Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

This is the third appeal to the Eighth Circuit involving litigation arising from police response to protest activity in St. Louis on September 17, 2017. In this case, as in the others, Plaintiffs allege that St. Louis police officers boxed civilians into a downtown intersection in a maneuver characterized as a “kettle.” Some persons caught in this kettle allegedly were beaten, pepper sprayed, handcuffed with zip-ties, and arrested. The Eighth Circuit has issued two decisions in cases brought by different plaintiffs against the same six police officers.   The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s order denying the officers’ motion to dismiss with respect to Plaintiffs’ claims alleging use of excessive force and conspiracy to deprive civil rights. The court affirmed the order with respect to the claims alleging unlawful arrest.   The court explained that the case-at-hand arises in the same procedural posture and includes the same relevant factual allegations as Baude v. Leyshock, 23 F.4th 1065 (8th Cir. 2022), and Baude precludes a grant of qualified immunity on the arrest claims in this case as well. Thus, the court concluded that the allegations, in this case, are insufficient to establish a plausible claim that the defendant officers violated any Plaintiffs clearly established right against the use of excessive force. View "Alicia Street v. Gerald Leyshock" on Justia Law

The parties to this matter—Plaintiff, on behalf of her son, and the Belton School District—disagree about the appropriate school placement for Plaintiff’s son pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. Section 1400 et seq. Plaintiff appealed the decision of the district court granting judgment on the administrative record to the District.   On appeal, Plaintiff asserts that transferring her son to Trails West would violate his right under the IDEA to be educated in the least restrictive environment (LRE). Alternatively, Plaintiff argued, if her son needs additional services, the District should provide them in her son’s current placement. Thus, the question is whether Kentucky Trail or Trails West is the LRE in which Plaintiff’s son can receive a free appropriate public education (FAPE).   The Eighth Circuit affirmed finding no clear error in the district court’s factual findings and agreed that a preponderance of the evidence supports the AHC’s conclusion that placement at Trails West respects Plaintiff’s son's rights under the IDEA. Second, although Plaintiff emphasizes the social benefit her son receives from his more integrated placement at Kentucky Trail, the evidence shows that her son receives all of his instruction in the special education classroom and eats lunch there as well, and he has contact with nondisabled peers only when passing in the hallways or at recess. Further, there was sufficient evidence to support the conclusion that placement at Trails West offers substantial benefits for Plaintiff’s son. View "J.P. v. Belton School District No. 124" on Justia Law

Current and former Minnesota state employees brought an action seeking damages for money deducted from their paychecks by unions that represented their local bargaining units. Although the Supreme Court held the deduction practice unlawful in Janus v. American Federation of State, County, & Municipal Employees, 138 S. Ct. 2448 (2018), the district court determined that the unions acted in good faith reliance on state statutes and existing judicial precedent. Accordingly, the court ruled that the unions were entitled to a defense to liability under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, and dismissed the employees’ claims.   The employees appealed arguing that there is no good-faith defense to liability for damages under Section 1983. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgments. The court explained because the unions collected fair-share fees under Minn. Stat. Section 179A.06 at a time when the procedure employed had been deemed constitutional by the Supreme Court, their reliance on the statute was objectively reasonable, and they are entitled to a good-faith defense. Even if subjective intent were deemed relevant, the employees have pleaded no facts to support a plausible inference that the unions collected these fees in subjective bad faith. The good-faith defense thus bars the employees’ claims for damages. View "Eric Brown v. AFSCME" on Justia Law

Appellants are four Minnesota state employees who sued unions that represented their local bargaining units. The employees sought monetary relief based on the amount of so-called “fair-share” fees that were deducted from employee paychecks for the benefit of the unions. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the unions.  On appeal, the employees argue that the district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of the unions on each of the claims for retrospective relief.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the unions’ reliance on Section 179A.06 was objectively reasonable. It is an open question whether subjective intent is relevant to the defense, but the employees did not present a submissible case that the unions collected fair-share fees in subjective bad faith in any event. Therefore, the district court correctly granted summary judgment for the unions on these claims.   The unions prevailed on motions for summary judgment. The rules of civil procedure provide those costs “should be allowed to the prevailing party,” unless the court or a federal statute or rule directs otherwise. Further, the employees point to no authority that requires a district court to reduce an award of costs because a defendant opted to forgo a motion to dismiss and to file a dispositive motion only after developing a factual record. A defendant may choose how best to defend a lawsuit, and if the case is resolved in favor of the defense on a motion for summary judgment, then the defendant is presumptively entitled to costs. View "Linda Hoekman v. Education Minnesota" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, an employee of the Department of Veterans Affairs, sued Denis McDonough, Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs, for disability discrimination. Plaintiff alleged three violations of the Rehabilitation Act: failure to accommodate; disability discrimination; and retaliation for requesting an accommodation. The district court granted summary judgment to Secretary McDonough.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court wrote that Plaintiff’s requested accommodation was not required under the Rehabilitation Act because it would impose an undue hardship on the VAPD. The court explained that Plaintiff’s accommodations would have violated the VAPD’s collective bargaining agreement, which requires that “[s]cheduled off-tours shall be rotated fairly and equitably among affected employees, i.e., day/evening, day/night.” Plaintiff’s requested accommodations are therefore presumptively unreasonable.   Plaintiff further argued that his reassignment was not reasonable for two reasons. First, he claimed that day shifts were not the only form of requested relief; they were just one of many possible accommodations the VAPD could have made. But the record undermines his argument. Further, he also suggested that his reassignment constituted an adverse employment action, not a reasonable accommodation. The VAPD provided the only available reasonable accommodation—reassignment. The district court was therefore correct to grant summary judgment to Secretary McDonough on Plaintiff’s failure to accommodate claim.   Moreover, Plaintiff claimed the unusual nature of his hiring process proves that the real reason for his non-selection was disability discrimination. However, showing that an interview process is “unusual” is not sufficient to prove that an employer’s proffered reason is pretextual. View "Jesse LeBlanc v. Denis McDonough" on Justia Law

Defendant, in addition to her full-time position as a St. Paul police officer, was cross-deputized as a federal agent to investigate an interstate sex-trafficking scheme. Many were charged, but none were convicted. The attention soon turned to Defendant, who faced lawsuits from the people she came across during the investigation, including the Plaintiff in this matter.   Plaintiff became involved because of a dangerous encounter with a witness in the federal sex-trafficking investigation. That witness made a call to Defendant, falsely claiming that Plaintiff started the dispute. In Defendant’s affidavit supporting the criminal complaint against Plaintiff, she identified herself as an “FBI Task Force Officer / St Paul MN PD Officer.”  Plaintiff sought to recover on a wrongful-arrest theory against Defendant, whom she has sued in two different capacities: as a St. Paul police officer and as a deputized federal agent.   The district court granted Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on the ground that her actions arose under color of federal law. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, finding that without any actual or purported relationship between Defendant’s conduct and her duties as a police officer no section 1983 action is available.   The court wrote that at issue here is whether Defendant acted under color of state law when she allegedly lied to protect a federal witness while serving on a federal task force. The court explained that state law had nothing to do with “the nature and circumstances” of Defendant’s conduct. The court wrote that Defendant acted within the scope of her federal duties while dealing with the situation, and she referenced her federal-task-force role during her conversations with officers. View "Ifrah Yassin v. Heather Weyker" on Justia Law

Appellant, a black male who was 60 years old at the time his employment was terminated, brought race, sex, and age discrimination claims under Title VII, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), and the Minnesota Human Rights Act (“MHRA”) and a retaliation claim under the Minnesota Whistleblower Act ("MWA") after the Minnesota Guardian ad Litem Board (“GALB”) terminated his employment following internal and external investigations into allegations of his misconduct. The district court granted GALB’s motion for summary judgment, finding that Appellant failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation and, even if he had done so, he failed to demonstrate GALB’s reasons for terminating his employment were pretextual.   Appellant appealed and the Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Appellant failed to point to any direct evidence of discrimination or retaliation; thus, the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework applies. The court concluded that GALB has demonstrated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory reason for terminating Appellant in March 2018: the internal and external investigations into Appellant’s alleged misconduct uncovered evidence that Appellant had engaged in gross misconduct. As such, because Appellant failed to show that GALB’s reasons for terminating his employment were pretextual, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment to GALB on his race, sex, and age discrimination claims and his retaliation claim. View "Gregory King v. MN Guardian ad Litem Board" on Justia Law

After Nygard removed his driveway and was about to pour a new one, an Orono inspector told Nygard that he needed a permit. The next day, Nygard finished the driveway and applied for a permit. The new driveway was narrower than the previous one. The city responded with a form, imposing several conditions. Nygard crossed out some conditions, initialed the modified form, and returned it. After several exchanges, the city notified Nygard that he must agree to the conditions or “this matter will be turned over to the prosecuting attorney.” Nygard did not acknowledge the conditions. A police officer drafted a statement of probable cause, alleging that “work had been completed without having first obtained a permit” and listing some alleged deficiencies in its construction. According to the Nygards, the police did not inspect the property and some allegations were not true.Nygard was acquitted of violating the city code. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of his suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming the code was void for vagueness and alleging First Amendment retaliation, abuse of process, and malicious prosecution. Nygard’s prosecution was not based on falsehoods. The report did not claim that the conditions were required by the code but that Nygard had not agreed to the conditions and had replaced a driveway without a permit. Any failure to investigate did not defeat probable cause; the city already knew that he installed a driveway without a permit. View "Nygard v. City of Orono" on Justia Law

Minneapolis police investigated Randle for selling crack cocaine while he was on supervised release for a prior federal offense. After conducting a controlled buy, Officer Hamilton applied for a warrant to search a Brooklyn Park, Minnesota home that Randle listed as his supervised release address. The warrant was executed that day. Randle arrived during the search. Police seized 308 grams of crack cocaine and related evidence from the home and from bags carried by Randle.The district court denied a motion to suppress, applying the good-faith exception while concluding the affidavit did not create a “fair probability that evidence of Randle’s alleged drug trafficking activities would be found at the Residence” because it did not include Hamilton’s statement that in his professional judgment drug traffickers typically keep narcotics in their home and did not state that Hamilton followed Randle to the residence directly after the controlled buy and failed to specify when the officers started following Randle. The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The evidence is admissible because “it was objectively reasonable for the officer executing [the] search warrant to have relied in good faith on the [issuing] judge’s determination that there was probable cause to issue the warrant.” The court also upheld the denial of a “Franks” hearing; Randle failed to make the necessary “substantial preliminary showing” of “deliberate falsehood or of reckless disregard for the truth.” View "United States v. Randle" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court convicting Defendant of unlawful possession of a firearm as a previously convicted felon and sentencing him to 105 months in prison, holding that there was no reversible error in the proceedings below.The presentence report in this case recommended a base offense level of 20 and an advisory guideline range of 92 to 115 months' incarceration. The parties subsequently determined that Defendant's base offense level should be 14. The court considered the sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) and ultimately imposed a sentence of 105 months' imprisonment. The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding that the sentence was not excessive or unreasonable and that the court did not abuse its discretion by considering an improper sentencing factor. View "United States v. Jones" on Justia Law