Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

After the Supreme Court held that the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid the execution of persons with intellectual disability, Hall asked a Florida state court to vacate his sentence, presenting evidence that included an IQ test score of 71. The court denied relief, determining that a Florida statute mandated that he show an IQ score of 70 or below before being permitted to present any additional intellectual disability evidence. The state’s highest court rejected Hall’s appeal, finding the 70-point threshold constitutional. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed. Florida’s rule disregards established medical practice that an individual score is best understood as a range. While nothing in its statute precludes Florida from considering an IQ test’s standard error of measurement, a statistical fact reflecting the test’s inherent imprecision, the interpretation of the Florida Supreme Court takes an IQ score as conclusive evidence of intellectual capacity. The interpretation fails to recognize that measurement’s inherent imprecision and bars consideration of other relevant evidence, e.g., deficits in adaptive functioning, including evidence of past performance, environment, and upbringing. Current thinking does not regard this strict cutoff as proper or humane. When a defendant’s IQ test score falls within the test’s acknowledged and inherent margin of error, the defendant must be able to present additional evidence of intellectual disability, including testimony regarding adaptive deficits. View "Hall v. Florida" on Justia Law

After a traffic stop, Rickard refused to produce identification or step out of the car, but led police officers on a high-speed chase. After a spin-out in a parking lot, Rickard continued to accelerate, even though his bumper was flush against a patrol car. An officer fired three shots into Rickard’s car. Rickard managed to drive away, almost hitting an officer. Officers fired 12 more shots as Rickard sped away, striking him and his passenger, both of whom died from a combination of gunshot wounds and injuries suffered when the car crashed. Rickard’s minor daughter filed a 42 U.S.C.1983 action, alleging excessive force. The district court denied the officers’ motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity, holding that their conduct violated the Fourth Amendment and was contrary to clearly established law. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. After holding that the Sixth Circuit properly exercised jurisdiction, the Supreme Court reversed. The officers acted reasonably in using deadly force. Rickard’s outrageously reckless driving, lasting more than five minutes, exceeded 100 miles per hour, and included passing more than two dozen other motorists. The conduct posed a grave public safety risk. Under the circumstances when the shots were fired, all that a reasonable officer could have concluded from Rickard’s conduct was that he was intent on resuming his flight, which would pose a threat to others on the road. The officers did not fire more shots than necessary to end the public safety risk. During the 10-second span when all the shots were fired, Rickard never abandoned his attempt to flee and eventually managed to drive away. A passenger’s presence does not bear on whether officers violated Rickard’s Fourth Amendment rights. View "Plumhoff v. Rickard" on Justia Law

While campaigning for a second term, President George W. Bush planned to spend the night at a Jacksonville, Oregon, cottage. Local law enforcement permitted supporters and protesters to assemble on opposite sides of a street along the motorcade route. The President made a last-minute decision to have dinner at an Inn’s outdoor patio before going to the cottage. Protesters moved to the front of the Inn, within weapons range of the President. Supporters remained in their original location, where a building blocked sight of, and weapons access to, the patio. At the direction of the Secret Service, police moved protesters two blocks away. They did not require guests already inside the Inn to leave, avoid the patio, or go through security screening. After the President dined, his motorcade passed the supporters, but the protesters were beyond his sight and hearing. Protesters sued, alleging that the agents engaged in viewpoint discrimination, violating the First Amendment. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the protesters failed to state a claim under the Bell Atlantic and Iqbal decisions (rendered after they filed suit). On remand, protesters added allegations that the agents acted pursuant to unwritten Secret Service policy of working with the Bush White House to inhibit expression of disfavored views at presidential appearances. The district court denied a motion to dismiss. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, concluding that viewpoint discrimination could be inferred, absent a legitimate security rationale for different treatment of the groups. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the agents are entitled to qualified immunity. At the time of the incident, the Court had addressed a constitutional challenge to Secret Service actions only once, recognizing the overwhelming importance of safeguarding the President. There was no precedent indicating that agents engaged in crowd control bear a First Amendment obligation to make sure that groups with conflicting views are at all times in equivalent positions. Maintenance of equal access would not make sense in the situation the agents confronted, where only the protesters, not the supporters, had a direct line of sight to the President. A map shows that, because of the protesters’ location, they posed a potential security risk, while the supporters did not. The agents could keep a close watch on the small number of people already inside the Inn, surveillance that would have been impossible for the hundreds of people outside the Inn. View "Wood v. Moss" on Justia Law

At 2:00 a.m., December 31, 2008, Officer Edwards was patrolling Bellaire, Texas. He saw a black Nissan SUV park in front of a house; Tolan and Cooper emerged. Edwards attempted to enter the license plate number into his squad car computer, but entered an incorrect character that matched a stolen vehicle of the same color and make, which triggered an automatic alert to other police units. Edwards exited his cruiser, drew his gun and ordered the men to the ground. Accused of having stolen the car, Cooper responded, “That’s not true” and Tolan stated, “That’s my car.” Tolan laid down on the porch of the home where he lived with his parents, who came outside. Tolan’s father told Cooper to lie down, then identified Tolan and Cooper (his nephew). Tolan’s mother stated that the vehicle belonged to the family. Sergeant Cotton arrived and drew his pistol. Tolan’s mother reiterated that they owned the car. Cotton ordered her to stand against the garage. She responded, “[A]re you kidding me? We’ve lived her[e] 15 years.” Tolan, his mother, and Cooper later testified that Cotton grabbed her arm and slammed her against the garage with such force that she fell to the ground. There was photographic evidence of bruises on her arms and back. Cotton testified that he was escorting her to the garage, when she flipped her arm up and told him to get his hands off her. Tolan testified that, seeing his mother being pushed, he rose to his knees. Edwards and Cotton testified that Tolan rose to his feet. All agree that Tolan exclaimed, “[G]et your fucking hands off my mom.” Cotton drew his pistol and fired at Tolan, hitting Tolan’s chest, collapsing his right lung and piercing his liver. He survived, but suffered an injury that disrupted his budding baseball career and causes him pain on a daily basis. Dismissing a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the district court found that Cotton’s use of force was not unreasonable. The Fifth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court vacated. In holding that Cotton’s actions did not violate clearly-established law, the Fifth Circuit failed to view the evidence in the light most favorable to Tolan as required on summary judgment; it failed to credit evidence that contradicted key factual conclusions, concerning whether the porch was dimly-lit, whether Tolan’s mother refused to remain calm, whether Tolan was verbally threatening, and whether Tolan was moving to intervene. View "Tolan v. Cotton" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to capital murder, capital kidnaping, and first-degree rape, the statutory aggravating circumstance for the murder. At the penalty phase, the trial court denied defense counsel’s request to instruct the jury not to draw any adverse inference from defendant’s decision not to testify. He was sentenced to death. The Kentucky Supreme Court affirmed, finding that the Fifth Amendment’s requirement of a no-adverse-inference instruction to protect a non-testifying defendant at the guilt phase is not required at the penalty phase. The district court granted federal habeas relief. The Sixth Circuit affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Kentucky Supreme Court’s rejection of the Fifth Amendment claim was not objectively unreasonable. The high standard of 28 U.S.C. 2254(d) permits federal habeas relief only if adjudication on the merits in state court “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an [objectively] unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by” the Supreme Court. After examining its own precedent, the Court stated that the Kentucky Supreme Court’s conclusion was not an unreasonable application of the holdings in those cases, which cannot be read to require the type of blanket no-adverse-inference instruction requested and denied here. The defendant’s own admissions of guilt had established every relevant fact on which Kentucky bore the burden of proof. Section 2254(d)(1) does not require state courts to extend Supreme Court precedent or license federal courts to treat the failure to do so as error. The appropriate time to consider, as a matter of first impression, whether the cited cases require a penalty-phase no-adverse-inference instruction would be on direct review, not in a section 2254(d) habeas case. View "White v. Woodall" on Justia Law

After the Supreme Court decided that the University of Michigan’s undergraduate admissions plan’s use of race-based preferences violated the Equal Protection Clause, but that its law school admission plan’s limited use did not, Michigan voters adopted a new section of the state constitution (Proposal 2), prohibiting use of race-based preferences in the admissions process for state universities. The district court upheld Proposal 2, but the Sixth Circuit reversed, concluding that it violated Supreme Court precedent. The Supreme Court reversed. Justice Kennedy, with Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, reasoned that the principle that consideration of race in admissions is permissible when certain conditions are met was not challenged; the issue was whether, and how, state voters may choose to prohibit consideration of such racial preferences. The decision by Michigan voters reflects an ongoing national dialogue; there was no infliction of a specific injury of the type at issue in cases cited by the Sixth Circuit. Individual liberty has constitutional protection, but the Constitution also embraces the right of citizens to act through a lawful electoral process, as Michigan voters did. Justices Scalia and Thomas stated that the question here, as in every case in which neutral state action is said to deny equal protection on account of race, is whether the challenged action reflects a racially discriminatory purpose. Stating that it did not, the Justices stated that the proposition that a facially neutral law may deny equal protection solely because it has a disparate racial impact “has been squarely and soundly rejected.” Justice Breyer agreed that the amendment is consistent with the Equal Protection Clause, but reasoned that the amendment only applies to, and forbids, race-conscious admissions programs that consider race solely in order to obtain the educational benefits of a diverse student body; the Constitution permits, but does not require, the use of that kind of race-conscious program. The ballot box, not the courts, is the instrument for resolving debates about such programs. This case does not involve a diminution of the minority’s ability to participate in the political process. View "Schuette v. Coal. Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigration Rights" on Justia Law

The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 and the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, impose base limits, restricting how much money a donor may contribute to a particular candidate or committee, and aggregate limits, restricting how much money a donor may contribute in total to all candidates or committees, 2 U.S.C. 441a. In the 2011–2012 election cycle, McCutcheon contributed to 16 federal candidates, complying with all base limits. He alleges that the aggregate limits prevented him from contributing to additional candidates and political committees and that he wishes to make similar contributions in the future. McCutcheon and the Republican National Committee challenged the aggregate limits under the First Amendment. The district court dismissed. The Supreme Court reversed, with five justices concluding that those limits are invalid. Regardless whether strict scrutiny or the “closely drawn” test applies, the analysis depends on the fit between stated governmental objectives and the means selected to achieve the objectives. The aggregate limits fail even under the “closely drawn” test. Contributing to a candidate is an exercise of the right to participate in the electoral process through political expression and political association. A restriction on how many candidates and committees an individual may support is not a “modest restraint.” To require a person to contribute at lower levels because he wants to support more candidates or causes penalizes that individual for “robustly exercis[ing]” his First Amendment rights. The proper focus is on an individual’s right to engage in political speech, not a collective conception of the public good. The aggregate limits do not further the permissible governmental interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance. The justices noted the line between quid pro quo corruption and general influence and that the Court must “err on the side of protecting political speech.” Given regulations already in effect, fear that an individual might make massive unearmarked contributions to entities likely to support particular candidate is speculative. Experience suggests that most contributions are retained and spent by their recipients; the government provided no reason to believe that candidates or committees would dramatically shift their priorities if aggregate limits were lifted. Multiple alternatives could serve the interest in preventing circumvention without “unnecessary abridgment” of First Amendment rights, such as targeted restrictions on transfers among candidates and committees, tighter earmarking rules, and disclosure. View "McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm'n" on Justia Law

After a grand jury indicted the Kaleys for reselling stolen medical devices and laundering the proceeds, the government obtained a restraining order against their assets under 21 U.S.C. 853(e)(1), to “preserve the availability of [forfeitable] property” while criminal proceedings are pending. An order is available if probable cause exists to think that a defendant has committed an offense permitting forfeiture and the disputed assets are traceable or sufficiently related to the crime. The Kaleys moved to vacate the order, to use disputed assets for their legal fees. The district court allowed them to challenge traceability to the crimes but not the facts supporting the underlying indictment. The Eleventh Circuit and Supreme Court affirmed. In challenging a section 853(e)(1) pre-trial seizure, an indicted defendant is not entitled to contest the grand jury determination of probable cause to believe the defendant committed the crimes. A probable cause finding sufficient to initiate prosecution for a serious crime is conclusive and, generally, a challenge to the reliability or competence of evidence supporting that finding will not be heard. A grand jury’s probable cause finding may effect a pre-trial restraint on a person’s liberty or property. Because the government’s interest in freezing potentially forfeitable assets without an adversarial hearing about the probable cause underlying criminal charges and the Kaleys’ interest in retaining counsel of their own choosing are both substantial, the issue boils down to the “probable value, if any,” of a judicial hearing in uncovering mistaken grand jury probable cause findings. The legal standard is merely probable cause, however, and the grand jury has already made that finding; a full-dress hearing will provide little benefit. View "Kaley v. United States" on Justia Law

After a bystander stated that Fernandez had committed a violent robbery minutes before police responded, the police saw Fernandez run into an apartment building. They heard screams coming from an apartment and knocked on the door, which was answered by Roxanne, who was battered and bleeding. When the officers asked her to step out of the apartment so that they could conduct a protective sweep, Fernandez came to the door and objected. Suspecting that he had assaulted Roxanne, the officers removed him and placed him under arrest. He was then identified as the perpetrator in the earlier robbery and taken to the police station. An officer returned to the apartment and, after obtaining Roxanne’s oral and written consent, searched and found items linking Fernandez to the robbery. The trial court denied a motion to suppress that evidence and he was convicted. The California Court of Appeal and the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed. Consent searches are permissible warrantless searches and are clearly reasonable when the consent comes from the sole occupant of the premises. When multiple occupants are involved, the rule extends to the search of the premises or effects of an absent, non-consenting occupant if “the consent of one who possesses common authority over [the] premises or effects” is obtained. When a physically present inhabitant refuses to consent, that refusal is dispositive as to him, regardless of the consent of a fellow occupant. In this case, the police had reasonable grounds for removal of Fernandez, so he was in the same position as an occupant absent for any other reason. He had been absent for some time when Roxanne consented to the search and the fact that he objected to the presence of the police when he first came to the door did not render the search unconstitutional. View "Fernandez v. California" on Justia Law

In 1985, a manager was shot to death during a robbery of his restaurant. In the following months, a second manager was murdered and another survived similar robberies. In each restaurant, the robber fired two .38 caliber bullets; all six bullets were recovered. The survivor, Smotherman, described his assailant and picked Hinton’s picture out of a photographic array. The police arrested Hinton and recovered from his house a .38 caliber revolver belonging to his mother, who shared the house. The Alabama Department of Forensic Sciences concluded that the six bullets had all been fired from the Hinton revolver. Hinton was charged with two counts of murder. He was not charged with the Smotherman robbery. The prosecution strategy was to link Hinton to the Smotherman robbery by eyewitness testimony and forensic evidence about the bullets and to persuade the jury that, given the similarity of the crimes, Hinton must have committed the murders. Hinton presented witnesses in support of his alibi that he was at work at the time of the Smotherman robbery. The six bullets and the revolver were the only physical evidence. Hinton’s attorney obtained a grant of $1,000 to hire an expert to challenge that evidence and did not request more funding, nor correct the judge’s mistaken belief that a $1,000 limit applied. Under that mistaken belief, Hinton’s attorney found only one person who was willing to testify: Payne. Hinton’s attorney believed that Payne did not have the necessary expertise. The prosecutor discredited Payne. The jury convicted Hinton; the court imposed a death sentence. In state post-conviction proceedings, Hinton alleged ineffective assistance and produced three highly credible experts, who testified that they could not conclude that any of the bullets had been fired from the Hinton revolver. The state did not submit rebuttal evidence. Following a remand by the state’s highest court, the trial court held that Payne was qualified to testify as a firearms and toolmark expert under the then-applicable standard. The Alabama Supreme Court denied review. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated and remanded, holding that Hinton’s attorney rendered ineffective assistance under its “Strickland” test. It was unreasonable to fail to seek additional funds to hire an expert where that failure was based not on any strategic choice but on a mistaken belief that available funding was limited. View "Hinton v. Alabama" on Justia Law