Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, inmates in the custody of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, were each sentenced to death and housed on the death row of his respective institution. Eventually, their death sentences were vacated, but several years elapsed before they were resentenced to life without parole. In the interim, Plaintiffs spent several years in the solitary confinement of death row. They sought damages, alleging violation of their Fourteenth Amendment rights to due process by continuing to subject them to the deprivations of solitary confinement on death row without meaningful review of their placements after their death sentences had been vacated. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. There is a constitutionally protected liberty interest that prohibits the state from continuing to house inmates in solitary confinement on death row after they have been granted resentencing hearings, without meaningful review of the continuing placement, however that principle was not previously clearly established, so prison officials are entitled to qualified immunity. The court noted scientific consensus concerning the harms of solitary confinement and recent precedent involving non-death row solitary confinement. View "Williams v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

In 1996, Gardner and others were convicted of racketeering, racketeering conspiracy, conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance, conspiracy to commit murder, murder in aid of racketeering, carjacking resulting in death, and using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence causing death. Gardner was sentenced to concurrent terms of life imprisonment on each count and 120 months on Count 4. The Fourth Circuit affirmed on direct appeal and, later, denial of his petition under 28 U.S.C. 2255, asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. In 2014, Gardner sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. 2241, citing the Supreme Court’s intervening “Alleyne” holding that “[a]ny fact that, by law, increases the [mandatory minimum] penalty for a crime is an ‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.” The district court dismissed, finding that Gardner’s claims should have been raised in a section 2255 motion in the court that sentenced him. The Third Circuit affirmed, noting section 2241’s limited scope. Alleyne simply extended the logic of Apprendi to mandatory minimums for criminal sentences; neither makes previously criminal conduct noncriminal. Because section 2255 is not inadequate or ineffective to raise an Apprendi argument, it is not inadequate or ineffective to raise an Alleyne argument. View "Gardner v. Warden Lewisburg USP" on Justia Law

In 2008, Camden implemented a “directed patrols” policy, requiring police officers to engage with city residents even though the residents are not suspected of any wrongdoing. The program consisted of “a structured 15-20 minute deployment into a targeted area to accomplish a specific patrol or crime reduction function.” Officers are to obtain personal information from the individuals they interact with, if the individuals agree to provide it. During these encounters, officers should “approach community members" and "inquire about criminal activity or quality of life issues.” According to the city, directed patrols in Camden were not new. “[T]he difference ... was that directed patrols would be tracked and recorded. The Fraternal Order of Police sued, claiming Camden had imposed an unlawful quota on arrests or citations because officers on supplemental patrol were expected to conduct a minimum of 27 directed patrols per shift and officers on regular patrol were expected to perform a minimum of 18; failure to comply is cause for disciplinary action, in violation of N.J.S.A. 40A:14-181.2. Individual officers alleged retaliation. The court granted defendants summary judgment, finding the anti-quota statute inapplicable to the policy. The Third Circuit affirmed with respect to the anti-quota law and First Amendment retaliation, but reversed as to whistleblower-retaliation. View "Fraternal Order of Police Lodge 1 v. City of Camden" on Justia Law

Marshall was sentenced to death in Pennsylvania in 1984 and has been pursuing a federal habeas petition since 2003. Marshall initially filed his petition through the Federal Community Defender; years later, on Marshall’s motion, the district court appointed new attorneys to represent Marshall. Marshall soon became dissatisfied with them because they would not withdraw the habeas petition filed by the Community Defender and assert different claims. Marshall eventually filed pro se a document, requesting an order: removing his new counsel; striking the habeas petition and other documents filed by the Community Defender; allowing the filing of a new habeas petition “nunc pro tunc”; and remanding for a new hearing “nunc pro tunc” in state court. In 2015, the court dismissed Marshall’s last three requests without prejudice. Counsel sought a determination of Marshall’s mental competence. The court held three hearings before Marshall consented to a psychiatric evaluation, which concluded that Marshall is not competent to assist his counsel or to proceed pro se. Eight days after a fourth hearing, before the court had announced any decision, Marshall filed a pro se notice of appeal. The district court subsequently found Marshall mentally incompetent and denied his request for removal of counsel. Marshall’s 30-day deadline to appeal that ruling expired without any filings. The Seventh Circuit dismissed. Marshall’s premature notice of appeal did not ripen when the district court issued its decision. View "Marshall v. Commissioner, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections" on Justia Law

Zaloga owns Correctional Care, a medical company, which contracted with theCounty Prison Board to provide medical services to the Lackawanna County Prison. Zaloga was frustrated with how the Borough (Moosic) handled disputes between Zaloga and a tire company that occupied a facility immediately adjacent to the Zalogas’ home. Among other actions, Zaloga opposed Mercatili’s reelection as the President of the Borough Council. About a month later, the Lackawanna County Solicitor notified Zaloga that the County intended not to continue the contract with Correctional Care upon its expiration, but that Correctional Care could compete in bidding for a new contract. Prison Board members and others indicated Mercatili and another were attempting to block Correctional Care’s contract renewal. Despite the purported political pressure, the County unanimously voted to award Correctional Care a three-year contract renewal. Zagora filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging retaliation in response to Zaloga’s exercise of his First Amendment rights. The district court decided that Mercatili’s claim to qualified immunity depended on disputed facts and would have to be resolved by a jury. The Third Circuit reversed. Mercatili’s conduct, even if Zaloga’s allegations are true, did not violate clearly established law. View "Zaloga v. Borough of Moosic" on Justia Law

Mack, a Muslim inmate at the federal correctional institution in Loretto, Pennsylvania, claims that he was terminated from his paid work assignment for complaining to a prison official about two correctional officers’ anti-Muslim harassment at work. He also claims that the same officers’ harassment had caused him to refrain from praying while at work. Mack brought suit, pro se, against prison employees seeking monetary relief for alleged violations of his rights under the First Amendment, Fifth Amendment, and the Religious Freedom and Restoration Act (RFRA). The district court dismissed all of Mack’s claims. The Third Circuit vacated as to the First Amendment retaliation and RFRA claims. The court held that an inmate’s oral grievance to prison officials can constitute protected activity under the Constitution; that RFRA prohibits individual conduct that substantially burdens religious exercise; and that RFRA provides for monetary relief from an official sued in his individual capacity. The court upheld dismissal of the First Amendment Free Exercise and Fifth Amendment equal protection claims. View "Mack v. Warden, Loretto Fed. Corr. Inst." on Justia Law

As a result of criminal convictions Immigration and Customs Enforcement sought removal of lawful U.S. permanent residents. Pending removal proceedings, each was detained under 8 U.S.C. 1226(c), which provides that if ICE has “reason to believe” that an alien is “deportable” or “inadmissible” by virtue of having committed a specified crime, that alien “shall” be taken into custody when released from detention for that crime, "without regard to whether the alien is released on parole, supervised release, or probation, and without regard to whether the alien may be arrested or imprisoned again for the same offense.” In a purported class action, the district court dismissed in part, holding that section 1226(c) did not violate substantive due process with respect to aliens who assert a substantial challenge to their removability. The court later held that the form giving aliens notice of their right to seek a hearing does not provide constitutionally adequate notice, that the government was required to revise the form, and that procedures for that hearing violate due process by not placing the initial burden on the government. The court then denied a motion to certify the class, stating that certification was “unnecessary” because “all aliens who are subjected to mandatory detention would benefit from the injunctive relief and remedies.” Stating that the district court “put the cart before the horse a,” the Third Circuit vacated. Once petitioners were released from detention, their individual claims became moot so the court retained jurisdiction only to rule on the motion for class certification—not to decide the merits issues. View "Gayle v. Warden Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Inst." on Justia Law

On April 22, 2012, Philadelphia Police Officer Dempsey was on solo patrol in a radio car in North Philadelphia, armed with a baton, a taser, and a handgun. Around 2:00 a.m. and again at 5:30, Dempsey received a call that a naked man was standing in North Mascher Street. Dempsey and other officers responded, but found no one. At 6:00 a.m., a passing motorist informed Dempsey of a naked man at the corner of North Mascher and Nedro Avenue. Dempsey radioed in the information, drove to the intersection, and saw a naked man (Newsuan), standing in front of a residence. Accounts diverge as to what happened next. Ultimately Newsuan, high on PCP, attacked Dempsey, slammed him into multiple cars, and tried to remove Dempsey’s handgun. Dempsey shot and killed Newsuan. The district court entered summary judgment, rejecting excessive force claims by Newsuan’s estate under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The Third Circuit affirmed. Regardless of whether Dempsey unnecessarily initiated a one-on-one confrontation with Newsuan that led to the subsequent fatal altercation, Newsuan’s violent attack on officer Dempsey was a superseding cause that severed any causal link between Dempsey’s initial actions and his subsequent justified use of lethal force. View "Johnson v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

Goodwin was arrested pursuant to a warrant for allegedly selling heroin to an undercover police officer. He was indicted, but the charges were eventually dropped. Goodwin brought suit, 42 U.S.C. 1983, for false imprisonment and malicious prosecution against the detectives involved in securing his arrest warrant. He claims that they submitted a false warrant application because they knew or should have known that he was in jail at the time of one of the undercover drug deals. He argues that his incarceration was evident from a booking sheet the detectives had when they applied for his arrest warrant. The detectives moved for summary judgment, asserting qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion, holding that there was a genuine dispute as to whether the detectives possessed the booking sheet when they submitted the warrant. At oral argument before the Third Circuit, defense counsel conceded that the detectives were aware of the booking sheet before submitting the warrant application. The court concluded that booking sheet did not preclude a finding of probable cause. The sheet showed the date on which Goodwin was incarcerated. It did not say when he was released and did not trigger a duty to further investigate. The detectives had probable cause when they applied for Goodwin’s arrest warrant and are entitled to qualified immunity. View "Goodwin v. Conway" on Justia Law

Mancini, a former Northampton County, Pennsylvania assistant county solicitor, filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action against Northampton County, County Executive Brown, and County Solicitor Scomillio, in connection with their termination of her employment. Mancini, a Democrat, alleged that she was a protected career service employee and that the newly elected Republican administration wrongfully dismissed her in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause and the First Amendment. The elimination of her position was the only ground Northampton provided for Mancini’s dismissal. Although the county held an informal hearing on her grievance after her termination, no decision was ever announced. A jury found that Northampton County, but not Brown or Scomillio, violated Mancini’s procedural due process rights and awarded her $94,232 in damages. The Third Circuit affirmed. A claimed “reorganization exception” to the constitutional procedural due process requirement cannot apply, as a matter of law, if there is a genuine factual dispute about whether the reorganization was a pretext for an unlawful termination. Northampton did not provide Mancini the meaningful process she was due and the jury could have reasonably concluded that the reorganization of the Solicitor’s Office was a pretext for unlawfully terminating Mancini. View "Mancini v. Northampton County" on Justia Law