Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Appellant alleged that he was transferred to a position of less responsibility within the District of Columbia Department of Mental Health ("District") in retaliation for his statements corroborating a claim of racial discrimination against a District official. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment for the District on the ground that appellant failed to show that his transfer was a materially adverse action. The court held that appellant had provided sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that he suffered a materially adverse employment action and to conclude that the District's proffered reasons for transferring him were pretextual and that he was transferred in retalaition for supporting his direct supervisor's complaint. Accordingly, the court erred in granting summary judgment for the District and the judgment was reversed and remanded.

Plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of a provision of the Fair Treatment for Experienced Pilots Act ("FTEPA"), 49 U.S.C. 44729, which allowed some pilots, but not him, to take advantage of Congress's decision to raise the mandatory retirement age from 60 to 65. Plaintiff also alleged that his former employer and former union violated a state law banning age discrimination in employment by failing to place him in a position at work that would have allowed him the benefit of the new retirement age. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's state age discrimination claims. The court concluded that plaintiff did not make clear in his complaint that he was suing his former employer for its failure to demote him to a status that might help him take advantage of the new age limit in the FTEPA and his complaint never alleged that he requested a demotion, that he was qualified for such a position, or that such positions were available, all facts he would need to prove to make out a prima facie case of age discrimination for failure to demote under the state discrimination statute. Accordingly, the court declined to pass on the merits of an argument the district court had no chance to consider and affirmed the dismissal of plaintiff's suit.

Plaintiff sued the Government Printing Office ("GPO") under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e, et seq., alleging race and gender discrimination when the GPO filled two positions with white men, without interviewing any candidates. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the GPO. The court concluded that the district court erred by requiring plaintiff to show not only that the GPO's nondiscriminatory reason was pretext, but also that discrimination was the actual reason plaintiff was passed over for the positions. Consequently, the court held that a reasonable jury could find in plaintiff's favor and reversed the district court's order of summary judgment, remanding for further proceedings.

In this case, a jury found that the FBI violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 28 U.S.C. 1447, by launching a security investigation of plaintiff, then an agent in its Saudi Arabia office, in retaliation for his filing of a discrimination complaint. On appeal, the government argued that plaintiff's claim was nonjusticiable under Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit case law because adjudicating Title VII liability called for the jury to second-guess security judgments committed by law to FBI discretion. The court vacated the judgment in plaintiff's favor and held that plaintiff's case, as presented to the jury, invited just such second-guessing. The court remanded for further proceedings, however, and held that plaintiff might be able to pursue his retaliation claims without calling into question unreviewable security decisions.

The Equal Rights Center ("ERC") sued Post Properties, Inc. ("Post") alleging that Post designed, constructed, and operated its apartment complexes in a manner that violated the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), as amended by the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 ("FHAA"), 42 U.S.C. 3601-3631, and Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. 12181-12189. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment to Post on the ground that the ERC lacked standing to bring suit where it failed to demonstrate an injury in fact. The court held that the ERC failed to demonstrate that its injury was actual or imminent at the time of the filed suit and held that the district court erroneously concluded that the ERC could not establish standing because it chose to redirect its resources to investigate Post's allegedly discriminatory practice. Therefore, the court focused on whether the organizational plaintiff undertook expenditures in response to, and to counteract, the effects of a defendant's alleged discrimination rather than in anticipation of litigation and determined that the ERC failed to demonstrate that it suffered an injury in fact that was actual or imminent at the time it filed the suit.

Plaintiff, acting pro se, sued defendant for alleged violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. 621, and the District of Columbia Human Rights Act when defendant declined to hire her. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed the complaint where plaintiff failed to appear from a single motions hearing when she believed that motions she had previously filed for a change of venue and for the magistrate judge's recusal remained pending and operated to suspend all proceedings. The court held that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint where the district court's dismissal was inconsistent with precedent when it had not previously found plaintiff disobedient or dilatory, did not attempt lesser sanctions, and failed to explain why the case-ending sanctions of dismissal was necessary.

Plaintiff, a former employee of the United States Agency for International Development ("USAID"), alleged claims of gender discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. At issue was whether the district court failed to evaluate plaintiff's evidence in its totality and failed to assume the truth of the facts and draw inferences in her favor. The court held that summary judgment was improperly granted regarding plaintiff's June 2004 non-promotion plan where plaintiff offered sufficient evidence to raise a material issue of disputed fact regarding USAID's explanation for her non-promotion was pre-textual and from which a reasonable jury could find unlawful gender discrimination. The court also held that summary judgment was properly granted for the remainder of plaintiff's claims where the district court properly ruled and considered the remaining evidence.