Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

The sole issue at his trial on a charge of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g) was whether Lopez possessed a gun. The jury heard from Lopez and from arresting officers Martinez and Ramos, who testified that they found a gun in Lopez’s pocket after encountering him leaving the scene of a reported burglary-in-progress. Lopez’s credibility was crucial to his defense. He admitted that when he was taken to the precinct, he gave officers his brother’s name rather than his own and that he had prior felony convictions. During cross-examination and closing arguments, the prosecution emphasized that Lopez did not say that he had been framed by the police or complain about alleged excessive force until he testified at trial. The Third Circuit vacated Lopez’s conviction, based on the government’s use of his post-Miranda silence to impeach him. View "United States v. Lopez" on Justia Law

In 2012, Dellavecchia was convicted of first-degree murder, criminal attempt (homicide), three counts of recklessly endangering another person, and weapons-related offenses. At trial, Ridley Township Lieutenant Willoughby testified that Dellavecchia made an incriminating statement immediately following a bedside arraignment conducted while he was hospitalized for a self-inflicted head injury on the day following his arrest for the commission of the offenses. Dellavecchia made his statement without counsel present and without having been given Miranda warnings; he had not waived the right to counsel. The Third Circuit affirmed denial of his petition for habeas relief, concluding that Willoughby did not deliberately elicit Dellavecchia’s statement and consequently did not violate Dellavecchia’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The court noted that the evidence, even disregarding Dellavecchia’s statement, overwhelmingly supported his convictions, so that any error when Willoughby recounted the statement at trial would have been harmless. View "Dellavecchia v. Sec'y Penn. Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

Mammaro filed a civil rights suit, claiming that the temporary removal of her child from her custody by the New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency was a violation of her substantive due process right as a parent. The removal, following a domestic violence incident between Mammaro and her husband, was based on allegations of neglect by Mammaro’s husband and brother-in-law, supplemented by two positive drug tests of Mammaro, and Mammaro’s decision to take the child from supervised housing, The district court held that several individual caseworkers were not entitled to qualified immunity. The Third Circuit reversed, finding there was no clearly established law, so that a reasonable caseworker would have understood that temporarily removing a child in these circumstances would violate substantive due process. View "Mammaro v. N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency" on Justia Law

In 2006, Lane hired Connelly as one of seven union truck drivers at its Pittsburgh facility. Connelly ranked fifth in seniority and was the only woman. In 2007, allegedly because Connelly had ended a romance with a co-worker (Nogy), her male co-workers began “curs[ing] ... and belittl[ing] her." Connelly notified supervisors. Lane suspended Nogy for three days but did not discipline or warn any other employees, who continued to harass Connelly. In 2009, Connelly learned about the company’s “Ethics Line,” which she called multiple times to report further harassment and make complaints about her male co-workers drinking on the job. In 2010, a Lane foreman made an unwanted physical advance to Connelly, which she reported to the Ethics Line and to her supervisor. In October 2010, a Lane supervisor became “incensed” at Connelly when she refused to drive a truck that had a flat tire and steering problems. Soon after, Connelly was laid off before the end of the construction season and before any other union truck driver. She was never recalled her to work. Lane did recall male truck drivers in 2011 and continues to employ them. The Third Circuit vacated dismissal of Connelly’s suit, which alleged disparate treatment, sexual harassment, hostile work environment, and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 2000e, finding her claims plausible. View "Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp" on Justia Law

Willis worked as a Neonatal Nurse Practitioner at Children’s from August 1993 until her termination in January 2012. From 2001 until 2011, Willis served as co-lead NNP. Lamouree, the nurse manager for the newborn intensive care unit was Willis’s supervisor. Lamouree’s supervisors were Valenta and Hupp. Starting in August 2011, Children’s issued Willis disciplinary warnings for three distinct incidents, all involving communications Willis was 61 years old at the time of her termination. After the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission closed Willis’s case, Willis sued under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, stating that Willis was unable to provide specifics to establish that this other employee was in fact not disciplined, and if so, any reason why she was not disciplined. In the pretext context, this type of second-hand, general rumor regarding a single substantially younger employee is insufficient as a matter of law to show pretext. While evidence demonstrating that a single member of a non-protected group received more favorable treatment can be relevant, “[a] decision adversely affecting an older employee does not become a discriminatory decision merely because one younger employee is treated differently.” View "Willis v. Childrens Hosp. of Pittsburgh" on Justia Law

Michtavi, a prisoner, had an operation to treat his prostate performed by Dr. Chopra, who is not a Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP) employee. After surgery, Michtavi noticed that the quantity of his ejaculate had reduced. He was diagnosed with retrograde ejaculation. Dr. Chopra advised that Psuedofel be prescribed to close the hole that was opened during the laser surgery, to prevent ejaculate from leaking into the bladder. Michtavi was concerned that without treatment, he might become impotent. The BOP did not provide the medication because “[i]t is the Bureau of Prison’s position that the treatment of a sexual dysfunction is not medically necessary, and . . . medical providers are not to talk to inmates about ejaculation, since it is a prohibited sexual act.” The district court stated that “prisoners retain a fundamental right to preserve their procreative abilities for use following release from custody” and, because Michtavi had alleged that retrograde ejaculation could make him sterile, held that his Eighth Amendment claims should survive summary judgment. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because a prisoner’s right to treatment of retrograde ejaculation, infertility, or erectile dysfunction is not clearly established. View "Michtavi v. Scism" on Justia Law

Bare Exposure operates “Atlantic City’s Only All Nude Entertainment.” HMS, a private corporation, leases expressway service plazas from the South Jersey Transportation and New Jersey Turnpike Authorities to operate restaurants and convenience stores. The Authorities are not involved in day-to-day operations or management, but only perform long-term maintenance to parking areas, building exteriors, and lobbies. HMS entered into a contract, allowing CTM to install and service brochure display racks in plaza lobbies. HMS “must approve all brochures or publications” before placement. The Authorities were not a party to the CTM contract. HMS discovered a Bare Exposure brochure in a CTM display rack. HMS instructed CTM to remove all Bare Exposure brochures. HMS did not consult with or receive any direction from the Authorities and did not consider the New Jersey Administrative Code. The Authorities never directed HMS to take any actions regarding the brochures. Bare Exposure contends that the Authorities placed government signs and photographs in lobbies and filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that HMS violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of HMS. HMS did act not “under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State,” absent direct involvement by state authorities either in the decision to remove the brochures or in general plaza operations. View "P.R.B.A. Corp. v. HMS Host Toll Roads, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant Matthew Faush was an employee of a temporary staffing agency. He was assigned to Tuesday Morning, Inc., where he claimed he was subjected to slurs and accusations based on his race. Ultimately he was terminated. Appellant filed suit against Tuesday Morning, claiming violations of Title VII of the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. The district court granted summary judgment to Tuesday Morning on the ground that because appellant was not Tuesday Morning’s employee, Tuesday Morning was not liable for employment discrimination. The Third Circuit reversed, finding that a rational jury, applying the factors announced by the Supreme Court in “Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Darden,” could have found on these facts that appellant was Tuesday Morning’s employee for purposes of Title VII and the Human Relations Act. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Faush v. Tuesday Morning, Inc." on Justia Law

A former inmate claimed that correctional officers violated her constitutional rights when, without proper authorization, they took her from one place of confinement to another where they denied her potable water, clothing, and sanitary napkins and related medications and subjected her to an unlawful body cavity search. The district court granted three defendants summary judgment and dismissed remaining claims against the other defendants, finding that she did not demonstrate that there were issues of material fact and that the complaint did not allege facts constituting a cause of action. The Third Circuit affirmed as to the former New Jersey Attorney General, New Jersey Commissioner of Corrections, and a Correctional Sergeant, but reversed dismissal of cruel and unusual punishment claims against unnamed defendants with respect to: the alleged denial of potable water and sanitary napkins and related medications; the inmate being required to go to the shower or otherwise be exposed while naked in the presence of male prison personnel and inmates; body cavity search claims. View "Chavarriaga v. NJ Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs claim that, since January 2002, the New York City Police Department has conducted a secret program “to monitor the lives of Muslims, their businesses, houses of worship, organizations, and schools in New York City and surrounding states, particularly New Jersey.”.The claim that NYPD mounts remotely-controlled surveillance cameras on light poles, aimed at mosques and sends “undercover officers” into mosques, student organizations, businesses, and neighborhoods that “it believes to be heavily Muslim.” Plaintiffs allege that the program is based on the false and stigmatizing premise that Muslim religious identity “is a permissible proxy for criminality, and that Muslim individuals, businesses, and institutions can therefore be subject to pervasive surveillance not visited upon individuals, businesses, and institutions of any other religious faith or the public at large.” The district court dismissed their suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for lack of standing and failure to state a claim. The Third Circuit reversed. The allegations “tell a story in which there is standing to complain and which present constitutional concerns that must be addressed and, if true, redressed.” The court analogized the situation to that faced by Jewish-Americans during the Red Scare, African-Americans during the Civil Rights Movement, and Japanese-Americans during World War II. View "Hassan v. City of New York" on Justia Law