Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed rom the district court’s adverse grant of summary judgment in favor of TrialCard, Inc. (“TrialCard”) on employment claims she brought under Mo. Stat. Section 213.055.1 (“MHRA”), 42 U.S.C. Section 1981 (“Section 1981”), and the Family Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”).   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Plaintiff’s “me too” evidence is likewise insufficient to establish TrialCard’s proffered reason for her termination was pretextual. This Court has noted that “me too” evidence of other discrimination victims can be relevant because “an employer’s past discriminatory policy and practice may well illustrate that the employer’s asserted reasons for disparate treatment are a pretext for intentional discrimination. Plaintiff’s “me too” evidence, however, is insufficient because she has not shown that these individuals received the same discipline under the same circumstances from the same person. Further, the court explained that Cigna repeatedly reached out to Plaintiff and her therapist about obtaining medical certification. Because Plaintiff failed to present evidence to support her FMLA claim, the district court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of TrialCard. View "Lakeitha Boston v. TrialCard, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellants were each pepper-sprayed by Police Officer William Olsten while participating in a protest in downtown St. Louis. Each of them sued various officials, alleging First Amendment retaliation and excessive force claims, as well as various other federal and state law claims. In each case, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of the city officials on all the federal claims and declined supplemental jurisdiction on the state law claims.   The Eighth Circuit consolidated the cases and affirmed. The court explained that here, Appellants admit that “every other non-police officer in the vicinity was actively involved in a protest” and that the officer “moved his arm side to side and indiscriminately sprayed numerous protestors.” One cannot simultaneously single out Appellants and “indiscriminately” spray the crowd. And there is no evidence in the record that either Appellant had any interaction with the officer or that the officer was aware of their presence, or that either did anything to differentiate themselves from the other protestors in the crowd. While one Appellant argued she was filming the protest, there is no evidence that the officer observed her filming or deployed pepper spray in retaliation for her doing so. Regardless of whether the officer’s action was appropriate or reasonable under the circumstances, the lack of evidence causally connecting the officer’s adverse action of using pepper spray to Appellants’ protected expression is fatal to the retaliation claims. View "Rasheen Aldridge v. City of St. Louis, Missouri" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs are food service managers employed by the Independent School District 191 in Burnsville, Minnesota. In 2015, Plaintiffs signed a contract to join the union that represents service workers in the school district, the School Service Employees International Union Local 284. These contracts authorized the school district to deduct monthly union dues from the union member’s paycheck and to send those dues to Local 284 on the union member’s behalf. The employees terminated their membership in the union in March 2020 and later sued the school district and Local 284. They alleged that the deduction of dues from their paychecks violated their rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and also contravened Minnesota law. At issue on appeal is whether a school district and a labor union violated the free speech rights of union members by deducting union dues from employee paychecks.   The Eighth Circuit agreed with the district court that the school district’s employees failed to state a claim, and the court, therefore, affirmed the judgment dismissing the action. The court explained that the employees’ argument mischaracterizes their choice: they were “faced with a constitutional choice—whether or not to join” the union. They chose to join the union and authorize the school district to deduct dues from their paychecks. They did so in exchange for the benefits of union membership, and they “assumed the risk that subsequent changes in the law could alter the cost-benefit balance of their bargain.” View "Pollyanna Burns v. School Svc Emp Union Local 284" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs individually and as next friends of their minor daughter, I.B., appealed the district court’s dismissal of disability discrimination and civil rights deprivation claims, and denial of their motion to reconsider dismissing with prejudice a state law negligence claim against the Bentonville, Arkansas School District (“the District”).   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Arkansas law provides a direct cause of action against the liability insurer of a school district that is “not subject to suit for tort.” Plaintiffs’ Complaint named “John Doe” as an additional defendant, alleged on information and belief that the District maintained liability insurance, identified the insurer as John Doe, and stated that “the joinder of [John Doe] will be made upon verification of its identity.” Eleven months later, the district court ordered Plaintiffs to show good cause for an extension of the deadline to add parties, if they opposed dismissal of the John Doe defendant without prejudice. When Plaintiffs did not respond, the district court dismissed John Doe without prejudice, leaving the District, with its statutory immunity, the only negligence defendant. Plaintiffs were not deprived of a remedy for the alleged negligence of District employees and agents. View "Rodney Baker v. Bentonville School District" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of his claims against various Arkansas Department of Corrections staff members for damages stemming from injuries that he received when he was beaten by another inmate. Plaintiff alleged that Defendants failed to protect him from the beating. The district court dismissed Plaintiff’s claim on summary judgment, finding that he had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies even though he remained hospitalized from his injuries until the time for filing expired. At issue is whether the district court erred in dismissing Plaintiff’s complaint for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.   The Eighth Circuit reversed and remanded. The court concluded that the district court’s rant of summary judgment was premature. The court explained that the district court legally erred in declining to decide whether administrative remedies were “unavailable” to Plaintiff. As the Supreme Court stressed in Ross, the PLRA “contains its own textual exception to mandatory exhaustion.” The court explained that under the PLRA, the exhaustion requirement hinges on the ‘availability’ of administrative remedies. The court reversed because the district court declined to decide whether the prison’s grievance procedure was unavailable to Plaintiff. View "John Smith v. Jeremy Andrews" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, for her son A.H., sued Defendant Officer under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, alleging he used excessive force by not giving a warning while searching with a canine trained to “bite and hold.” Trimble moved for summary judgment. The district court denied qualified immunity on the excessive force claim. Defendant appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that there is no dispute that Defendant did not provide a warning when he deployed Ace or when Ace alerted to fresh human odor during the search. The parties dispute whether A.H. heard the warnings from the other officers. A.H., lying underneath a trailer, testified he did not hear any warnings. The court wrote that assuming the facts most favorably to A.H., he did not hear the other officers’ warnings and did not have the opportunity to surrender. Defendant had fair notice from the court’s precedent that the failure to give a warning and an opportunity to surrender violated clearly established law. View "TonyaMarie Adams v. Nathan Trimble" on Justia Law

Plaintiff contracted to haul freight for CTW Transportation Services. Two weeks later, CTW terminated the contract. On October 7, 2020, Plaintiff filed an administrative complaint against CTW with the Department of Labor, alleging that his contract was terminated in violation of 49 U.S.C. Section 31105(a) for reporting safety violations. The administrative law judge (“ALJ”) ordered discovery to close on May 25 and set trial for July 27. At his deposition on March 30, Plaintiff testified that his attorney had not produced all the documents he had given him. Once in federal court, Plaintiff reasserted his Section 31105(a) retaliation claim. CTW moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The district court agreed that it lacked jurisdiction.   The Eighth Circuit vacated the dismissal. The court explained that in finding that it lacked jurisdiction, the district court did not find that pre-May 5 conduct alone caused the delay. Instead, it relied almost exclusively on Plaintiff’s conduct after May 5, 2011. For example, Plaintiff’s failure to prepare the case for trial and his “heaping personal insults on the ALJ” all occurred in August and September. Such conduct could not have caused the Secretary’s failure to meet the 210-day deadline. CTW argues that we can still affirm because Plaintiff engaged in bad-faith conduct before May 5. But because the district court did not specifically find that pre-May 5 conduct alone caused the Secretary to miss the deadline, its order dismissing the case must be vacated. View "Avery Wilson v. CTW Transportation Services" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued police officers under Sec. 1983 after the officers made warrantless entry into their apartment. The district court granted summary judgment to Plaintiffs and Defendants appealed.On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed. While warrantless searches are presumptively unreasonable, there is an exception when officers act with probable cause to believe that a crime has been committed and an objectively reasonable basis to believe that exigent circumstances exist.Here, the officers were dispatched to the scene in response to a report of domestic violence. The report received by the officers explained that the 911 call came from a neighbor who thought “abuse” was occurring and heard a “verbal argument,” “someone being thrown around,” and “yelling and screaming” in the upstairs apartment. The neighbor stated that a woman, her boyfriend, and a child lived in the apartment. This created anm exigency, justifying warrantless entry. View "Benedda Cotten v. Ryan Miller" on Justia Law

The Eighth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling denying the Deputy’s motion for qualified immunity in Plaintiff’s lawsuit, alleging that the Deputy’s conduct amounted to deliberate indifference to her seizure condition after she was arrested for driving while intoxicated. The Deputy asserted qualified immunity in his motion for summary judgment, which the district court denied.   The Eighth Circuit reversed. The court explained that the Deputy promptly attended to Plaintiff and asked her whether she was hurt or suffered from medical problems. She said no and did not advise him of her seizure disorder. Emergency medical personnel also observed Plaintiff and were content not to take her to the hospital, advising the Deputy that she had refused further treatment. He then took Plaintiff and her medications to jail. Barton I did not provide the Deputy with fair notice that his failure to seek further medical treatment for Plaintiff or to speak with the jailors about what Plaintiff’s boyfriend told him constituted deliberate indifference. Thus, Plaintiff failed to show that clearly established law prohibited the Deputy’s conduct, and the Deputy is entitled to qualified immunity. View "Kelly Martin v. Jordan Turner" on Justia Law

Respondent suffers from multiple mental disorders, including schizophrenia. In 2018, he was sentenced to 80 months imprisonment for being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition. He was due to be released on January 8, 2021. Prior to his release, the government filed a petition pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 4246, requesting that Respondent be committed to the custody of the Attorney General because, the government asserted, Respondent suffers from mental disorders that pose a significant danger to the public if he were released. The district court granted the government’s Section 4246 petition, of which Respondent appealed.   The Eighth Circuit affirmed. The court explained that Respondent’s main assertion, that “the evidence presented at the Section 4246 hearing failed to demonstrate . . . that he is ‘presently’ suffering from a mental disease which now poses a substantial risk of bodily injury to others,” is belied by his own testimony. For example, at the Section 4246 hearing, he testified that he started the CIA and that he has “to get violent with some of these people, dangerous people in the community,” in order to protect the community. This, in combination with the evidence that he actually acted upon his delusions when he attacked other inmates and a prison official, shows that he is suffering from a mental disease that now poses a substantial risk of bodily injury to others. The district court’s findings, to that effect, were not clearly erroneous. View "United States v. Erik Becerra" on Justia Law