Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, alleging that the termination of his employment violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. Plaintiff introduced evidence of two statements made by the person who effected his termination, both of which were indicative of a discriminatory motive. The court reversed and remanded because those statements, if proven to have been made, would permit a reasonable factfinder to conclude that age-based discrimination led to plaintiff's termination. View "Wilson v. Cox, et al." on Justia Law

After plaintiff was discharged by the Department of Corrections, he filed suit against the District and two officials, alleging violations of his rights under the District's whistleblower statute, D.C. Code 1-615.53, and of his liberty interests under the Fifth Amendment. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment on the claims under the whistleblower act where plaintiff was terminated for the misconduct that occurred in March 2005, not January 2006, where he struck a handcuffed inmate. The court also affirmed summary judgment on the Fifth Amendment claim where any deprivation of liberty by stigmatizing was not without due process. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "McCormick, Jr. v. D.C., et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against the Department under Title VII after the Department refused to certify him under the Human Reliability Program. Plaintiff claimed that, in denying him certification, the Department relied on the psychological evaluation of a Department psychologist who allegedly recommended against certification because of plaintiff's race. The court concluded that the Department's decision to certify an applicant under the Human Reliability Program was the kind of judgment covered under Department of the Navy v. Egan. The court also concluded that the individual who performed the psychological evaluation of plaintiff was in the category of officials within the Department authorized and trained to make a judgment about plaintiff's suitability for certification. Therefore, the Department's decision not to certify plaintiff was unreviewable and the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Foote v. Moniz" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a Board employee, filed suit claiming that her supervisors engendered a hostile work environment, discriminating against her on the basis of her race and sex. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the Board, concluding that, while the supervisors' actions may have been unprofessional, uncivil, and somewhat boorish, they did not constitute an adequate factual basis for the Title VII claims presented here. View "Brooks v. Grundmann" on Justia Law

In response to the Congo war, Congress created Section 1502 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. 78m(p), which requires the SEC to issue regulations requiring firms using "conflict minerals" to investigate and disclose the origin of those minerals. The Association challenged the SEC's final rule implementing the Act, raising claims under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq.; the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78a et seq.; and the First Amendment. The district court rejected all of the Association's claims and granted summary judgment for the Commission and intervenor Amnesty International. The court concluded that the Commission did not act arbitrarily and capriciously by choosing not to include a de minimus exception for use of conflict materials; the Commission could use its delegated authority to fill in gaps where the statute was silent with respect to both a threshold for conducting due diligence and the obligations of uncertain issuers; the court rejected the Association's argument that the Commission's due diligence threshold was arbitrary and capricious; the Commission did not act arbitrarily and capriciously and its interpretation of sections 78m(p)(2) and 78m(p)(1)(A)(i) was reasonable because it reconciled these provisions in an expansive fashion, applying the final rule not only to issuers that manufacture their own products, but also to those that only contract to manufacture; and the court rejected the Association's challenge to the final rule's temporary phase-in period, which allowed issuers to describe certain products as "DRC conflict undeterminable." The court also concluded that it did not see any problems with the Commission's cost-side analysis. The Commission determined that Congress intended the rule to achieve "compelling social benefits," but it was "unable to readily quantify" those benefits because it lacked data about the rule's effects. The court determined that this benefit-side analysis was reasonable. The court held that section 15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(1)(A)(ii) & (E), and the Commission’s final rule violated the First Amendment to the extent the statute and rule required regulated entities to report to the Commission and to state on their website that any of their products have “not been found to be 'DRC conflict free.'" The label "conflict free" is a metaphor that conveys moral responsibility for the Congo war. By compelling an issuer to confess blood on its hands, the statute interferes with the exercise of the freedom of speech under the First Amendment. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Nat'l Assoc. of Manufacturers, et al. v. SEC, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit against the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) and the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (SSA) raising constitutional challenges to the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. No 111-148, 124 Stat. 119; raising statutory challenges to actions of HHS and the Commissioner relating to the implementation of the ACA and prior Medical legislation; and attacking the failure of defendants to render an "accounting" that would alter the American people to the insolvency towards which Medicare and Social Security programs were heading. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the district court's dismissal of their claims. The court rejected plaintiffs' claims that 26 U.S.C. 5000A, which was sustained as a valid exercise of the taxing power, violated the Fifth Amendment's prohibition of the taking of private property without just compensation and violated the origination clause. The court concluded that plaintiffs' substantive attack on the Social Security Program Operations Manual System (POMS) provisions was clearly foreclosed by its decision in Hall v. Sebelius, holding that the statutory text establishing Medicare Part A precludes any option not to be entitled to benefits. The court rejected plaintiffs' second statutory claim attacking an interim final rule. Finally, the court concluded that plaintiffs failed to provide a legal argument for their claims against the Commissioner and Secretary, and therefore, the court lacked jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claim to an "accounting." Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Assoc. Amer. Physicians, et al. v. Sebelius, et al." on Justia Law

This case stemmed from an employment discrimination suit filed by appellant against the Navy. The Navy subsequently offered a stipulation of Settlement (the "Agreement"). After concluding that specific performance of the Agreement was no longer practicable, appellant sought nearly a million dollars in damages and attorney's fees. The court held that a settlement agreement embodied in a consent decree was a contract under the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. 1346(a)(2), and transferred the case to the Court of Federal Claims. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order dismissing the motion to enforce and remanded with instructions to transfer to the Court of Federal Claims. View "Franklin-Mason v. Mabus, Jr." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit challenging the refusal of the Board of Correction of Naval Records to amend certain of her fitness reports. The court concluded that the decision of the Board was neither arbitrary nor capricious nor unsupported by substantial evidence, in contravention of the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706(2)(A); even if the court were to assume that plaintiff asked for and was denied counseling, such deprivation would not violate her due process rights; because plaintiff failed to demonstrate discriminatory intent, her equal protection claim also failed. Accordingly, the court held that the Board's denial of plaintiff's petition to correct her military records was neither arbitrary nor capricious and that her constitutional challenges were without merit. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Roberts v. United States, et al." on Justia Law

Appellants, federally registered lobbyists, wishing appointment to one type of advisory committee, the Industry Trade Advisory Committees (ITACs), challenged the constitutionality of the presidential ban on federally registered lobbyists from serving on advisory committees. Appellants alleged that the government has conditioned their eligibility for the valuable benefit of ITAC membership on their willingness to limit their First Amendment right to petition government. The district court dismissed the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6). The court concluded, however, that appellants have pled a viable First Amendment unconstitutional conditions claim. The court remanded for the district court to develop the factual record and to undertake the Pickering v. Board of Education analysis in the first instance. The district court must determine whether the government's interest in excluding federally registered lobbyists from ITACs outweighed any impingement on appellants' constitutional rights. View "Autor, et al. v. Pritzker, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant, concluding that plaintiff's whistleblower complaint did not qualify as a "mixed case" complaint capable of triggering the savings clause under 5 U.S.C. 7702(f). Plaintiff argued that even though he presented his Title VII claim in the wrong forum (the MSPB), because he did so along with a timely filed IRA as part of a "mixed case," his formal EEO complaint should be deemed timely with the correct forum (the DOL) under section 7702(f)'s savings clause. The court affirmed the judgment because plaintiff's formal Title VII claim - filed well after the expiration of the EEO route's 15-day deadline - was untimely where the savings clause excused errors only in the place, not time, of filing. View "Schlottman v. Perez" on Justia Law