Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Petitioner filed a habeas action alleging that he received ineffective assistance of sentencing counsel when his lawyer failed to investigate potential impeachment evidence of his own expert witness, and that his death sentence was unconstitutional due to flaws in the jury instructions. The district court agreed and vacated petitioner's death sentence.The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment vacating petitioner's death sentence, concluding that counsel was not deficient by reasonably relying on the professional community to vet an expert. Furthermore, petitioner cannot show that, under the circumstances, no competent lawyer could have made the choice to trust the legal community's appraisal of the witness. Even if further investigation was more prudent, it is not clear that the investigation should have covered the witness's falsified lab reports. Therefore, petitioner did not overcome the presumption that counsel performed reasonably by not investigating the witness's credentials.The court also concluded that there was no substantial likelihood that the calling of an alternative psychiatric witness would have led to a different result; the state habeas court did not err in finding that petitioner was not prejudiced by sentencing counsel's failure to call a psychiatrist, and post-conviction counsel was not ineffective by failing to raise the issue; and the district court erred in concluding that the sentencing instructions violated Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. 367 (1988), and that Missouri's capital sentencing system violates Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). View "McLaughlin v. Precythe" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit alleging 42 U.S.C. 1983 compensatory and punitive damage claims against paramedics for injecting her with ketamine without her consent, and against physicians who allegedly implemented ambulance protocols while conducting the second ketamine study, both in their individual and official capacities. Plaintiff also alleged claims of Monell liability against the county, several of its health care facilities, and the individual defendants for developing and implementing a countywide ketamine protocol. The complaint alleged that defendants used excessive force, violated her right to bodily integrity, and acted with deliberate indifference in violation of the Fourth Amendment and her right to substantive due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims. In regard to plaintiffs' claims against the paramedics, the court concluded that the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's excessive force claims where it was not objectively unreasonable for paramedics to administer medical aid to an intoxicated, suicidal, semi-conscious woman who needed medical intervention; the district court properly dismissed the substantive due process claims where, even if the semi-conscious plaintiff was competent to refuse treatment, the paramedics did not engage in conscience shocking conduct in electing to sedate a suicidal, intoxicated woman to protect both the patient and themselves; and the paramedics were not deliberately indifferent to plaintiff.In regard to claims against the physicians, the court concluded that at minimum these defendants are entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiff's claims related to their oversight of the county's ketamine studies because they were not personally involved in the actions leading to plaintiff's emergency treatment. Finally, in regard to the Monell liability claims, the court concluded that plaintiff failed to establish that the paramedics violated her Fourth Amendment or substantive due process rights. View "Buckley v. Hennepin County" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of defendants in an action brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and state negligence law against prison officials, medical staff, and a medical services company for withholding plaintiff's prescription orthotic shoes.The court concluded that, although the district court erred by relying on Arkansas law to exclude parts of plaintiff's substituted expert's testimony because the matter should have been weighed under Daubert and relevant federal law, the error was harmless. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in excluding the nurse's testimony as a substituted expert when her opinions went beyond the scope of the earlier expert report and deposition. The court further concluded that the district court did not err in granting the warden's motion for summary judgment as there was no evidence that the warden recognized the risk of having plaintiff wear standard issue prison shoes or knew that requiring a doctor's authorization for special shoes would put plaintiff's health at risk. Furthermore, there was no error in granting summary judgment for the medical defendants where their actions either did not rise to the level of criminal negligence or were not so inappropriate that a jury would find intentional maltreatment or a refusal to provide essential care. View "Shipp v. Murphy" on Justia Law

Jim Bakker and Morningside filed suit against several out-of-state defendants in Missouri federal court, alleging that defendants, while acting in their official capacities, violated their First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. In February 2020, as the Covid-19 pandemic was beginning in the United States, Jim Bakker and Morningside began advertising a product called Silver Solution on the Jim Bakker Show. Bakker and Morningside claimed that Silver Solution "has been proven by the government that it has the ability to kill every pathogen it has ever been tested on;" that it "has been tested on other strains of the coronavirus and has been able to eliminate it within 12 hours;" and that it is "patented, it works, we have tested it, it works on just about everything." Bakker and Morningside allege that defendants' investigations into Silver Solution violate their constitutional rights and that the state statutes defendants have acted under are unconstitutional.The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of defendants' motion to dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction. Assuming defendants fell under Missouri's long-arm statute, the court concluded that asserting personal jurisdiction in this case violates due process where the only contact with Missouri were letters and emails directed at Morningside Church and Bakker, rather than the forum state. Therefore, after considering the five factor test for assessing the sufficiency of a defendant's contacts, the court concluded that Bakker and Morningside have not demonstrated that defendants' conduct connects them to the forum in a meaningful way. View "Morningside Church, Inc. v. Rutledge" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Missouri resident, filed suit in state court against her former employer, Ferrellgas, a propane supplier, as well as James Ferrell and Pamela Brueckmann, Kansas residents and employees and officers of Ferrellgas. Plaintiff alleged gender discrimination claims under the Missouri Human Rights Act against Ferrellgas (Counts I and II), and tort claims against all defendants (Counts IIIVI). After removal to the district court, the district court granted defendants' motion to compel arbitration in part.The Eighth Circuit reversed, concluding that the district court erred in concluding that no language in plaintiff's employment agreement suggested that she consented to arbitrate tort claims arising from actions which predated her employment. The court explained that, though plaintiff's claims are based on alleged misrepresentations and omissions made before and at the time she accepted employment, they are subject to arbitration because they arise out of and relate to the resulting employee agreement and employee relationship. The court also concluded that Ferrell and Brueckmann, officers and agents of Ferrellgas who were not parties to the Employee Agreement, may enforce the arbitration clause. The court concluded that a signatory plaintiff cannot avoid arbitration when she treated signatory and non-signatory defendants as a single unit. In this case, each of plaintiff's tort claims against defendants is a single one that should be referred in its entirety to arbitration. View "Morgan v. Ferrell" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's adverse grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's political retaliation claim related to disciplinary measures and his ultimate termination from the Sheriff's Office. The court concluded that there was no error in the district court's determination that collateral estoppel barred plaintiff from pursuing his political retaliation claim based on those issues he raised in his termination appeal; the district court could give the Iowa Civil Service Commission's determination preclusive effect; and plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case that his two-day suspension was political retaliation because he could not establish a causal connection between the suspension and his political campaign. View "Charleston v. McCarthy" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court's grant of the University's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' action under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 for failure to state a claim. Plaintiffs, former players of the University's women's ice hockey team, filed suit after the University cut its women's ice hockey team but not its men's ice hockey team.Given the regulatory structure and its textual content, the court disagreed with the district court's reasons for dismissing the complaint. The court explained that, when applying the 1979 Interpretation of the implementing regulation, the district court improperly relied on a compliance test from the Levels of Competition provision (VII.C.5) as the only way to analyze a claim under the separate, unrelated Selection of Sports provision (VII.C.4). The court concluded that the 1979 Interpretation's Contact Sports Clause's plain text is not inconsistent with the regulation's Separate Teams Provision. By disregarding the plain text, the court concluded that the district court erred in its analysis.Ultimately, the court concluded that the district court's primary reasons for dismissing the complaint rested on an incorrect view of the law. In this case, it appears that the district court saw the Contact-Sports-Clause claim as futile, not novel. Therefore, no set of facts could have convinced the district court to give the athletes a second look. But given a level playing field, the court concluded that the athletes may be able to state an actionable Title IX claim. The court remanded for the district court to apply the law to plaintiffs' complaint in the first instance. View "Berndsen v. North Dakota University System" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit challenging Iowa Code Sec. 717A.3A(1)(a)-(b), which makes it a crime for a person to gain access to an agricultural production facility by false pretenses and to make false statements on an employment application to such a facility, on First Amendment grounds. The district court ruled that both provisions were unconstitutional and enjoined their enforcement.The Eighth Circuit concluded that the provisions providing that a person is guilty of agricultural production facility fraud if they obtain access to the facility by false pretenses is consistent with the First Amendment because it prohibits exclusively lies associated with a legally cognizable harm - namely trespass to private property. The court explained that the proscription of the Employment Provision does not require that false statements made as part of an employment application be material to the employment decision. Therefore, the statute is not limited to false claims that are made "to effect" an offer of employment; it allows for prosecution of those who make false statements that are not capable of influencing an offer of employment. The court concluded that, given the breadth of the Employment Provision, it proscribes speech that is protected by the First Amendment and does not satisfy strict scrutiny. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part, vacating the injunction against enforcement of the access provision. View "Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Reynolds" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against Peco Foods and Jonathan and DeAnn Vaught, seeking an order that would prevent Peco Foods and the Vaughts from bringing a civil suit against plaintiffs under an Arkansas statute, Ark. Code Ann. 16-118-113. Plaintiffs, who describe themselves as "nonprofit organizations dedicated to reforming industrial animal agriculture," claim that the statute violates their rights to free speech under the First Amendment. In this case, two lead organizations allege that they have "specific and definite plans" to investigate Peco Foods's chicken slaughterhouses and the Vaughts' pig farm. The district court dismissed the action based on lack of Article III standing.The Eighth Circuit reversed, concluding that the complaint adequately alleges the elements of Article III standing where plaintiffs allege that, but for the statute, the lead organizations would send an investigator to gather information and take video and audio recordings in the facilities owned by Peco Foods and the Vaughts; that all plaintiffs would use the results of the investigations in their advocacy; and that this conduct is arguably affected with a constitutional interest, because "the creation and dissemination of information are speech within the meaning of the First Amendment." The complaint also alleges an intention to engage in a course of conduct arguably proscribed by the Arkansas statute, and the complaint sufficiently alleges a credible threat of enforcement. Accordingly, the court remanded for the district court to consider the merits in the first instance. View "Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Vaught" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the 28 U.S.C. 2254 petition for habeas relief as procedurally defaulted. In this case, petitioner's ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim was first procedurally defaulted on appeal, not at the initial-review collateral proceeding, which makes the Martinez exception inapplicable to petitioner's case. Therefore, with no excuse for the procedural default, federal habeas review of the claim is barred. View "Hartman v. Payne" on Justia Law