Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff sued United States Attorney General Eric Holder, alleging that the FBI refused to hire him as a special agent because of his Type I diabetes in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 701 et seq. A jury found in favor of plaintiff and awarded him compensatory damages. Subsequently, the district court denied both Holder's motion for judgment as a matter of law and plaintiff's request for equitable relief. Both parties appealed. The court held that a reasonable jury could reasonably conclude that plaintiff's diabetes and treatment regiment "substantially limited" his major life activity of eating and that plaintiff was therefore disabled within the meaning of the Act. Rejecting the remaining arguments, the court held that the district court did not err in denying Holder's motion for judgment as a matter of law. The court also affirmed the district court's denial of equitable relief to plaintiff and rejected plaintiff's assertion that the district court erred in denying him front pay or instatement based on Holder's after-acquired evidence defense and in determining that plaintiff was not entitled to back pay based on the testimony of Holder's expert witness.

Plaintiffs, parents of children who were eligible to receive a free and appropriate public education, filed suit to challenge the exclusion of mapping of cochlear implants from the regulatory definition of "related services" under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1401(26)(B). The court concluded that the phrase "audiology services" as used in the IDEA's "related services" definition did not unambiguously encompass mapping of cochlear implants. The court also found that the Mapping Regulations embodied a permissible construction of the IDEA because they were rationally related to the underlying objectives of the IDEA. The court further found that the Mapping Regulations did not substantially lessen the protections afforded by the 1983 regulations. Because the Department's construction of its own regulation was neither plainly erroneous nor inconsistent with the regulation, the court owed it deference. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Department.

Appellant alleged that his employer, the United States Customs and Border Protection Agency, repeatedly rejected him for promotions in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq. The district court granted summary judgment for the agency. The court reversed the district court's dismissal of appellant's claims stemming from John Milne's promotion where the district court never reached the issue; reversed its grant of summary judgment with respect to his age and race discrimination claims stemming from Mark Reefe's promotion where genuine issues of material fact existed; and remanded for further proceedings. The court disposed of appellant's remaining arguments and affirmed in all other respects.

This case arose when plaintiffs filed a class action complaint under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the District was violating the Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. 1396 et seq. Since 1993, a consent decree has governed how the District provides "early and periodic screening, diagnostic, and treatment services" under the Act. The District has now asked the district court to vacate that decree on two grounds: that an intervening Supreme Court decision has made clear that plaintiffs lack a private right of action to enforce the Medicaid Act, and that in any event, the District has come into compliance with the requirements of the Act. Because the court concluded that the district court's rejection of one of the District's two arguments did not constitute an order "refusing to dissolve [an] injunction[]" within the meaning 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1), the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Plaintiff contended that his supervisor at the Department of State gave him negative performance reviews in retaliation for his opposition to discriminatory conduct, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. The district court granted the Department's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case. The court held that because plaintiff failed to offer evidence from which a jury could conclude that he opposed a practice that could "reasonably be thought" to violate Title VII, he failed to satisfy the first element of his cause of action. Plaintiff also failed to establish the third element of a Title VII retaliation claim: that the employer took a materially adverse action against the employee "because" the employee opposed a protected practice. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Department.

Appellant, an African American man employed by the IRS, alleged that the IRS discriminated against him on the basis of race and gender when it awarded a temporary detail and then a permanent promotion to a white female employee. Appellant also claimed that the IRS retaliated against him when he pursued the matter with the Equal Employment Opportunity office. The district court granted summary judgment to the government on all claims. The court agreed that appellant failed to exhaust his claim regarding the temporary detail and so affirmed that portion of the district court's judgment. But because the court concluded a reasonable jury could find that the government's proffered nondiscriminatory reason for denying appellant the permanent promotion was pretextual and that discrimination was the real reason, the court reversed the grant of summary judgment on the discriminatory promotion claim and remanded to allow that claim to proceed to trial. And because the court concluded that appellant established a prima facie case of retaliation, the court remanded that claim for further proceedings.

Roger Rudder, two other adults, and two juveniles sued the District of Columbia and two Metropolitan Police officers for using excessive force against them at the 2008 Caribbean Carnival Parade in violation of their civil rights. The district court dismissed their suit with prejudice. The court concluded that, although plaintiffs unambiguously conceded all their common law claims, the juvenile plaintiffs' common law claims should have been dismissed without prejudice because those claims were not time-barred. The complaint also alleged facts stating facially plausible claims against two officers for violations of the Fourth Amendment. Therefore, the judgment of the district court was reversed.

Appellants were arrested for speeding in excess of 30 mph above the posted speed limit and subsequently filed a class action on behalf of all individuals who have been arrested and subjected to criminal penalties for such speeding in the last three years. Appellants alleged that the district's traffic enforcement policies denied them the equal protection of law and thus violated the Fifth Amendment. Specifically appellants objected to the district's policy of subjecting motorists who speed in excess of 30 mph over the speed limit to different penalties, depending on how they were caught. The district court granted the district's motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). The court affirmed the district court's judgment, but on different grounds. The court held that appellants' claim lacked merit because their challenge could not survive rational basis review where the district's traffic policy neither burdened a fundamental right nor targeted a suspect class.

Appellant, an African-American female attorney in the Office of the Chief Counsel of the PBGC, filed suit in district court against the PBGC, claiming employment discrimination and retaliation in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 2000e. Appellant appealed two issues: first, claims of race and gender discrimination and unlawful retaliation, arising out of four discrete episodes; second, a claim of retaliatory hostile work environment arising not only out of the four discrete episodes but also out of various other events as to which she raised claims that were time-barred. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of appellant's claims of race and gender discrimination and of unlawful retaliation where the court did not believe that the PBGC's failure to remedy the various critiques and epithets to which appellant's fellow employees subjected her would have persuaded a reasonable employee to refrain from making or supporting charges of discrimination. The court held, however, that the district court erred to the extent that it categorically excluded her time-barred complaints in considering the hostile work environment claim, thus failing to employ the Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan analysis, including a determination of which acts exhibit the relationship necessary to be considered part of the same actionable hostile work environment claim. Accordingly, the court remanded for a determination of which, if any acts, should have been included under Morgan.

Plaintiff sued defendant, alleging that defendant had unlawfully discriminated against her in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq. Plaintiff, a medical student who was diagnosed with dyslexia and a mild processing-speed disorder, contended on remand that the district court erred by failing to apply the 2008 amendments to the ADA and in relying on her prior academic achievement in assessing whether she suffered from a disability under the ADA. The court held that because plaintiff failed to show legal or clear factual error by the district court, the judgment was affirmed.