Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Appellant pled guilty to racketeer influenced corrupt organization conspiracy and was sentenced to a term of imprisonment. Appellant appealed, arguing that his conviction was obtained in violation of Kastigar v. United States, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, and that the government breached his plea agreement. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals remanded for the district court to consider certain of Appellant's claims of ineffective assistance but denied his appeal in all other respects, holding (1) with respect to the Kastigar hearing, there was nothing deficient about counsel's performance; but (2) as to the other claims of ineffective assistance, the cause should be remanded for factual development, as Appellant raised the claims for the first time on appeal, and the Court could not tell from the record whether he was entitled to relief.

Edwina Bigesby was sentenced to ten years' imprisonment for various drug-related offenses, including possession with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of crack cocaine. Bigesby appealed, contending her convictions should be vacated because the trial judge erroneously excluded evidence critical to her defense. Alternatively, Bigesby claimed her sentence should be reduced under the Fair Sentencing Act (FSA), which increased the amount of crack cocaine needed to trigger a ten-year mandatory minimum sentence. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals rejected both arguments and affirmed the judgment below, holding (1) the trial judge did not improperly exclude evidence relevant to Bigesby's defense; and (2) Bigesby was not entitled to re-sentencing under the FSA.

The Libertarian Party, along with its 2008 presidential candidate Bob Barr, contended that the District's failure to report the number of votes cast for Barr violated the First and Fifth Amendments. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Board. The court concluded that because the party had failed to show that the District's law placed a severe burden on its rights, the District's important regulatory interests were generally sufficient to justify the restrictions pursuant to Burdick v. Takushi. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

The Association filed suit, under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706, and the Constitution, challenging the State Authorization, Compensation, and Misrepresentation Regulations the Department of Education initiated under the Higher Education Act (HEA), Pub. L. No. 89-329, 79 Stat. 1219, 1232-54. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court holding that the Compensation Regulations did not exceed the HEA's limits; the court mostly rejected the Association's claim that these regulations were not based on reasoned decisionmaking; the court remanded two aspects of the Compensation Regulations, however, that were lacking for want of adequate explanations. The court also held that the Misrepresentation Regulations exceeded the HEA's limits in three respects: by allowing the Secretary to take enforcement actions against schools sans procedural protections; by proscribing misrepresentations with respect to subjects that were not covered by the HEA, and by proscribing statements that were merely confusing. The court rejected the Association's other challenges to the Misrepresentation Regulations. Finally, with respect to the State Authorization Regulations, the court concluded that the Association had standing to challenge the school authorization regulation, but held that the regulation was valid. However, the court upheld the Association's challenge in the distance education regulation, because that regulation was not a logical outgrowth of the Department's proposed rules.

Plaintiff, a former employee of the Library of Congress, brought this action against, inter alia, his former supervisor (defendant), alleging that his termination for publication of articles critical of high-level public officials violated the First and Fifth Amendments and entitled him to damages relief under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics. Defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that a Bivens action was not available under the circumstances of the case and that he was entitled to qualified immunity. Because the court concluded that the courts should not imply a new form of Bivens action on the facts of this case, the court reversed the order of the district court denying defendant's motion to dismiss.

Shelby County contended that when Congress reauthorized section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. 1973c(a), in 2006, it exceeded its enumerated powers. The district court disagreed and granted summary judgment for the Attorney General. Applying the congruence and proportionality standard of review in Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. One v. Holder, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Plaintiffs brought suit challenging the constitutionality of section 5 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA), 42 U.S.C. 1973c, arguing that, as amended by the VRA's 2006 reauthorization, section 5 exceeded the powers granted to Congress by the Reconstruction Amendments and violated the Fifth Amendment's equal protection guarantee. The district court initially dismissed the suit for lack of standing but the court reversed and remanded based on the standing of plaintiff John Nix, who had announced his intention to run for the Kinston City Council in the 2011 elections. On remand, the district court granted summary judgment for the government, holding that section 5 was constitutional. While the appeal was pending before the court, and before oral argument could take place, the Justice Department changed its mind in light of some new evidence that it received in a separate proceeding. The Department subsequently informed the court and the parties that the Attorney General was withdrawing his objection to the proposed change. Three days later, the government filed its merits brief arguing in part that the case had been mooted by the Attorney General's actions. After considering the supplemental briefing from both parties, the court agreed with the government and therefore vacated the judgment and remanded the case to the district court with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction.

Plaintiff applied for a position as Director of the Library of Congress and when he was passed over for the job, he claimed that the Library of Congress violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq. On appeal, defendant sought a new trial, arguing that the district court erred by instructing the jury that he had to prove that unlawful discrimination was the "sole reasons" for his non-selection. Although the court agreed that "sole reason" was not the correct standard, the jury instructions themselves corrected any error by defining "sole reasons" as "but-for" causation. The court recognized, however, that its recent Title VII employment discrimination cases have caused some confusion and the court took the opportunity to clarify the requirements the statute placed upon plaintiffs and the courts.

Plaintiffs brought an action arising under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against a number of MPD law enforcement personnel, asserting, inter alia, that various officers and their supervisors violated plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment rights by planning and conducting a 4:00 a.m. search on a warrant that did not authorize a nighttime search and breaking and entering into plaintiffs' home without knocking and announcing their presence. At issue on appeal was whether the district court erred in denying defendants qualified immunity on the knock-and-announce and nighttime search claims. The court agreed that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because neither their no-knock entry of plaintiffs' home nor their nighttime search violated clearly established law. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded.

Plaintiffs, owners of two dairy operations, appealed the dismissal of their constitutional challenges to two provisions of the Milk Regulatory Equity Act of 2005 (MREA), 7 U.S.C. 608c. Plaintiffs alleged that the provisions, which subjected certain large producer-handlers of milk to contribution requirements applicable to all milk handlers, constituted a bill of attainder and violated the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. Because the court found that the MREA did not apply with specificity to affected persons, the court need not address whether it satisfied either of the remaining elements of a bill of attainder. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claim. In regards to plaintiffs' remaining arguments, the court held that mere disparity of treatment was not sufficient to state an equal protection violation. The court also found that the government provided an explanation that was not only rational on its face but also had been consistently recognized by the courts as legitimate. Further, plaintiffs failed to plead the threshold requirement of a due process claim: that the government had interfered with a cognizable liberty or property interest. Finally, the court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to allow plaintiffs to file a supplemental complaint. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.