Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff Planned Parenthood Association of Utah (PPAU) filed this 42 U.S.C. 1983 action claiming that defendant Gary Herbert, the Governor of Utah, violated PPAU’s constitutional rights by directing defendant Joseph Miner, the Executive Director of the Utah Department of Health (UDOH), to stop UDOH from acting as an intermediary for “pass-through” federal funds that PPAU used to carry out certain programs within the State of Utah. PPAU also filed a motion seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a preliminary injunction. Although the district court initially issued a TRO, it ultimately withdrew it and denied PPAU’s request for a preliminary injunction. PPAU filed this interlocutory appeal challenging the denial of its motion for preliminary injunction. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals granted a stay in favor of PPAU to prevent the cessation of funding during the pendency of this appeal, and expedited the briefing and oral argument schedule. After that briefing and oral argument, the Tenth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court and remanded with instructions to grant PPAU’s motion for preliminary injunction. View "Planned Parenthood v. Herbert" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Mark Kilcrease was a commercial truck driver temporarily unable to work due to the effects of cancer. After his cancer went into remission, plaintiff applied for a truck-driving position with Domenico Transportation Company. Domenico rejected plaintiff's application, and he filed suit, alleging discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court granted summary judgment to Domenico on both claims, and plaintiff appealed. After review, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment on both claims. With respect to his discrimination claim, the Court agreed with the district court that plaintiff failed to demonstrate he was a qualified individual within the meaning of the ADA and therefore could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination. With respect to his retaliation claim, the Court concluded plaintiff could not show the requisite nexus between his ADA complaints and an adverse employment action. View "Kilcrease v. Domenico Transportation" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action in which they raised various claims relating to their arrests and now-vacated convictions for prostitution. The district court, with a magistrate judge presiding by consent of the parties, dismissed most of Plaintiffs’ claims as barred by the statute of limitations and granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ surviving claims of malicious prosecution. Plaintiffs appealed only the grant of summary judgment on their malicious prosecution claims against one Defendant, David Young. Young was employed by the City of Albuquerque as a civilian fleet manager for the police department. He also served as a voluntary reserve officer for the police department. In separate incidents occurring in 2007 and 2008, Plaintiffs were each arrested by Young on charges of prostitution after a brief conversation in his unmarked vehicle. Young then filed criminal complaints and prosecuted misdemeanor prostitution cases against Plaintiffs in municipal court. Each Plaintiff pled guilty to the charges against her. In 2011, an attorney filed a petition for relief from judgment on behalf of Plaintiffs and nine other women who had pled guilty to prostitution after being arrested and prosecuted by Young, arguing he abused and misrepresented his position and authority as an agent of the City of Albuquerque when making the arrests. Instead of filing a response to the petition, the city entered into a stipulation with the petitioners agreeing that the requested relief should be granted. The state district court entered a set aside petitioners’ guilty pleas, vacating and dismissing with prejudice their judgments and sentences. Plaintiffs then filed this federal 1983 action in which they alleged, among other claims, that Young subjected them to malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. After dismissing Plaintiffs’ other claims as barred by the statute of limitations, the federal district court determined Young was entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution claims because they had not met their burden of demonstrating that their criminal cases were terminated in a way that indicated their actual innocence of the charges against them. "Although we sympathize with Plaintiffs’ concerns about possible abuses of police power and authority, we are not persuaded that these concerns require (or permit) us to vary from our settled law on malicious prosecution." The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. View "M.G. v. Young" on Justia Law

Pro se plaintiffs-appellees Kent and Tonya Mayfield brought this action against Deputy Jim Bethards under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming he violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by entering their property without a warrant with the intention of killing their two pet dogs. In the Complaint, the Mayfields alleged a witness observed that although neither dog acted aggressively, both officers began firing on the dogs once on the Mayfields’ property. Deputy Clark fired on Suka, the Mayfields’ brown dog, but missed as she fled to the back of the house. Deputy Bethards shot Majka, the Mayfields’ white Malamute Husky, three times, killing her on the front porch. The deputies then unsuccessfully searched for Suka behind the house, where she had disappeared into a wooded section of the Mayfields’ property. The Complaint further alleged that upon returning to the front yard, the deputies first moved Majka’s body in an apparent attempt to obscure that she had been shot on the Mayfields’ property and then tried to hide her body in a row of trees. Deputy Bethards raised a qualified-immunity defense and moved to dismiss the Complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The district court denied his motion and Deputy Bethards appeals. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Mayfield v. Bethards" on Justia Law

Pro se plaintiff-appellant LaTonya Davis brought this action against four Lakewood Police Department officers and the City of Lakewood (the “City”). She alleged that the officers used excessive force in arresting her for a misdemeanor offense. Police stopped Davis’ car, which had a license plate with a handicapped symbol, for driving with a suspended license. Officer Todd Clifford called for additional assistance; several police cars arrived and officers began pounding Davis’ car with their batons, demanding she exit the vehicle. Fearing for her safety, Davis asked the officers for assurances that they would not hurt her, and they responded by smashing her car window, pulling her through the broken window by her hair and arms, and throwing her on the glass-littered pavement. Davis claimed the City was culpable in failing to properly train and supervise the officers. She appealed the district court’s grant of summary judgment, which held the officers were entitled to qualified immunity and that the City was not liable. After review, the Tenth Circuit affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings. Specifically, the Court reversed the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to two of the officers, Clifford and Sergeant Todd Fahlsing. "If proven, their alleged use of force against a misdemeanant who did not pose an immediate threat to herself or others would be excessive under clearly established law." The Court affirmed as to all other defendants because Davis waived any challenge with respect to those defendants. View "Davis v. Clifford" on Justia Law

Robert Adair was a firefighter with the City of Muskogee, Oklahoma (the City) when he injured his back during a training exercise. As a result of his injury, Adair completed a functional-capacity evaluation that measured and limited his lifting capabilities. After two years on paid leave, Adair received a workers’ compensation award definitively stating that Adair’s lifting restrictions were permanent. The same month he received his award, Adair retired from the Muskogee Fire Department. Adair argued that his retirement was a constructive discharge: he claimed that the City forced him to choose between being fired and retiring, which, he contended, discriminated against him in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), and retaliated against him for receiving a workers’ compensation award in violation of the Oklahoma Workers’ Compensation Act, Okla. The district court granted the City’s motion for summary judgment. "Unfortunately, in analyzing Adair’s discrimination claims, neither the parties nor the district court recognized the changes that Congress made to the ADA in enacting the ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA)." Notwithstanding this error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. "Even if the City regarded Adair as having an impairment, Adair cannot show that he was qualified to meet the physical demands required of firefighters or that the City could reasonably accommodate his lifting restrictions." View "Adair v. City of Muskogee" on Justia Law

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) brought a civil enforcement action against three Papa John’s entities for violating the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) by denying a reasonable workplace accommodation to the appellant. Scott Bonn, and firing him for requesting this accommodation. Bonn moved to intervene, but the district court determined that Bonn’s claim was subject to arbitration under an agreement that Bonn’s mother had executed. Based on this determination, the district court denied the motion to intervene and ordered Bonn to arbitrate his claim. Bonn appealed the denial of his motion to intervene and the order compelling arbitration. After review, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the arbitration agreement did not curtail Bonn’s unconditional statutory right to intervene. Accordingly, the Court reversed the denial of the motion to intervene. Furthermore, the Court concluded that it lacked appellate jurisdiction over the order compelling arbitration. "Although the district court ordered Mr. Bonn to arbitrate his claim, that order did not affect the EEOC’s claim against Papa John’s, which remains pending. Because that claim remains, the order compelling arbitration did not constitute a 'final decision,' which is necessary for appellate jurisdiction over an order compelling arbitration. Therefore, we dismiss this part of Mr. Bonn’s appeal." View "EEOC v. PJ Utah, LLC" on Justia Law

Wasatch Equality and four snowboarders (collectively, Wasatch) sued to challenge a snowboard ban at Alta Ski Area in Utah. In its complaint, Wasatch alleged the ban unconstitutionally discriminated against snowboarders and denied them equal protection of the law in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Recognizing that private action won’t sustain a civil rights complaint, Wasatch further alleged the ban constituted “state action” because Alta operated its ski resort on federal land via a permit issued by the United States Forest Service. The district court disagreed, and dismissed this case for failure to identify a state action. Because the Tenth Circuit agreed Wasatch hadn't plausibly established that the snowboard ban constituted state action, the Court affirmed. View "Wasatch Equality v. Alta Ski Lifts" on Justia Law

Kody Brown, Meri Brown, Janelle Brown, Christine Brown, and Robyn Sullivan (“the Browns”) form a “plural family.” Kody Brown is legally married to Meri Brown and “spiritually married” to the other three women, whom he calls “sister wives.” When the family became the subject of a TLC reality television show in 2010, the Lehi Police Department opened an investigation of the Browns for violating Utah’s bigamy statute, Utah Code Annotated section 76-7-101. The Browns then filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action in federal district court against the Governor and Attorney General of the State of Utah and the Utah County Attorney. Claiming the Statute infringed their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights, the Browns sought declaratory relief and a permanent injunction enjoining enforcement of the Statute against them. The Tenth Circuit concluded after review of this matter that the district court erred by proceeding to the merits: "[f]ollowing adoption of the [Utah County Attorney’s Office] UCAO Policy, the Browns’ suit ceased to qualify as an Article III case or controversy. Their suit was moot before the district court awarded them relief, and the court therefore lacked jurisdiction to decide the Browns’ claims." View "Brown v. Buhman" on Justia Law

Three Albuquerque Police Department officers shot plaintiff-appellant Stephan Cordova after he raised a gun in their direction. Cordova survived and was charged with assault, although the charges were later dismissed on speedy trial grounds. Cordova then brought this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming primarily: (1) that the charges of assault were brought in bad faith; (2) that the police unreasonably prevented interaction with his family when he was in a hospital recovering from his wounds; and (3) the police used excessive force by firing on him without an adequate warning. The district court allowed only the Fourth Amendment excessive-force claims to go to trial, where a jury returned a verdict for the officers. The Tenth Circuit found no error in the district court’s conclusions. View "Cordova v. City of Albuquerque" on Justia Law