Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 action alleging that investigating officers had violated his constitutional rights. After spending more than 10 years in prison, plaintiff was released when new evidence suggested that he was not the driver of a vehicle that caused a fatal accident.In regard to plaintiff's reckless-investigation claims, the court concluded that, even if the trooper could have conducted a more thorough investigation, there is no evidence that he recklessly or purposefully ignored eyewitnesses. Furthermore, failing to locate an unavailable witness does not qualify as recklessly or purposefully ignoring evidence. Nor did the trooper's failure to ask additional questions at the scene shock the conscience. The court also concluded that the officers' decision to leave the vehicle at a local impound lot also did not rise to the level of reckless or purposeful misconduct. Finally, because plaintiff failed to establish a constitutional violation, his remaining claims also fail. View "Engesser v. Fox" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's denial of defendant's motion for summary judgment in an action brought by DeJuan Bison's family after DeJuan committed suicide by hanging himself in a cell after being transferred from the St. Louis City Justice Center to the City of Jennings Detention Center. Plaintiffs alleged that defendant was an officer who failed to notify detainee intake personnel with the City that Brison was suicidal when St. Louis transferred Brison into the City's custody.The court concluded that defendant did not violate any clearly established right where she was not required to second-guess a mental health professional's judgment as to the substantiality of a suicide risk. The court explained that a mental health professional had determined that DeJuan was not suicidal and his classification as under Close Observation was, in an of itself, indicative of the absence of suicide risk. View "Perry v. Adams" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the college, alleging that it mishandled the sexual misconduct disciplinary process and committed other acts of deliberate indifference in the wake of the first of two assaults. Plaintiff seeks relief under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (Title IX), the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and Minnesota common law.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the college on all of plaintiff's claims. In regard to the Title IX claim, the court concluded that, on the record, it cannot say that a reasonable jury would conclude that the college's response to the sexual assault by Student One amounted to deliberate indifference. Although the court noted that the college could have been more inclusive during the sexual assault complaint and more attentive to plaintiff in the aftermath, the court agreed with the district court that permitting a meeting between plaintiff and Student One to take place, after the sexual assault proceedings had concluded, was not an act of deliberate indifference. Even if it was, it is far from clear that requiring plaintiff to attend the meeting would have violated Title IX. The court also concluded that, even assuming that track posters of Student One on campus qualify as sexual harassment for purposes of Title IX liability, the record evidence fails to support a finding that not removing the posters amounted to deliberate indifference. Finally, the evidence does not show that the college's conduct in the wake of plaintiff's complaint concerning Student Two was clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances. In regard to the ADA and Section 504 claims, the court concluded that nothing in the record suggests that the college denied plaintiff reasonable accommodations as she endeavored to finish her degree while struggling with challenges to her mental health brought on by the sexual assaults. View "Shank v. Carleton College" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against a deputy sheriff, alleging an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment and state-law torts of battery and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff's action arose from an incident where he was asked to leave an automobile auction because the deputy sheriff believed that he was trespassing in a restricted area. When the deputy grabbed plaintiff's arm to escort him out of the building, plaintiff shoved the deputy. The deputy eventually deployed pepper spray against a defiant plaintiff. Plaintiff then seized the pepper spray cannister from the deputy and a further altercation ensued.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the deputy based on qualified immunity, concluding that, even if the deputy was mistaken about trespassing, plaintiff's physical resistance gave the deputy probable cause to believe that plaintiff committed another offense by unlawfully resisting arrest or detention. The court explained that plaintiff's use of force gave the deputy reasonable grounds to believe that additional force was justified to remove plaintiff from the premises. The court also concluded that, under these circumstances, a reasonable officer could have believed that it was reasonable to strike the resisting plaintiff in the head and take him to the ground for handcuffing. Furthermore, plaintiff cites no authority in comparable circumstances that clearly establishes a right to be free from the deputy's use of force. Therefore, the deputy is entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim. Finally, the court concluded that the district court properly applied official immunity to dismiss the state-law claims. View "Jacobsen v. Klinefelter" on Justia Law

Tofurky and the Institute filed a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, challenging the constitutionality of Missouri Revised Statutes 265.494(7), which criminalizes "misrepresenting a product as meat that is not derived from harvested production livestock or poultry."The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of the statute. After determining that Tofurky and the Institution have standing to bring this pre-enforcement First Amendment challenge, the court concluded that Tofurky and the Institution were unlikely to prevail on the merits. The court explained that Tofurky and the Institution's intended speech was not likely to be seen as "misrepresenting a product as meat" and thus did not fall within the scope of the statute. Therefore, the district court did not apply the wrong legal standard. Furthermore, the district court acted within its discretion in reading the statute as not prohibiting their commercial speech. The court similarly concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in determining that Tofurkey and the Institution failed to show irreparable harm. The court declined to reach the remaining Dataphase factors for a preliminary injunction. View "Turtle Island Foods, SPC v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Business Leaders in Christ filed suit against the University and others, alleging that the University defendants violated its First Amendment rights through the application of the University's Policy on Human Rights. This action arose from the University's investigation of Business Leaders' refusal to allow a gay member to become an officer in the religious organization. The district court held that the University defendants violated Business Leaders' First Amendment rights to free speech, expressive association, and free exercise of religion; granted Business Leaders permanent injunctive relief and thus prohibited the University defendants from enforcing the Policy against Business Leaders under certain conditions; but granted qualified immunity to the individual defendants on Business Leaders' money damages claims.The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. The court held that the district court erred in granting qualified immunity to the individual defendants on Business Leaders' free-speech and expressive-association claims. In this case, the law was clearly established at the time the individual defendants acted that the University's recognition of registered student organizations constituted a limited public forum, that the university may not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint in a limited public forum, and that Business Leaders had a right not to be subjected to viewpoint discrimination while speaking in the University's limited public forum. However, the district court correctly granted qualified immunity to the individual defendants on Business Leaders' free-exercise claim, because the law was not clearly established at the time that the individual defendants' violated Business Leaders' free-exercise rights. View "Business Leaders In Christ v. The University of Iowa" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an officer in the Minneapolis Police Department, filed suit against more than forty local government entities and employees for, among other things, violating the Driver's Protection Privacy Act (DPPA).The Eighth Circuit concluded that the district court did not err by denying the City's Rule 50(b) motion for judgment as a matter of law with respect to the 72 vicarious-liability claims against it. In this case, the dismissals of the 72 underlying claims against the officers were not "judgments on the merits" under the meaning of section 217B(2) and that section does not prohibit the City from being held vicariously liable for them. The court also concluded that defendants are entitled to a new trial on the basis that the admitted evidence of 850 accesses that were not committed by the 58 MPD officers whose alleged DPPA violations were at issue; the admitted evidence of harassment, retaliation, and failure to investigate by the City; and the instructions to the jury that the City would indemnify Officers Young and Olson. The court vacated the judgment, reversed, and remanded for a new trial due to the erroneous admission of evidence and faulty jury instruction that affected defendants' substantial rights. View "Krekelberg v. City of Minneapolis" on Justia Law

After police officers interrogated L.G. at her high school, she filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that the school resource officer had unconstitutionally seized her by escorting her to the office for questioning. Once L.G. was in the office, defendant left her alone with the officers and closed the door.The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's order rejecting defendant's request for qualified immunity and remanded with directions to dismiss the section 1983 claim against defendants. The court respectfully disagreed with the district court that it was clearly established that the school setting makes no difference for Fourth Amendment purposes when the seizure occurs at the behest of police. In this case, defendant's involvement in the alleged seizure was minimal and ministerial. Furthermore, the incident occurred in a public school setting where it would not necessarily be clear at what point a student has been unreasonably seized for constitutional purposes. Therefore, the court did not think existing circuit precedent, such as Stoner v. Watlingten, 735 F.3d 799, 804 (8th Cir. 2013), and Cason v. Cook, 810 F.2d 188 (8th Cir. 1987), would have alerted every reasonable officer in defendant's position that she was violating L.G.'s constitutional rights. The court also concluded that L.G. has not successfully demonstrated a robust consensus of persuasive authority that created a clearly established right, and this is not the rare case where a general constitutional rule applies with "obvious clarity." View "L.G. v. Edwards" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin defendants from enforcing the City of Davenport's Special Events Policy against him. In this case, plaintiff seeks to protect his right to share his religious messages in public spaces within Davenport. The district court found that the Street Fest was a traditional public forum and that law enforcement's decision to move plaintiff to an adjacent location was likely a content-neutral limitation on the time, place, and manner of his speech.The court concluded that the district court did not err in determining the Special Events Policy was a content-neutral permitting scheme. Furthermore, even if it the court assumed for purposes of this appeal, without deciding, that plaintiff has shown a likelihood of success on the merits, the court found that plaintiff's inability to demonstrate a threat of irreparable harm heavily weighs against granting preliminary injunctive relief. View "Sessler v. City of Davenport" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim, alleging that the County's right-of-way dedication ordinance violates their procedural due process rights. The court concluded that plaintiffs' due process and unconstitutional conditions claims are an impermissible attempt to recast a Takings claim. In this case, plaintiffs claim that the County's dedication rules could result in an exaction, which would require consideration of nexus and proportionality. However, the court concluded that this conflates takings and due process law. The court explained that plaintiffs claim a redundant remedy under the due process clause.The court concluded that the ordinance here promotes the government's interest in providing public roads and was not truly irrational. Furthermore, because plaintiffs received individualized notice and an opportunity to be heard on their variance applications, the County provided sufficient notice and opportunity for a hearing about their proposed uses. View "Pietsch v. Ward County" on Justia Law