Justia Civil Rights Opinion Summaries

George Rouse hanged himself shortly after defendants, Oklahoma State Bureau of Investigation Agents Francia Thompson and Marvin Akers transported him to the Grady County Law Enforcement Center (GCLEC) for booking. Rouse’s mother, Regina Williams, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. She alleged the defendants knew Rouse was suicidal when they delivered him to GCLEC but failed to inform GCLEC’s booking staff of that fact. Defendants appealed, arguing the district court erred in its order denying their motion to reconsider its denial of their motion to dismiss on grounds of qualified immunity. The Tenth Circuit dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that defendants didn’t expressly designate the district court's order in their notice of appeal. "And we can’t fairly infer an intent to appeal that order from any of the other relevant documents before us." View "Williams v. Akers" on Justia Law

Defendant Shannon Armstrong was standing alongside his patrol car conversing with Dusti Mowrey, a local resident and, by happenstance, a friend of Plaintiff Thomas Culver, when he witnessed a Chevrolet pickup with two individuals inside approach the Maverick Country Store without headlights and then disappear behind the store. The dash camera on Defendant’s patrol car revealed that shortly after 2:26 a.m., the white Chevrolet pickup deactivated its headlights before moving left off the public thoroughfare and over the sidewalk adjacent to a delivery area at the back of the store. The dash camera indicated Defendant activated his flashing lights at 2:27:06 a.m. and proceeded south on 6th Street in pursuit of the pickup. The pickup was approximately three blocks ahead of the patrol car when it turned right or south on North 3rd Street. The morning ended with Plaintiff being arrested for public intoxication. The charges would ultimately be dropped, but Plaintiff sued Defendant for unlawful arrest based on the exchange between him, his passenger and Defendant the night of his arrest. On Defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the district court held probable cause supported Plaintiff’s arrest and granted Defendant qualified immunity. Plaintiff appealed. After review, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals also rejected Plaintiff’s claim and affirmed the district court’s grant of qualified immunity to Defendant. View "Culver v. Armstrong" on Justia Law

In 2011, city officials of West Valley City terminated Plaintiff Karen Bird from her position as manager of the city’s Animal Shelter. During the latter half of Plaintiff’s employment, the environment of the Animal Shelter was toxic. Plaintiff was one of the biggest contributors to this tumultuous environment. During the high point of what staffers at the shelter dubbed "the little war," the Salt Lake Tribune published an article about a cat that had survived two euthanization attempts in the Animal Shelter’s gas chamber. A reporter called a West Valley City official and informed the official that he (the reporter) had received an anonymous telephone call alleging that the shelter had ordered a mass execution of animals due to overpopulation. Other shelter managers were under the impression that Plaintiff, who was notoriously against using the gas chamber to euthanize animals and who was one of the few individuals privy to the meeting discussing the shelter’s overpopulation, was the source of these leaks. Around the same time as the anonymous phone call to the press, Plaintiff finally decided she "had enough" and filed the formal complaint that belied this lawsuit before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Tenth Circuit could not find that Plaintiff had been fired because of her gender, any hostile work environment she experienced, and West Valley City did not form any contract with her that mandated it would protect her from workplace violence or prevent her from being retaliated against. The Court did find, however, that the district court did not determine whether Plaintiff raised a genuine issue of material fact that this belief substantially motivated West Valley City officials’ decision to terminate Plaintiff. Nor did it determine whether the leaks to the press qualified as “constitutionally protected activity.” The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded for further proceedings. View "Bird v. West Valley City" on Justia Law

Eugene Foster appeals from a district-court order granting summary judgment in favor of Mountain Coal Company, LLC (Mountain Coal) on his retaliation claims under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Foster injured his neck while working for Mountain Coal. Mountain Coal terminated Foster several months after the injury, citing that Foster “gave false information as to a credible Return To Work Slip.” After Mountain Coal terminated his employment, Foster filed a charge of discrimination with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and the Colorado Civil Rights Division. Ultimately, the EEOC issued Foster a right-to-sue notice; armed with the notice, Foster filed a complaint against Mountain Coal, seeking relief under the ADA and Colorado law. On the briefs, the district court entered summary judgment for Mountain Coal on Foster’s ADA and state-law discrimination claims and on Foster’s ADA retaliation claims. Foster appealed. After review, the Tenth Circuit reversed, finding that the district court erred in granting Mountain Coal’s motion for summary judgment with respect to Foster’s ADA retaliation claims. "We conclude that a reasonable jury could find that Foster established a prima facie case of retaliation with respect to both his April 3 and April 11 purported requests for accommodation." The Court further concluded that a reasonable jury could find that Mountain Coal’s asserted basis for terminating Foster’s employment was pretext. Therefore the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court’s order granting Mountain Coal’s motion for summary judgment with respect to Foster’s ADA retaliation claims and remanded for further proceedings. View "Foster v. Mountain Coal Company" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-Appellant A.M. filed this action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 on behalf of her minor child, F.M., against two employees of the Albuquerque Public Schools: Cleveland Middle School (“CMS”) Principal Susan LaBarge and Assistant Principal Ann Holmes. A.M. also filed suit against Officer Arthur Acosta of the Albuquerque Police Department (“APD”). A.M. brought several claims stemming from two school-related events: (1) the May 2011 arrest of F.M. for allegedly disrupting his physical-education class, and (2) the November 2011 search of F.M. for contraband. Holmes and LaBarge sought summary judgment on the basis of qualified immunity, and the district court granted their respective motions. The court also denied A.M.’s motion for summary judgment on her claims pertaining to Officer Acosta after determining that Officer Acosta was entitled to prevail on qualified-immunity grounds too. On appeal, A.M. argued that the district court erred in awarding qualified immunity to all of the defendants. The Tenth Circuit consolidated these matters for review, and found o reversible error in the district court's grant of qualified immunity. View "A.M. v. Holmes" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the interpretation of 42 U.S.C. 12181(7)(F), which makes certain "service establishments" public accommodations for purposes of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act. Title III, in turn, generally prohibits public accommodations from discriminating against individuals on the basis of disability. Brent Levorsen suffered from various psychiatric disorders, including borderline schizophrenia. For years, Levorsen has donated plasma in exchange for money in an effort to supplement his limited income. And in May 2013, he attempted to do just that at a Salt Lake City branch of Octapharma Plasma, Inc. When an Octapharma employee learned that Levorsen suffers from borderline schizophrenia, the employee became concerned that Levorsen might have a schizophrenic episode while donating and dislodge the collecting needle, possibly injuring himself or someone else. The employee thus advised Levorsen that he was ineligible to donate plasma. Levorsen then provided Octapharma with a signed form from his psychiatrists, who both indicated that Levorsen is medically suitable to donate plasma twice a week. When Octapharma maintained its refusal to allow Levorsen to donate, he brought this action under Title III of the ADA. The district court concluded that plasma-donation centers (PDCs) aren’t service establishments because, unlike section 12181(7)(F)’s enumerated examples, PDCs don’t provide a service to the public in exchange for a fee. The Tenth Circuit found this "superficial distinction" irrelevant. Under the plain language of section 12181(7)(F), a PDC was a "'service establishment' for two exceedingly simple reasons: It’s an establishment. And it provides a service." Because the district court erred in concluding otherwise, and in dismissing the underlying action on that basis, the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Levorsen v. Octapharma Plasma" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Planned Parenthood Association of Utah (PPAU) filed this 42 U.S.C. 1983 action claiming that defendant Gary Herbert, the Governor of Utah, violated PPAU’s constitutional rights by directing defendant Joseph Miner, the Executive Director of the Utah Department of Health (UDOH), to stop UDOH from acting as an intermediary for “pass-through” federal funds that PPAU used to carry out certain programs within the State of Utah. PPAU also filed a motion seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO) and a preliminary injunction. Although the district court initially issued a TRO, it ultimately withdrew it and denied PPAU’s request for a preliminary injunction. PPAU filed this interlocutory appeal challenging the denial of its motion for preliminary injunction. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals granted a stay in favor of PPAU to prevent the cessation of funding during the pendency of this appeal, and expedited the briefing and oral argument schedule. After that briefing and oral argument, the Tenth Circuit reversed the decision of the district court and remanded with instructions to grant PPAU’s motion for preliminary injunction. View "Planned Parenthood v. Herbert" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Mark Kilcrease was a commercial truck driver temporarily unable to work due to the effects of cancer. After his cancer went into remission, plaintiff applied for a truck-driving position with Domenico Transportation Company. Domenico rejected plaintiff's application, and he filed suit, alleging discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). The district court granted summary judgment to Domenico on both claims, and plaintiff appealed. After review, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment on both claims. With respect to his discrimination claim, the Court agreed with the district court that plaintiff failed to demonstrate he was a qualified individual within the meaning of the ADA and therefore could not establish a prima facie case of discrimination. With respect to his retaliation claim, the Court concluded plaintiff could not show the requisite nexus between his ADA complaints and an adverse employment action. View "Kilcrease v. Domenico Transportation" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action in which they raised various claims relating to their arrests and now-vacated convictions for prostitution. The district court, with a magistrate judge presiding by consent of the parties, dismissed most of Plaintiffs’ claims as barred by the statute of limitations and granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ surviving claims of malicious prosecution. Plaintiffs appealed only the grant of summary judgment on their malicious prosecution claims against one Defendant, David Young. Young was employed by the City of Albuquerque as a civilian fleet manager for the police department. He also served as a voluntary reserve officer for the police department. In separate incidents occurring in 2007 and 2008, Plaintiffs were each arrested by Young on charges of prostitution after a brief conversation in his unmarked vehicle. Young then filed criminal complaints and prosecuted misdemeanor prostitution cases against Plaintiffs in municipal court. Each Plaintiff pled guilty to the charges against her. In 2011, an attorney filed a petition for relief from judgment on behalf of Plaintiffs and nine other women who had pled guilty to prostitution after being arrested and prosecuted by Young, arguing he abused and misrepresented his position and authority as an agent of the City of Albuquerque when making the arrests. Instead of filing a response to the petition, the city entered into a stipulation with the petitioners agreeing that the requested relief should be granted. The state district court entered a set aside petitioners’ guilty pleas, vacating and dismissing with prejudice their judgments and sentences. Plaintiffs then filed this federal 1983 action in which they alleged, among other claims, that Young subjected them to malicious prosecution in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution. After dismissing Plaintiffs’ other claims as barred by the statute of limitations, the federal district court determined Young was entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiffs’ malicious prosecution claims because they had not met their burden of demonstrating that their criminal cases were terminated in a way that indicated their actual innocence of the charges against them. "Although we sympathize with Plaintiffs’ concerns about possible abuses of police power and authority, we are not persuaded that these concerns require (or permit) us to vary from our settled law on malicious prosecution." The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. View "M.G. v. Young" on Justia Law

Pro se plaintiffs-appellees Kent and Tonya Mayfield brought this action against Deputy Jim Bethards under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming he violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by entering their property without a warrant with the intention of killing their two pet dogs. In the Complaint, the Mayfields alleged a witness observed that although neither dog acted aggressively, both officers began firing on the dogs once on the Mayfields’ property. Deputy Clark fired on Suka, the Mayfields’ brown dog, but missed as she fled to the back of the house. Deputy Bethards shot Majka, the Mayfields’ white Malamute Husky, three times, killing her on the front porch. The deputies then unsuccessfully searched for Suka behind the house, where she had disappeared into a wooded section of the Mayfields’ property. The Complaint further alleged that upon returning to the front yard, the deputies first moved Majka’s body in an apparent attempt to obscure that she had been shot on the Mayfields’ property and then tried to hide her body in a row of trees. Deputy Bethards raised a qualified-immunity defense and moved to dismiss the Complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The district court denied his motion and Deputy Bethards appeals. Finding no reversible error, the Tenth Circuit affirmed. View "Mayfield v. Bethards" on Justia Law