Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Jeffrey Herrera filed a pro se complaint alleging that he was detained for several months beyond his maximum release date, which he claimed violated the Eighth Amendment. Herrera was arrested in September 2012, sentenced in March 2013 to 36 to 72 months’ imprisonment, and released on parole in December 2014. After violating parole, his sentence was reduced in January 2017 to 30 to 66 months, with credit for time served. Despite this, Herrera claimed he was detained until October 2019, seven months past his maximum release date of March 2019.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissed Herrera’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), reasoning that his claim must be brought as a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and that his claim for damages was barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). The court also found that any amendment to the complaint would be futile. Herrera’s motions for reconsideration and relief from judgment were denied, with the court maintaining that his claim was barred by Heck and the statute of limitations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case and determined that Heck does not apply to Herrera’s overdetention claim because it does not imply that his conviction or sentence were invalid. The court found that Herrera plausibly pleaded an Eighth Amendment overdetention claim, as he alleged that prison officials were aware of his overdetention and failed to act, resulting in his prolonged detention. However, the court noted that the claim might be time-barred under Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations but remanded the case to allow Herrera to amend his complaint to address potential tolling of the statute of limitations. The Third Circuit vacated the District Court’s order and remanded for further proceedings. View "Herrera v. Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole" on Justia Law

Richard Hightower, a pretrial detainee, was attacked by his cellmate, Anthony Tyler, in a Philadelphia jail, resulting in Hightower's paralysis. Hightower was classified as a low-security risk, while Tyler was classified as a high-security risk with a history of violent behavior. Due to a mistake by a prison health services company, Tyler was placed in Hightower's intake cell instead of being transferred to a permanent cell. Tyler's aggressive behavior escalated, culminating in a violent attack on Hightower.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granted summary judgment in favor of the City of Philadelphia and the guards. Hightower did not appeal the judgment for the guard but did appeal the judgment for the city.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Hightower failed to prove that the city caused any constitutional violation. To succeed in his Monell claim, Hightower needed to show that the city had an unconstitutional policy or custom or was deliberately indifferent to inmates' rights. The court found that the city had no policy of not separating inmates by security-risk level during intake and that the lack of a policy is not a policy. Additionally, Hightower could not show a custom that violated his rights or that the city acted with deliberate indifference. The court concluded that the risk to Hightower was not so obvious that the city could be held liable without a pattern of similar violations.The Third Circuit affirmed the District Court's summary judgment in favor of the City of Philadelphia. View "Hightower v. City of Philadelphia" on Justia Law

Jorge Rivera-Guadalupe was living in a rooming house in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, when he was mugged and robbed. His friend, Christopher Valkosak, came to stay with him for protection. The next evening, Valkosak was shot by a stranger in the hallway outside Rivera-Guadalupe’s room. Detective Jacob Pierce investigated the incident, interviewed a neighbor who described the shooter as a tall Black male, and obtained a search warrant for Rivera-Guadalupe’s room. The search yielded marijuana, a knife, and IDs but no gun. Rivera-Guadalupe was arrested and charged with multiple offenses, including attempted homicide and possession of marijuana. He was acquitted of all charges after being incarcerated for over eighteen months.The United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania dismissed claims against other defendants but allowed the malicious prosecution claim against Det. Pierce to proceed. Det. Pierce sought dismissal based on qualified immunity, arguing that probable cause for some charges precluded a malicious prosecution claim. The District Court, referencing Johnson v. Knorr, held that probable cause for one charge does not insulate officers from liability for malicious prosecution on other charges lacking probable cause. Det. Pierce’s motion for judgment on the pleadings was denied, and he appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the right to be prosecuted only on charges supported by probable cause was not clearly established at the time of Rivera-Guadalupe’s prosecution due to conflicting precedents within the circuit and among other circuits. The court reversed the District Court’s denial of qualified immunity for Det. Pierce and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss on that basis. The court clarified that the any-crime rule applies to false arrest claims but not to malicious prosecution claims. View "Rivera-Guadalupe v. Pierce" on Justia Law

A Harrisburg, Pennsylvania ordinance prohibits persons to “knowingly congregate, patrol, picket or demonstrate in a zone extending 20 feet from any portion of an entrance to, exit from, or driveway of a health care facility.” Individuals purporting to provide “sidewalk counseling” to those entering abortion clinics claimed that the ordinance violated their First Amendment rights to speak, exercise their religion, and assemble, and their due process and equal protection rights. The court determined that the ordinance was content-neutral because it did not define or regulate speech by subject-matter or purpose, so that intermediate scrutiny applied, and reasoned that it must accept as true (on a motion to dismiss) claims that the city did not consider less restrictive alternatives. The claims proceeded to discovery. In denying preliminary injunctive relief, the court ruled that plaintiffs did not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits. The Third Circuit vacated. In deciding whether to issue a preliminary injunction, plaintiffs normally bear the burden of demonstrating likelihood of prevailing on the merits. In First Amendment cases where the government bears the burden of proof on the ultimate question of a statute’s constitutionality, plaintiffs must be deemed likely to prevail for purposes of considering a preliminary injunction unless the government has shown that plaintiffs’ proposed less restrictive alternatives are less effective than the statute. View "Reilly v. City of Harrisburg" on Justia Law

Roquet, is a psychologist at the Avenel Special Treatment Unit (STU), where Oliver, a sexually violent predator, has been civilly committed for treatment. At least annually, the Treatment Progress Review Committee (TPRC) interviews each detainee and considers a range of materials to formulate a recommendation about whether the patient should progress to the next step in the program. Roquet, a member of the TPRC, wrote a report that recommended that Oliver not advance in treatment. The Report recognized that this was “not consistent” with Oliver’s treatment team's recommendation, but concluded that Oliver “had not fully met the treatment goals,” provided a detailed overview of Oliver’s sexual and non-sexual offenses, diagnostic history, and clinical treatment, and summarized the results of Oliver's interview, including that “it appears that he denies, minimizes or justifies much of his documented offense history,” and that “[h]e did not demonstrate remorse for his crimes or empathy for his victims.” Oliver sued, alleging retaliation for his First Amendment-protected participation in legal activities on behalf of himself and other STU residents. The Third Circuit concluded that Roquet was entitled to qualified immunity, reasoning that Oliver pleaded facts reflecting that Roquet based her recommendation on the medically-relevant collateral consequences of his protected activity, but has not sufficiently pleaded that the recommendation was based on the protected activity itself. View "Oliver v. Roquet" on Justia Law

Court erred in dismissing civil rights claims as time-barred without considering whether inmate exhausted administrative remedies and whether limitations period should be tolled.Wisniewski, a Pennsylvania inmate, filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. He worked as an aide in the prison’s law library. Believing that prison policies were harming inmates’ ability to access the courts, he registered complaints. Based on his possession of another inmate’s grievance forms, Wisniewski was found guilty of engaging in or encouraging unauthorized group activity, possession or circulation of a petition, possession of contraband, and lying to an employee. The charges were dismissed after Wisniewski spent 90 days in the Restricted Housing Unit. Wisniewski alleged additional retaliation: removal from his job, tampering with his television, denying him yard time, delaying his disciplinary confinement release, and interfering with his access to legal materials and the photocopier. The district court dismissed the claims arising out of events that occurred more than two years before the filing of the complaint and dismissed the remaining First Amendment retaliation claims for failure to state a claim. The Third Circuit reversed in part; the district court erred in dismissing the claims as time-barred without considering whether Wisniewski properly exhausted administrative remedies and to what extent the limitations period should be tolled. View "Wisniewski v. Fisher" on Justia Law

Counsel was ineffective in failing to object to jury instruction concerning eyewitness testimony, using the words “may not” rather than “need not.” Bey was convicted of murder, attempted murder, and possessing an instrument of crime, based on a nonfatal shooting and a fatal shooting that took place in 2001. Philadelphia Police Officer Taylor was in the parking lot during the shooting: his identification of Bey as the shooter was consistent and unequivocal. However, in statements to Bey’s then-defense counsel, the surviving victim said that his shooter was not Bey. Defense counsel requested a “Kloiber” jury instruction. In instructing the jury, the court changed a word, telling jurors that they “may not” receive an identification with caution rather than instructing them that they “need not” receive the identification with caution. Defense counsel did not object. In his unsuccessful petition for state post-conviction relief, Bey raised an ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on the Kloiber instruction, but failed to highlight the “may not” language. The federal district court held that, to the extent that Bey’s ineffective assistance claims were not procedurally defaulted, Bey could not show prejudice because “there was overwhelming evidence of guilt.” The Third Circuit reversed, based on the Kloiber claim, finding cause to excuse Bey’s procedural default. View "Bey v. Superintendent Greene SCI" on Justia Law

Pretrial detainee’s due process rights were not violated by placement in administrative segregation and restriction of phone privileges pending investigation of misconduct. While Steele was a pretrial detainee at New Jersey’s Middlesex County Adult Correction Center, officials received credible information that Steele was threatening other detainees in order to coerce them into using Speedy Bail Bond Service and was receiving compensation from Speedy. After interviewing Steele and advising him of the allegations, officials placed him in administrative segregation while they investigated. Steele’s telephone privileges were restricted to legal calls only. Steele filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming violations of his due process rights when the defendants transferred him to administrative segregation and restricted his phone privileges, interfering with his ability to find a co-signer for his own bail. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment for all defendants. Defendants’ limitation of Steele’s phone privileges did not “shock the conscience.” Steele has not met his heavy burden of showing that defendants exaggerated their response to the genuine security considerations that actuated his move. Steele’s transfer was for institutional security reasons rather than for discipline or punishment and he was accorded the required level of process. View "Steele v. Cicchi" on Justia Law

In 2008, the Delaware correctional system was facing scandal for its handling of inmate releases. One inmate committed suicide in his cell on the day he was supposed to be—but was not—released. Dozens of others had either been released too early or too late. Reform consisted of establishment of a new Central Offender Records office within the Delaware Department of Corrections. Inmates who were over-detained sued top correctional officials in a putative class action, claiming that Delaware’s problems with over-detentions have, if anything, gotten worse since 2008. The Third Circuit affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendants. The court noted that “hard, reliable data about the number of over-detentions occurring each year is more or less missing from the record.” To survive summary judgment on an allegation of deliberate indifference, the plaintiffs needed more than speculation connecting any increase in over-detentions with the COR policies they deem ineffective. View "Wharton v. Danberg" on Justia Law

Brandon, convicted of burglary, was sentenced to 16–48 months’ imprisonment. During intake, Brandon informed mental health staff that he had attempted suicide, had recently engaged in self-harm, and had plans about how to kill himself. Brandon was diagnosed with serious mental disorders, identified as a “suicide behavior risk,” and placed on the mental health roster. During his incarceration at Pennsylania's SCI Cresson, Brandon reported suicidal thoughts. Brandon did not receive counseling or evaluation; any mental health interviews were conducted “through the cell door slot in the solitary confinement unit.” Brandon was repeatedly subjected to solitary confinement. Most SCI Cresson incidents of self-harm occurred in solitary confinement. During Brandon’s incarceration, the U.S. Department of Justice investigated allegations that SCI Cresson provided inadequate mental health care, failed to adequately protect prisoners, and subjected them to excessive periods of isolation. Ultimately, the DOJ reported “systemwide failure” to consider mental health issues appropriately, a “fragmented and ineffective” mental healthcare program, insufficient staffing, poor recordkeeping, screening and diagnostic procedures, deficient oversight and lack of training in the proper response to warning signs by mentally ill prisoners. Brandon, age 23, committed suicide while in solitary confinement. The Third Circuit reversed dismissal of his parents’ civil rights claims. Their allegations support an inference that, despite knowing of Brandon’s vulnerability and the increased risk of suicide in solitary confinement, the defendants disregarded that risk and permitted Brandon to be repeatedly isolated in solitary confinement. View "Palakovic v. Wetzel" on Justia Law