Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted for conspiracy to distribute narcotics. At issue on appeal was whether the government proved, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Defendant knowingly entered into the conspiracy with the specific intent to further the unlawful objective of drug distribution. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) there was no affirmative evidence that Defendant knowingly joined the narcotics conspiracy or had the specific intent to further its aims; and (2) given the scope of the government's investigation and the role its witnesses played in the conspiracy, any reasonable jury should have wondered why the government could not find such evidence.

Laura Elkins and her husband, John Robbins, brought suit against the District of Columbia and some of its officials, alleging violations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments for the search of Elkins' home and the seizure of Elkins' notebook, which related to a home renovation. Plaintiffs also alleged that Defendants' outrageous conduct trampled Elkins' due process rights. The district court concluded that the seizure of the notebook was illegal and entered judgment against two District officials but assessed nominal damages of one dollar each. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's orders in all respect except that the entries of summary judgment against the two District officials were vacated and the case remanded with instructions to enter judgment in their favor because the District and its officials were entitled to summary judgment on all Plaintiffs' claims.

After the State Department terminated the employment of Appellant on his sixty-fifth birthday, Appellant brought suit alleging that his forced retirement violated the federal employment provisions of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). The district court dismissed Appellant's complaint on the ground that the statute under which Appellant was hired, section 2(c) of the Basic Authorities Act, permitted the Department to exempt Appellant from the protections of the ADEA. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding nothing in the Basic Authorities Act that abrogates the ADEA's broad proscription against personnel actions that discriminate on the basis of age.

Bassem Youssef, an Egyptian-born American citizen, claimed that his employer, the FBI, (1) discriminated against him on the basis of his national origin after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, by not placing him in a substantive position dealing with counterterrorism and instead transferring him to a job for which he was dramatically overqualified; and (2) retaliated against him when he filed a complaint and spoke to his superiors about his predicament. The district court granted summary judgment against Youseef's discrimination claim but allowed his retaliation claim to be tried by a jury. The jury returned a verdict against Youssef, and the district court denied Youssef's motion for a new trial. The D.C. Circuit Court affirmed the district court's refusal to grant a new trial but reversed its judgment against Youssef's discrimination claim, holding that because the district court did not reach the fact-intensive issue of a possible discriminatory motive for the transfer, and the parties did not fully brief it to the Court, the case was remanded for further examination of the FBI's reason for the transfer.

In 1993, Plaintiff was convicted of the crimes of threatening to injure a person and manslaughter. In 1997, Congress brought the D.C. parole system under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Parole Commission (USPC). In 2000, the USPC adopted its own regulations regarding suitability for parole. At Plaintiff's parole hearings in 2001 and 2005, the USPC applied the 2000 regulations and denied Plaintiff parole. In 2005, Plaintiff filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, alleging that application of the 2000 Regulations, rather than the 1987 Regulations, at his hearings violated his rights under the Ex Post Facto Clause. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's dismissal of Plaintiff's damages suit on the ground of qualified immunity, concluding that application of those regulations did not violate any clearly established constitutional right of which a reasonable official would have known at the time of the hearings.

Defendant was convicted following a jury trial of multiple offenses, including possession of a firearm as a convicted felon, related to the shooting of an undercover agent of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives. Defendant was sentenced to 270 months in prison, and the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. Defendant subsequently filed a motion to modify his sentence, arguing that he was entitled to a reduction and sentence and seeking a hearing to see if his sentence should be reduced. The district court denied the motion. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, holding that the district court did not clearly err by finding that it reached Defendant's ultimate sentence by starting with Sentencing Guideline 2K2.1, which covers convictions for felons in possession of a firearm.

This appeal was the latest step in a long-running controversy over the use of post office sidewalks to gather signatures on petitions. Before the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals in this case was a facial challenge to a ban on collecting signatures on post office sidewalks that do not run along public streets. Appellants also asked the district court to enjoin enforcement of the regulation on Grace sidewalks. The district court concluded that the ban did not violate the First Amendment. The D.C. Circuit affirmed, holding (1) interior postal sidewalks are not public forums; (2) a ban on collection in these circumstances is reasonable; and (3) because the challenged regulation no longer applied to Grace sidewalks, declaratory and injunctive relief would not longer be appropriate.

Carlos Marino, who was incarcerated for a conviction for drug conspiracy, submitted a request to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), seeking documents that Marino alleged belonged to a co-conspirator who testified against him at trial. Marino suspected the prosecution engaged in various forms of misconduct during trial, especially in its dealings with the co-conspirator. The DEA denied Marino's FOIA request. Marino appealed, and the district court granted summary judgment against him, concluding that Marino lacked a sufficient defense to the DEA's summary judgment motion. In its motion, the DEA invoked FOIA exemption 7(C), which allows an agency to withhold information compiled for law enforcement purposes if disclosure "could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." Marino subsequently filed a motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), which the district court denied. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the public domain exception provided Marino with a meritorious defense to the DEA's summary judgment motion. Remanded.

Plaintiff was a black male who worked in the United State Department of Agriculture's (Department) Foreign Agricultural Service. Plaintiff's employment was terminated after it was discovered that Plaintiff submitted false receipts for reimbursement, failed to report his required financial interests, and failed to properly submit to the Department a credit issued by a hotel to his government-issued credit card, among other things. Plaintiff filed suit in district court, alleging various claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. The district court granted the Department summary judgment on nine of Plaintiff's ten counts, including his race discrimination claim. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiff failed to produce sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that he was terminated because of racial discrimination.

Appellee, an employee of the FBI, alleged that FBI officials retaliated against him in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when, by reporting unfounded security concerns to the Bureau's Security Division, they prompted an investigation into his continued eligibility for a security clearance. In the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals' earlier opinion in this case, Rattigan v. Holder, the Court held that although the Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit precedent shields the Security Division's security clearance-related decisions from judicial review, the Title VII claim could nonetheless go forward so long as it challenged only the reporting of Appellee to the Security Division and not the Division's decision to investigate. On rehearing, however, the Court vacated the district court judgment and narrowed the scope of Title VII liability in these circumstances, holding that Appellee's Title VII claim could proceed only if he could show that agency employees acted with a retaliatory or discriminatory motive in reporting or referring information that they knew to be false. Remanded for further proceedings.