established a prima facie case, but that defendants articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for eliminating plaintiff's position and demoting her: the need to restructure the financial department to put a stronger emphasis on accounting and more effectively implement the new operating system. The court concluded that plaintiff's evidence was insufficient and did not satisfy her burden of showing age was a motivating factor in defendants' decision to restructure. The court also concluded that defendants are entitled to summary judgment on plaintiff's federal claims under Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA) and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA).Given the similarities between the federal and state ADEA claim, the court concluded that it was appropriate for the district court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction and grant summary judgment on the Nebraska ADEA claim. Because plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress was neither novel nor complex, the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction would not offend principles of comity and fairness. The court concluded that the district court erred in splitting plaintiff's claim that her employer retaliated against her for reporting Medicaid and HIPPA issues and for filing charges with the Nebraska Equal Opportunity Commission. The court vacated the district court's order on the NFEPA claim with instructions to remand the claim in its entirety to state court so that Nebraska courts may resolve the novel questions of state law. View "Starkey v. Amber Enterprises, Inc." on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action brought by plaintiff, alleging a claim for unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that defendant had probable cause to arrest plaintiff where he had an outstanding arrest warrant at the time of arrest, and the warrant was valid. Furthermore, plaintiff was driving with a broken headlight in violation of Missouri law. The court explained that, although defendant told plaintiff he was under arrest for a DWI, defendant had probable cause based on the outstanding warrant or the broken headlight. Furthermore, an officer's wrongly-stated reason for an arrest does not nullify an otherwise lawful arrest, and a claim that defendant fabricated evidence about the arrest does not negate his probable cause at the time of the arrest. View "Wood v. Wooten" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, reporters with Al Jazeera America news network, filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against an officer and the county, alleging civil rights claims stemming from their coverage of protests after the death of Michael Brown in Ferguson, Missouri. The officer had deployed a tear-gas canister at plaintiffs while they were preparing for a live broadcast. The district court denied qualified immunity to the officer, permitting the reporters to proceed on their First Amendment, Fourth Amendment, and state-law battery claims.Taking the facts in the light most favorable to the reporters, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the reporters were not engaged in unlawful activity when the officer fired on them, and thus the officer did not have arguable probable cause to use the tear-gas. The court explained that, based on the robust consensus of cases of persuasive authority, it is clearly established that using an arrest (that lacks arguable probable cause) to interfere with First Amendment activity is a constitutional violation. Therefore, the court affirmed the denial of qualified immunity on the First Amendment claim. However, when the officer deployed the tear-gas, it was not clearly established that his acts were a seizure. Accordingly, the district court should have granted qualified immunity to the officer on the Fourth Amendment claim. Finally, the court concluded that the district court correctly denied summary judgment on the state-law claim. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Quraishi v. Anderson" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant in a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action brought by plaintiff, alleging unreasonable seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The court concluded that plaintiff failed to cite any Eighth Circuit case considering probable cause under similar circumstances where an officer has probable cause to make a DWI arrest. Because there is no "precedent" or "controlling authority," the court looks for a "robust consensus of cases." The court explained that what constituted probable cause for a DWI arrest was not "sufficiently clear" at the time of arrest. Furthermore, a survey of DWI cases in Missouri demonstrates that even if defendant acted without arguable probable cause, existing law did not give him “fair warning” that his conduct was unconstitutional. In this case, it was not clearly established that defendant lacked arguable probable cause to believe that plaintiff had been driving based on the available facts: arriving alone, at the remote police station, early in the morning, keys in hand, to pick up another individual who had been arrested. Finally, the district court did not err in denying plaintiff's Rule 56(e)(1) and 59(e) motions. View "Kuessner v. Wooten" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Mike Campbell filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit against Missouri state representative Cheri Toalson Reisch after she blocked him from her Twitter account, alleging that she violated the First Amendment by denying him the right to speak. The district court agreed with plaintiff, declared that Reisch had violated his rights, and ordered her to stop blocking plaintiff and others because of the content or viewpoint of their speech.The Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that plaintiff is not entitled to section 1983 relief because Reisch was not acting under state law when she blocked him from her Twitter account. The court held that Reisch's account is the kind of unofficial account that the court envisioned in Knight First Amendment Inst. at Columbia Univ. v. Trump, 928 F.3d 226, 235–36 (2d Cir. 2019). The court explained that no one seriously disputes that her account at least began life as a private account because Reisch was not a public official when she created it. Even if Reisch had been a public official at the time, the court would still hold that she had not created an official governmental account because she used it overwhelmingly for campaign purposes. The court thought that Reisch's Twitter account is more akin to a campaign newsletter than to anything else, and so it's Reisch's prerogative to select her audience and present her page as she sees fit. Therefore, Reisch's own First Amendment right to craft her campaign materials necessarily trumps Campbell's desire to convey a message on her Twitter page that she does not wish to convey, even if that message does not compete for room as it would, say, in a campaign newsletter. The court remanded for the district court to enter judgment in Reisch's favor. View "Campbell v. Reisch" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the County, CCS, and other prison officials and healthcare providers under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs in violation of the Fourteenth and Eighth Amendments. Plaintiff also alleges that two officers threatened him in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Plaintiff's allegations stemmed from complications resulting from treatment of his foot injuries.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of one defendant's motion to dismiss and summary judgment as to the other defendants. The court held that the district court properly granted the physician assistant's motion to dismiss where the amended complaint failed to sufficiently allege that the physician assistant knew that plaintiff had serious medical needs and was deliberately indifferent to them. In this case, the court accepted plaintiff's allegations as true, but not his legal conclusions. The court also held that the district court properly granted summary judgment on plaintiff's deliberate indifference claims as to the remaining defendants where plaintiff's claims are a mere disagreement with treatment decisions. The court further held that plaintiff failed to administratively exhaust his claims that prison guards threatened retaliation, and plaintiff cannot show that a reasonable inmate of ordinary firmness would have failed to file a grievance in his situation. View "East v. Minnehaha County" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's motion to suppress evidence in a case where defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm. The court held that there was no Fourth Amendment violation where the district court did not err in determining the Creighton University security officers were not acting as, or participating with, government officials when they stopped defendant and discovered the gun at issue. In this case, none of the security officers had received training from the Omaha police; they did not contact the police before detaining defendant; they did not act at the request of the police; and there is no evidence they intended to assist them. View "United States v. Avalos" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an inmate of the ADC, filed a pro se 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging that ADC had denied her hormone therapy to treat her diagnosed gender dysphoria in violation of her constitutional rights. The district court dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice for failure to state a claim. After plaintiff appealed, the parties informed the court for the first time that plaintiff was in fact already receiving hormone therapy and had been for several months.The Eighth Circuit held that plaintiff's request for injunctive relief in the form of hormone therapy is moot. Therefore, the district court's judgment on the hormone therapy claim is vacated and remanded with directions to dismiss it as moot. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action in all other respects. View "Prowse v. Payne" on Justia Law