Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

While police were preparing to execute a search warrant for a basement apartment, detectives in an unmarked car outside the apartment saw two men, later identified as Bailey and Middleton, leave the gated area above the apartment, get in a car, and drive away. The detectives followed for about a mile, then stopped the car. They found keys during a pat-down search of Bailey, who said that he resided in the apartment. He later denied it when informed of the search. The men were handcuffed and driven to the apartment, where the search team had found a gun and illicit drugs. One of Bailey’s keys unlocked the apartment’s door. The district court denied Bailey’s motion to suppress the key and statement, holding that Bailey’s detention was justified under Michigan v. Summers, as a detention incident to execution of a search warrant, and, in the alternative, that the detention was supported by reasonable suspicion under Terry v. Ohio. Bailey was convicted. The Second Circuit affirmed, without ruling on the Terry claim. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded for determination of whether Terry applies. The rule in Summers, permitting detention even if there is no particular suspicion that an individual is involved in criminal activity or poses a specific danger to officers, is limited to the immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched. None of the law enforcement interests identified in Summers applies with similar force to the detention of recent occupants beyond the immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched. View "Bailey v. United States" on Justia Law

Gonzales, an Arizona death row inmate, sought federal habeas relief. Counsel sought a stay, contending that mental incompetence prevented Gonzales from rationally communicating with or assisting counsel, and that 18 U. S. C.3599(a)(2) requires a stay when a petitioner is adjudged incompetent. The district court denied a stay, finding that Gonzales’ claims were record based or resolvable as a matter of law. The Ninth Circuit held that Gonzales had a right to a stay pending a competency determination. Carter, an Ohio death row inmate, initiated federal habeas proceedings but later moved for a competency determination and stay. The district court granted the motion, found Carter incompetent, dismissed his petition without prejudice, and prospectively tolled the statute of limitations. The Sixth Circuit identified a right to competence in 18 U. S. C. 4241 and ordered indefinite stay with respect to claims requiring assistance. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that Section 3599 does not provide a state prisoner a right to suspension of federal habeas proceedings when he is adjudged incompetent and that Section 4241 does not provide a right to competence during federal habeas proceedings. Review of record-based claims, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d), is limited to the record before the state court that heard the case on the merits and extra-record evidence concerning such claims is inadmissible. View "Ryan v. Gonzales" on Justia Law

This case arose when respondent brought an action against petitioners, two Secret Service agents, and others, under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, claiming that he was arrested and searched without probable cause, in violation of the Fourth Amendment, and that the arrest violated the First Amendment because it was made in retaliation for respondent's criticism of Vice President Cheney. At issue was whether two federal law enforcement agents were immune from suit for allegedly arresting a suspect in retaliation for his political speech, when the agents had probable cause to arrest the suspect for committing a federal crime. The Court held that petitioners were entitled to qualified immunity because, at the time of respondent's arrest, it was not clearly established that an arrest supported by probable cause could give rise to a First Amendment violation.

Respondent, a firefighter employed by the City of Rialto, brought an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against the City, the Fire Department, the private attorney hired by the City, and other individuals. The district court granted summary judgment to the individual defendants based on qualified immunity. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the attorney the City hired was not entitled to seek qualified immunity because he was a private attorney, not a City employee. At issue before the Court was whether an individual hired by the government to do its work was prohibited from seeking qualified immunity, solely because he worked for the government on something other than a permanent full-time basis. The Court held that a private individual temporarily retained by the government to carry out its work was entitled to seek qualified immunity from suit under section 1983. Therefore, the Court reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit.

Petitioner filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action in the district court against government entities that ran the jails and other defendants, alleging Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment violations, and arguing that persons arrested for minor offenses could not be subjected to invasive searches unless prison officials have reason to suspect concealment of weapons, drugs, or other contraband. The district court granted him summary judgment, ruling that "strip-searching" nonindictable offenders without reasonable suspicion violated the Fourth Amendment. The Third Circuit Reversed. The Court affirmed and concluded that the search procedure at the county jails struck a reasonable balance between inmate privacy and the needs of the institutions, and thus the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments did not require adoption of the framework and rules petitioner proposed.

The 2010 census showed an enormous increase in Texas' population which required the State to redraw its electoral districts for the United States Congress, the State Senate, and the State House of Representatives, in order to comply with the Constitution's one-person, one-vote rule. The State also had to create new districts for the four additional congressional seats it received. Plaintiffs subsequently brought suit in Texas, claiming that the State's newly enacted electoral plans violated the United States Constitution and section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1973. The Court held that because it was unclear whether the District Court for the Western District of Texas followed the appropriate standards in drawing interim maps for the 2012 Texas elections, the orders implementing those maps were vacated, and the cases were remanded for further proceedings.

Hosanna-Tabor, a member congregation of the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, operated a small school in Michigan offering a "Christian-centered education" to students in kindergarten through eighth grade. The Synod classified its school teachers into two categories: "called" and "lay." "Called" teachers, among other things, were regarded as having been called to their vocation by God. To be eligible to be called from a congregation, a teacher must satisfy certain academic requirements. "Lay" or "contract" teachers, by contrast, were not required to be trained by the Synod or even to be Lutheran. "Called" teacher, Cheryl Perich filed a charge with the EEOC, claiming that her employment had been terminated in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. The EEOC brought suit against Hosanna-Tabor, alleging that Perich had been fired in retaliation for threatening to file an ADA lawsuit. Perich intervened. Invoking what was known as the "ministerial exception," Hosanna-Tabor argued that the suit was barred by the First Amendment because the claims concerned the employment relationship between a religious institution and one of its ministers. The Court held that the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment barred suits brought on behalf of ministers against their churches, claiming termination in violation of employment discrimination laws. Because Perich was a minister within the meaning of the ministerial exception, the First Amendment required dismissal of this employment discrimination suit against her religious employer.

The Arizona Citizens Clean Elections Act (matching funds provision), Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 16-940 et seq., created a voluntary public financing system to fund the primary and general election campaigns of candidates for state office. Petitioners, candidates and independent expenditure groups, filed suit challenging the constitutionality of the matching funds provision. The Court held that the matching funds provision substantially burdened the speech of privately financed candidates and independent expenditure groups without serving a compelling state interest where the professed purpose of the state law was to cause a sufficient number of candidates to sign up for public financing, which subjected them to the various restrictions on speech that went along with that program. Therefore, the Court held that the matching funds scheme violated the First Amendment and reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit.

Respondents, representing the video game and software industries, filed a preenforcement challenge to California Assembly Bill 1179 (Act), Cal. Civ. Code Ann. 1746-1746.5, which restricted the sale or rental of violent video games to minors. At issue was whether the Act comported with the First Amendment. The Court held that, because the Act imposed a restriction on the content of protected speech, it was invalid unless California could demonstrate that it passed strict scrutiny. The Court held that California had a legitimate interest in addressing a serious social problem and helping concerned parents control their children. The Court held, however, that as a means of protecting children from portrayals of violence, the legislation was seriously underinclusive, not only because it excluded portrayals other than video games, but also because it permitted a parental or avuncular veto. The Court also held that, as a means of assisting concerned parents, it was seriously overinclusive because it abridged the First Amendment rights of young people whose parents think violent video games were a harmless pastime. The Court further held that the overbreadth in achieving one goal was not cured by the overbreadth in achieving the other and therefore, the legislation could not survive strict scrutiny. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit enjoining the Act's enforcement.

This case concerned the extent of the protection, if any, that the Petition Clause granted public employees in routine disputes with government employers where petitioner filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit after respondent's termination of petitioner as police chief and where petitioner was subsequently reinstated, with directives instructing petitioner in the performance of his duties. Petitioner alleged that the directives were issued in retaliation for the filing of his first grievance and violated his First Amendment right to "petition the Government for a redress of grievances." At issue was whether the public concern test applied when the employee invoked the Petition Clause. The Court held that a government employer's allegedly retaliatory actions against an employee did not give rise to liability under the Petition Clause unless the employee's petition related to a matter of public concern. Therefore, the Court held that the Third Circuit's conclusion that the public concern test did not limit public employees' Petition Clause claims was incorrect. Accordingly, the Court concluded that, absent full briefs by the parties, the Court need not consider how the foregoing framework would apply to this case and therefore, vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings.