Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

On October 9, 2009, Lieutenant Fink escorted Robinson to his cell. Removing his handcuffs, Fink allegedly twisted Robinson’s arm “real hard” and said, “since today is my last day, I wanted to leave you with a present.” Robinson submitted a sick call request the next day. He was prescribed medication but continued to experience pain. Under the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections Inmate Abuse Allegation Monitoring Policy, an inmate could report abuse verbally or in writing to any staff member; file a grievance under the DOC Grievance Policy; or report in writing to the Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR). Once an inmate reported abuse, all subsequent procedures were to be conducted at the initiative of the prison administration; the staff member “shall complete” a report to a supervisor and the facility’s Security Office, which “shall” investigate and report to OPR. Robinson submitted Form DC-135A, describing the incident and asking the Unit Manager to investigate. He also filed a Sick Call Request, again describing the incident. Other than confirming that Robinson received an assessment and medication, no staff member followed up on Robinson’s reports. The Third Circuit vacated a finding of failure to exhaust administrative remedies and summary judgment in favor of Fink. The Prison Litigation Reform Act was satisfied by Robinson’s attempts to avail himself of the prison’s administrative processes and the prison’s noncompliance with its own deadline. View "Robinson v. Superintendent Rockview SCI" on Justia Law

Richardson was placed in Lewisburg Penitentiary's Special Management Unit (SMU) program, intended for inmates with histories of violence and individuals who “participated in or had leadership roles in geographical groups/gang related activity." In a purported class action, seeking damages and injunctive relief for “[a]ll persons who are currently or will be imprisoned in the SMU program at USP Lewisburg,” Richardson alleged that through a “pattern, practice or policy,” officials at USP Lewisburg frequently placed inmates with hostile cellmates, unnecessarily increasing the risk of violence and that if an inmate refused to accept a hostile cellmate, he would be placed in painful restraints. Richardson claims that he was subjected to this policy. The district court found Richardson’s class definition “untenable because it [wa]s not objectively, reasonably ascertainable.” Meanwhile, Richardson was transferred out of USP Lewisburg. The Third Circuit remanded, holding that Richardson’s class claims are not moot. When individual claims for relief are acutely susceptible to mootness, a would-be class representative may, in some circumstances, continue to seek certification after losing his personal stake in the case. Richardson may continue to seek class certification based on the Third Circuit’s intervening 2015 holding, in Shelton v. Bledsoe, that ascertainability is not required for Rule 23(b)(2) classes. View "Richardson v. Dir., Fed. Bureau of Prisons" on Justia Law

EMTs found three-year-old Jordan not breathing and without a pulse; there were bruises all over Jordan’s body, particularly severe across his ribs. Jordan’s mother, Candice, blamed the bruising on prior falls and horseplay with Jordan’s four-year-old brother, Kamden. A pathologist concluded that the bruises were too severe to have been caused by a four-year-old; he found gray material and bruising, consistent with being bound with duct tape. Candice lived with her three children and Candice’s mother, Lois. Candice was charged with first- and third-degree murder, aggravated assault, and endangering the welfare of a child. Lois pleaded guilty to endangering the welfare of children, regarding the condition of her home. Before trial, Candice told cellmates different stories about what happened to Jordan. Kamden stated to several people, and in a videotaped interview, that “mommy hit [Jordan] and pushed him . . . he fell down and died.” A judge determined that Kamden was competent to testify. For two years, Lois maintained that she did not cause Jordan’s death. Shortly before trial, Lois admitted to an investigator that she had abused Jordan by repeatedly hitting his ribs with a pipe, throwing him against the wall, and restraining him with duct tape. Lois refused to repeat her confession to the prosecutor or to testify at Candice’s trial. The court refused to admit the hearsay confession. There was testimony that Kamden sometimes referred to Lois as “mommy” and that both women abused Jordan. A jury convicted Candice of third-degree murder, aggravated assault, and endangering the welfare of a child; she was sentenced to 18-40 years imprisonment. The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting a claim of violation of Candice’s due process right to present her defense. “Lois’ statements had no indicia of credibility. Lois ... was attempting to have her cake and eat it too.” View "Staruh v. Superintendent, Cambridge Springs SCI" on Justia Law

Williams captioned his case as a state habeas action against a prison warden. He alleged claims about the conditions of his confinement, specifically Eighth Amendment claims about the lack of medical care. The Third Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action, noting that his claims did not challenge to the fact or duration of his imprisonment, which is the essential purpose of the writ of habeas corpus. Williams’s claims would properly be brought in an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, not a habeas petition. When the challenge is to a condition of confinement such that a finding in plaintiff's favor would not alter his sentence or undo his conviction, a civil rights action is appropriate. The court noted that Williams already has a civil rights action pending relating to the same or similar claims and deliberately filed a different type of action. View "Williams v. Warden, Lackawanna County Prison" on Justia Law

Aspiring political parties and their members challenged, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, the constitutionality of two provisions of Pennsylvania’s election code: 25 Pa. Stat. 2911(b) and 2937. The provisions, respectively, regulate the number of signatures required to attain a position on the general election ballot and govern the process by which private individuals can sue in the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court to challenge the validity of a candidate’s nomination paper or petition. At the summary judgment stage, the district court held that, acting in combination, the two provisions, as applied, violated plaintiffs’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. On appeal, the Commonwealth argued that neither named state official has a sufficient connection to the challenged provisions to be a proper defendant and that the court’s order was “incoherent on its face” The Third Circuit affirmed, rejecting the “technical issues” raised by the Commonwealth. Both the Secretary of the Commonwealth and its Commissioner of the Pennsylvania Bureau of Commissions, Elections, and Legislation had a sufficient connection to the enforcement of the challenged provisions as required under Ex Parte Young. View "Constitution Party of Pa. v. Cortes" on Justia Law

The sole issue at his trial on a charge of possessing a firearm as a convicted felon, 18 U.S.C. 922(g) was whether Lopez possessed a gun. The jury heard from Lopez and from arresting officers Martinez and Ramos, who testified that they found a gun in Lopez’s pocket after encountering him leaving the scene of a reported burglary-in-progress. Lopez’s credibility was crucial to his defense. He admitted that when he was taken to the precinct, he gave officers his brother’s name rather than his own and that he had prior felony convictions. During cross-examination and closing arguments, the prosecution emphasized that Lopez did not say that he had been framed by the police or complain about alleged excessive force until he testified at trial. The Third Circuit vacated Lopez’s conviction, based on the government’s use of his post-Miranda silence to impeach him. View "United States v. Lopez" on Justia Law

In 2012, Dellavecchia was convicted of first-degree murder, criminal attempt (homicide), three counts of recklessly endangering another person, and weapons-related offenses. At trial, Ridley Township Lieutenant Willoughby testified that Dellavecchia made an incriminating statement immediately following a bedside arraignment conducted while he was hospitalized for a self-inflicted head injury on the day following his arrest for the commission of the offenses. Dellavecchia made his statement without counsel present and without having been given Miranda warnings; he had not waived the right to counsel. The Third Circuit affirmed denial of his petition for habeas relief, concluding that Willoughby did not deliberately elicit Dellavecchia’s statement and consequently did not violate Dellavecchia’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel. The court noted that the evidence, even disregarding Dellavecchia’s statement, overwhelmingly supported his convictions, so that any error when Willoughby recounted the statement at trial would have been harmless. View "Dellavecchia v. Sec'y Penn. Dep't of Corrs." on Justia Law

Mammaro filed a civil rights suit, claiming that the temporary removal of her child from her custody by the New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency was a violation of her substantive due process right as a parent. The removal, following a domestic violence incident between Mammaro and her husband, was based on allegations of neglect by Mammaro’s husband and brother-in-law, supplemented by two positive drug tests of Mammaro, and Mammaro’s decision to take the child from supervised housing, The district court held that several individual caseworkers were not entitled to qualified immunity. The Third Circuit reversed, finding there was no clearly established law, so that a reasonable caseworker would have understood that temporarily removing a child in these circumstances would violate substantive due process. View "Mammaro v. N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency" on Justia Law

In 2006, Lane hired Connelly as one of seven union truck drivers at its Pittsburgh facility. Connelly ranked fifth in seniority and was the only woman. In 2007, allegedly because Connelly had ended a romance with a co-worker (Nogy), her male co-workers began “curs[ing] ... and belittl[ing] her." Connelly notified supervisors. Lane suspended Nogy for three days but did not discipline or warn any other employees, who continued to harass Connelly. In 2009, Connelly learned about the company’s “Ethics Line,” which she called multiple times to report further harassment and make complaints about her male co-workers drinking on the job. In 2010, a Lane foreman made an unwanted physical advance to Connelly, which she reported to the Ethics Line and to her supervisor. In October 2010, a Lane supervisor became “incensed” at Connelly when she refused to drive a truck that had a flat tire and steering problems. Soon after, Connelly was laid off before the end of the construction season and before any other union truck driver. She was never recalled her to work. Lane did recall male truck drivers in 2011 and continues to employ them. The Third Circuit vacated dismissal of Connelly’s suit, which alleged disparate treatment, sexual harassment, hostile work environment, and retaliation under 42 U.S.C. 2000e, finding her claims plausible. View "Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp" on Justia Law

Willis worked as a Neonatal Nurse Practitioner at Children’s from August 1993 until her termination in January 2012. From 2001 until 2011, Willis served as co-lead NNP. Lamouree, the nurse manager for the newborn intensive care unit was Willis’s supervisor. Lamouree’s supervisors were Valenta and Hupp. Starting in August 2011, Children’s issued Willis disciplinary warnings for three distinct incidents, all involving communications Willis was 61 years old at the time of her termination. After the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission closed Willis’s case, Willis sued under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act and Pennsylvania Human Relations Act. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants, stating that Willis was unable to provide specifics to establish that this other employee was in fact not disciplined, and if so, any reason why she was not disciplined. In the pretext context, this type of second-hand, general rumor regarding a single substantially younger employee is insufficient as a matter of law to show pretext. While evidence demonstrating that a single member of a non-protected group received more favorable treatment can be relevant, “[a] decision adversely affecting an older employee does not become a discriminatory decision merely because one younger employee is treated differently.” View "Willis v. Childrens Hosp. of Pittsburgh" on Justia Law