Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Appellants, individual protestors and Black Lives Matter D.C. brought consolidated actions against federal law enforcement officers, alleging that officers’ actions in clearing protestors from Lafayette Park in June 2020 violated their First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment rights and seeking damages under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). Appellees, former Attorney General Barr and various named U.S. Park Police officers moved to dismiss the claims, arguing that a Bivens remedy is unavailable in this context. The district court granted the motions.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court held that, in applying Supreme Court precedent, Appellants’ claims arise in a new context and that special factors counsel hesitation against extending the availability of Bivens claims to that context. The court explained that it did not reach Appellees’ other special factors arguments regarding the availability of alternative remedies, congressional involvement in the intersection between presidential security and protestors’ rights, the political branches’ activity in investigating the events underlying Appellants’ claims, and the risk that discovery might expose “sensitive Executive Branch communications between high-ranking officials.” View "Radiya Buchanan v. William Barr" on Justia Law

Appellant complaint, filed in 2021, repeated the claims she had made against the defendants in her 2018 complaint. The district court dismissed her 2018 complaint because the D.C. statutory limitations period had run. In both of her complaints Appellant alleged that in 2004, when she was 14 years old and a student at a KIPP charter school in the District of Columbia, one of her teachers began having sexual relations with her. She further alleged that this man continued to abuse her after she enrolled in another school and that they began living together in Maryland. She claimed that she ended her relationship with him in 2009. At issue is whether, as the district court ruled, res judicata barred Appellant’s second action.   The DC Circuit reversed and remanded. The court explained that the District of Columbia’s Sexual Abuse Statute of Limitations Amendment Act went into effect on May 3, 2019. The new and expanded limitations period extends to “the date the victim attains the age of 40 years, or 5 years from when the victim knew, or reasonably should have known, of any act constituting sexual abuse, whichever is later.” Here, the court held that the district court did not decide whether the old or the new D.C. statute of limitations applied to several of Appellant’s claims. The court wrote that the district court also concluded that its interpretation of the new Act depended on constitutional avoidance, which the DC Circuit determined to be inapplicable. View "Shanique Perez v. Kipp DC Supporting Corporation" on Justia Law

Three former officers of a local affiliate of the American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO (“AFGE”) filed a lawsuit alleging that AFGE unlawfully retaliated against them for speech protected under Section 101(a)(2) of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (“LMRDA”). Specifically, the former officers challenge AFGE’s imposition of a trusteeship on the local union and their removal from office. The district court granted summary judgment to AFGE as to two officers and, after a jury trial, entered judgment on the merits for AFGE as to the third officer.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that to establish a prima facie free speech claim under Section 101(a)(2), then, a plaintiff must show that (1) she engaged in speech protected by LMRDA; (2) she was subject to an adverse action; and (3) that action is causally linked to the protected speech. If the non-movant, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, “fails to make a sufficient showing to establish an element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial,” a court must enter summary judgment against it. Here, the court wrote that Appellants failed to make the requisite showing, and consequently summary judgment was appropriate on their free speech claims. View "Alexander Bastani v. American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO" on Justia Law

Plaintiff is the former Vice President of Program and Community of the Eugene and Agnes E. Meyer Foundation. She received largely positive feedback during her tenure, but less than two years after she was hired, the CEO of the Foundation fired her for purported interpersonal and communication-related issues. Plaintiff, who is African-American, believes these stated reasons were pretext to mask discriminatory animus. Plaintiff and the Foundation signed a severance agreement, under which Plaintiff agreed to release employment-related claims against the Foundation and its employees, and which contained a mutual non-disparagement clause. But roughly a month after Plaintiff was fired, the CEO told another leader in the non-profit space that Plaintiff was let go because she was “toxic,” created a “negative environment.” Plaintiff sued the Foundation and its CEO for breaching the severance agreement, for doing so in a racially discriminatory manner in violation of 42 U.S.C. Section 1981, and for defaming her. The district court dismissed all three claims.   The DC Circuit held that the district court erred in dismissing all three claims. As to Plaintiff’s breach of contract claim, the non-disparagement clause could reasonably be interpreted to preclude the Foundation from disparaging Plaintiff, and dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is therefore inappropriate. As to her Section 1981 claim, the court found that she has plausibly alleged a prima facie case that the Foundation, through the CEO, breached the severance agreement due to racial animus. And lastly, the CEO’s statements are not protected by the common interest privilege, which requires a showing of good faith on the part of the speaker. View "Terri Wright v. Eugene & Agnes E. Meyer Foundation" on Justia Law

Several defendants were charged by indictment in separate cases with various offenses arising from their alleged participation in the Capitol riot on January 6, 2021. Among other charges, the government also charged each Defendant with one count of Obstruction of an Official Proceeding under 18 U.S.C. Section 1512(c)(2). The district court granted each Defendant’s motion to dismiss. The government filed a motion to reconsider, which the district court denied. At issue on consolidated appeal is whether individuals who allegedly assaulted law enforcement officers while participating in the Capitol riot can be charged with corruptly obstructing, influencing, or impeding an official proceeding, in violation of 18 U.S.C. Section 1512(c)(2). The DC Circuit reversed. The court held that the district court erred in dismissing the counts under 18 U.S.C. Section 1512(c)(2). The court wrote that Defendants’ alleged conduct falls comfortably within the plain meaning of “corruptly . . . obstruct[ing], influenc[ing], or imped[ing] [an] official proceeding, or attempt[ing] to do so.” The alternative interpretations of Section 1512(c)(2) proffered by the district court and Defendants failed to convince the court to depart from the natural reading of the statute’s unambiguous text. View "USA v. Joseph Fischer" on Justia Law

On November 22, 2021—the day federal employees were required to be vaccinated—Appellant filed suit in District Court, challenging the mandate’s constitutionality. Characterizing Appellant’s suit as a “workplace dispute involving a covered federal employee,” the District Court found Appellant’s claims were precluded under the CSRA and dismissed the suit for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On appeal, Appellant insisted that he challenges the vaccine mandate’s constitutionality, as opposed to contesting a workplace dispute under the CSRA. According to his complaint, however, he alleged that the vaccine mandate is unconstitutional—at least in part—because it requires that he obtain the vaccine to avoid adverse employment action.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court explained that all attempts to characterize his argument as anything but a challenge to adverse employment action fail for jurisdictional purposes because Appellant himself admitted that his standing to challenge the vaccine mandate is rooted in the looming disciplinary action he now faces as a result of his continued noncompliance. In other words, Appellant challenges the vaccine mandate to maintain his employment while continuing to defy the mandate that he views as unlawful. And while his constitutional arguments are relevant to the merits, they do not change the fact that one of Appellant’s interests in this suit is to avoid the impending adverse employment action. Appellant’s claims are not wholly collateral because challenges to adverse employment actions are the type of claims that the MSPB regularly adjudicates. Thus, the court found that should Appellant choose to continue challenging the vaccine mandate, he must do so through the CSRA’s scheme. View "Jason Payne v. Joseph Biden, Jr." on Justia Law

Appellant, a United States citizen and veteran, alleges Appellees (Foreign Officials) detained and tortured him in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Appellant argued that the Foreign Officials did so to extract a false confession that he was an American mercenary. That is enough, in Appellant’s view, to establish that the district court had personal jurisdiction over the Foreign Officials. If not, he asserts alternatively that jurisdictional discovery is warranted.   The DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of the Foreign Officials’ motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction and its denial of Appellant’s request for jurisdictional discovery. The court explained traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice do not save Appellant’s complaint. The court held Appellant failed to demonstrate that exercising specific jurisdiction over the Foreign Officials, in this case, would meet the requirements of the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. And he also failed to describe particular ways in which jurisdictional discovery would cure his complaint’s defect. View "Darryl Lewis v. Kalev Mutond" on Justia Law

Plaintiff asked the Foreign Service Grievance Board to review the Foreign Service’s decision to deny her tenure. While the Board was considering her grievances, Plaintiff asked the Board to grant “interim relief.” That relief would have let Plaintiff keep working for the Foreign Service until her case was decided. But the Board refused to grant it. So Plaintiff filed suit, claiming that the Board should have given her relief. After Plainitff in lost in the district court and appealed to this court, the Board reached final decisions on her grievances. 
 The DC Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to dismiss Plaintiff’s backpay claim, and the court dismissed Plaintiff’s appeal of her interim-relief claims as moot. The court explained backpay is not an available remedy on judicial review of the Board’s orders. Nothing in the Foreign Service Act authorizes a court to issue backpay. Plus, under the Act, judicial review is adjudicated “in accordance with the standards set forth in [the Administrative Procedure Act].” Here, the Board found no merit to four of Plaintiff’s grievances. As for the fifth grievance, the Board held that Plaintiff’s claim had merit, but it still denied her backpay. And because Plaintiff has not petitioned for judicial review of the Board’s decision to deny backpay in that grievance, the court wrote it cannot direct the Board to reconsider it. View "Julie Beberman v. Antony Blinken" on Justia Law

Hawaiian Dredging Construction Company and a Hawaiian chapter of the Boilermakers union failed to renew a collective bargaining agreement. Hawaiian Dredging then discharged Boilermakers welders who were covered by the now-expired agreement. The Boilermakers thought those discharges were an “unfair labor practice” under the National Labor Relations Act and asked the National Labor Relations Board to weigh in. Originally, the Board sided with the Boilermakers. But Hawaiian Dredging asked the DC Circuit to review that decision, and the court remanded it to the Board to reconsider. The Board then changed its view and concluded that no unfair practice occurred. Then the Union petitioned for review.   The DC Circuit denied the petition finding that the Board’s new decision was supported by substantial evidence and correctly applied established law. The court agreed with the Board that Hawaiian Dredging demonstrated “a legitimate and substantial business justification for” discharging the welders. The court explained when a prehire agreement expires, a construction employer has no continuing obligation to maintain a bargaining relationship with a union. So, absent other evidence, there is nothing discriminatory about a policy that suspends work and discharges all employees when an agreement expires. If anything, Hawaiian Dredging’s policy promotes collective bargaining by ensuring that all of its welding work is done pursuant to a pre-hire agreement. The court also concluded that substantial evidence supports the Board’s factual finding that Hawaiian Dredging discharged the welders because of its policy and not for some discriminatory reason. View "International Brotherhood of Boilermakers v. NLRB" on Justia Law

The District of Columbia Department of Behavioral Health had a policy of restraining civilly committed hospital patients during transport to court hearings. It applied that policy to Plaintiff. He says the policy violated his Fifth Amendment right to be free from unjustified bodily restraint. After the superior court granted Plaintiff conditional release, he filed a Section 1983 suit against an assortment of D.C. officials — including the directors of the Department of Corrections and the Department of Behavioral Health. He sought damages for “pain and suffering, degradation, and humiliation” caused by the restraints. The district court granted summary judgment for the D.C. officials.   The DC Circuit affirmed. The court held that Bell and Youngberg each show that the D.C. officials did not violate Plaintiff’s Fifth Amendment rights. The court explained that to show that the restraint policy violated the Constitution under Youngberg, Plaintiff must prove that it was not an exercise of “professional judgment.” The court found that Plaintiff failed to prove either. First, the policy was “made by a professional.” Second, the policy was not a “substantial departure” from the “practices or standards” for transporting civilly-committed patients. Accordingly, the court held that Plaintiff’s claim fails because he offered no evidence to show that the policy was a substantial departure from accepted standards for transporting civilly-committed patients. View "Warren Harris v. Muriel Bowser" on Justia Law